Can a High-Tech Breakthrough Approach Deliver Novel Supply and Demand Solutions? A Study of Digital Cinema Rollout. by Culkin, Nigel












Can	  a	  high-­‐tech	  breakthrough	  approach	  deliver	  novel	  
supply	  and	  demand	  solutions?	  




Submitted	  to	  the	  University	  of	  Hertfordshire	  in	  partial	  fulfilment	  of	  the	  









	   2	  
Table	  of	  Contents	  
Abstract	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  5	  
Acknowledgements	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  7	  
Preface	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  8	  
Prologue	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  9	  
1.0 Introduction	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  13	  
1.1 Background	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  16	  
1.2 Chapter	  Summary	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  
2.0 Technological	  innovation	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  23	  
2.1 Defining	  and	  contextualising	  innovation	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  24	  
2.2 Why	  firms	  innovate	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  29	  
2.3 Measuring	  innovation	  activity	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  31	  
2.4 Innovation	  as	  part	  of	  an	  evolutionary	  process	   	   	   	   	  	  	  35	  
2.5 From	  creative	  destruction	  to	  technological	  disruption	   	   	   	  	  	  36	  
2.6 Digitising	  innovation	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  38	  
2.7 National	  systems	  of	  innovation	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  39	  
2.8 Chapter	  summary	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  42	  
3.0 Research	  design	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  45	  
3.1 Research	  problem	  and	  justification	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  46	  
3.2 Research	  approach	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  47	  
3.2.1 Pragmatism	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  47	  
3.3 Methodologies	   and	  methods	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  48	  
3.3.1 Historical	  research	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  57	  
3.3.2 Case	  study	  research	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  57	  
3.3.3 Statistical	  analysis	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  58	  
3.4 Ethics	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  59	  
3.5 Chapter	  summary	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  61	  
4.0 Research	  paper	  summaries	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  63	  
4.1 Overview	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  63	  
4.2 Supporting	  papers	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  66	  
5.0 Disturbing	  effects	  of	  the	  digital	  cinema	  rollout	   	   	   	   	  	  	  75	  
5.1 Introduction	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  75	  
5.2 From	  supply	  chain	  to	  value	  networks	  	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  80	  
5.2.1 The	  Limits	  of	  the	  straitjacket	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  82	  
5.2.2 The	  value	  of	  nothing	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  85	  
5.2.3 The	  charge	  of	  the	  rollout	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  90	  
5.3 The	  disruption	  of	  markets	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  92	  
	  
	   3	  
5.3.1 The	  diffusion	  of	  digital	  cinema	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  95	  
5.3.2 Member	  state	  clustering	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  97	  
5.3.3 Digital	  diffusion	  curve	  observations	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  102	  
5.3.4 The	  price	  of	  cinema	  tickets	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  104	  
5.3.5 Film	  market	  shares,	  by	  admission	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  107	  
5.4 The	  disruption	  of	  learning	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  110	  
5.4.1 It’s	  all	  about	  the	  windows,	  stupid	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  111	  
5.4.2 A	  different	  window	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  119	  
5.5 Chapter	  Summary	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  120	  
6.0 Conclusions	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  126	  
6.1	  	   Introduction	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  126	  
6.2	  	   From	  supply	  chain	  to	  value	  networks	  	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  127	  
6.3	   The	  disruption	  of	  markets	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  130	  
6.4	  	   The	  disruption	  of	  learning	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  135	  
6.5	  	   Chapter	  summary	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  138	  
6.6	  	   Limitations	  and	  future	  research	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	  139	  
7.0	  	   Contribution	  to	  knowledge	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  144	  
8.0	   Epilogue	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  149	  
References	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  152	  
Appendices	  
	   A1.	  	   List	  of	  interviews,	  industry	  events,	  markets	  and	  workshops	  attended.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  172	  
	   A2.	   Research	  model,	  data	  and	  methodology.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  178	  	  	  
	   A3.	   Country	  clustering	  according	  to	  digital	  cinema	  adoption.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  180	  
	   A4.	   Two-­‐way	  mixed	  ANOVA	  model.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  181	  
	   A5.	   Speech	  by	  Lord	  (Tony)	  Hall,	  Director	  General,	  BBC.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  182	  	  
	   A6.	   P1	  Digital	  Cinema:	  No	  Country	  for	  Old	  Entrepreneurs?	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  187	  
	   A7.	  	   P2	  Digital	  Cinema:	  Opportunities	  and	  Challenges.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  207	  
	   A8.	   P3	  Digital	  Cinema	  as	  Disruptive	  Technology.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  230	  	  
	   A9.	   P4	  Getting	  in	  and	  getting	  on	  in	  Hollywood:	  Freelance	  careers	  in	  an	  uncertain	  	  
	   	   industry.’	   	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  246	  
	   A10.	  	   P5	  Facing	  the	  digital	  future:	  Digital	  Technology	  and	  the	  Film	  Industry.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   A11.	  	   P6	  An	  Emotional	  Business:	  A	  Guide	  to	  Understanding	  the	  Motivations	  of	  	  	  
	   	   Small	  Business	  Decision	  Makers’.	  	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  268	  
	   A12.	  	   P7	  Anchor	  Institutions	  and	  Regional	  Innovation	  Systems	  for	   	   	  
	   	   supporting	  micro	  and	  small	  businesses.	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  287	  
	   A13.	   P8	  Entrepreneurial	  universities	  in	  the	  region:	  the	  force	  awakens?’	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  297	  
	   	  
	  
Separate	  Document	  
	   4	  
List	  of	  Tables	  
1.1	   Published	  works	  and	  their	  relationship	  to	  entrepreneurial	  innovation,	  	  
	   digital	  cinema	  and	  national	  systems	  of	  innovation	   	   	   	   	  	  	  20	  
3.1	   Non-­‐exhaustive	  list	  of	  events	  attended	  for	  data	  collection	   	   	   	  	  	  51	  
5.1	   Selected	  country	  status,	  2007	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  78	  
5.2	   US	  Studio	  ownership,	  2016	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  88	  
5.3	   Cinema	  indicators,	  2005	  –	  2013	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  94	  
	  
	  
List	  of	  Figures	  
2.1	   The	  innovation	  measurement	  framework	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  32	  
2.2	   Sources	  of	  information	  used	  for	  product/process	  innovation	  2010-­‐12	  	   	  	  	  40	  
3.1	   Constituents	  of	  the	  conceptual	  framework	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  55	  
3.2	   The	  eight	  published	  papers	  and	  their	  relationship	  to	  the	  conceptual	  
framework	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  56	  
5.1	   European	  diffusion	  S-­‐curve	  of	  digital	  screen	  innovation	  
	   	   Digital	  screens	  over	  total	  screens	  (%)	  	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  95	  
5.2	   European	  digital	  screen	  penetration	  as	  at	  December	  2008	  (%)	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  98	  
5.3	   European	  digital	  screen	  penetration	  as	  at	  December	  2011	  (%)	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  100	  
5.4	   European	  digital	  screen	  penetration	  as	  at	  December	  2013	  (%)	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  101	  
5.5	   Marginal	  means	  of	  digital	  screen	  penetration	  by	  adopter	  clustering	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  104	  
5.6	   Ticket	  price	  at	  European	  box	  office	  in	  Euros	  (€)	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  105	  
5.7	   Marginal	  means	  of	  ticket	  price	  at	  European	  box	  office	  in	  Euros	  (€)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  106	  
5.8	   Film	  shares	  in	  the	  European	  market	  by	  admissions	  (%)	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  108	  
5.9	   US	  studios	  release	  window	  strategy	  2006	  –	  2006	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  112	  	  
6.1	   Wanda	  cinema	  group	  timeline	  (Dec	  2016)	   	   	   	   	   	  133	  
	  
	  
	   	  
	  
	  
	   	  
	  
	   5	  
Abstract	  
	  
Digitalization	  is	  the	  process	  of	  making	  digital	  everything	  that	  can	  be	  digitised	  to	  change	  a	  
business	  model	  and	  provide	  new	  revenue	  and	  value-­‐producing	  opportunities.	  However,	  
difficulties	   exist	   in	   evaluating	   the	   value	   created	   by	   digital	   technology	   investments	   in	  
organisations,	  industry	  structures,	  economies	  and	  society,	  at	  large.	  
My	   dissertation	   illustrates	   how	   the	   distinct	   characteristics	   of	   digital	   technologies	   are	  
implicit	  in	  an	  evolution	  from	  stable	  to	  fragile	  product	  innovation;	  while	  highlighting	  the	  
need	   for	  a	  dynamic	  approach	  to	  entrepreneurial	   innovation	  within	  national	   innovation	  
systems.	   The	   foundations	   for	   my	   work	   are	   bound	   up	   in	   the	   digitalization	   of	   value	  
networks,	  and	  the	  context	   for	   this	   research	   is	  digital	  cinema	  –	  a	  process	   that	  began	   in	  
2000.	  
Digital	   cinema	   offered	   a	   new	   value	   proposition	   to	   distributors	   and	   significant	   cost	  
reductions	   for	   the	   US	   studios.	   With	   a	   reliance	   on	   a	   highly	   developed	   value	   chain	   to	  
protect	   intellectual	   property,	   these	   studios	   sought	   to	   learn	   from	   the	   disruption	  
digitalization	   caused	   to	   the	   music	   industry,	   by	   cultivating	   digital	   technology	   as	   an,	  
incremental	   innovation,	   in	   replacing	   celluloid	  with	   bytes	   to	   project	   content	   to	   cinema	  
audiences.	  
Global	   digital	   cinema	   penetration	   in	   2014	   stood	   at	   90	   per	   cent	   of	   the	   total	   screen	  
footprint.	  The	  dissertation	  assesses	  features	  of	  this	  digital	  rollout	  that	  have	  been	  under-­‐
explored;	   including	   the	   role	   digital	   technology	   has	   assumed	   in	   process	   and	   product	  
innovation;	  and,	  the	  behavioural	  responses	  of	  both	  incumbents	  and	  new	  entrants	  during	  
the	  diffusion	  and	  adoption	  phase.	  
My	   dissertation	   is	   supported	   by	   eight	   published	   papers,	   which	   highlight	   the	   need	   for	  
domestic	   policymakers	   to	   focus	   their	   attention	   on	   emerging	   entrepreneurial	  
innovations;	   the	   utilisation	   of	   current	   knowledge	   and	   strategies	   for	   novel	   solutions	   in	  
order	   to	   strengthen	   their	   respective	  national	   innovation	   systems.	   Taken	   together	   they	  
help	   explain	   the	   creation,	   diffusion	   and	   adoption	   of	   digital	   cinema,	   explore	   the	   new	  
content	  creation	  opportunities	  they	  support,	  and	  explain	  how	  three	  nations	  in	  particular	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have	   sought	   to	   innovate	   and	   reorientate	   themselves	   in	   relation	   to	   these	   novel	  
phenomena.	  
The	  wider	  implications	  of	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  project	  build	  on	  the	  innovation	  literature	  in	  
examining	  the	  diffusion,	  adoption	  and	  knowledge	  acquisition	  during	  the	  rollout	  of	  digital	  
cinema	   technology.	   These	   findings	   suggest	   a	   radically	   different	   reading	   of	   both	  
disruptive	   innovations	   and	   national	   innovation	   systems	   than	   has	   been	   offered	   in	  
previous	  accounts,	  viewing	  the	  digital	  cinema	  rollout	  as	  a	  case	  study	  of	  an	   increasingly	  
mobile	   sector,	   in	   which	   technological	   factors	   retreat	   in	   importance	   behind	  
entrepreneurial	  innovation	  as	  a	  key	  driving	  force	  in	  reaching	  audiences.	  
Finally,	  in	  exploring	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  the	  digitalization	  of	  value	  networks	  I	  have	  made	  
a	   significant	   contribution	   to	   knowledge	   in	   the	   design	   of	   an	   innovative	  mixed	  method;	  
specifically	  in	  the	  area	  of	  field	  research	  -­‐	  a	  qualitative	  data	  collection	  method	  designed	  
for	   considering,	   observing,	   and	   interacting	   with	   individuals	   in	   their	   natural	  
environments.	  Over	   time,	   I	   have	   established	   that	   digital	   cinema	   was	   capable	   of	  
delivering	  novel	  supply	  and	  demand	  solutions	  -­‐	  starting	  with	  a	  few	  unrelated	  scraps	  of	  
data,	  through	  the	  establishment	  of	  personal	  networks	  with	  communities	  of	  practice	  (in	  
the	  UK,	  US	  &	  Norway)	   to	  building	   rich,	   and	   complex	  quantitative	  data	   sets	   capable	  of	  





	   	  




Woody	  Allen	  once	  said:	  “Life	  is	  full	  of	  misery,	  loneliness,	  and	  suffering	  -­‐	  and	  it's	  all	  over	  
much	  too	  soon.”	  	  
	  
I	  doubt	  if	  he	  was	  making	  a	  direct	  comparison	  to	  the	  process	  of	  writing	  a	  dissertation,	  but	  
then	  you	  never	  know	  with	  Woody	  Allen.	  
	  
What	   I	   do	   know	   is	   that	   we	   each	   arrive	   at	   complex	   problems	   from	   different	   starting	  
points	   and	  with	   that	   in	  mind,	   I	   thank	  my	   supervisors,	   Professor	   Keith	   Randle	   and	   Dr.	  
Frank	   Currie.	   They	   have	   been	   gracious	   with	   their	   time	   and	   support	   throughout	   this	  
meandering	  voyage	  of	  discovery;	  they	  also	  helped	  reduce	  the	  misery	  along	  the	  way.	  	  
	  
My	  children,	  Alexander	  and	  Nathalie,	   joined	  a	   little	   later	  and	  helped	   to	   take	  away	   the	  
loneliness,	   especially	   when	   I	   found	   myself	   jumping	   onto	   the	   Island	   of	   Conclusions,	  
wandering	  up	  the	  Mountain	  of	  Ignorance	  and	  falling	  in	  the	  Doldrums.	  	  
	  
Last,	   but	   certainly	   not	   least,	   my	   partner	   Harriet,	   who	   kindly	   put	   up	   with	   all	   sorts	   of	  




St	  Albans,	  December	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This	  dissertation	  is	  based	  on	  outputs	  described	  across	  the	  following	  eight	  papers.	  When	  
they	  are	  referred	  to	   in	  the	  text,	  for	  convenience	  I	  use	  the	  corresponding	  alphanumeric	  
system	  from	  P1	  to	  P8,	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  author	  surnames	  and	  dates.	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Two	  events	  took	  place	  in	  1997,	  which	  on	  reflection	  acted	  as	  a	  catalyst	  for	  the	  production	  
of	  this	  dissertation.	  First,	  the	  Rt.	  Hon.	  Chris	  Smith	  was	  appointed	  to	  the	  post	  of	  Minister	  
of	  State	  for	  the	  Department	  for	  Culture,	  Media	  and	  Sport	  (DCMS).	  Second,	  I	  completed	  
the	   first	   draft	   of	   a	   research	   degree	   imaginatively	   entitled	   ‘The	   State	   of	   Government	  
Intervention	  in	  the	  SME	  Sector	  1979-­‐1997:	  A	  Market	  Perspective’.	  	  
The	  election	  of	  Tony	  Blair’s	  Labour	  government	  was	  viewed	  by	  some	  as	  young,	  equable	  
and	  very	  appealing;	  the	  term	  ‘Cool	  Britannia’	  was,	   for	  a	  time,	  seen	  as	  the	  main	  driving	  
force	   behind	   a	   feeling	   of	   euphoria	   and	   optimism	   in	   Britain.	   In	   an	   interview	   for	   the	  
Independent	   newspaper,	   Smith	   acknowledged	   that	   Cool	   Britannia	  was	   the	   Spice	   Girls,	  
The	  Full	  Monty	   and	  London's	  Soho	  on	  a	  Saturday	  night;	  but	   it	   could	  also	  be	  a	   form	  of	  
post-­‐industrial	  capitalism	  that	  combined	  hard-­‐nosed	  profits	  with	  a	  fuller	  recognition	  of	  
the	  human	  creativity	  on	  which	   they	  hinged.	  He	  was	  of	   the	  opinion	   that,	   "The	  creative	  
industries	   are	   where	   the	   growth	   is,	   where	   the	   jobs	   are…	   and…	   new	   accommodation	  
between	  those	  industries	  and	  the	  markets	  could	  boost	  the	  economy”	  (Smith	  cited	  in	  The	  
Independent,	  1998).	  Such	  ambition	  was	  a	   far	  cry	   from	  the	  Department’s	  origins	  as	  the	  
Department	  of	  National	  Heritage,	  or	  as	  it	  was	  known	  by	  its	  epithet,	  the	  ‘Ministry	  of	  Fun	  
(and	  free	  tickets)’	  during	  the	  time	  of	  its	  first	  Minister,	  the	  Rt.	  Hon.	  David	  Mellor.	  
Such	  a	  novel	   idea	  that	   the	  UK	  creative	   industries	  might	  evolve	   from	  a	   fragmented	  and	  
somewhat	   peripheral	   ensemble	   to	   a	   major	   force	   for	   economic	   growth	   prompted	   my	  
colleague	   (Professor	   Keith	   Randle)	   and	   I	   to	   create	   the	   Film	   Industry	   Research	   Group	  
(FiRG)	  to	  explore	  the	  issue	  in	  greater	  depth.	  	  
We	  agreed	  our	   initial	   focus	  would	  be	  -­‐	  work	  organisation	   in	  the	  US	  film	  industry	  -­‐	  as	  a	  
mechanism	  with	  which	  to	  inform	  policy	  and	  practice	  in	  the	  UK.	  During	  our	  first	  project,	  
we	  studied	  the	  experiences	  of	   freelance	  workers	   in	  the	  film	  industry	  as	  they	  sought	  to	  
gain	   access	   to	   a	   heavily	   project-­‐based	   market	   and	   develop	   their	   skills.	   This	   was	  
operationalised	   via	   a	   four-­‐year	   longitudinal	   research	   programme.	   During	   the	   second	  
wave	  of	  fieldwork	  in	  2001,	  we	  noted	  that	  interviewees	  began	  to	  reference	  the	  increasing	  
	   10	  
use	  on	  set	  of	  high	  definition	  cameras;	  the	  frequencies	  of	  such	  anecdotes	  grew	  and	  made	  
us	  realise	  that	  something	  was	  changing	  and	  that	  it	  was	  beginning	  to	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  
the	   creative	  workforce.	   Two	   interviewees	   even	  mentioned	   they	   had	   just	   bought	   their	  
first	   book	   on	   the	   subject,	   Digital	   Moviemaking,	   by	   Scott	   Billups	   (2000).	   We	   were	  
fortunate	   enough	   to	   meet	   Billups	   at	   his	   home	   on	   Mulholland	   Drive	   as	   part	   of	   our	  
fieldwork.	  Among	  some	  fascinating	  insights	  during	  our	  time	  with	  him	  was	  his	  suggestion	  
that	   because	   of	   digitalization	   theaters	   would	   no	   longer	   be	   part	   of	   the	   film	   business;	  
instead,	  they	  would	  be	  a	  mere	  bargaining	  chip	  in	  the	  real	  estate	  developer	  business.	  	  
While	  Professor	  Randle	  continued	  to	  lead	  our	  research	  on	  the	  work	  organisation	  project,	  
the	  entrepreneurial	  innovation	  opportunities	  afforded	  by	  what	  would	  become	  known	  as	  
‘digital	  cinema’	  aroused	  my	  interest;	  I	  decided	  to	  establish	  a	  separate	  strand	  of	  work	  to	  
explore	  the	  phenomenon	  further.	  Professor	  Randle	  has	  gone	  on	  to	  develop	  a	  significant	  
body	  of	  work	  around	  working	  practices	  in	  the	  creative	  industries	  to	  which	  I	  continue	  to	  
contribute,	  and	  we	  have	  benefited	  greatly	  over	  the	  past	  ten	  years	  from	  the	  diversity	  and	  
overlap	  between	  our	  interests	  in	  this	  field	  (see	  Randle	  &	  Culkin,	  2009	  [P4]).	  	  
The	   potential	   discontinuity	   suggested	   by	   digitalization	   soon	   emerged	   and	   this	   new	  
project	  –	  situated	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  an	  evolving	  disruption	  –	  saw	  my	  outputs	  contribute	  to	  
the	  furtherance	  of	  knowledge	  around	  the	  business,	  technological	  and	  cultural	  impact	  of	  
digital	   cinema	   (Culkin	   &	   Randle,	   2003	   [P2]).	   The	   formulation	   of	   these	   outputs	   was	  
informed	  by	  the	  conclusions	  drawn	  in	  my	  research	  degree	  and	  a	  subsequent	  article	  on	  
entrepreneurial	   innovation,	   which	   has	   been	   cited	   continuously	   since	   its	   publication	  
(Culkin	  &	  Smith,	  2000	  [P6]).	  Soon	  after,	  the	  East	  of	  England	  Development	  Agency	  (EEDA)	  
commissioned	   me	   to	   examine	   the	   role	   UK	   universities	   might	   play	   in	   the	   creative	  
industries	  –	  a	  loose	  collection	  of	  13	  sectors	  consisting	  of	  entrepreneurs,	  micro-­‐firms	  and	  
a	  small	  number	  of	  international	  conglomerates.	  Based	  on	  the	  results	  from	  entrepreneurs	  
and	   industry	   opinion	   leaders	   in	   both	   the	   public	   and	   private	   sector,	   the	   findings	  
generated	  the	  first	  in	  a	  series	  of	  thought	  leadership	  reports	  (2004);	  disseminated	  widely	  
and	  well	   received	   (Culkin	  &	  Morawetz,	   2004,	   2005	  &	  2007	   [P5]).	  During	   this	   time	   the	  
FiRG	  website	  became	  one	  of	  the	  main	  depositories	  for	  the	  business	  of	  film	  and	  cinema;	  a	  
subject	  that	  I	  have	  returned	  to	  most	  recently,	  examining	  the	  role	  of	  anchor	  institutions	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and	  their	  contribution	  to	  regional	  and	  national	   innovation	  systems	  (Culkin,	  2016a	  [P7],	  
2016b	  [P8]).	  	  
As	  the	  digital	  rollout	  moved	   into	   its	  second	  phase,	  Kodak	  made	   its	  entrance	  at	  the	  Los	  
Angeles	  Consumer	  Electronics	  Show	  in	  2004.	  But,	  at	  about	  the	  same	  time,	  Boeing	  closed	  
its	  d-­‐cinema	  business,	  which	  was	  once	  projected	  to	  bring	  US$1	  billion	  a	  year	  in	  revenue,	  
and	   Technicolor	   scaled	   down	   its	   ambitions,	   before	   its	   sale	   to	   the	   French	   Company,	  
Thomson.	  The	  incumbents,	  for	  long	  entrusted	  with	  physically	  transporting	  a	  film-­‐maker’s	  
story	   to	   cinemas	   around	   the	  world	   had	   finally	  woken	   to	   the	   threat	   posed	   by	   digitally	  
stored	  data	  in	  a	  computerised	  file;	  an	  entirely	  original	  way	  of	  doing	  the	  same	  job	  and	  not	  
one	  all	  new	  entrants	  had	  yet	  worked	  out	  where	  the	  market	  was	  heading.	  Such	  a	  scenario	  
provided	  me	  with	  an	  opportunity	  for	  my	  next	  research	  outputs.	  This	  article	  focused	  on	  
current	  dilemmas	   in	   the	  evolution	  of	  digital	   cinema,	  examined	  potential	   new	  business	  
models,	   considered	   the	   strategies	   of	   incumbents	   and	   entrepreneurial	   entrants	   at	   the	  
forefront	  of	  the	  technology	  implementation	  phase,	  and,	  for	  the	  first	  time,	  explored	  how	  
different	   territories	  might	   adapt	   to	   accommodate	   this	   transition.	   I	   also	   speculated,	   as	  
markets	  converged	  (and	  notwithstanding	  the	  potential	  revenue	  streams	  from	  high-­‐end	  
digital	  cinema	  market	  installations),	  as	  to	  whether	  the	  real	  market	  to	  be	  contested	  was	  
the	   evolving	   home-­‐cinema	   market.	   For	   technology	   companies,	   the	   market	   for	   digital	  
cinema	   was	   merely	   a	   branding	   exercise	   for	   reaping	   the	   rewards	   in	   the	   consumer	  
electronics	  market	  (Culkin	  et	  al.,	  2006	  [P3]).	  
The	  twin	  problems	  brought	  about	  by	  a	  lack	  of	  clarity	  around	  global	  standards,	  and	  a	  full-­‐
blown	  global	  economic	  crisis	  led	  to	  a	  temporary	  slowdown	  in	  the	  digital	  cinema	  rollout.	  
However,	   some	   countries	   continued	   to	  move	   ahead	   through	   a	  mixture	   of	   private	   and	  
public	   entrepreneurial	   innovations,	   which	   suggested	   a	   change	   in	   the	   basis	   of	  
competition	  to	  create	  new	  markets	  was	  possible.	  In	  a	  paper	  entitled	  ‘Digital	  Cinema:	  No	  
Country	  for	  Old	  Entrepreneurs?’	  (Culkin,	  2008	  [P1])	   I	  explored	  the	   latest	  developments	  
in	  the	  exhibition	  sector,	  to	  explain	  why	  the	  adoption	  of	  an	  innovation	  (digital	  cinema)	  	  -­‐	  
capable	   of	   revolutionising	   the	   film	   industry	   -­‐	   had	   stumbled	   in	   its	   attempts	   to	   cross	  
Geoffrey	   Moore’s	   “chasm"	   (Moore,	   1991).	   Despite	   the	   effort	   of	   the	   Digital	   Cinema	  
Initiative	   (DCI),	   one	   standard	   remained	   ‘aspirational’	   rather	   than	   ‘anticipated’	  when	   it	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came	  to	  the	  adoption	  phase	  and	  different	  countries	  were	  recognising	  the	  opportunities	  
afforded	  by	  this	  technology	  (Culkin,	  2008	  [P1]).	  	  
I	  found	  myself	  following	  Schumpeter	  that,	  every	  social	  environment	  has	  its	  own	  way	  of	  
filling	  the	  entrepreneurial	  function	  as	  opposed	  to	  a	  path-­‐independent	  process	  with	  a	  set	  
of	  predictable	  outcomes.	  The	  change	  would	  happen,	  but	   it	  might	  not	  be	   just	  what	  the	  
studios	  were	  hoping	  for	  or	  expecting.	  Consequently,	   the	  purpose	   of	   this	  dissertation	  is	  
to	   investigate	   whether	   digital	   cinema	   rollout	   did	   contribute	   towards	   Chris	   Smith’s	  
assessment	  that	  the	  creative	  industries	  are	  where	  the	  growth	  is,	  where	  the	  jobs	  are	  and	  
with	  public	   intervention,	   these	   industries,	  and	   the	  markets	   they	  serve	  could	  boost	   the	  
economy.	  	  
The	   body	   of	   this	   dissertation	   explores	   the	   phenomenon	   of	   the	   digitalization	   of	   value	  
networks	  in	  the	  context	  of	  digital	  cinema.	  It	  does	  so	  by	  focusing	  on	  the	  contribution	   of	  
the	  distribution	  and	  exhibition	  of	  creative	  content	  to	  national	  innovation	  systems	  in	  the	  
United	  Kingdom,	  Norway	  and	   the	   United	  States	  –	  three	  countries	  that	  exhibit	  marked	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A	  wave	  of	   digital	   change	  pervades	   the	   conditions	   in	  which	  our	   organisations,	   industry	  
structures,	  and	  economies	  operate.	  Digitalisation	  has	  lapped	  at	  the	  edges	  of	  government	  
establishments,	  with	  new	  disruptive	  changes	  from	  social	  media,	  ‘the	  Internet	  of	  things’,	  
open-­‐book	  governance	  and	  many	  other	  elements	  (Margetts	  &	  Dunleavy,	  2013).	  In	  under	  
20	  years	  incumbents	  in	  the	  content-­‐based	  industries,	  with	  names	  as	  synonymous	  as	  the	  
industries	   themselves,	   have	   watched	   their	   revenue-­‐generating	   business	   models	   –	   the	  
product	  of	  highly	  developed	  supply	  chains	  –	  be	  disrupted	  by	  lower	  cost	  digital	  solutions,	  
in	  some	  cases	  to	  the	  point	  of	  extinction.	  
In	   the	  US	  media	   industry,	   in	  2015	   the	  newspaper	   sector	  observed	   its	  worst	   year	   since	  
the	   2008	   global	   recession.	   Average	   weekday	   newspaper	   circulation,	   print	   and	   digital	  
combined,	   fell	   by	   7	   per	   cent	   and	   while	   digital	   circulation	   increased	   slightly,	   it	   only	  
accounted	  for	  22	  per	  cent	  of	  total	  circulation.	  According	  to	  Mitchell	  &	  Holcomb	  (2016),	  
the	  newspaper	  workforce	  has	  contracted	  by	  almost	  20,000	  positions,	  or	  39	  per	  cent	  of	  
staff,	  in	  the	  last	  20	  years.	  
The	  impact	  on	  the	  photographic	  imaging	  industry	  is	  equally	  well	  documented.	  Eastman	  
Kodak	   developed	   the	   first	   megapixel	   sensor	   in	   1986,	   while	   Polaroid’s	   investment	   in	  
digital	   imaging	   technology	   meant	   it	   had	   a	   prototype	   ready	   in	   1992.	   From	   a	   strictly	  
evolutionary	   perspective,	   one	   might	   assume	   that	   Polaroid	   would	   have	   faced	   many	  
problems	  in	  developing	  new,	  disparate	  products	  for	  new	  and	  emerging	  markets	  when	  in	  
fact,	   it	  had	   little	  difficulty	  overcoming	  the	  path	  dependencies	  normally	  associated	  with	  
knowledge	   evolution.	   Indeed,	   with	   its	   position	   as	   a	   first	   mover	   in	   new	   technologies,	  
Polaroid	  was	  able	  to	  advance	  solutions	  across	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  markets	  related	  to	  digital	  
imaging.	   Despite	   this,	   Polaroid	   remained	   wedded	   to	   the	   primacy	   of	   technology,	   an	  
approach	  founded	  on	  major	  research	  projects	  generating	  commercial	  success.	  There	  was	  
little	  doubt	  that	  Polaroid's	  early	  exploration	  of	  the	  electronic	  domain	  was	  reinforced	  by	  
this	   worldview.	   However,	   despite	   such	   investments,	   Polaroid	   had	   not	   advanced	   in	  
developing	  the	  capabilities	  required	  to	  find	  a	  way	  to	  leverage	  upon	  its	  business	  model.	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Consequently,	   the	   twin	   demands	   of	   the	   digital	   and	   analogue	   businesses	   paralysed	  
Polaroid	  and	  by	  the	  mid-­‐1990s	  it	  had	  sold	  off	  all	  digital	  capabilities	  and	  instead	  invested	  
more	   in	  service	  marketing.	  While	   the	  strategy	  appeared	  positive	   in	   the	  short	   term	  the	  
company	  was	  forced	  into	  bankruptcy	  within	  a	  few	  years	  (Tripsas	  &	  Gavetti,	  2000).	  
The	  recent	  demise	  of	  Kodak	  –	  a	  brand	  synonymous	  with	  photography,	  filmmaking,	  and	  
cinema	   –	   was	   also	   by	   and	   large	   associated	   with	   the	   transition	   to	   consumer	   and	  
commercial	   digital	   photography.	   On	   one	   level,	   Kodak	   might	   be	   considered	   the	   latest	  
victim	  of	  the	  conversion	  to	  all	  things	  digital,	  which	  often	  provides	  market	  solutions	  faster	  
or	  more	  cheaply	  than	  the	  incumbent’s	  current	  offerings.	  However,	  on	  closer	  inspection,	  
its	   failure	   is	   more	   to	   do	   with	   the	   nature	   of	   creative	   destruction,	   which	   is	   different.	  
George	  Eastman	  established	  the	  Eastman	  Kodak	  Company	   in	  1888,	   five	  years	  after	  the	  
birth	  of	   the	  Austrian	  economist	   Joseph	  A.	  Schumpeter.	   In	  1954,	  Schumpeter,	  with	  one	  
eye	   on	   the	   successes	   of	   Eastman	   and	   other	   US	   entrepreneurs,	   wrote	   that	   creative	  
destruction	  was	   the	  driving	   force	  of	  capitalism	  and	  the	  entrepreneur	  was	   the	  pivot	  on	  
which	   everything	   turns.	   By	   contrast	  with	  many	   of	   his	   peers,	   Schumpeter	   argued	   that,	  
“those	  who	  failed	  to	  realize	  that	  the	  phrase	  ‘combining	  factors,’	  when	  applied	  to	  a	  going	  
concern,	   denoted	   little	   more	   than	   routine	   management;	   and	   the	   task	   of	   combining	  
factors	  becomes	  a	  distinctive	  one	  only	  when	  applied	  not	  to	  the	  current	  administration	  of	  
a	  going	  concern	  but	  to	  the	  organization	  of	  a	  new	  one”	  (1954/1986:530).	  
When	  Kodak	  announced	  in	  February	  2015	  that	  it	  had	  signed	  an	  agreement	  to	  continue	  
supplying	   film	  stock	   to	  all	   six	  major	  Hollywood	  studios,1	   it	  appeared	   the	  company	  was	  
making	   a	   stance	   against	   the	   gales	   of	   creative	   destruction.	  However,	   as	   the	  Hollywood	  
Reporter	  (2015)	  countered,	  if	  Kodak	  is	  going	  to	  make	  film,	  we	  also	  need	  laboratories	  to	  
process	  the	  film.	  The	  New	  York	  Film	  Lab	  (a	  partnership	  between	  Deluxe	  and	  Technicolor	  
that	  was	   created	   to	   respond	   to	   film’s	   shrinking	   footprint)	   closed	   later	   that	   same	   year	  
(Giardina,	  2015).	  So,	  while	  celluloid	  hasn’t	  disappeared,	  there	   is	   little	  doubt	  that	   it	  will	  
remain	  at	  best,	  on	  the	  periphery	  of	  filmmaking	  in	  the	  future.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Walt	   Disney	   Company,	   Paramount	   Pictures,	   NBC	  Universal,	   20th	   Century	   Fox,	  Warner	   Bros.	   and	   Sony	  
Pictures.	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In	  parallel	  with	  Polaroid,	  Kodak	  was	  well	  aware	  of	  the	  threat	  of	  digital	  imaging.	  It	  too	  had	  
invested	  in	  large-­‐scale	  R&D	  projects,	  but	  management	  was	  unable	  to	  break	  its	  reliance	  
on	   silver	   halide,	   arguing	   that	   professional	   photographers	   could	   not	   do	  without	   it	   and	  
neither	   could	   Hollywood.	   Kodak	   was	   cognisant	   of	   developments	   in	   Japan,	   where	  
photographic	   contemporaries	   (e.g.	   Fuji	   and	   Olympus)	   with	   their	   direct	   links	   to	   the	  
consumer	  market	   had	   already	   started	   along	   a	   digital	   road.	   It	   did	   attempt	   to	   radically	  
reorganise	   itself,	   developing	   new	   capabilities	   in-­‐house	   through	   acquisitions	   and	  
investments.	   However,	   despite	   positioning	   itself	   as	   having	   a	   digital	   presence	   in	  
consumer,	   commercial	   and	   healthcare	   markets,	   Kodak	   did	   not	   attend	   the	   annual	   Las	  
Vegas	  Consumer	  Electronics	  Show	  until	  2004	  (Financial	  Times,	  2011).	   It	  had	  relied	  on	  a	  
razor-­‐blade	  strategy	  –	  selling	  cameras	  at	  a	  low	  cost,	  and	  film	  to	  fuel	  growth	  and	  profits.	  
Kodak’s	   modus	   operandi	   was	   heavily	   dependent	   on	   the	   highly	   profitable	   margins	  
generated	  from	  celluloid	  and	  paid	  progressively	  less	  attention	  to	  equipment	  until	  it	  was	  
too	  late	  to	  ask	  the	  right	  questions	  of	   its	  relationship	  with	  evolving	  markets	  (Gavetti,	  et	  
al.,	  2005).	  
Taking	   contextual	   stories	   of	   incumbent	   inertia	   from	   the	   wider	   media	   entertainment	  
domain	   into	   account	   now	   is	   a	   good	   time	   to	   explore	   the	   role	   and	   impact	   of	   digital	  
technology	   as	   an	   instrument	   to	   stimulate	   entrepreneurial	   behaviour	   and	   concomitant	  
innovation	  dynamics	  in	  cinema	  –	  as	  the	  last	  link	  to	  turn	  digital	  in	  the	  global	  film	  supply	  
chain.	   My	   interest	   in	   entrepreneurial	   innovation	   grew	   out	   of	   a	   research	   study	   in	  
Hollywood	  on	  project	  work	   in	   the	   film	  and	  audiovisual	   (AV)	   industry	   (Culkin	  &	  Randle,	  
2009	  [P4]).	  The	  project	  became	  the	  springboard	  for	  a	  second	  venture	  on	  the	  impact	  of	  
technology	  on	  distribution	  and	  exhibition	   (Culkin	  &	  Morawetz,	  2004;	  2005;	  2007	   [P5]).	  
This	   second	   project	   coincided	   with	   the	   US	   studios	   declaration	   that	   a	   digital	   cinema	  
rollout	  and	  adoption	  would	  lead	  to:	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  films	  on	  offer	  (e.g.	  due	  to	  product	  
diversity);	  cinema	  owners	  being	  able	  to	  programme	  more	  flexibly	  and	  creatively,	  in	  line	  
with	   cinema-­‐goer	   demand;	   encouragement	   of	   entrepreneurs	   to	   enter	   this	   space;	   and	  
finally,	  to	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  cinema-­‐going	  experience	  because	  digital	  transportation	  
of	   creative	   content	   would	   lead	   to	   the	   eradication	   of	   film	   piracy	   (MPAA,	   2003).	   I	   was	  
motivated	   to	  understand	  how	   the	  US	   studios	  would	  a)	  apply	   the	  dynamics	  of	   learning	  
from	  Polaroid,	  Kodak,	  Deluxe,	  Technicolor	  et	  al.,	  given	  that	  35mm	  film	  had	  been	  the	  de	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facto	   platform	   for	   carrying	   film	   since	   the	   very	   beginnings	   of	   their	   business;	   and,	   b)	  
manage	   to	   learn	   and	   then	   cultivate	   new	   process	   innovations	   following	   a	   period	   of	  
incumbent	  inertia	  in	  the	  music	  industry,	  brought	  about	  by	  disruptive	  technologies.	  Was	  
it	  really	  time	  –	  or	  even	  possible	  –	  to	  say	  so-­‐long	  to	  celluloid	  and	  hello	  to	  digital?	  
1.1	  	   Background	  
John	  Wesley	  Hyatt	  was	  32	  years	  old	  when	  in	  1869	  he	  patented	  celluloid,	  later	  to	  become	  
the	  universal	  platform	  for	  delivering	  feature	  film	  across	  the	  world,	  unrivalled	  for	  the	  next	  
130	   years.	   Shawn	   Fanning	   was	   just	   19	   when	   he	   wrote	   a	   peer-­‐to-­‐peer	   (P2P)	   software	  
program	  in	  1999	  called	  Napster,	  which	  single-­‐handedly	  triggered	  a	  chain	  of	  events	  that	  
changed	  the	  operating	  business	  models	  in	  the	  music	  industry	  in	  the	  space	  of	  three	  years.	  
Of	  all	  the	  media	  and	  content	  industries,	  music	  industry	  incumbents	  had	  been	  hit	  first	  and	  
hardest	   by	   the	   changes	   produced	   by	   digitalization.	   After	   a	   period	   of	   relatively	   healthy	  
growth	   that	   ran	   across	   the	   1990s,	   revenue	   in	   the	  US	  music	   industry	   shrank	   by	   16	   per	  
cent	   to	   2003.	   As	   Leurdijk	   et	   al.	   (2014)	   observed,	   copyright	   infringements	   of	   illegally	  
shared	  and	  downloaded	  music	  from	  P2P	  networks	  could	  take	  off	  on	  a	  large	  scale	  due	  to	  
the	   digitalization	   of	   music	   and	   the	   growth	   of	   the	   Internet.	   In	   fact,	   Oberholzer-­‐Gee	   &	  
Strumpf	  (2007)	  claimed	  that	  revenues	  from	  recorded	  music	  contracted	  by	  50	  per	  cent	  in	  
the	   7	   years	   following	   the	   introduction	   of	   Napster	   and,	   the	   number	   of	   compact	   discs	  
shipped	  in	  the	  US	  alone,	  fell	  by	  25	  per	  cent	  to	  705	  million	  units	  between	  2000	  and	  2005.	  
In	   2005,	   the	   Motion	   Picture	   Association	   of	   America	   (MPAA)2	   released	   a	   report	   that	  
claimed	   the	  major	  US	  motion	  picture	   studios	   lost	  US$6.1	  billion	   to	  piracy	   in	  2005.	  The	  
report	  cited	  that	  US$4.8	  billion	  of	  the	  loss,	  or	  80	  per	  cent,	  resulted	  from	  piracy	  overseas	  
and	  US$1.3	   billion,	   or	   20	   per	   cent,	   from	   losses	   in	   the	  US.	   Furthermore,	  US$3.8	   billion	  
were	   lost	   to	   hard	   goods	   piracy,	   defined	   as	   acquiring	   films	   by	   either	   purchasing	   or	  
securing	  an	   illegally	  made	  VHS/DVD/VCD	  through	  a	  business,	  or	  accepting	  from	  friends	  
or	  relatives	  an	  illegal	  copy	  of	  a	  legitimate	  VHS/DVD/VCD.	  The	  study	  went	  on	  to	  claim	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Consisting	  of	  Buena	  Vista	  Pictures	  Distribution,	  Metro-­‐Goldwyn-­‐Mayer	  Studios	  Inc.,	  Paramount	  Pictures,	  
Sony	  Pictures	  Entertainment	  Inc.,	  Twentieth	  Century	  Fox	  Film	  Corporation,	  Universal	  City	  Studios,	  LLP,	  and	  
Warner	  Bros.	  –	  sometimes	  known	  as	  the	  ‘Hollywood	  oligopoly’.	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$2.3	  billion	  were	  lost	  to	  Internet	  piracy,	  defined	  as	  obtaining	  films	  by	  either	  downloading	  
them	  from	  the	  Internet	  without	  paying	  or	  acquiring	  hard	  copies	  of	  illegally	  downloaded	  
films	   from	   a	   personal	   contact	   (MPAA,	   2005).	   Research	   undertaken	   by	   Siwek	   (2006)	  
around	   the	   same	   time	   argued	   that	   the	  true	  cost	  of	  motion	  picture	  piracy	  far	  exceeded	  
its	   impact	   on	   the	   film	   producers	   themselves,	   harming	   not	   only	   the	   owners	   of	   the	  
intellectual	  property	  but	  also	  US	  consumers	  and	  taxpayers.	  The	  authors	  went	  on	  to	  claim	  
that	  as	  policymakers	  sought	  to	  maintain	  the	  health	  and	  vitality	  of	  the	  US	  economy	  and	  
preserve	   its	   global	   competitiveness,	   it	   was	   imperative	   that	   government	   and	   industry	  
work	  together	  to	  combat	  this	  growing	  problem.	  	  
The	  need	  to	  focus	  governmental	  attention	  on	  the	  negative	  impact	  of	  piracy	  was	  based	  on	  
the	  fact	  that	  the	  MPAA	  was	  convinced	  that	  piracy	  activity	  was	  equal	  to,	  or	  greater	  than,	  
the	   challenges	   faced	   during	   the	   1950s,	   the	   decade	   that	   saw	   a)	   the	   introduction	   of	  
television;	  b)	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  1947	  Paramount	  anti-­‐trust	  consent	  decree,	  which	  led	  to	  a	  
separating	  of	  ownership	  for	  production	  companies	  and	  cinema	  chains;	  c)	  large	  swaths	  of	  
newly	   married	   young	   Americans	   moving	   to	   the	   suburbs;	   and,	   d)	   a	   loss	   of	   foreign	  
revenues	   brought	   about	   by	   quota	   systems,	   high	   taxes	   and	   blocked	   funds.	   The	   film	  
studios	   saw	   themselves	   as	   a	   significant	   player	   in	   the	   US	   national	   innovation	   system,	  
they	   were	   in	   need	   of	   protection	   against	   an	   invisible	   adversary.	   To	   protect	   their	  
competitive	   position,	   the	   film	   studios	   (producers)	   sought	   to	   address	   the	   apparent	  
destruction	   of	   the	   music	   industry’s	   business	   model	   with	   an	   ultra-­‐cautious	   high-­‐tech	  
breakthrough	   approach,	   designed	   to	   enable	   digital	   distribution	   (and	   consumption)	   of	  
content	   in	  cinemas,	  while	  maintaining	  control	  of	  the	  main	  access	  routes	  to	  market.	  So,	  
for	   the	   first	   time,	   the	   studios	   collaborated	   (creating	   the	  DCI	   [Digital	   Camera	   Initiative]	  
business	  model)	  to	  maintain	  their	  control	  of	  the	  flow	  of	  IP	  (content).	  The	  studios	  argued	  
that	   this	   linear	   approach	  would	  a)	  maintain	  quality	   standards	   (through	   technology);	  b)	  
enhance	   the	  market	  experience	   (for	   customer	  and	   consumer);	   and,	   c)	   eradicate	  piracy	  
(via	   a	   financial	  model),	  which	   they	  perceived	  was	  a	   growing	   concern	   for	   consumers	  at	  
the	  start	  of	  the	  2000s.	  	  
As	  observed	  by	  Rob	  and	  Waldfogel	  (2006)	  the	  growth	  in	  CD	  sales	  had	  already	  stopped	  by	  
the	   end	   of	   the	   1990s,	   as	   by	   then	  most	   consumers	   had	   replaced	   their	   vinyl	   collections	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with	  CDs.	  More	  recently,	  De	  Vinck	  and	  Lindmark	  argued	  we	  also	  need	  greater	  “insights	  
on	  the	  disruptive	  force	  of	   innovation,	  building	  on	  the	  pioneering	  work	  of	  Schumpeter…	  
and	   more	   recent	   works	   on	   disruptive	   innovation”	   to	   appreciate	   how	   interactions	  
between	   business,	   consumer	   and	   institutions	   (public	   and	   private)	   facilitate	   innovation	  
and	  technology	  diffusion	  (2014:105).	  Cinema	  was	  once	  but	  a	  final	  destination	  for	  movies	  
(before	  they	  were	  repurposed	  as	  videos	  or	  dvds),	  a	  place	  reliant	  on	  one	  product,	  within	  a	  
traditional	  commercial	  and	  cultural	  supply	  chain.	  However,	  the	  end	  of	  celluloid	  provides	  
the	   cinema	   business	   with	   an	   opportunity	   to	   re-­‐position	   itself	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   a	   new	  
digitalized	  value	  network.	  A	  network,	   in	  which,	  digital	   technologies	  provide	  alternative	  
revenue	  and	  value-­‐producing	  opportunities	   that	  may	  ultimately	   lead	  to	  the	  emergence	  
of	  completely	  different	  business	  models.	  	  
Therefore,	   the	   purpose	   of	   this	   composite	   analysis	   (dissertation	   and	   associated	  papers	  
[P1–8])	   is	  to	   investigate	   the	  extent	   to	  which	  a	  high-­‐tech	  breakthrough	  approach	  could	  
deliver	   novel	   supply	   and	   demand	   solutions,	   through	   a	   study	   of	   the	   digital	   cinema	  
rollout.	   This	   work	   is	   situated	   in	   the	   context	   of	   high-­‐tech	   breakthrough	   approaches	  
seemingly	   conferring	   advantages	   over	   simpler	   entrepreneurial	   approaches,	   especially	  
when	  dealing	  with	  incumbent	  firms.	  	  
As	  a	  result,	  three	  further	  questions	  contribute	  to	  the	  primary	  question:	  
• Is	  digital	  cinema	  an	  example	  of	  disruptive	  innovation?	  
• If	   it	   is,	  what	  adoption	  and	  diffusion	  patterns	  can	  be	   identified	  from	  the	  approaches	  
taken	  in	  the	  three	  countries	  investigated	  –	  the	  UK,	  Norway	  and	  the	  US?	  
• To	   what	   extent	   can	   the	   absence	   or	   presence	   of	   national	   or	   sectoral	   institutional	  
activity	  explain	  the	  different	  experiences	  of	  the	  three	  countries?	  	  
This	  dissertation	  explores	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  the	  digitalization	  of	  value	  networks	  in	  the	  
context	   of	   digital	   cinema,	   focusing	   on	   the	   contribution	   of	   the	   distribution	   and	  
exhibition	   of	   creative	   content	   to	   national	   innovation	   systems	   in	   the	   UK,	   Norway	   and	  
the	   US	   –	   three	   countries	   that	   exhibit	   marked	   differences	   in	   their	   approach	   to	  
entrepreneurial	  innovation	  (Culkin,	  2016a;	  2016b	  [P7	  &	  P8]).	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Findings	   should	   provide	   stakeholders	   such	   as	   policymakers,	   universities	   and	  
entrepreneurial	   innovation	  researchers	  with	  a	  greater	  appreciation	  of	  the	  features	  of	  a	  
value	   network	   that	   may	   enhance	   the	   contribution	   of	   entrepreneurial	   innovation	   in	  
strengthening	  the	  UK’s	  national	  innovation	  system.	  
1.2	  	   Chapter	  summary	  
In	   this	   chapter,	   I	   have	   shown	   the	  evolution	  of	   cinema	   (as	   a	   place)	   followed	  a	   singular	  
path,	  forged	  from	  its	  dependency	  on	  celluloid	  (Hanson,	  2007a).	  While	  researchers	  have	  
arrived	  at	   its	  path	   from	  many	  directions,	   their	  attention	  was	   focused	  on	  the	  cinematic	  
experience	   for	   creative	   talent,	   the	   films,	   and	   their	   audience;	   despite	   cinema	   hosting	  
technological	  innovations	  from	  the	  first	  moving	  image	  projected	  onto	  a	  screen,	  through	  
the	  introduction	  of	  digital	  sound	  systems	  were	  introduced	  in	  the	  first	  part	  of	  the	  1990s,	  
to	   the	   emergence	   of	   virtual	   reality,	   in	   2016.	   	   As	   a	   result,	   cinema	   has	   primarily	   been	  
viewed	  as	  the	  first	  destination	  for	  a	  cultural	  and	  economic	  medium	  that	  represents	  both	  
the	  best	  and	  worst	  of	  a	   film	  supply	   chain	  dependent	  on	   the	   largesse	  of	  Hollywood.	   In	  
terms	  of	  a	  movie-­‐going	  experience,	  the	  reason	  this	  condition	  has	  endured	  is	  that	  cinema	  
was	  situated	  at	  the	  end	  of	  a	  linear	  supply	  chain.	  Despite	  periods	  of	  change	  and	  potential,	  
the	   overall	   technological	   evolutions	   have	   up	   until	   now	   been	   to	   the	   advantage	   of	  
Hollywood	   (De	   Vinck	   &	   Lindmark,	   2014:122;	   Hanson,	   2007b).	   A	   separate	   and	   distinct	  
chain	  was	   created	  when	  a	   film	  was	  written	  on	   to	  a	  different	  medium	   (videotapes	  and	  
later	  DVDs)	  and	  shipped	  to	  individuals	  on	  planes,	  in	  hotel	  rooms	  and	  finally	  -­‐	  region	  by	  
region	  -­‐	  into	  private	  homes.	  	  
It	   has	   not	   escaped	  my	   attention	   that	  while	   the	   European	   Commission	   have	   called	   for	  
greater	  insights	  on	  the	  disruptive	  nature	  of	  innovation,	  little	  comparative	  work	  has	  been	  
undertaken	   in	   this	   area,	   since	   my	   research	   outputs	   between	   2000	   and	   2014	  
(entrepreneurial	   innovation,	  digital	  cinema	  and	  national	   innovation	  systems).	  In	  2000,	  I	  
wrote	  about	  the	  need	  for	  the	  UK	  government	  to	  develop	  their	  understanding	  of	  both	  the	  
context	  and	  composition	  of	  small	  firms	  and	  the	  markets	  within	  which	  they	  operate	  [P1].	  
In	   2003,	   I	  wrote	   that	   technology	  now	  existed	   to	  distribute	   and	  exhibit	   a	   film	  digitally;	  
and,	   that	   the	   pace	   of	   change	   was	   increased	   significantly	   and	   that	   it	   was	   not	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inconceivable	  that	  digital	  cinema	  would	  equal	  the	  best	  conventional	  cinema	  has	  to	  offer	  
more	  rapidly	  than	  previous	  adoption	  periods	  [P2].	  Later	  on	  (with	  Randle)	  I	  explored	  the	  
fluidity	  of	  freelance	  work	  in	  the	  US	  entertainment	  industries,	  which	  provided	  a	  graphic	  
picture	  of	  the	  uncertainty	  of	  project-­‐based	  work	  in	  the	  creative	  industries	  [P3].	  	  Finally,	  
my	  work	  around	   regional	  and	  national	   innovation	  systems	  has	   revealed	   that	  given	   the	  
aggregate	  effects	  of	  distributed	  knowledge	  production	  and	  information	  asymmetries	  we	  
need	   a	   cultural	   change	   in	   universities	   to	   encourage	   collaboration	  with	   industry	   across	  
the	   UK.	  Much	   value	   can	   be	   gained	  when	   universities	   are	   engaged	   and,	   take	   the	   lead	  
regarding	  offering	   insights	  and	  developing	  regional	   initiatives	  to	  support	  the	  micro	  and	  
small	   business	   sector	   to	   overcome	   systemic	   issues	   responsible	   for	   holding	   back	   UK	  
competitiveness	  and	  innovative	  performance	  for	  decades	  [P8].	  In	  Table	  1.1,	  below	  I	  have	  
sought	  to	   identify	  how	  the	  published	  works	  address	  the	  three	  areas	  of	  entrepreneurial	  
innovation,	  digital	  cinema	  and	  national	  systems	  of	  innovation.	  
Table	  1.1:	  Published	  works	  and	  their	  relationship	  to	  entrepreneurial	  innovation,	  digital	  cinema	  and	  national	  
systems	  of	  innovation	  
	   	   	   Focus	  (***Primary	  **secondary	  *	  Tertiary)	  
Paper	  ID	  &	  
Publication	  
Year	  





No.	  1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(2008)	  
Cinema	  No	  Country	  for	  Old	  
Entrepreneurs	  
3	   **	   ***	   *	  
No.	  2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(2003)	  
Digital	  Cinema:	  Opportunities	  &	  
Challenges	  
25	   **	   ***	   *	  
No.	  3	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(2006)	   Digital	  Cinema	  as	  Disruptive	  Technology	  
3	   **	   ***	   *	  
No.	  4	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(2009)	  
Getting	  in	  and	  getting	  on	  in	  Hollywood:	  
Freelance	  careers	  in	  an	  uncertain	  
industry.	  
56	   *	   ***	   *	  
No.	  5	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(2004/05/07)	  
Facing	  The	  Digital	  Future:	  Digital	  
Technology	  and	  the	  Film	  Industry	  
8	   *	   ***	   *	  
No.	  6	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(2000)	  
An	  Emotional	  Business:	  A	  Guide	  to	  
Understanding	  the	  Motivations	  of	  Small	  
Business	  Decision	  Makers	  
225	   ***	   N/A	   **	  
No.	  7	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(2016a)	  
Anchor	  Institutions	  and	  Regional	  
Innovation	  Systems	  for	  supporting	  
micro	  and	  small	  businesses’	  
0	   ***	   N/A	   ***	  
No.	  8	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(2016b)	  
Entrepreneurial	  universities	  in	  the	  
region:	  the	  force	  awakens?	  
1	   ***	   N/A	   ***	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On	   one	   level,	   the	   aim	   of	   Table	   1.1	   is	   to	   provide	   an	   overview	   of	   the	   contribution	   to	  
knowledge	   and	   impact	   of	   a	   body	   of	   work	   that	   commenced	   with	   an	   initial	   set	   of	  
anecdotes,	  during	  a	  fieldwork	  trip	  to	  Los	  Angeles.	  	  	  	  Here,	  I	  met	  with	  Scott	  Billups,	  author	  
of	  Digital	  Moviemaking	   (2000),	  whose	  book	  had	  been	  mentioned	  by	  two	  respondents.	  
Billups	   spoke	   about	   the	   impact	   that	   digitalization	  would	   have	   on	   filmmaking	   and	   film	  
projection	  over	   the	  next	   twenty	   years.	  Despite	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  discussion	  was	  highly	  
technical	  and	  taking	  no	  notes,	  I	  still	  recall	  many	  of	  the	  ideas	  that	  Billups	  was	  working	  on.	  
And,	  the	  fact	  that	  our	  conversation	  was	  interrupted	  -­‐	  while	  he	  took	  a	  telephone	  call	  from	  
Marlon	  Brando	   -­‐	   suggested	  he	  was	  also	  a	  well-­‐connected,	   forward	   thinker.	   	  As	  part	  of	  
the	   original	   research	   project	   (freelance	   film	   work)	   I	   returned	   to	   Los	   Angeles	   on	   two	  
further	   occasions.	   During	   these	   visits,	   I	   was	   able	   to	   piece	   together	   ‘scraps	   of	   data’	   in	  
order	  to	  construct	  a	  more	  nuanced	  picture	  of	  the	  emergence	  of	  digital	  cinema.	  	  This	  led	  
to	  the	  production	  of	  the	  paper	  (P2)	  as	  previously	  discussed	  in	  this	  first	  chapter	  (P19).	  
Although	   the	   idea	   of	   focusing	   entirely	   on	   digital	   cinema	   was	   appealing,	   I	   had	   just	  
published	   a	   paper	   from	  my	   first	   research	   degree,	  which	   looked	   at	   decision-­‐making	   in	  
small	   firms	  and	  why	   the	  UK	  Government	   struggled	   to	   implement	  policies	   that	  made	  a	  
difference	   in	  supporting,	  small-­‐firm	  growth.	  The	  upshot	  was	  that	   I	  thought	   it	  would	  be	  
interesting	  to	  explore	  the	  synergies	  between	  the	  two.	  Such	  an	  applied	  research	  agenda	  
was	  difficult	   to	  establish	   In	   the	  UK;	   there	  was	  much	   interest	   in	   the	  UK	  film	  production	  
from	   the	  New	   Labour	   Government,	   but	   far	   less	   interest	   in	   the	   distribution	   sector,	   let	  
alone	   the	   exhibition	   sector.	   It	   has	   been	   noted	   elsewhere	   that,	   in	   the	   UK	   we	   can	   be	  
somewhat	  dismissive	  about	  applied	  research,	  but	   in	  reality,	  such	  use-­‐inspired	  research	  
can	  be	  truly	  excellent.	  I	  will	  go	  on	  to	  demonstrate	  through	  the	  digital	  cinema	  case-­‐study,	  
that	   while	   the	   UK’s	   innovation	   ecosystem	   is	   a	   complex,	   non-­‐linear	   process,	   the	  
complexity	   of	   the	   policy	   support	   mechanisms	   for	   research	   and	   development	   poses	   a	  
barrier	  to	  business	  engagement	  in	  collaborative	  activities,	  especially	  for	  entrepreneurial	  
innovation	   (Dowling,	   2015).	   The	   digital	   (r)evolution	   that	   swept	   through	   other	   creative	  
content	   industries	   was	   finally	   embraced	   by	   cinema	   at	   the	   start	   of	   the	   twenty-­‐first	  
century.	   Before	   then,	   perceived	   wisdom	   told	   us	   that	   although	   movies	   made	   money	  
throughout	   cinematic	   economic	   history,	   cinemas	   themselves	   depended	   on	   revenue	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generated	  from	  the	  front	  of	  house	  -­‐	  hot-­‐dogs,	  popcorn	  and	  fizzy	  drinks	  –to	  make	  money	  
(Hanson,	  2007b).	  	  
However,	   as	   I	   will	   show	   over	   the	   next	   seven	   chapters,	   the	   digital	   cinema	   rollout	  
demonstrates	   that	   a	   high-­‐tech	   breakthrough	   can	   deliver	   novel	   supply	   and	   demand	  
solutions	  and	  provide	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  the	  role	  of	  entrepreneurial	   innovation	  
for	  regional	  and	  national	   innovation	  systems.	   	   	  Finally,	   taken	  together,	   the	  dissertation	  
and	   published	   papers,	   will	   establish	   how	   the	   methodology	   has	   emerged,	   over	   time,	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Chapter	  2:	  Technological	  innovation	  
 
 
In	  innovation	  literature,	  the	  arrival	  of	  digital	  technology	  created	  a	  major	  rethink	  on	  how	  
organisations,	   industry	  structures	  and	  economies	  operate.	  Margetts	  &	  Dunleavy	  (2013)	  
reported	   that	  digitalization	   is	  now	   lapping	  at	   the	  edges	  of	   government	  establishments	  
and	  the	  way	  they	  interact	  with	  the	  societies	  they	  represent.	  
In	   the	   second	   half	   of	   the	   1800s,	   a	   new	   wave	   of	   industrialisation	   spread	   throughout	  
developing	   nations.	   Innovation	   brought	   about	   new	   technologies	   such	   as	   the	   steam	  
engine,	  railroads	  and	  telegraphs,	  making	  communication	  and	  transportation	  faster	  and	  
easier.	   Industry	   grew	   as	   business	   developed	   innovative	   means	   to	   extract	   natural	  
resources	  such	  as	  oil	  from	  the	  ground	  and	  to	  produce	  steel	  cost-­‐effectively.	  Many	  local	  
firms	  were	  transformed	  into	  national	  companies	  through	  their	  ability	  to	  locate	  and	  ship	  
materials	  across	  country	  with	  relative	  ease.	  In	  the	  workplace,	  the	  assembly	  line	  method	  
of	  production,	  long	  considered	  one	  of	  the	  greatest	  innovations	  of	  the	  20th	  century,	  then	  
enabled	  these	  companies	  to	  produce	  goods	  on	  a	  mass	  scale.	  As	  Beninger	  (1986)	  argued,	  
such	  developments	  sparked	  a	  wave	  of	  societal	  disruptions,	   including	  the	  birth	  of	   trade	  
unionism,	  urbanisation	  and	  improvements	  in	  healthcare	  and	  income	  levels.	  According	  to	  
Schatzberg	  (2006),	  when	  the	  term	  ‘technology’	  became	  widespread	  in	  elite	  discourse	  in	  
the	  US,	  it	  was	  as	  the	  result	  of	  a	  long	  struggle	  over	  the	  meanings	  of	  industrialisation.	  He	  
went	  on	  to	  claim	  that	  Karl	  Marx	  viewed	  technology	  as	  having	  helped	  to	  raise	  the	  useful	  
arts	   above	   the	  world	   of	   grubby	   artisans	   and	   into	   the	   spheres	   of	   big	   business	   and	   the	  
university.	   In	   a	   similar	   vein,	   Oldenziel	   saw	   technology	   as	   the	   product	   of	   a	   class	   and	  
gender	   struggle,	   becoming	   a	   keyword	   to	   denote	   the	   useful	   application	   of	   scientific	  
knowledge	   for	   the	   benefit	   of	   humankind,	   and	   engineers	   were	   designated	   as	   the	   sole	  
bearers	   of	   that	   form	   of	   knowledge	   (1999:14).	   Taken	   together,	   the	  work	   of	   these	   and	  
other	  scholars	  complicates	  not	  only	  the	  early	  twentieth-­‐century	  meanings	  of	  technology,	  
but	  also	  its	  current	  use	  (Schatzberg,	  2006:487).	  
Today,	   as	   technology	   increasingly	   allows	   products,	   services	   and	   knowledge	   to	   be	  
digitised	  and	  mobile	  devices	  accelerate	   in	  ubiquity	  and	  processing	  power,	  physical	  and	  
digital	   components	   are	   combined	   and	   the	   distinctive	   features	   of	   digital	   technology	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facilitate	   new	   types	   of	   innovation	   processes	   that	   are	   uniquely	   different	   from	   the	  
innovation	  processes	  of	  the	  industrial	  era	  (Lucas	  &	  Goh,	  2009;	  Nylén	  &	  Holfström,	  2015).	  
Digital	   technologies	   occupy	   an	   individual’s	   customs	   and	   habits	   through	   everyday	  
activities	   such	   as	   communicating	   with	   friends	   and	   work	   colleagues,	   organising	   and	  
employing	  knowledge	  in	  previously	  unimaginable	  ways	  and	  combining	  factors	  to	  create	  
novel	  supply	  and	  demand	  solutions	  (Henfridsson	  &	  Yoo,	  2013).	  However,	  alongside	  the	  
novelties	   ushered	   in	   by	   the	   widespread	   employment	   of	   digital	   technologies	   sits	  
obsolescence:	   first	   in	   the	   form	  of	  a	   radical	   shift	   in	   job-­‐skill	  demands	   (Randle	  &	  Culkin,	  
2009	   [P4])	   and	   second,	   in	   the	   widespread	   displacement	   of	   labour	   brought	   about	   by	  
pattern	   recognition	  capabilities,	   robotic	   innovations	  and	   the	  bypassing	  of	  geographical	  
boundaries	  (Btyonjolfsson	  &	  McAfee,	  2014;	  Culkin,	  2008	  [P1]).	  
To	   explore	   the	   effects	   of	   the	   technological	   evolution	   in	   the	   film	   and	   audiovisual	  
industries,	   the	   following	   sections	  present	  an	  overview	  of	   relevant	   literature	   that	  holds	  
potential	   for	  explaining	  changes	   in	   the	  wider	  creative	  content	   industries.	   In	  so	  doing,	   I	  
first	   discuss	   dominant	   theories	   of	   innovation,	   before	   investigating	   the	   concepts	   of	  
national	   innovation	   systems,	   disruptive	   innovation	   and	   creative	   destruction,	   and	  
entrepreneurial	  innovation.	  	  
2.1	   Defining	  and	  contextualising	  innovation	  
Innovation	  can	  be	  defined	  as	   the	  process	  of	   commercialising	  or	  bringing	   into	  common	  
usage	   an	   invention.	   	   This	   is	   posited	   within	   the	   context	   of	   an	   invention	   as	   an	   idea,	  
concept	  or	  design	  for	  a	  new	  or	  improved	  device,	  product	  or	  process	  that	  is	  available	  as	  
concrete	  information	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  description,	  sketch	  or	  model	  (Freeman,	  1982).	  The	  
term	   innovation	  was	  first	  employed	  at	  the	  start	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century	  during	  a	  time	  
when	   the	   field	   of	   science	   was	   changing	   beyond	   recognition.	   New	   products	   were	  
developed	  for	  both	  industrial	  and	  consumer	  markets,	  which	  in	  turn	  led	  to	  a	  further	  rapid	  
development	   of	   technologies	   across	   a	   wide	   range	   of	   industries,	   to	   sustain	   economic	  
growth,	  from	  the	  1950s	  onwards.	  As	  markets	  advanced	  and	  became	  increasingly	  global	  
in	  reach,	  businesses	  and	  public	  research	  organisations	  turned	  to	  patents	  to	  protect	  their	  
innovations	   from	   research	   and	   development	   programmes.	   However,	   growth	   in	  
patenting	   corresponded	   to	   new	  modes	   of	   innovation	   research	   practice,	   which	   placed	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more	   emphasis	   on	   knowledge	   networks	   and	   markets	   than	   the	   individual	   firm	   as	   we	  
approached	  the	  twenty-­‐first	  century.	  	  
The	   original	   definition	   of	   innovation	   was	   too	   narrow	   to	   reflect	   the	   role,	   patents	   and	  
knowledge	   networks,	   played	   in	   innovation	   and	   economic	   performance	   and	  
the	  Organisation	  for	  Economic	  Co-­‐operation	  and	  Development	  (OECD)	  was	  tasked	  with	  
broadening	   its	  scope.	  The	  update	  -­‐	  announced	   in	  2005	  –	  now	  asserted	  that	   innovation	  
was,	  “the	   implementation	  of	  a	  new	  or	  significantly	   improved	  product	  (good	  or	  service)	  
or	   process,	   a	   new	   marketing	   method,	   or	   a	   new	   organisational	   method	   in	   business	  
practices,	   workplace	   organisation	   or	   external	   relations”	   (OECD/Eurostat	   2005:17).	  
Although	   the	   definition	   above	   is	   well	   understood	   today,	   it	   was	   Schumpeter	   who	   saw	  
innovation	  very	  broadly	  as	  a	  product,	  a	  process	  and	  as	  organisational	  change	  that	  does	  
not	   necessarily	   have	   to	   arise	   from	   new	   scientific	   discoveries,	   but	   that	   may	   combine	  
already	  existing	  technologies	  or	  their	  applications	  in	  a	  new	  context.	  It	  has	  been	  argued	  
elsewhere	  that	  the	  concepts	  of	  both	  innovation	  and	  entrepreneurship	  are	  Schumpeter’s	  
most	   distinctive	   contributions	   to	   economics	   (Hanush	  &	   Pyka,	   2007:857)	   and	  while	   he	  
was	  not	  the	  first	  to	  write	  about	  innovation,	  very	  few	  have	  been	  as	  influential	  as	  he.	  	  
Today,	  innovation	  lies	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  structural	  change	  and	  discontinuous	  change	  is	  one	  
of	   the	   driving	   forces	   of	   economic	   development.	   Two	   salient	   features	   of	   western	  
economies	   are	   product	   routines	   (e.g.	   technological	   stability	   often	   favoured	   by	  
incumbent	   firms)	   on	   the	   one	   hand	   and	   product	   development	   (e.g.	   technological	  
breakthroughs,	  more	  often	  favoured	  by	  new	  firms)	  on	  the	  other.	  Interest	  in	  the	  process	  
of	   competition	   between	   two	   technologies	   –	   one	   old,	   one	   new	   –	   arises	   from	   the	  
observation	  that	  there	  remain	  technologies	  that	  have	  outlived	  their	  technological	   ‘sell-­‐
by’	  date,	  despite	  being	  outperformed	  by	  new	  ones.	  This	  mechanism	  is	  often	  referred	  to	  
as	   the	   'sailing-­‐ship	  effect',	  after	  Gilfillan's	   study	  on	   innovation	   in	  ships	   (Gilfillan,	  1935).	  
He	   showed	   how	   the	   then-­‐current	   product	   (sailing	   ship)	   was	   improved	   as	   the	   new	  
product	  (steamer)	  surfaced	  in	  1813.	  Almost	  all	  of	  the	  components	  and	  materials	  of	  the	  
sailing	   ship	   were	   subject	   to	   incremental	   advances,	   transforming	   it	   from	   a	   wooden	  
structure	   to	   basically	   a	   metallic	   one,	   whose	   carrying	   capability	   was	   hugely	   improved.	  
Gilfillan	  wrote,	   “it	   is	   paradoxical,	   but	   on	  examination	   logical,	   that…	  during	  her	  decline	  
	   26	  
and	   just	   before	   extermination,	   [she]	   was	   partly	   vouchsafed	   by	   her	   supplanter,	   the	  
steamer”	  (1935:156).	  
It	  is	  worth	  noting	  here	  that	  Schumpeter’s	  original	  concept	  of	  an	  entrepreneur	  was	  that	  
of	   a	   ‘heroic	   individual’	   who	   possessed	   supernormal	   qualities	   of	   intellect,	   carrying	   out	  
new	  combinations,	  while	  powerful	  elements	  of	  society	  erected	  barriers	  in	  his	  way,	  intent	  
on	   maintaining	   the	   status	   quo.	   He	   viewed	   the	   occurrence	   of	   discontinuous	   and	  
revolutionary	  change	  as	  the	  core	  of	  economic	  development,	  which	  breaks	  the	  economy	  
out	  of	   its	   static	  mode	   (e.g.	   the	  circular	   flow)	  and	  sets	   it	  on	  a	  dynamic	  path	  of	   fits	  and	  
starts	  (Śledzik,	  2013:89).	  While	  Schumpeter	  did	  not	  move	  from	  his	  view	  of	  the	  distinctive	  
role	  of	   the	  entrepreneur,	  his	  observation	  on	  the	   issue	  changed	  over	  time.	  Schumpeter	  
never	  turned	  his	  back	  on	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  “travelling	  salesman”	  which	  recognised	  that	  
entrepreneurs	   came	   from	   all	   social	   classes	   (Schumpeter,	   1939).	   He	   distinguished	  
between	  small	   firms	  and	  high-­‐growth	   firms,	  maintaining	   that	  while	  both	  undertook	  an	  
essential	  role	  in	  a	  successful	  economy,	  they	  were	  very	  different	  sorts	  of	  enterprises.	  	  
However,	   after	   taking	   up	   permanent	   residence	   in	   the	   US,	   Schumpeter	   came	   to	   the	  
conclusion	   that	   the	   agents	   who	   drive	   innovation	   and	   deliver	   economic	   growth	   are	  
actually	  large(r)	  firms,	  in	  particular,	  those	  that	  had	  built	  up	  capital	  reserves	  to	  invest	  in	  
R&D	  activities	  to	  facilitate	  the	  absolute	  optimal	  way	  to	  commercialise	  new	  technology.	  
Nor	   did	   Schumpeter	   (unlike	   many	   of	   his	   fellow	   economists)	   share	   the	   view	   that	   big	  
business	   was	   somehow	   anti-­‐American.	   He	   argued	   that	   over	   time	   only	   the	   largest	  
corporate	  units	  prospered	  in	  certain	  industries	  –	  most	  requiring	  big	  capital	  investments	  
to	  maintain	   their	   position	   in	   the	   face	   of	   competition	   (e.g.	   oil,	   cars	   and	   chemicals).	   In	  
other	   industries,	   established	   firms	   –	   once	   entrepreneurial	   start-­‐ups	   –	   would	   try	   to	  
preserve	  their	  dominant	  position	  through	  patents,	   further	   innovation,	  secret	  processes	  
and	  advertising,	  each	  move	  an	  act	  of	  aggression	   in	   the	   face	  of	  new	   firms	  springing	  up	  
alongside	   the	   incumbents.	   The	   dynamic	   process	   will	   come	  many	   times:	   all	   successful	  
firms	   have	   been	   entrepreneurial	   at	   some	   moment	   in	   their	   histories,	   though	   a	   given	  
company	  is	  certain	  to	  be	  more	  entrepreneurial	  at	  one	  point	  and	  less	  so	  at	  another.	  Early	  
in	   the	   twentieth	   century,	   firms	   such	   as	   AT&T,	   GE,	   Kodak	   and	  DuPont	   set	   up	   research	  
departments	   in	  an	  effort	   to	  make	   innovation	  part	  of	   their	  business	   routine.	  But,	  when	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their	   innovations	   dwindle,	   firms	   begin	   to	   die;	   in	   this	   way	   Schumpeter	   used	  
entrepreneurship	   to	   explain	   structural	   change,	   economic	   growth	   and	   business	   cycles,	  
using	   a	   combination	   of	   economic,	   sociological	   and	   technological	   considerations	  
(McCraw,	  2007:181).	  
Alongside	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   entrepreneurial	   corporation,	   Schumpeter	   also	  
recognised	   the	   changes	   that	  brought	  about	   the	  modern	   financial	   system.	  However,	   as	  
Festré	   &	   Nasica	   (2009)	   have	   noted,	   the	   enormous	   contribution	   Schumpeter	  made	   on	  
entrepreneurship	  and	  innovation	  cast	  his	  banking	  and	  credit	  analysis	  into	  the	  shadows.	  
At	   each	   stage	   of	   capitalist	   development,	   it	   is	   shaped	   by	   the	   institutional	   structure,	  
especially	  banking	  institutions,	  and	  this	  structure	  is	  always	  evolving	  in	  response	  to	  profit-­‐
seeking	  activity	  under	   the	  constantly	   renewed	   financial	   institutional	   setting	   (2009:336-­‐
337).	   The	   two	  main	   functions	   of	   the	   Schumpeterian	   banker	   –	   as	   an	   ephor3	   and	   as	   an	  
innovator	   –	   reveal	   the	   specific	   industrial	   and	   financial	   environment	   of	   this	   historical	  
period	   of	   capitalism.	   The	   implication	   Schumpeter	   makes	   is	   that	   banks	   cannot	   be	  
described	  as	  passive	  intermediaries	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  steady	  growth	  since	  they	  now	  play	  a	  
key	   role	   in	   the	   distribution	   of	   economic	   resources;	   the	   banker,	   “has	   either	   replaced	  
private	   capitalists	   or	   become	   their	   agent;	   he	   has	   himself	   become	   the	   capitalist	   par	  
excellence.	   He	   stands	   between	   those	   who	   wish	   to	   form	   new	   combinations	   and	   the	  
possessors	  of	  productive	  means”	  (1934:74). Schumpeter’s	  view	  of	  the	  banker	  as	  “ephor”	  
underpinned	  his	  understanding	   that	   innovation	   in	   finance	  was	  essential	   to	   finance	   the	  
capital	  development	  of	  the	  economy.	  The	  houses	  of	  Rothschild	  and	  Morgan	  epitomised	  
the	  sort	  of	  players	  who	  could	  organise	  the	  resources	  necessary	  for	  financing	  the	   large-­‐
scale	   investments	   that	  made	  the	   industrial	   revolution	  possible.	  Such	  banking	  dynasties	  
took	   on	   a	   brokering	   role	   when	   expediting	   trade	   in	   existing	   business	   matters	   and	   as	  
dealers	  when	  underwriting	  new	  business;	  these	  new	  lines	  sprang	  from	  the	  need	  to	  trade	  
positions	   in	   the	   liabilities	   of	   enterprises	   and	   provide	   external	   finance	   for	   capital	   asset	  
ownership.	   Those	   investment	   bankers,	   adroit	   at	   providing	   funding	   for	   innovative	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  The	  ephors	  were	  a	  council	  of	  five	  magistrates	  from	  eight-­‐century	  BC	  Sparta	  who	  shared	  power	  with	  the	  
two	   kings.	   Elected	   annually	   by	   the	   assembly,	   they	   presided	   over	  meetings	   of	   the	   council	   of	   elders	   and	  
were	  responsible	  for	  the	  execution	  of	  their	  decrees.	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combinations	  of	  resources,	  soon	  became	  the	  mainstay	  of	  economic	  power,	  the	  “ephor”	  
of	  the	  “exchange”	  economy	  (Festré	  &	  Nasica,	  2009:347).	  	  
But	   this	   period	   also	   paved	   the	  way	   for	   cycles	   of	   price	   wars	   between	   industrial	   firms,	  
which	   if	   left	  unchecked	  could	  do	  untold	  damage	   to	   the	  quality	  of	   the	   instruments	   the	  
investment	  banker	  sold,	  and	  soon	  they	  “began	  to	  abhor	  competitive	  markets”	   (Minsky	  
1993:109).	  Their	  response	  was	  to	  protect	  cash	  flows	  in	  the	  firms	  they	  financed	  by	  simply	  
financing	   industrial	  combinations	  through	  a	  series	  of	  cartels,	   trusts	  and	  mergers.	  At	  an	  
industry	   level,	   investment	   bankers	   took	   a	   controlling	   position	   in	   the	   economy,	   first	   in	  
stimulating	  merger	  activity	  and	  then,	  securing	  large	  ownership	  shares	  on	  the	  boards	  of	  
directors	   of	   newly	   combined	   corporations	   (Festré	   &	   Nasica,	   2009:348).	   Schumpeter	  
realised	   that	   banks	   were	   active	   agents	   and	   if	   they	   did	   not	   grant	   credit	   to	   finance	  
investment	  expenditures,	   they	  obstructed	  entrepreneurial	   innovations.	  But	  equally,	  he	  
knew	  that:	  “The	  banker	  must…	  know	  what	  the	  transaction	  is	  which	  he	  is	  asked	  to	  finance	  
and	  how	  it	  is	  likely	  to	  turn	  out,	  but	  he	  must	  also	  know	  the	  customer,	  his	  business…	  and	  
get…	  a	  clear	  picture	  of	  his	  situation.	  But	   if	  banks…	  finance	  innovation,	  all	  this	  becomes	  
immeasurably	  more	  important”	  (1939:116).	  	  
Schumpeter	  was	  of	  the	  view	  that	  it	  was	  this	  entrepreneur	  who	  created	  innovation.	  And	  
innovation	   was	   not	   only	   invention:	   driven	   by	   competition	   to	   improve	   technology,	  
finance	   and	   organisation,	   the	   Schumpeterian	   entrepreneur	   does	   more	   than	   textbook	  
equilibrium	   theory	   allowed	   (McCraw,	   2009).	   As	   such,	   banks	   are	   at	   the	   core	   of	  
entrepreneurial	   innovations	   and	   should	   possess	   “moral	   and	   intellectual	   qualities”	   to	  
perform	  their	  function,	  which	  is	  essentially	  a	  “critical,	  checking,	  admonitory	  one”.	  In	  his	  
book,	  Capitalism,	  Socialism	  and	  Democracy,	  Schumpeter	  established	  that:	  	  
	  “…in	  capitalist	   reality	  as	  distinguished	   from	   its	   textbook	  picture,	   it	   is	  not	   [textbook]	  
competition	  which	   counts	   but	   the	   competition	   from	   the	   new	   commodity,	   the	   new	  
technology,	  the	  new	  source	  of	  supply,	  the	  new	  type	  of	  organization	  (the	  largest-­‐scale	  
unit	  of	  control	  for	  instance)	  –	  competition	  which	  commands	  a	  decisive	  cost	  or	  quality	  
advantage	  and	  which	  strikes	  not	  at	  the	  margins	  of	  the	  profits	  and	  the	  outputs	  of	  the	  
existing	  firms	  but	  at	  their	  foundations	  and	  their	  very	  lives…”	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (1950:82)	  
Innovation	   propels	   the	   capitalist	   economy	   with	   “gales	   of	   creative	   destruction”,	   the	  
phrase	  that	  Schumpeter	  borrowed	  from	  Werner	  Sombart,	  which	  represented	  a	  dynamic	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process	   in	   which	   new	   technologies	   replace	   the	   old	   (Reinert	   &	   Reinert,	   2006).	   In	  
Schumpeter’s	   view,	   “radical”	   innovations	   create	   major	   disruptive	   changes,	   whereas	  
“incremental”	   innovations	   continuously	   advance	   the	   process	   of	   change.	   Schumpeter	  
(1934:66)	  proposed	  a	  list	  of	  five	  types	  of	  innovations:	  
i)	   Introduction	   of	   new	   products:	   that	   is,	   one	   with	   which	   consumers	   are	   not	   yet	  
familiar	  –	  or	  of	  a	  new	  quality	  of	  a	  good;	  
ii)	   Introduction	   of	   new	   methods	   of	   production:	   that	   is,	   one	   not	   yet	   tested	   by	  
experience	   in	   the	   branch	   of	  manufacture	   concerned,	   which	   need	   by	   no	  means	   be	  
founded	  upon	  a	  scientifically	  new	  discovery,	  and	  also	  exist	  in	  a	  new	  way	  of	  handling	  a	  
commodity	  commercially;	  
iii)	   Opening	   of	   new	  markets:	   that	   is,	   a	  market	   into	   which	   the	   particular	   branch	   of	  
manufacture	  of	   the	  country	   in	  question	  has	  not	  previously	  entered,	  whether	  or	  not	  
this	  market	  has	  existed	  before;	  
iv)	   Development	   of	   new	   sources	   of	   supply	   for	   raw	   materials	   or	   other	   inputs:	  
irrespective	  of	  whether	  this	  source	  already	  exists,	  or	  whether	  it	  has	  to	  be	  created;	  
v)	  Creation	  of	  new	  market	  structures	  in	  an	  industry:	  like	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  monopoly	  
position	   (for	   example	   through	   trustification)	   or	   the	   breaking	   up	   of	   a	   monopoly	  
position).	  
	  
Observed	   through	   a	   Schumpeterian	   lens,	   innovation	   is	   a	   sort	   of	   creative	   act	   in	  
economics,	  requiring	  a	  business	  attitude,	  whereby	  profit	  could	  be	  accrued	  -­‐	  in	  the	  long	  
term	   -­‐	   by	   those	   entrepreneurs	   capable	   of	   repeatedly	   forming	   new	   innovations.	  
Schumpeter’s	  concept	  of	  innovation	  became	  the	  basis	  for	  numerous	  studies	  and	  modern	  
concepts	   in	   innovation	   and	   greatly	   influenced	   theories	   of	   innovation,	   including	   the	  
Organisation	   for	  Economic	  Cooperation	  and	  Development	   (OECD)	   in	   the	  production	  of	  
the	  Oslo	  Manual.	  
2.2	  	   Why	  firms	  innovate	  
As	  well	  as	  categorising	  what	  types	  of	  innovation	  exist,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  understand	  why	  
firms	   deem	   it	   necessary	   to	   innovate.	   During	   a	   period	   of	   rapid	   technology	   evolution	  
Lawrence	   &	   Lorsch	   (1967)	   published	   a	   study	   of	   six	   firms	   that	   operated	   in	   the	   same	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market;	   this	   study	   proved	   influential	   for	   the	   understanding	   of	   why	   firms	   innovate.	  
Lawrence	  and	  Lorsch	  observed	  that	  the	  sales,	  research	  and	  production	  functions	  in	  each	  
organisation	   were	   differentiated	   from	   each	   other	   in	   terms	   of	   formal	   structures,	  
management’s	   goal	   orientation,	   time	   orientations	   and	   interpersonal	   orientations.	   A	  
relationship	  was	  identified	  between	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  states	  of	  differentiation	  and	  
integration	  in	  each	  firm	  met	  a)	  the	  requirements	  of	  the	  environment	  and	  b)	  its	  relative	  
economic	  performance	  (1967:1).	  All	  the	  firms	  had	  similar	  integrative	  devices	  (integrating	  
teams	  and	  departments),	  but	  in	  the	  high	  performing	  firms,	  the	  integrative	  devices	  more	  
fully	  met	  six	  determinants	  of	  effectiveness,	  which	  included	  such	  factors	  as	  the	  pattern	  of	  
influence	  in	  the	  organisation	  and	  the	  typical	  mode	  of	  behaviour	  used	  to	  resolve	  conflict.	  	  
Subsequent	  research,	  applying	  a	  more	  dynamic	  perspective,	  has	  gone	  on	  to	  identify	  that	  
firm-­‐level	   innovation	   is	   essential	   to	   fostering	   new	   ideas	   for	   products	   and	   services,	  
providing	   staff	   with	   a	   sense	   of	   job	   satisfaction,	   encouraging	   teamwork	   and	   enabling	  
firms	  to	  find	  competitive	  advantages	  in	  the	  marketplace.	  Utterback	  &	  Abernathy	  (1975)	  
looked	  at	   relationships	  between	  the	  pattern	  of	   innovation	  within	  a	   firm	  and	  certain	  of	  
the	   firm's	   characteristics:	   the	   stage	   of	   development	   of	   its	   production	   process	   and	   its	  
chosen	  basis	  of	  competition	  (1975:639).	  Their	  results	  suggested	  the	  sources	  and	  types	  of	  
innovations	   a	   given	   firm	   might	   expect	   to	   undertake	   successfully,	   critical	   resources	  
required	   and	   potential	   problems	   or	   constraints.	   Special	   attention	   is	   called	   to	   the	  
interrelated	   nature	   of	   decision-­‐making	   within	   the	   firm	   (Culkin,	   2008	   [P1]).	   The	  
capabilities	  of	   a	   firm	   to	   innovate,	   to	   achieve	  efficient	  operations	  and	   so	  on	   cannot	  be	  
divorced	  from	  one	  another:	  they	  are	  a	  matter	  of	  overall	  strategy.	  In	  a	  second	  study,	  the	  
same	   authors	   went	   on	   to	   argue	   that	   entrepreneurially	   orientated	   firms	   are	   typically	  
likely	  to	  champion	  radical	  innovation,	  expecting	  new,	  fluid	  units	  to	  view	  as	  barriers	  any	  
factors	   that	   impede	   product	   standardisation	   and	   market	   aggregation	   (Abernathy	   &	  
Utterback,	  1978:46).	  	  
The	   second	   half	   of	   the	   twentieth	   century	   saw	   the	   development	   of	   new	   industrial	  
products	   yielding	   path-­‐dependence	   outcomes,	   which	   evolved	   from	   the	   process’s	   own	  
history,	   as	   firms	   searched	   for	   novel	   innovations	   to	   maintain	   economic	   growth.	   This	  
paradigm	   held	   until	   the	   early	   1970s	   and	   was	   built	   on	   energy	   and	   oil-­‐related	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technologies,	  mass	  production	  and	  specialised	  corporate	  R&D	  (Freeman	  &	  Perez,	  1988). 
Such	   innovation	   management	   insights	   are	   drawn	   from	   the	   binary	   classification	   of	  
mechanistic	   or	   organic	   systems	   approaches	   among	   incumbent	   firms	   (Burns	   &	   Stalker,	  
1962);	  from	  Rosenberg	  (1976)	  on	  the	  history	  of	  technology	  and	  the	  role	  of	  universities	  in	  
technical	   advances	   in	   industry	   (Rosenberg	   &	   Nelson,	   1994);	   from	   Nelson	   &	   Winter	  
(1982)	  on	  the	  “natural	  trajectories”	  evolutionary	  theory	  of	  economic	  change;	  and	  from	  
Penrose’s	  (1959)	  theory	  of	  the	  growth	  of	  the	  firm.	  Thus,	  successful	  innovation	  by	  a	  firm	  
depends	  on	  the	  generation	  of	  feasible	  new	  capabilities,	  the	  operation	  of	  which	  adds	  new	  
value	   to	   the	   existing	   circular	   stream	   of	   income	   and	   thereby	   creates	   new	   profits	   and	  
higher	   income	  (Cantwell,	  2000:2).	  Edith	  Penrose	  argued	  that	  such	  firms	  have	  a	  general	  
entrepreneurial	  bias	  towards	  growth	  and	  the	  opportunity	  costs	  of	  failing	  to	  grow	  create	  
strong	  inducements	  to	  growth:	  “As	  management	  tries	  to	  make	  the	  best	  use	  of	  resources	  
available,	   a	   truly	   dynamic	   interacting	   process	   occurs	   which	   encourages	   continuous	  
growth	  but	  limits	  the	  rate	  of	  growth”	  (Penrose,	  1959:5).	  She	  went	  on	  to	  suggest	  that	  for	  
the	  entrepreneurial	   firm,	   this	   creates	   incentives	   to	  exploit	  unused	   resources,	   including	  
knowledge,	   through	   further	   growth	   and	   this	   opens	   up	   further	   opportunities	   in	   the	  
environment	   (ibid.:58).	   Entrepreneurial	   firms	   do	   not	   wait	   for	   the	   technologies	   to	  
become	  available	  to	  take	  up	  these	  opportunities.	  Such	  a	  continual	  adjustment	  between	  
internal	   resources	   and	   evolving	   external	   opportunities	   make	   likely	   the	   prevalence	   of	  
improvisation	  and	  adaptation	   strategies	   followed	  by	  entrepreneurial	  managers	   (Martin	  
&	  Matlay,	  2001:407;	  Brown	  and	  Eisenhardt,	  1998:3;	  Bhidé,	  2000:61,	  Garnsey,	  2002:110).	  	  
2.3	  	   Measuring	  innovation	  activity	  
The	  Oslo	  Manual	  (OECD,	  2005)	  defined	  four	  types	  of	  innovations	  that	  encompass	  a	  wide	  
range	   of	   changes	   in	   firms’	   activities:	   product	   innovations,	   process	   innovations,	  
organisational	   innovations	   and	   marketing	   innovations.	   Product	   innovations	   involve	  
significant	  changes	  in	  the	  capabilities	  of	  goods	  or	  services.	  Process	  innovations	  represent	  
significant	   changes	   in	   production	   and	   delivery	   methods	   (OECD/Eurostat,	   2005:16-­‐17).	  
Organisational	  innovations	  refer	  to	  the	  implementation	  of	  new	  organisational	  methods.	  
These	   can	  be	   changes	   in	  business	  practices,	   in	  workplace	  organisation	  or	   in	   the	   firm’s	  
external	   alliances.	   Marketing	   innovations	   involve	   the	   application	   of	   new	   marketing	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methods	  e.g.	  product	  design	  modification,	  packaging	  changes,	  promotion	  and	  pricing	  of	  
goods	  and	  services	  (Rothwell,	  1994).	  	  
The	  manual	  also	  recognised	  the	  role	  of	  linkages	  with	  other	  firms	  and	  institutions	  in	  the	  
innovation	  process	  through	  the	  introduction	  of	  an	  innovation	  measurement	  framework	  
(Fig.	  2.1).	  This	  approach	  was	  important	  for	  two	  main	  reasons.	  First,	  it	  sought	  to	  highlight	  
the	   importance	   of	   innovation	   in	   less	   R&D-­‐intensive	   industries	   (e.g.	   services	   and	   low-­‐
technology	  manufacturing	   [OECD/Eurostat,	   2005]).	   Second,	   it	   recognised	   the	   status	   of	  
new	   and	   small	   firms	   in	   a	   world	   that	   has	   shifted	   from	   a	   managed	   economy	   to	   an	  
entrepreneurial	  economy	  (Thurik,	  2009).	  In	  the	  former,	  science	  and	  systematic	  large	  firm	  
R&D	  was	  central	  to	  policymakers’	  thinking	  whereas,	  in	  the	  latter,	  entrepreneurship	  is	  a	  
cornerstone	  of	  innovation	  (Audretsch	  &	  Thurik,	  2004;	  Mahroum,	  2008;	  OECD,	  2010).	  	  
The	  need	  to	   incorporate	   linkages	  came	  as	  a	  direct	  result	  of	   increased	  knowledge	  flows	  




The	   adjustment	   acknowledged	   the	   changing	   role	   of	   organisational	   structures	   and	  























	   33	  
actors;	   and	   that	   innovation	   was	   not	   the	   sole	   preserve	   of	   the	   manufacturing	   sector:	  
“innovation	  in	  services	  oriented	  sectors	  can	  differ	  substantially	  from	  innovation	  in	  many	  
manufacturing-­‐oriented	  sectors.	  It	  is	  often	  less	  formally	  organised,	  more	  incremental	  in	  
nature	   and	   less	   technological”	   (OECD/Eurostat,	   2005:17).	   However,	   while	   changes	  
relating	  to	  service	  innovations	  may	  seem	  subtle	  to	  managers,	  they	  can	  often	  destroy	  an	  
incumbent’s	  capabilities,	  knowledge	  and	  competencies,	  which	  are	  deeply	  embedded	  in	  
organisational	  structures,	  processes	  and	  routines.	  Thus,	  new	  entrants	  typically	  perform	  
better	   than	   incumbents	   in	   a	   context	   of	   service-­‐led	   innovations	   (Henderson	   and	   Clark,	  
1990;	  Christensen,	  1997).	  
2.4	  	   Innovation	  as	  part	  of	  an	  evolutionary	  process	  
Despite	  acknowledging	  the	  importance	  of	  small	  firms	  in	  general	  and	  service	  industries	  in	  
particular,	   there	   is	   a	   growing	   body	   of	   scholars	   who	   believe	   we	   must	   distinguish	  
innovation	  from	  ‘invention’,	  which	  is	  an	  act	  of	  intellectual	  creativity	  without	  importance	  
to	  economic	  analysis	   (Godin,	  2016).	  They	  argue	   that	   the	   long	  accepted	   linear	  model	   is	  
only	   one	   of	   several	   theories	   developed	   over	   time	   to	   explain	   how	   technological	  
innovation	  continues	  through	  applied	  research	  and	  then	  enters	  the	  development	  phase.	  
Such	   ideas	   speak	   to	   the	   notion	   concerning	   invention	   and	   innovation	   that	   there	   is	   no	  
relation	   between	   science	   (basic	   research	   in	   particular)	   and	   innovation.	   Adherents	   cite	  
Schumpeter:	   “innovation	   is	   possible	  without	   anything	  we	   should	   identify	   as	   invention	  
and	  invention	  does	  not	  necessarily	  induce	  innovation”	  (1939:84-­‐85).	  They	  further	  argue	  
that	   this	   will	   avoid	   or	   counteract	   the	   bandwagon	   movements	   in	   markets	   that	  
prematurely	   commit	   the	   future	   inextricably	   to	   a	   particular	   technical	   standard,	   before	  
enough	   information	  has	  been	  obtained	  about	  the	   likely	   technological	  or	  organisational	  
and	   legal	   implications,	   of	   an	   early	   precedent-­‐setting	   decision	   (David,	   2007:110).	  
However,	  the	  liner	  argument	  continues	  to	  feed	  into	  policy-­‐making	  and	  remains	  in	  many	  
alternative	  models	  of	  technological	  innovation	  (Godin	  &	  Lane,	  2014:165).	  
In	   the	   context	   of	   localised	   technological	   change,	   evolutionary	   economists	   consider	  
growth	   and	   change	   rather	   than	   equilibrium	   to	   be	   the	   relevant	   object	   of	   analysis	   and	  
hence	  they	  “[value]	  historic	  time	  and	  philological	  investigation	  as	  basic	  tools	  to	  study	  the	  
dynamics	  of	  social	  events”	  (Antonelli,	  2006a:51).	  Accordingly,	  a	  technological	  trajectory	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is	   one	   possible	   development	   path	   that	   can	   be	   pursued	   within	   the	   framework	   of	   a	  
technological	   innovation.	   The	   evolutionary	   argument	   draws	   heavily	   on	   the	   notion	   of	  
path	  dependence,	  which	   argues	   that	   buyers	   rarely	   have	   access	   to	   perfect	   information	  
with	  which	  to	  make	  rational	  decisions	  (David,	  1985;	  Arthur,	  1989).	  The	  argument	  further	  
contends	  that	  current	  choices	  are	  influenced	  by	  earlier	  decisions	  which	  in	  turn	  limit	  later	  
choices,	  channelling	  the	  sequence	  of	  economic	  outcomes	  along	  one	  possible	  path	  rather	  
than	  another	  (Antonelli,	  2006b;	  Culkin,	  2008	  [P1];	  Culkin	  et	  al.,	  2006	  [P3]).	  	  
In	  part,	  the	  difference	  between	  ‘path-­‐dependent’	  and	  ‘path-­‐independent’	  processes	  can	  
be	  explained	  by	   the	   fact	   that	   foresight	  doesn't	  matter	   for	  path-­‐independent	  processes	  
(Puffett,	   2008).	   Regardless	   of	   the	   journey,	   path-­‐independent	   processes	   will	   invariably	  
lead	  to	  a	  set	  of	  predictable	  outcomes	  –	  those	  that	  lead	  to	  the	  most	  efficient	  outcomes	  
and	   produce	   maximum	   payoffs.	   However,	   path-­‐dependent	   processes	   have	   multiple	  
potential	   outcomes,	   and	   the	   outcome	   selected	   is	   not	   necessarily	   the	   one	   producing	  
maximum	  payoffs.	  For	  evolutionary	  theorists,	  the	  technological	  trajectory	  concept	  arises	  
from	  the	  view	  of	  innovation	  as	  a	  cumulative	  and	  specific	  problem-­‐solving	  process	  (Dosi,	  
1982;	   1988).	   In	   Arthur's	   (1989)	   basic	   analytical	   framework,	   “small	   events”,	   which	   he	  
ascribed	   as	   random,	   lead	   to	   initial	   oscillations	   in	   the	   market	   shares	   of	   competing	  
disruptive	  innovations;	  such	  fluctuations	  are	  augmented	  by	  positive	  feedbacks,	  because	  
technologies	  with	  larger	  market	  shares	  tend	  to	  be	  more	  valuable	  to	  new	  adopters.	  As	  a	  
result,	  one	  technology	  grows	  in	  market	  share	  until	  it	  is	  ‘locked	  in’	  as	  a	  de	  facto	  standard.	  	  
It	  is	  possible	  to	  see	  that	  such	  approaches	  can	  be	  traced	  back	  to	  Gabriel	  Tarde,	  who	  made	  
a	   clear	   distinction	   between	   accumulable	   inventions	   and	   substitutable	   inventions,	  
observing,	   “…we	   already	   know	   that	   its	   two	   tendencies	   are	   distinguishable,	   the	   one	  
creative,	   the	   other	   critical,	   the	   one	   abounding	   in	   combinations	   of	   old	   accumulable	  
inventions	   and	   discoveries,	   the	   other	   in	   struggles	   between	   alternative	   inventions	   or	  
discoveries”	   (1903:154).	   Tarde	   raises	   a	   question	   that	   still	   lies	   at	   the	   heart	   of	  
contemporary	  evolutionary	  theory	  today:	   is	   innovation	  a	  factor	   leading	  to	  convergence	  
(‘universal	  uniformisation’)	  or	  divergence?	  Although	  imitation	  leads	  to	  gradual	  similarity	  
among	  individuals,	  in	  Tarde’s	  view	  it	  does	  not,	  for	  all	  that,	  stifle	  their	  originality:	  on	  the	  
contrary,	  it	  encourages	  it,	  because	  there	  is	  not	  a	  single	  model	  to	  be	  imitated	  but	  rather	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an	   infinite	   number	   thereof;	   this	   combination	   is	   a	   source	   of	   both	   originality	   and	  
divergence	  (Djellal	  &	  Gallouj,	  2014:28).	  
2.5 	  From	  creative	  destruction	  to	  technological	  disruption	  
While	   the	   term	   ‘creative	   destruction’	   is	   firmly	   associated	   with	   Schumpeter,	   the	   term	  
‘disruptive	   technology’	   emerged	   from	   research	   into	   the	   disk-­‐drive	   industry	   by	  
Christensen	   (1992)	   to	  describe	  a	   revolutionary	   change	   in	   an	   industry	   (Thomond	  et	  al.,	  
2003),	  which	  leads	  to	  technological	  discontinuity	  and	  causes	  disorder	  in	  the	  market	  and	  
failure	   of	   certain	   incumbents.	   Danneels	   (2004)	   subsequently	   defined	   disruptive	  
technology	   as	   a	   technology	   that	   changes	   the	   bases	   of	   competition	   by	   changing	   the	  
performance	  metrics	  along	  which	  firms	  compete;	  in	  essence,	  these	  technologies	  create	  
fissures	  along	  an	   industry’s	   traditional	   lifecycle	  path.	  Christensen	   (1997)	  argued	   that	  a	  
key	   distinction	   here	   lies	   between	   the	   terms	   ‘sustaining’	   and	   ‘disruptive’	   technologies.	  
While	   sustaining	   technologies	   are	   used	   to	   incrementally	   improve	   the	   performance	   of	  
established	  product	  categories,	  disruptive	  technologies	  enable	  the	  creation	  of	  disruptive	  
product	   innovations	  that	  bring	  novel	  values	  to	  the	  market	  (Nylén	  &	  Holmström,	  2015).	  
Customers	  seeking	  certain	  benefits	  determine	  which	  attributes	  they	  value	  in	  a	  product,	  
with	   different	   customer	   groups	   valuing	   different	   attributes.	  New	  products	   based	   on	   a	  
disruptive	   technology	   have	   different	   attribute	   sets	   from	   existing	   products.	   They	   tend	  
initially	   to	   have	   a	   lower	   level	   of	   performance	   on	   dimensions	   relevant	   to	   mainstream	  
market	   segments	   but	   have	   higher	   performance	   on	   dimensions	   valued	   by	   remote	   or	  
emerging	   market	   segments.	   Christensen	   characterised	   disruptive	   technologies	   as	  
typically	   “cheaper,	   simpler,	   smaller	   and	   frequently,	   more	   convenient	   to	   use	   [than	  
established	  technologies]”	  (1997:	  xviii).	  	  
One	   of	   the	   main	   reasons	   incumbent	   firms	   struggle	   to	   innovate	   with	   disruptive	  
technologies	   involves	   traditional	   innovation	   management	   methods	   (e.g.	   monitoring	  
existing	   customer	   needs	   and	   key	   competitor	   benchmarking).	   The	   outcomes	   regularly	  
lead	  to	  product	  developments	  with	  increased	  features	  that	  are	  adequate	  for	  sustaining	  
technologies;	   however,	   applying	   such	   methods	   to	   disruptive	   technologies	   may	   prove	  
deleterious	   to	   incumbents.	   As	   such,	   when	   the	   disruption	   has	   established	   itself	   in	   an	  
underserved	   customer	   segment;	   incumbents	   may	   be	   displaced	   as	   the	   disrupter	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continues	   to	   develop	   new	   revenue-­‐creating	   opportunities	   in	   their	   core	   markets.	   The	  
consequences	  of	  not	  securing	  disruptive	  innovations	  can	  be	  “far	  more	  devastating	  than	  
simply	  lost	  opportunities	  or	  lost	  market	  share”	  (Thomond	  et	  al.,	  2003:6).  
The	   interest	   in	   disruptive	   technology	   is	   a	   direct	   response	   to	   the	   theoretical	  
developments	  in	  the	  field	  of	  innovation	  management,	  which	  has	  focused	  to	  explain	  how	  
(often	   large)	   firms	  attain	  and	   sustain	   competitive	  advantage.	  The	   resource-­‐based	  view	  
(Penrose,	   1959)	   relies	   on	   the	   notion	   that	   incumbents,	   in	   stable	   environments,	   can	  
achieve	   competitive	   advantage	   where	   resources	   and	   capabilities	   consist	   of	   four	  
attributes:	  rareness,	  value,	  inability	  to	  be	  imitated	  and	  inability	  to	  be	  substituted	  (Barney	  
&	   Clark,	   2007;	   David,	   1985).	   It	   does	   not,	   however,	   explain	   how	   incumbents	   can	   build	  
competitive	   advantage	   in	   rapidly	   changing	   environments	   when	   barriers	   to	   entry	   are	  
under	  threat,	  inter	  alia,	  from	  information	  and	  communications	  technology	  (Bhatt,	  et	  al.,	  
2005;	  Christensen,	  2003).	  
The	  resource-­‐based	  view	  and	  resource	  dependence	  theory	  are	  founded	  on	  a	  notion	  that	  
all	   firms	   depend	   critically	   on	   environmental	   stakeholders	   for	   the	   provision	   of	   vital	  
resources,	  and	  that	  this	  dependence	  is	  often	  reciprocal	  (e.g.	  between	  major	  customers	  
and	  investors).	  The	  checks	  and	  balances	  such	  a	  situation	  creates	  led	  Christensen	  (1997)	  
to	  argue	  that	  innovation	  managers	  have	  far	  less	  control	  over	  a	  firm’s	  resources	  than	  they	  
generally	  imagine.	  This	  is	  particularly	  relevant,	  and	  environmental	  stakeholders	  actually	  
impose	  key	  barriers	  to	  innovation,	  when	  firms	  seek	  to	  invest	  in	  disruptive	  technology.	  	  
Despite	   the	   suggestion	   that	   the	   theory	   of	   disruptive	   innovation	   is	   one	   of	   the	   most	  
pervasive	   models	   generated	   by	   management	   research,	   it	   has	   not	   been	   without	   its	  
detractors.	   In	   its	   original	   form,	   the	   theory	   of	   disruptive	   innovation	   was	   unclear	   as	   to	  
which	  attributes	  of	  disruption	  were	  essential	  to	  disruptive	  success	  and	  which	  ones	  were	  
ancillary	   (Danneels,	   2004:250).	   For	   example,	   there	   was	   an	   implication	   that	   disruption	  
embraced	   technical	   and	   market	   standards,	   consumer	   expectations	   and	   the	   relative	  
strengths	   of	   incumbents	   and	   entrants.	   Christensen	   later	   stated	   that	   the	   construct	   of	  
disruption	  related	  to	  the	  area	  of	  business	  models,	  “understanding	  that	  disruptiveness	  is	  
not	  an	  absolute	  phenomenon	  but	  can	  only	  be	  measured	  relative	  to	  the	  business	  model	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of	  another	  firm…..an	  innovation	  that	  is	  disruptive	  relative	  to	  the	  business	  model	  of	  one	  
firm	  can	  be	  sustaining	  relative	  to	  the	  business	  model	  of	  another”	  (2006:48).	  	  
More	   recently,	  as	  Kolawole	   (2013)	   reported,	  Christensen	  et	  al.	  had	   tried	   to	  expand	  on	  
the	  theory	  of	  disruptive	  innovation	  to	  explain	  a	  phenomenon	  they	  chose	  to	  call	  “hybrid	  
innovation”.	   The	   authors	   went	   on	   to	   claim	   hybrid	   innovation	   was	   a	   special	   type	   of	  
sustaining	   innovation	   that	   attempts	   to	   offer	  mainstream	   customers	   the	   reliability	   and	  
performance	   of	   incumbent	   technologies	   while	   simultaneously	   providing	   some	   of	   the	  
benefits	   of	   new	   disruptive	   technologies.	   One	   of	   their	   examples	   used	   to	   support	   the	  
evolution	   of	   their	   work	   involved	   referencing	   the	   sailing	   ship	   versus	   steamship	  
innovation,	  with	  no	  mention	  of	  Gilfillan’s	  earlier	  work	  (of	  1935).	  	  
While	  Christensen	  et	  al.’s	  work	  has	  been	  helpful	  and	  insightful,	  the	  theory	  of	  disruptive	  
innovation	   has	   its	   limitations	   when	   seeking	   to	   understand	   changes	   in	   content-­‐based	  
industries	   in	   so	   much	   that	   it	   fails	   to	   provide	   the	   tools	   required	   to	   fully	   theorise	   the	  
unique	  aspects	  of	  digital	  technology	  (Nylén,	  2015).	  A	  contemporary	  of	  Christensen	  at	  the	  
Harvard	  Business	  School,	  Jill	  Lepore	  (2014),	  recently	  took	  aim	  at	  the	  very	  foundations	  of	  
the	   disruptive	   innovation	   literature	   by	   suggesting	   that	   many	   of	   the	   incumbent	   firms	  
featured	   in	  The	   Innovator’s	  Dilemma	   (Christensen,	  1997)	  actually	  turned	  their	   fortunes	  
around.	   Lepore	   (a	   history	   professor)	   went	   on	   to	   demonstrate	   that	   a	   number	   of	   the	  
original	  disrupters	   identified	  by	  Christensen	  were	  themselves	  displaced.	   In	  fact,	  Lepore	  
wrote,	   “Christensen’s	   sources	   are	   often	   dubious	   and	   his	   logic	   questionable”	   (2014).	  
While	   the	   phrase	   ‘disruptive	   innovation’	   has	   become	   overused,	   it	   remains	   a	   useful	  
narrative	   to	   describe	   how	   incumbent	   firms	   can	   sometimes	   struggle	   to	   fend	   off	   new	  
entrants	  pushing	  seemingly	  lower-­‐quality	  products.	  The	  theory	  of	  disruptive	  innovation	  
can	   also	   provide	   useful	   insights	   to	   the	   importance	   of	   testing	   assumptions,	   seeking	  
external	   verification,	   and	   other	   means	   of	   reducing	   myopic	   thinking;	   however,	   it	   was	  
inspired	  by	  the	  disk	  drive	  industry	  which	  even	  Christensen	  admitted	  was	  highly	  unusual	  
(King	  &	  Baatartogtokh,	  2015).	  Where	   I	   agree	  with	   Lapore	   is	   that	  disruptive	   innovation	  
has	  become	  much	  more	  than	  a	  theory	  of	  business	  economics	  in	  that	  it	  carries	  with	  it	  a	  
set	  of	  social	  and	  political	  values	  that	  seem	  much	  less	  attractive	  goals	  now	  than	  they	  once	  
did.	   Whereas	   Schumpeter	   focused	   on	   how	   enterprises	   succeeded,	   to	   quote	   Lapore,	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“…disruptive	  innovation	  is	  a	  theory	  about	  why	  businesses	  fail.	  It’s	  not	  more	  than	  that.	  It	  
doesn’t	  explain	  change.	  It’s	  not	  a	  law	  of	  nature.	  It’s	  an	  artefact	  of	  history,	  an	  idea,	  forged	  
in	  time;	  it’s	  the	  manufacture	  of	  a	  moment	  of	  upsetting	  and	  edgy	  uncertainty.	  Transfixed	  
by	  change,	  it’s	  blind	  to	  continuity.	  It	  makes	  a	  very	  poor	  prophet”	  (2014).	  
2.6 	   Digitising	  innovation	  
Since	  its	   inception	  and	  subsequent	  diffusion,	  the	  Internet	  has	  regularly	  been	  acclaimed	  
as	  a	  pervasive	  democratising	  agent	  (e.g.	  Groshek,	  2009).	  Whether	  or	  not	  the	  Internet	  in	  
itself	   is	   a	   disruptive	   technology,	   it	   has	   allowed	   disruption	   to	   travel	   along	   its	   highway,	  
from	  Napster	   to	  Airbnb,	  Uber	  and	  Oculus	  virtual	   reality	  hardware.	  However,	   reflecting	  
on	  the	  realities	  of	  the	  post-­‐Napster	  music	  marketplace,	  Lefsetz	  concedes:	  
The	   Internet	   was	   supposed	   to	   wipe	   out	   major	   labels.	   But	   it’s	   only	   made	   them	  
stronger…	  with	  major	   labels	   now…	  more	   powerful	   than	   at	   any	   time	   since	   Napster	  
when	  the	  Internet	  cacophony	  restored	  the	  major	  label	  hierarchy…	  Case	  in	  point,	  Sam	  
Smith	  has	  been	   featured	   in	  every	  major	  outlet,	   the	  press	  on	  his	  Apollo	   show	  alone	  
was	   incredible.	   This	   is	  what	   a	  major	   label	   can	   do,	   it	   can	   build	   a	   star	  overnight.	   An	  
indie	   act	   could	   be	   as	   good	   as	   Sam	   Smith,	   but	   without	   the	   muscle,	   money	   and	  
relationships,	  it	  could	  never	  get	  the	  push,	  the	  head	  start.	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (Lefsetz,	  2014)	  
What	  we	  need,	  therefore,	  is	  a	  passage	  of	  time	  through	  which	  we	  can	  understand	  more	  
fully	  whether	  the	  surfacing	  and	  status	  of	  Napster	  and	  Uber	  have	  resulted	  in	  substantive	  
entrepreneurial	  firms	  or	  travelled	  a	  long	  arc	  back	  to	  many	  of	  the	  same	  institutionalised	  
power	  relations	  these	  platforms	  appeared	  to	  disassemble	  (Carter	  &	  Rogers,	  2014).	  While	  
Christensen’s	  view	  was	  founded	  on	  failure,	  Schumpeter’s	  vision	  of	  creative	  destruction	  
was	   more	   encouragement	   of	   entrepreneurship	   to	   stimulate	   process	   and	   product	  
innovations	  between	  existing	   firms	  and	  potential	   competitors.	  The	   fiscal	  policy	   system	  
he	   outlined	   was	   designed	   to	   promote	   savings	   that	   could	   finance	   new	   ventures	   and	  
ensure	   American	   prosperity	   far	   into	   the	   future	   (McCraw,	   2007:431).	   The	   question	   is,	  
does	  creative	  destruction,	  with	  its	  focus	  on	  building	  sustainable	  competitive	  advantage	  
for	   nations,	   hold	   the	   same	  ambitions	   in	   the	  digital	   era	   as	   those	  of	   Schumpeter’s	   day?	  
And,	   in	   an	   increasingly	   boundary-­‐less	   era,	   does	   there	   still	   exist	   a	   role	   for	   national	   or	  
sectoral	  institutions	  in	  a	  nation’s	  innovation	  ecosystem?	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2.7 	   National	  systems	  of	  innovation	  
Freeman	  (1987)	  was	  the	  first	  to	  publish	  the	  expression	  ‘national	  systems	  of	  innovation’,	  
abbreviated	  to	  NSI,	  defining	  such	  a	  system	  as	  “the	  network	  of	  institutions	  in	  the	  public	  
and	  private	  sectors	  whose	  activities	  and	  interactions	  initiate,	  import,	  modify	  and	  diffuse	  
new	  technologies”	  (1987:1).	  The	  OECD	  (1997)	  acknowledged	  how	  the	  NSI	  rightly	  focused	  
on	   flows	   between	   technology	   and	   information	   among	   people,	   enterprises	   and	  
institutions,	   which	   are	   key	   to	   the	   innovation	   process.	   Innovation	   and	   technology	  
development	   are	   the	   results	   of	   a	   complex	   set	   of	   relationships	   among	   actors	   in	   the	  
system,	  which	  include	  enterprises,	  universities	  and	  government	  research	  institutes.	  For	  
policymakers,	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  NSI	  can	  help	  identify	  leverage	  points	  for	  boosting	  
innovative	   performance	   and	   general	   competitiveness.	   It	   can	   be	   used	   to	   highlight	  
mismatches	   within	   the	   system,	   within	   institutions	   and	   how	   government	   policies	   are	  
played	  out	  in	  the	  market,	  which	  can	  frustrate	  technology	  development	  and	  innovation.	  
Policies	  that	  seek	  to	  advance	  networking	  among	  the	  actors	  and	  institutions	  in	  the	  system	  
and	  that	  aim	  at	  augmenting	  the	  innovative	  capacity	  of	  firms,	  particularly	  their	  ability	  to	  
identify	  and	  absorb	  technologies,	  are	  most	  valuable	  in	  this	  context	  (1997:7).	  	  
According	   to	   Freeman	   (1995),	   the	   earliest	   exponent	   of	   the	   term	   “national	   systems	   of	  
innovation”	  was	  Bengt-­‐Ake	  Lundvall,	  although	  Friedrich	  List's	  conception	  of	  “the	  national	  
system	  of	  political	  economy”	  (1841)	  may	  well	  have	  been	  called	  “the	  national	  systems	  of	  
innovation”.	   In	  his	  work,	  List	  proposed	  a	  number	  of	  policies	  designed	  to	  help	   the	   (less	  
developed)	  German	  economy	  in	  combating	   its	  more	  developed	  neighbour,	  England.	  As	  
Freeman	  (op.	  cit.)	  noted,	  most	  of	  these	  policies	  were	  concerned	  with	  learning	  about	  new	  
technology	  and	  applying	  it	  to	  further	  industrialisation	  and	  economic	  growth	  through	  the	  
protection	  of	  infant	  industries.	  List	  was	  also	  clear	  that	  the	  health	  of	  a	  nation’s	  economy	  
was	  the	  result	  of	  knowledge	  accumulation	  and	  physical	  capital	   investments	  made	  over	  
generations	  and	  that	  in	  order	  to	  support	  future	  prosperity,	  industry	  should	  be	  linked	  to	  
the	   formal	   institutions	   of	   science	   and	   education.	   Technology-­‐related	   analysis	   has	  
habitually	  focused	  on	  inputs	  (e.g.	  research	  expenditures)	  and	  outputs	  (e.g.	  patents).	  But	  
the	  interactions	  among	  the	  actors	  involved	  in	  technology	  development	  are	  as	  important	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as	   investments	   in	   R&D,	   especially	   as	  many	   advanced	   economies	   have	  moved	   from	  an	  
industrial	  to	  a	  service	  basis	  (Cunningham,	  2014:14).	  	  
Results	   from	   this	   shift	   to	   a	   new	   set	   of	   ‘business-­‐pull’	   interactions	   have	   exposed	   the	  
problems	  with	   the	  prolonged	   reliance	  on	   a	   science-­‐push	  narrative.	   Large	   international	  
surveys	  such	  as	  the	  European	  Union’s	  Community	  Innovation	  Survey	  (CIS)	  point	  to	  how	  
the	  most	  innovative	  and	  entrepreneurial	  firms	  use	  internal	  and	  other	  enterprises’	  ideas	  
to	   develop	   businesses	   opportunities.	   In	   the	   2012	   survey	   EU	   firms	   provided	   data	   on	  
sources	  of	  information	  used	  by	  product	  and/or	  process	  innovative	  enterprises.	  Based	  on	  
this	  data,	  Figure	  2.2	  demonstrates	  the	  level	  of	  importance	  given	  by	  firms	  to	  each	  type	  of	  
source	   and	   whether	   it	   was	   used	   or	   not	   used.	   It	   can	   be	   seen	   that	   information	   from	  
suppliers	  is	  widely	  used	  among	  enterprises	  in	  the	  EU	  as	  a	  source	  of	  information:	  80	  per	  
cent	  of	   innovative	   firms	  used	   intelligence	  garnered	   from	  their	   suppliers	  between	  2010	  
and	   2012.	   The	   firm	   itself,	   and	   clients	   or	   customers	   from	   the	   private	   sector,	  were	   the	  
second	   and	   third	  most	   common	   sources	   of	   information,	   both	   reported	   by	  more	   than	  
70	  per	   cent	   of	   such	   enterprises	   in	   the	   EU	   for	   the	  period	  2010–12.	  However,	   less	   than	  
two-­‐fifths	   of	   innovative	   firms	   (38	   per	   cent)	   reported	   having	   used	   information	   from	  
higher	   education	   institutions	   (HEIs)	   between	   2010	   and	   2012;	   although	   among	   EU	  
member	   states	   there	   existed	   a	  wide	   range	   in	   the	   shares	   for	   this	   type	   of	   source,	  with	  
more	  than	  60	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  innovative	  firms	  in	  Norway	  and	  Finland	  reporting	  the	  use	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The	  share	  of	  innovative	  firms	  using	  information	  from	  the	  government,	  public	  or	  private	  
research	  institutes	  came	  in	  last	  place	  –	  along	  with	  HEIs	  the	  engine	  rooms	  of	  the	  ‘science-­‐
push’.	   	   This	   is	   perhaps	   hardly	   surprising	   when	   the	   renowned	   health	   journal,	  Nature,	  
published	  findings	  from	  a	  survey	  of	  1,576	  researchers	  who	  took	  an	  online	  questionnaire	  
on	   reproducibility	   in	   research	   (Baker,	  2016).	  More	   than	  70%	  of	   researchers	  have	   tried	  
and	  failed	  to	  reproduce	  another	  scientist's	  experiments,	  and	  more	  than	  half	  have	  failed	  
to	  reproduce	  their	  own	  experiments.	  Based	  on	  these	  findings	  Nature	   is	  now	  proposing	  
not	  to	  publish	  research	  until	  a	  secondary,	  independent	  ‘preclinical	  trial’	  has	  been	  carried	  
out.	   This	   crisis	   in	   trust	   follows	   Nobel	   prize-­‐winner,	   Professor	   Randy	   Schekman’s	  
announcement	  in	  2013,	  that	  his	  laboratory	  would	  no	  longer	  send	  research	  papers	  to	  the	  
top-­‐tier	   journals.	  Schekman	  cited	   that	  pressure	   to	  publish	   in	  such	   journals	  encouraged	  
researchers	   to	   cut	   corners	  and	  pursue	  popular	   fields	  of	   science	   instead	  of	  doing	  more	  
important	  work.	   	   Schekman	  went	   on	   to	   claim	   that	   the	   prestige	   of	   appearing	   in	  major	  
journal	   had	   led	   the	   Chinese	   Academy	   of	   Sciences	   to	   pay	   successful	   authors	   the	  
equivalent	   of	   US$30,000	   (£18,000),	   which	   for	   some	   researchers	   made	   half	   of	   their	  
income	  through	  such	  inducements	  (Sample,	  2013).	  
However,	   armed	  with	   these	   findings	   alone	   it	  would	   be	  wrong	   to	   assume	   that	   no	   role	  
exists	   for	   universities	   in	   a	   nation’s	   entrepreneurial	   innovation	   ecosystem	   (Sam	  &	   Van	  
Der	  Sijde,	  2014:900).	  Faced	  with	  the	  Community	  Innovation	  Survey	  findings	  and	  a	  shift	  in	  
UK	   Government	   oversight,	   culminating	   in	   universities	   and	   science	   policy	   being	   split	  
between	  two	  departments,	  led	  to	  two	  further	  outputs	  on	  universities	  as	  entrepreneurial	  
institutions	   and	   knowledge	   partner	   to	   regional	   micro	   and	   small	   firms	   (Culkin,	   2016a,	  
2016b	   [P7	  &	   P8]).	   Following	   the	  November	   2015	   Spending	   Review,	   a	   series	   of	   events	  
were	   set	   in	   motion	   that	   would	   have	   left	   just	   science,	   research	   and	   higher	   education	  
teaching	  as	   items	  of	  revenue	  spending	   in	  a	  post	  2017	  BIS	  budget.	  However,	   these	  two	  
papers	  were	  formulated	  pre-­‐Brexit	  and	  the	  changes	  I	  envisaged	  have	  gone	  even	  further;	  
now	   universities	   are	   divided	   between	   the	   Department	   for	   Education,	   which	   is	  
responsible	   for	   higher	   education,	   and	   the	   new	   Department	   for	   Business,	   Energy	   and	  
Industrial	  Strategy,	  which	  will	  oversee	  research.	  With	  the	  Treasury	  currently	  assessing	  38	  
landmark	   devolution	   deals	   from	   cities,	   towns	   and	   counties	   across	   the	   UK;	   it	   is	   not	  
unreasonable	  to	  expect	  that,	  most	  of	  the	  £1.5bn	  adult	  skills	  budget	  will	  be	  moved	  into	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the	   regions	  along	   the	   lines	  of	   the	  Greater	  Manchester	  devolution	  deal	   struck	   in	  2014.	  
This	  will	   come	   as	   little	   surprise	   to	   some	   commentators	   as	  Nowotny	  et	   al.,	   (2013)	   and	  
Scott	   (2013)	   noted	   there	   has	   always	   existed	   a	   lack	   of	   coordination	   between	   national	  
policies	   for	  higher	  education	  and	   regional	   development;	   notwithstanding	   the	   fact	   that	  
universities	   contribute	   to	   UK	   productivity	   targets	   by	   delivering	   direct	   and	   indirect	  
expenditure	   on	   goods	   and	   services,	   providing	   jobs,	   developing	   a	   more	   highly	   skilled	  
workforce	  and	  generating	  new	  knowledge.	  	  
2.8 	   Chapter	  summary	  
I	   have	   tried	   to	   demonstrate	   in	   this	   chapter	   the	   dilemma	   for	   both	   private	   and	   public	  
sector	   agents	   is	   significant	   in	   that	   they	   seek	   to	   influence	   the	   adoption	   of	   competing	  
technologies	   as	   a	   way	   of	   supporting	   the	   developments	   in	   national	   and	   regional	  
innovation	   systems,	   which	   themselves	   are	   increasingly	   dependent	   on	   services.	   In	   this	  
respect,	  they	  exhibit	  Schumpeterian	  tendencies	  in	  that	  “every	  social	  environment	  has	  its	  
own	  ways	  of	  filling	  the	  entrepreneurial	  function”	  (Schumpeter,	  1949:70),	  acknowledging	  
that	  one	  outcome	  of	  a	  market	  disruption	   is	  that	   it	  brings	  with	   it	  multiple	  and	  mutually	  
exclusive	  solutions	  (David,	  1985,	  2007).	  This,	  in	  turn,	  leads	  to	  the	  development	  of	  many	  
different	  standards	  if	  no	  supplier	  can	  achieve	  early	  market	  leadership,	  which	  can	  lead	  to	  
‘lock	  in’;	  or	  at	  least	  that	  was	  an	  issue	  in	  a	  pre-­‐digital,	  analogue-­‐focused	  economy.	  	  
I	  have	  also	  shown	  that	  it	   is	  difficult	  to	  dispute	  the	  view	  of	  Cunningham	  when	  he	  states	  
that	   there	   is	   a	   compelling	   need	   to	   accommodate	   the	   arguments	   and	   evidence	   for	  
innovation	   in	   the	   service	   sector,	   which	   has	   been	   poorly	   served	   by	   the	   dominant	  
technological	   product	   and	   process	   (TPP)	   approaches	   (2014:38).	   For	   example,	   hard-­‐to-­‐
access,	  intermediate	  services	  are	  widely	  available,	  a	  reality	  that	  has	  created	  a	  system	  of	  
global	  specialisation	  in	  a	  post-­‐digital	  era.	  However,	  on	  this	  ‘flat’	  landscape,	  characterised	  
by	  hyper-­‐competition,	  the	  capabilities	  required	  to	  orchestrate	  and	  deploy	  the	  available	  
resources	  remain	  scarce	  and	  geographically	  isolated	  (Teece	  &	  Al-­‐Aali,	  2013).	  	  
Perhaps	   the	   most	   important	   class	   of	   intangible	   assets	   not	   universally	   available	   is	  
technological	   know-­‐how,	   which	   is	   why	   social	   researchers	   claim	   that	   technological	  
innovation	   is	   a	   sociological	   concept	   and	   that	   the	   concept	   of	   basic	   research	   originates	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from	   natural	   scientists	   (Kline,	   1995;	   Lucier,	   2012;	   Godin,	   2014).	   Know-­‐how	   and	   other	  
intangibles	   are	   increasingly	   the	   ‘bottleneck	   assets’	   that	   allow	   innovating	   firms	   to	  
differentiate	  and	  establish	   some	  degree	  of	   competitive	  advantage.	   They	   cause	   ‘hills’	   –	  
and	  sometimes	  ‘mountains’	  –	  to	  appear	  on	  otherwise	  flat	  competitive	  landscapes.	  Value	  
can	  flow	  to	  the	  enterprise	  from	  the	  astute	  creation,	  combination,	  transfer,	  accumulation	  
and	  protection	  of	   intangible	  assets.	  Such	  assets	  are	   the	  new	   ‘natural	   resources’	  of	   the	  
global	   economy	   (Teece	  &	  Al-­‐Aali,	   2013;	  Cunningham,	  2014)	  but	   they	  are	  not	  naturally	  
occurring	   and	   depend	   on	   managerial	   action	   and,	   in	   part,	   on	   national	   systems	   of	  
innovation	  (Nelson,	  1993:13).	  
The	   question	   is	   whether	   or	   not	   creative	   destruction,	   with	   its	   focus	   on	   building	  
sustainable	   competitive	   advantage	   for	   nations	   in	   the	   digital	   era,	   holds	   the	   same	  
ambitions	  as	  those	  of	  Schumpeter’s	  day.	  And,	  given	  the	  findings	  from	  the	  CIS	  Survey	  of	  
2012,	   does	   there	   exist	   a	   role	   for	   national	   institutions	   –	   such	   as	   HEIs	   and	   government	  
agencies	  –	  in	  a	  nation’s	  innovation	  ecosystem?	  Governments	  across	  the	  world	  speak	  of	  
the	  contribution	  that	   technological	   innovation	  has	  made	  to	  national	  economic	  growth,	  
which	   in	   turn	   has	   been	   persuasive	   as	   a	   rationale	   for	   the	   development	   of	   policy	   to	  
stimulate	   technological	   innovation.	   As	   Harris	   makes	   clear,	   innovation	   becomes	   a	  
supercategory,	  it	  “integrates	  what	  would	  otherwise	  be	  separate	  activities	  and	  inquiries”	  
in	   order	   to	   redraw	   the	   intellectual	   world	   that	   society	   adopts	   (2005:	   xi).	  What	   I	   have	  
therefore	  sought	  to	  demonstrate	  is	  that	  over	  the	  twentieth	  century	  innovation	  became	  a	  
fundamental	  axiom,	  percolating	  through	  the	  corridors	  of	  power.	  Innovation	  was	  seen	  as	  
the	  panacea	  for	  every	  socioeconomic	  problem.	  What	  has	  been	  presented	  is	  grounded	  in	  
the	   outputs	   of	   peer-­‐assessed	   researchers	   and	   accepted	   international	   definitions;	  
whatever	   society’s	   problems	   might	   be,	   innovation	   is	   the	   a	   priori	   solution	   (Godin,	  
2016:550).	  	  
Finally	   in	   this	   chapter	   I	   demonstrated	   that,	   despite	   its	   origins,	  when	   higher	   education	  
largely	   reflected	   the	   values	   of	   localism,	   the	   reform	   of	   English	   higher	   education	   (first)	  
triggered	  by	   the	  Browne	  Report	   (2010)	  encouraged	  universities	   to	   shift	   their	  attention	  
towards	   an	   international	   growth	   trajectory,	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   local	   and	   regional	  
development	   support	   (Goddard	   et	   al.,	   2014).	   But	   as	   we	   know,	   universities	   are	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somewhere	   in	   the	  UK	  and	   that	  somewhere	  matters,	  especially	   since	   the	  demise	  of	   the	  
Business	  Link	  network	  in	  2011	  and	  the	  government	  committed	  to	  a	  widening	  devolution	  
agenda	  (Christopherson	  et	  al.,	  2014).	  Concerning	  two	  of	  the	  appended	  papers	  [P7	  &	  8]	  I	  
suggested	   why,	   and	   how	   universities	   might	   reinvigorate	   their	   relationships	   with	   local	  
business,	   to	   retain	   highly	   skilled	   talent,	   re-­‐exert	   their	   influence	   on	   local	   and	   regional	  
economies	   and	   emerge	   as	   a	   long-­‐term	   anchor	   institution	   (Sam	   &	   Van	   Der	   Sijde,	  
2014:892-­‐893).	   As	   such,	   the	   overall	   purpose	   of	   the	   chapter	   was	   to	   present	   an	  
overarching	   view	   of	   the	   phenomenon	   before	   exploring	   the	   three	   elements	   of	   the	  
conceptual	  framework	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  dissertation	  and	  the	  published	  material.	  In	  this	  
context,	  these	  concepts	  have	  neither	  been	  debated	  nor	  explored	  in	  any	  depth.	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Chapter	  3:	  Research	  design	  
 
 
3.1	  	   Research	  problem	  and	  justification	  
A	  growing	  body	  of	  research	  has	  sought	  to	  address	  reasons	  behind	  why	  incumbent	  firms	  
are	  often	  displaced	  by	  entrants,	  under	  conditions	  of	  discontinuous	  technological	  change	  
(Tripsas	   &	   Gavetti,	   2000;	   Gavetti,	   et	   al.,	   2005;	   Sandström,	   2013)	   and/or	   digitalization	  
(e.g.	  the	  process	  of	  making	  digital	  everything	  that	  can	  be	  digitized	  to	  change	  a	  business	  
model	  and	  provide	  new	  revenue	  and	  value-­‐producing	  opportunities).	  As	  discussed	  in	  the	  
previous	   chapter,	   recent	   thinking	   around	   innovation	   policies,	   models	   and	  
approaches,	   highlights	   the	   importance	   of	   entrepreneurial	   innovation	   (both	   public	   and	  
private);	  an	  increasing	  reliance	  on	  Mode	  2	  knowledge	  on	  technological	  advances;	  and,	  a	  
need	   for	   content	   creators,	   intermediaries	   and	   consumers	   to	   cooperate,	   learn	   and	  
construct	  commercial	  and	  cultural	  artefacts	  to	  make	  effective	  contributions	  to	  regional	  
and	  national	  innovation	  systems.	  The	  discussion	  around	  entrepreneurial	  innovation	  also	  
provides	  a	  novel	  way	   in	  which	  to	  re-­‐evaluate	  the	  traditional	   film	  chain.	  The	  process	  of	  
digitalization	  allows	  us	  to	  reimagine	  this	  chain,	  as	  part	  of	  an	  evolving	  value	  network4.	  A	  
chain	  dependent	  up	  to	  now	  on	  a	  set	  of	  intricate	  relationships	  constructed	  at	  the	  start	  of	  
the	   last	   century.	   Such	   connections	  were	   underpinned	   by	   the	   colluding	   role	   played	   by	  
first-­‐tier	   cinemas,	   that	   enabled	   the	   major	   US	   studios	   to	   continue	   to	   dominate	   the	  
industry,	  despite	  the	  fact	  those	  cinemas	  only	  constituted	  a	  small	  portion	  of	  the	  overall	  
exhibition	  market	  (Huettig,	  1944).	  	  
3.2	  	   Research	  approach	  
The	  principal	  epistemological	  and	  ontological	  considerations	  shaping	  the	  research	  design	  
and	   methodology	   for	   this	   dissertation	   are	   constructivism	   and	   interpretivism.	   The	  
iterative	  research	  approach	  adopted	  to	  explore	  this	  phenomenon	  is	  that	  of	  pragmatism,	  
due	  to	  the	  insights	  it	  offers	  for	  research	  into	  management	  and	  organisations;	  as	  well	  as	  
providing	   an	   epistemological	   justification	   for	   mixing	   approaches	   and	   methods	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	   This	   composite	   analysis	   is	   the	   first	   of	   its	   kind	   to	   examine	   these	   issues	  within	   the	   bounds	   of	   a	   national	  
innovation	  system.	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(Onwuegbuzie	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  Gray,	  2013;	  Slife	  &	  Williams,	  1995;	  Manning,	  1997).	   	  As	  this	  
dissertation	   seeks	   to	  address	  one	  key	   research	  question	  and	   three	   secondary	   research	  
questions,	   I	   employed	   a	   mixed	   methodology	   strategy,	   based	   on	   a	   complementary	  
relationship	  between	  the	  following	  qualitative	  and	  quantitative	  research	  methodologies:	  	  
Historical	   research	  to	  source	  key	  documents	  that	  describe	  the	  nature,	  development	  
and	  performance	  of	  the	  film	  and	  audio	  industry	  and	  the	  national	  innovation	  system	  in	  
each	   of	   the	   three	   research	   countries.	   Key	   documents	   were	   also	   examined	   for	   any	  
mention	  of	  how	  the	  creative	  industries	  contribute	  to	  the	  national	  innovation	  system	  
in	  each	  of	  the	  countries.	  	  
Multiple-­‐case	   studies	   research	   to	   report	   on	   the	   actions	   of	   entrepreneurs,	   senior	  
business	   leaders,	   policymakers,	   technologists	   and	   intermediaries	   in	   the	   fields	   of	  
science,	   wireless	   communication,	   engineering	   and	   innovation,	   in	   each	   of	   three	  
countries	  (e.g.	  one	  case	  study	  per	  country).	  	  
Collection	  and	  analysis	  of	  statistical	  data	  that	  complemented	  the	  historical	   research	  
component.	  	  
Engaging	  with	   informants	  over	  an	  extended	  period	  of	  time	  requires	  practical	  solutions,	  
which	   is	  often	  underexplored	   in	  the	  research	   literature.	  Building	  on	  the	  1988	  paper	  by	  
Buchanan,	   et	   al.,	   entitled	   ‘Getting	   in,	   getting	   on,	   getting	   out,	   and	   getting	   back,’	   I	  
designed	  a	  novel	  approach	  to	  overcome	  what	  the	  writers	  termed,	  the	  ‘darker’	  realities	  
of	  field	  research	  work	  (1988:67).	  	  While	  the	  ‘opportunistic’	  side	  of	  Buchanan,	  et	  al.,	  work	  
is	   acknowledged,	   it	   often	   appears	   to	   relate	   to	   studies	   in	   large	   organizations;	   such	   an	  
approach	  does	  not	  necessarily	  help	  build	  trusted	  relationships	  and	  maintaining	  goodwill	  
in	  dynamic,	  creative	  networks,	  spread	  across	  (in	  this	  instance)	  two	  continents	  and	  three	  
countries	   (Pauwels	  &	  Matthyssens,	   2004).	   I	   provide	   an	   explanation	  of	   the	   approaches	  
used	   further	   in,	   Sections’	   3.4	   -­‐	   3.6;	   they	   are	   described	   more	   fully	   in	   the	   associated	  
papers.	  	  
While	   in	  philosophical	   terms	  both	  positivism	  and	  constructivism	  paradigms	  are	   located	  
at	  opposite	  ends	  of	  a	  research	  spectrum,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  find	  the	  two	  employed	  in	  one	  
study.	  In	  support	  of	  this	  argument,	  Guba	  and	  Lincoln	  assert	  there	  is	  “great	  potential	  for	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the	   interweaving	  of	  viewpoints,	   for	   the	   incorporation	  of	  multiple	  perspectives,	  and	   for	  
borrowing,	   or	   bricolage,	   where	   borrowing	   seems	   useful,	   richness	   enhancing,	   or	  
theoretically	   heuristic”	   (2005:197).	   In	   researching	   topics,	   where	   ‘true	   statements’	   are	  
notoriously	  difficult	  to	  acquire	  –	  as	  in	  the	  film	  industry	  –	  it	  provides	  the	  researcher	  with	  
an	  enriching	  and	  flexible	  approach,	  especially	  for	  the	  historical	  and	  case	  study	  research,	  
while	  allowing	  them	  to	  respect	  Tashakkori	  and	  Teddlie’s	  axiom	  to	  “study	  what	  interests	  
you	  and	  is	  of	  value	  to	  you”	  (1998:30).	  	  
With	   its	   implied	   relationship	   between	   ‘researcher’	   and	   ‘researched’,	   pragmatism	  
became	  the	  most	  appropriate	  epistemological	   position	   in	  which	  to	   locate	  this	  study.	  It	  
afforded	  me	   the	   flexibility	   to	  modify	   my	   methods	   as	   further	   evidence	   was	   revealed,	  
sustained	   the	  methodologies	   selected	  and	   allowed	  me	  to	   construct	  my	  own	   response	  
to	   the	   outcomes,	  over	  a	  ten	  year	  period	  (Rorty,	  1989;	  Stich,	  1990;	  Lincoln,	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  
And	   so,	   to	   a	   pragmatist,	   “the	   mandate	   of	   science	   is	   not	   to	   find	   truth	   or	   reality,	   the	  
existence	  of	  which	  are	  perpetually	   in	  dispute,	  but	  to	  facilitate	  human	  problem-­‐solving”	  
(Powell,	  2001:884).	  	  	  
3.2.1	  Pragmatism	  
The	  foundations	  of	  the	   ‘classical’	  pragmatic	  philosophical	  tradition	  can	  be	  found	   in	  the	  
writings	   of	   Charles	   Sanders	   Peirce	   (1839–1914),	  William	   James	   (1842–1910)	   and	   John	  
Dewey	   (1859–1952).	   All	   three	   of	   the	   founding	   pragmatists	   combined	   a	   naturalistic,	  
Darwinian	  view	  of	  human	  beings	  with	  a	  distrust	  of	  the	  problems	  which	  philosophy	  had	  
inherited	   from	  Descartes,	  Hume	  and	  Kant	   (Rorty,	  1989).	  Despite	   sharing	  similar	   ideals,	  
each	  had	  their	  own	  particular	  approach	  to	  pragmatism	  (Heelan	  &	  Schulkin,	  1998;	  Haack,	  
2003).	  	  
However,	  there	  is	  general	  agreement	  among	  Pragmatists	  that	  research	  occurs	  in	  social,	  
political,	  historical	  and	  other	  contexts.	  In	  this	  way,	  mixed-­‐methods	  studies	  may	  include	  a	  
postmodern	  turn,	  a	  theoretical	  lens	  that	  is	  reflective	  of	  social	  justice	  and	  political	  aims.	  
So,	   embracing	   a	   pragmatic	   epistemological	   position	   opens	   the	   door	   for	   the	   mixed-­‐
methods	   researcher	   to	   incorporate	   multiple	   methods	   as	   well	   as	   a	   diverse	   range	   of	  
approaches	   to	   data	   collection	   and	   analysis	   (Creswell,	   2013:203).	   Pragmatic	  method	   is,	  
therefore,	  concerned	  with	  the	  uncovering	  of	  goals,	   interests,	  values	  and	  consequences	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(Bryman,	  1985;	  Cherryholmes,	  1992).	  It	  is	  here	  where	  it	  differs	  from	  neutral	  observation,	  
historical	  and	  hermeneutical	  analysis.	  Pragmatism	  is	  thus	  an	  epistemology,	  which	  differs	  
from	  empiricism,	  rationalism	  and	  historicism	  (Ormerod,	  2006).	  
3.3	  	   Methodologies	   and	  methods	  
Before	  explaining	  the	  approach	  undertaken	  for	  this	  dissertation,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  address	  
the	   words	   ‘method’	   and	   ‘methodology’.	   According	   to	   Crotty	   (1998)	  methods	   are	   the	  
practical	  tools	  you	  employ	  for	  undertaking	  research,	  the	  techniques	  or	  procedures	  used	  
to	   gather	   or	   analyse	   data	   related	   to	   some	   research	   question	   or	   hypothesis,	   whereas,	  
methodology	  (or	  research	  design)	  is	  the	  debate	  around	  methods	  or	  the	  strategy,	  plan	  of	  
action,	  process	  or	  design,	  stipulating	  the	  bases	  guiding	  the	  choice	  and	  use	  of	  a	  specific	  
set	  of	  research	  methods	  (1998:3).	  In	  an	  attempt	  to	  moderate	  uncertainty	  and	  a	  growing	  
recognition	   that	   findings	   (generated	   from	   both	   quantitative	   and	   qualitative	   research	  
methodologies)	   would	   shine	   a	   brighter	   light	   on	   the	   research	   questions,	   a	   mixed	  
methodology	  procedure	  was	  employed	  in	  this	  dissertation	  (Creswell,	  et	  al.,	  2003).	  	  
In	   addition,	   this	   approach	   helped	   to	   produce	   a	   more	   complete	   picture	   of	   the	  
phenomenon,	   one	   that	   was	   more	   meaningful	   than	   each	   of	   the	   components	   (Feilzer,	  
2010;	  Bryman	  &	  Bell,	  2015).	  In	   this	   case,	  the	  constituent	  parts	   were	  historical	  research,	  
case	   study	   research	   and	   statistical	   collection	   and	   analysis.	   For	   example,	   the	  
development	   of	   national	   innovation	   systems	   and	   breakthrough	   (or	   disruptive)	  
technology	   was	   generated	   from	   analysis	   of	   secondary	   data	   (e.g.	   government,	   trade,	  
and	   academic	   papers)	   and	   interviews	   were	   supported	   through	   an	   exploration	   of	   the	  
impact	   of	   breakthrough	   technologies	   using	   statistical	   data.	   In	   contrast,	   the	  
entrepreneurial	   innovation	   constituent	   was	   constructed	   entirely	   within	   case	   study	  
research,	  a	  qualitative	  methodology	  involving	  participant	  observation	  at	  industry	  events	  
and	   panel	   discussions	   (in	   person	   and	   online),	   and	   semi-­‐structured	   interviews	   in	   a	  
number	  of	  different	  countries.	  The	  key	  stages	  involved	  in	  the	  diffusion	  and	  adoption	  of	  
the	  digital	   cinema	   innovation	   took	  place	  broadly	  within	  a	  10-­‐year	  period	   (2003–2013),	  
and	   for	   that	   reason,	   the	   innovation	   lent	   itself	   to	   historical	   research	   and	   statistical	  
collection	  and	  analysis.	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Data	  were	  collected	  over	  a	  six-­‐year	  period:	  primarily,	  but	  not	  exclusively	   from	  2006	  to	  
2010	  in	  the	  US	  and	  UK,	  and	  from	  2009	  to	  2012	  in	  Norway.	  Document	  analysis,	  interviews	  
with	   innovation	   and	   cinema	   industry	   experts,	   and	   statistical	   analysis	   were	   the	   main	  
methods	  used	  in	  the	  historical	  research	  component.	  	  
Case	   study	   data	   collected	   via	   semi-­‐structured	   interviews,	   short	   observations	   and	  
document	   analysis	   were	   captured	   and	   analysed.	   Data	   collected	   from	   the	   European	  
Audiovisual	   Observatory	   (EAO),	   Organisation	   for	   Economic	   Cooperation	   and	  
Development	  (OECD),	  Screen	  Digest/IHC,	  and	  country	  sources	  in	  relation	  to:	   innovation	  
investment	   and	   performance;	   size	   and	   outputs	   of	   film	   and	   audiovisual	   systems;	  
international	  gatherings	  of	  industry	  players,	  and	  economic	  and	  non-­‐economic	  impacts	  of	  
capital	   investment	   at	   the	   box-­‐office,	   all	   contributed	   to	   the	   quantitative	   research	  
component.	   This	   combination	   of	   qualitative	   and	   quantitative	   viewpoints,	   data	  
collection,	   analysis	   and	   inference	   techniques	   is	   situated	  at	   the	  heart	  of	  mixed-­‐methods	  
research	  and	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  breadth	  and	  depth	  of	  understanding	  and	  corroboration	  
(Johnson	  et	  al.,	  2007:123)	  is	  one	  way	  of	  improving	  both	  the	  validity	  and	  reliability	  over	  a	  
single	  method	  approach	   (McCutcheon	  &	  Meredith,	  1993;	  Neuman,	  2013;	  Tashakkori	  &	  
Teddlie,	  2008).	  
Any	   study	   in	   the	   film	   and	   AV	   industry	   is	   fraught	   with	   difficulties.	   First,	   there	   is	   the	  
secretive	   nature	   of	   deal	   making	   at	   all	   stages	   of	   the	   supply	   chain	   from	   script	  
development,	   through	   green-­‐lighting	   a	   project	   to	   sales	   and	   distribution	   across	   many	  
territories	   (Daniels	  et	  al.,	   1998)	   and	   finally	   audience	  measurement.	  As	   a	   consequence,	  
there	   is	   little	   published	   data	   available	   to	   analyse	   with	   any	   great	   level	   of	   statistical	  
confidence.	  A	  mixed-­‐methods	  approach	  provides	  opportunities	  to	  react	  to,	  reflect	  upon	  
and	   incorporate	   emerging	   themes	   in	   a	   dynamic	   system	   requiring	   the	   researcher	   to	  
embrace	  expansive	  and	  creative	   lines	  of	   inquiry.	   In	  addition,	   the	   fieldwork	  was	   spread	  
across	  a	  number	  of	  countries	  poses	  a	  challenge	  in	  terms	  of	  interviewing	  key	  players;	  this	  
challenge	  was	  deepened	  when	  there	  are	  both	  private	  and	  public	  players	  engaged	  in	  the	  
innovation	  process.	  
The	  way	  that	  I	  found	  to	  overcome	  this	  problem,	  in	  part,	  was	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  what	  
Maskell	  et	  al.,	  referred	  to	  as	  “temporary	  clustering”	  (2006:997).	  My	  approach	  made	  use	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of	   the	   fact	   that	   film	   and	   cinema	  professionals	  meet	   regularly	   at	   conventions,	   festivals	  
and	   conferences.	   Here,	   their	   latest	   and	   most	   advanced	   findings,	   innovations	   and	  
products	   are	   demonstrated	   and	   evaluated	   through	   a	  mix	   of	   exhibitions	   and	   seminars.	  
The	  benefits	  are	  clear	  if	  one	  makes	  the	  most	  use	  of	  the	  networking	  opportunities	  –	  the	  
existence	  of	  local	  buzz	  of	  high	  quality	  and	  relevance	  created	  a	  dynamic	  cluster,	  providing	  
follow-­‐on	   interviewing	   opportunities	   that	   I	   used	   to	   build	   relationships	   and	   trust,	   over	  
time	  (Bathelt	  et	  al.,	  2004:45;	  Hardy	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  The	  existence	  of	  temporary	  clustering	  
in	  the	  film	  and	  AV	  industry	  proved	  particularly	  well	  suited	  to	  data	  collection.	  I	  was	  able	  
to	  maintain	  an	  ongoing	  conversation	  with	  8	  –	  10	  respondents	   in	  which	  to,	  develop	  my	  
understanding	   of	   the	   subject,	   refine	   case-­‐study	   ideas,	   test	   (and	   receive)	   news	   stories	  
from	   in-­‐country	   trade-­‐press	   and	   get	   early	   warning	   of	   when	   they	   were	   travelling	   to	  
conventions,	  festivals	  and	  conferences.	  	  
Two	   of	   the	  most	   important	   film	   and	   AV	   industry	   conventions	   are,	   the	   American	   Film	  
Market	   (AFM)	   in	   Los	   Angeles	   and	   the	   International	   Broadcasting	   Conference	   (IBC),	   in	  
Amsterdam.	   Both	   annual	   events	   attract	   key	   personnel	   from	   film	   and	   AV	   industries	  
around	   the	   world	   to	   network	   (including	   cinema	   owners,	   marketing	   and	   sales	   agents,	  
distributors,	  studio	  executives,	  national	  and	  regional	  film	  institutions).	  These	  clustered,	  
temporary	  markets	   create	   a	   rich	   space	   in	  which	   the	   researcher	   can	   reach	   and	  engage	  
with	   normally	   dispersed	   and	  difficult-­‐to-­‐interview	   senior	   personnel	   in	   the	   film	   and	  AV	  
industry.	  While	  the	  AFM	  is	   focused	  entirely	  on	  the	  film	   industry,	   the	   IBC	   is	   the	   leading	  
international	   forum	   for	   the	   electronic	   media	   industry.	   It	   attracts	   more	   than	   50,000	  
visitors	   from	   160	   countries	   and	   responded	   to	   the	   emergence	   of	   digital	   cinema	   by	  
creating	   a	   specialist	   day	   within	   the	   conference;	   it	   brings	   together	   senior	   personnel	  
involved	   in	   the	   creation,	  management	   and	   delivery	   of	   entertainment	   content	   training	  
through	   a	   mix	   of	   keynote	   talks,	   workshops,	   and	   panel	   discussions.	   Overall,	   such	  
initiatives	   act	   as	   an	  efficient	  way	   to	   share	  market,	   product	   and	   service	   intelligence	  on	  
specialist	   topics.	   Similar	   to	   the	   industry	   markets,	   these	   short,	   intensive	   events	   pull	  
together	  a	  diverse	  range	  of	  high	  level,	  key	  industry	  figures	  to	  debate	  the	  most	  pressing	  
issues	  in	  relevant	  areas	  for	  an	  engaged	  audience.	  In	  the	  course	  of	  this	  research,	  primary	  
data	  have	  been	  collected	  at	  the	  events	  shown	  in	  Table	  3.1,	  among	  others.	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By	   attending	   these	   temporary	   digital	   cinema-­‐clustering	   events,	   entry	  was	   gained	   to	   a	  
wide	  range	  of	  intelligence	  and	  intellectual	  property	  that	  would	  otherwise	  be	  inaccessible	  
via	  more	  traditional	  approaches	  to	  data	  collection.	  The	  benefits	  -­‐	  measured	  in	  costs	  and	  
timescales	   -­‐	   make	   temporary	   clusters	   ideally	   suitable	   for	   the	   research	   agenda.	  
Moreover,	  during	   the	  diffusion	  and	  adoption	   stages	  of	   the	  digital	   cinema	   rollout,	   such	  
events	  captured	  the	  zeitgeist,	  where	  latest	  industry	  knowledge	  was	  exchanged	  and	  new	  
management	  approaches	  explored	  in	  a	  way	  that	  had	  not	  been	  possible	  before.	  
Table	  3.1:	  Non-­‐exhaustive	  list	  of	  events	  attended	  for	  data	  collection	  
Industry	  markets	   • IBC,	  Amsterdam	  (2010)	  
• IBC,	  Amsterdam	  (2008)	  
• American	  Film	  Market,	  Los	  Angeles	  (2007)	  
• IBC,	  Amsterdam	  (2006)	  
• IBC,	  Amsterdam	  (2005)	  
Industry	  events	  
	  
• D-­‐Cinema	  Day,	  Amsterdam	  (2010)	  
• 3D	  Systems,	  London	  (2010)	  
• Digital	  Cinema	  Roadshow,	  Manchester	  (2009)	  
• Digital	  Cinema	  Roadshow,	  Hull	  (2009)	  
• Digital	  Cinema	  Roadshow,	  Cambridge	  (2009)	  
• Digital	  Cinema	  Roadshow,	  Wolverhampton	  (2009)	  
• Digital	  Cinema	  Roadshow,	  London	  (2009)	  
• D-­‐Cinema	  Day,	  Amsterdam	  (2008)	  
• D-­‐Cinema	  Day,	  Amsterdam	  (2006)	  
• European	  Digital	  Cinema	  Forum,	  Amsterdam	  (2006)	  




• Old	   Dogs,	   New	   Tricks:	   the	  many	  modern	   forms	   of	   film	  
	   and	  their	  audience,	  London	  (2013)	  
• Digital	   Storytelling:	   The	   Art	   &	   Science	   of	   Visual	  
	   Effects,	  Oslo	  (2012)	  
• European	  Digital	  Cinema	  Forum,	  Amsterdam	  (2010)	  
• European	  Digital	  Cinema,	  London	  (2008)	  
• European	  Digital	  Cinema	  Forum,	  Amsterdam	  (2008)	  
• 9th	   DeSantis	   Center	   Workshop	   in	   Motion	   Picture	  
	   Industry	  Studies,	  Los	  Angeles	  (2007)	  
• European	  Digital	  Cinema,	  London	  (2006)	  
• European	  Digital	  Cinema	  Forum,	  Amsterdam	  (2006)	  
• 8th	   DeSantis	   Center	   Workshop	   in	   Motion	   Picture	  
	   Industry	  Studies,	  Fort	  Lauderdale	  (2006)	  	  
• European	  Digital	  Cinema	  Forum,	  Amsterdam	  (2005)	  
• 7th	   DeSantis	   Center	   Workshop	   in	   Motion	   Picture	  
	   Industry	  Studies,	  Los	  Angeles	  (2005)	  
Source:	  Author.	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A	   range	   of	   data	   gathering	   methods	   were	   used	   during	   these	   events,	   including	  
ethnographic	  and	  unobtrusive	  approaches,	  direct	  observation,	  free	  and	  semi-­‐structured	  
interviewing.	   This	   process	   helped	   me	   to	   explore	   the	   role	   of	   the	   distribution	   and	  
exhibition	   of	   films	   within	   the	   UK,	   Norway	   and	   the	   US	   national	   innovation	   systems;	  
three	   countries	   that	   exhibit	   marked	   differences	   between	   them	   in	   terms	   of	   their	  
approach	   to	  entrepreneurial	   innovation	   (Culkin,	   2016a,	   2016b	   [P7	  &	  P8]).	   The	  process	  
also	   contributed	   in	   the	   development	   of	   the	   three	   constituents	   of	   my	   conceptual	  
framework	  (Fig:	  3.1):	  
•  Constituent	   1:	   A	   state	   of	   entrepreneurial	   innovation	  whereby	   a	   sector	   is	   able	   to	  
take	   on	   new	   paths	   of	   development	   or	   several	   paths	   at	   once	   without	   recourse	   to	  
breakthrough	   technologies.	   It	   is	   resilient	   to	  change	   from	  outside	  and	  allows	  strong	  
co-­‐evolution	  between	  technological	  development	  and	  supportive	  institutions.	  
• Constituent	  2:	   A	  state	  of	  responsive	  innovation	  of	  ‘incremental	  change’.	  These	  are	  
minor	   changes	  among	   sector	   incumbents,	  possibly	   leading	   to	  a	   state	  of	  hysteresis,	  
where	   there	   is	   a	   general	   unwillingness	   to	   change	   and	   little	   ability	   to	   renew	   or	  
reinvent	  an	  area.	  This	  may	  or	  may	  not	   lead	  to	   further	   institutional	  change	  and	   if	   it	  
does,	  only	  to	  minor	  adaptations.	  	  
• Constituent	  3:	  The	  third	  and	  most	  negative	  outcome	  is	  that	  of	  the	  state	  of	  ‘lock-­‐in’.	  
The	  sector	  fails	  to	  adapt	  in	  any	  way	  to	  change	  and	  eventually	  faces	  economic	  decline	  
or	  redundancy.	  	  
Following	   the	   development	   of	   the	   three	   constituents,	   in	   Fig	   3.2,	   I	   have	   overlaid	   the	  
outputs	   from	   published	   papers	   on	   the	   conceptual	   framework	   to	   demonstrate	  
(graphically)	  how	  each	  contributes	   to	   the	  dissertation	  overall.	  Taken	  together	  with	   the	  
inputs	  (Table	  1.1	  [P20])	  this	  helps	  to	  establish	  how	  the	  methodology	  emerged	  over	  time,	  
building	   from	   scraps	   of	   data	   to	   complex	   data	   sets	   and	   provides	   a	   contribution	   to	  
knowledge.	  Data	  were	  collected	  in	  and	  from	  the	  three	  countries	  over	  a	  six-­‐year	  period:	  
primarily	  –	  but	  not	  exclusively	  –	  from	  2006	  to	  2010	  in	  the	  US;	  from	  2006	  to	  2011	  in	  the	  
UK;	  and	  from	  2009	  to	  2012	  in	  Norway.	  	  
Document	   analysis,	   interviews	   with	   innovation	   and	   cinema	   experts	   and	   statistical	  
analysis	   were	   used	   in	   the	   historical	   research	   component.	   Data	   for	   the	   multiple	   case	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studies	   (each	   unit	   =	   one	   country)	   was	   collected	   via	   semi-­‐structured	   interviews,	   short	  
observations	  and	  document	  analysis	  were	  captured	  and	  analysed	  within	   two	  elements	  
of	   the	   conceptual	   framework.	   Data	   collected	   from	  the	   European	   Audiovisual	  
Observatory	   (EAO),	   the	   OECD,	   Screen	   Digest/IHC	   and	   country	   sources	   in	   relation	   to:	  
innovation	   investment	   and	   performance;	   size	   and	   outputs	   of	   film	   and	   audiovisual	  
systems;	   international	  gatherings	  of	   industry	  players,	  and	  economic	  and	  non-­‐economic	  
impacts	   of	   capital	   investment	   at	   the	   box-­‐office,	   all	   contributed	   to	   the	   quantitative	  
research	  component.	  
Interviews	  were	  undertaken	  with	  20	  senior	  executives,	  analysts	  and	  commentators	  in	  a	  
mix	  of	  private	  and	  public	  institutions	  across	  a	  number	  of	  countries,	  but	  primarily	  in	  the	  
UK,	   Norway	   and	   the	   US.	   My	   participation	   in	   a	   number	   of	   temporary	   cluster	   events	  
gained	   me	   access	   to	   a	   further	   25	   global	   motion	   picture	   business	   people	   and	   cinema	  
professionals.	  Taken	  together	  these	  contacts	  provided	  me	  with	  a	  robust	  understanding	  
of	   the	   phenomenon	   (Walsh	   &	   Koelsch,	   2012).	   A	   further	   five	   interviews	   sought	   to	  
uncover	   issues	   pertinent	   to	   the	   emergent	   entertainment	   digital	   value	   chain	   in	   the	  
context	   of	   organisational	   (and	   personal)	   learning	   from	   the	   experiences	   of	   the	   music	  
industry.	  Of	  relevance	  (from	  all	  interviews)	  here	  were	  the	  strategies	  companies	  created	  
for	   a	   journey	   from	   linear	   landscape	   to	  digital	   ecosystem	  and	   to	  what	   extent	   they	  had	  
learned	  from	  history	  to	  avoid	  a	  possible	  ‘motion	  picture	  digital	  bubble’.	  I	  was	  particularly	  
interested	   in	   focusing	  on	  areas	  where	  companies,	  entrepreneurs	  and	   institutions	  have	  
demonstrated	   or	   claimed	   to	   demonstrate,	   innovative	   behaviour	   in	   the	   face	   of	   the	  
Hollywood	   studios’	   attempt	   to	   control	   the	   digital	   cinema	   rollout	   through	   their	   Digital	  
Cinema	  Initiative	  (DCI).	  	  
Repeated	   interviews	  provided	   an	  ongoing	   commentary	   on	   the	   extent	   to	  which	   having	  
‘first	  mover’	  advantage	  or	  being	  on	  the	  cutting	  edge	  is	  central	  in	  deploying	  a	  ‘disruptive	  
innovation’	  or,	  whether	   taking	  a	  different	  approach	  or	  being	  a	   fast	   follower	   can	  be	  as	  
successful	  locally	  in	  an	  emergent	  digital	  ecosystem	  (Buchanan,	  et	  al.,	  1988).	  In	  addition,	  
the	  choice	  of	  interviewees	  was	  determined	  by	  the	  type	  of	  institutions	  engaged	  in	  digital	  
cinema	   in	  each	  country;	  building	  on	  the	  technique	  of	  snowball	   sampling,	   I	  was	  able	   to	  
use	   the	   relationships	   forged	   with	   respondents	   (over	   multiple	   exchanges)	   to	   engage	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senior	  industry	  experts,	  who	  would	  otherwise	  remained	  hidden,	  in	  the	  darkest	  recesses	  
of	  field	  research	  work.	  A	  further	  aim	  of	  the	  interviews	  was	  to	  understand	  the	  nature	  and	  
strength	  (in	  terms	  of	  quality)	  of	  relationships	  between	  institutions	  and	  organisations,	  the	  
type	  of	  support	  on	  offer	  to	  them,	  and	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  they	  engage	  (or	  don’t)	  with	  
the	  assistance	  on	  offer.	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3.6.1	  Historical	  research	  
History	   adds	   perspective,	   richness	   and	   context	   to	   the	   study.	   Historical	  methods	   of	  
research	   are	   the	   process	   of	   systematically	   examining	   an	   account	   of	   what	   has	  
happened	   in	   the	   past.	   In	   this	   dissertation,	   historical	   research	   was	   not	   used	   as	   a	  
simple	  accumulation	  of	  facts	  and	  dates	  or,	  even	  a	  description	  of	  past	  events.	  It	  was	  
employed	  here,	  to	  provide	  a	  flowing	  dynamic	  account	  of	  past	  events	  to	  recapture	  the	  
nuances,	  personalities	  and	  ideas	  of	  events	  that	  took	  place	  during	  the	  digital	  cinema	  
roll	   out.	   Following	  Tilly	   (2004)	   and	  Deflem	  &	  Dove	   (2013)	   I	   examined	   the	   traces	  of	  
previous	   justifications	   (for	   the	   roll	   out)	   had	   left	   behind	   in	   the	   present.	   As	   Savitt	  
argues,	   in	   a	   most	   ideal	   and	   systematic	   case,	   the	   procedure	   of	   historical	   enquiry	  
recognises	   that	   1)	   historical	   events	   are	   in	   the	   past	   and	   cannot	   be	   known	   as	  
contemporary	  events	  are	  known;	  2)	  historical	  events	  are	  unique	  and	  unclassifiable;	  3)	  
history	   is	   about	   the	   actions,	   statements	   and	   thoughts	   of	   human	   beings;	   and	   4)	  
historical	  events	  have	  irreducible	  richness	  and	  complexity	  (2009:198).	  	  
By	   tracing	   the	   recent	  historical	  processes,	  which	  characterised	   the	  unfolding	  of	   the	  
events	   of	   the	   digital	   cinema	   deployment,	   my	   intention	   was	   to	   construct	   a	   robust	  
account,	   identifying	   the	   actors,	   the	   decision	   points	   they	   faced,	   the	   choices	   they	  
made,	   the	   paths	   taken	   and	   shunned,	   and	   the	   manner	   in	   which	   their	   choices	  
generated	  events	  and	  outcomes	  (Bates	  et	  al.,	  1998:13-­‐14).	  As	  such,	  the	  use	  and	  the	  
goal	   of	   historical	   research	   in	   this	   dissertation	   has	   enabled	  me	   to	   communicate	   an	  
understanding	  of	  past	  events,	  as	  they	  unfolded	  over	  a	  10-­‐year	  period	  (Hodder,	  2000).	  
Data	   generated	   from	   papers	   obtained	   from	   each	   country	   and	   supported	   from	  
expert	   interviews	   have	   been	   combined	   to	   paint	   a	   picture	   of	   the	   rollout	   of	   digital	  
cinema	   in	   the	  UK,	  Norway	  and	  the	  US.	  	  
3.6.2	  Case	  study	  research	  
Case	  study	  method	  enables	  a	  researcher	  to	  closely	  examine	  the	  data	  within	  a	  specific	  
context.	   In	   this	   dissertation	   I	   follow	   Yin’s	   definition	   for	   case	   study	   research:	   “an	  
empirical	   inquiry	   that	   investigates	   a	   contemporary	   phenomenon	  within	   its	   real-­‐life	  
context;	   when	   the	   boundaries	   between	   phenomenon	   and	   context	   are	   not	   clearly	  
evident;	  and	  in	  which	  multiple	  sources	  of	  evidence	  are	  used”	  (1984:23).	  In	  addition,	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the	  case	  study	  method	  “explores	  a	  real-­‐life,	  contemporary	  bounded	  system	  (a	  case)	  
or	   multiple	   bounded	   systems	   (cases)	   over	   time,	   through	   detailed,	   in-­‐	   depth	   data	  
collection	  involving	  multiple	  sources	  of	  information...	  and	  reports	  a	  case	  description	  
and	  case	  themes”	  (Creswell,	  2013:97).	  	  
This	   study	   is	   a	   mixed	   methods	   multiple-­‐case	   study	   of	   three	   countries	   during	   the	  
period	   they	   introduced	   the	   products	   and	   processes	   necessary	   to	   complete	   the	  
digitalization	   of	   the	   distribution	   and	   exhibition	   sector	   of	   the	   film	   industry.	   Such	  
characteristics	   make	   the	   three	   countries	   selected	   a	   contemporary	   and	   dynamic	  
context	  for	  my	  study.	  Leading	  researchers	  (e.g.	  Yin,	  1994;	  Stake,	  1995;	  Eisenhardt	  &	  
Graebner,	   2007)	   highlight	   that	   two	   advantages	   of	   multiple-­‐case	   studies	   above	   a	  
single-­‐case	  study	  are	  first,	  you	  are	  able	  to	  analyse	  the	  data	  within	  each	  situation	  and	  
also	  across	  different	  situations.	  And,	  second,	  multiple	  cases	  allow	  wider	  exploring	  of	  
research	  questions	  and	  theoretical	  evolution.	  	  
The	   research	   was	   performed	   as	   a	   longitudinal,	   embedded	   multiple-­‐case	   study,	  
providing	  a	  single	  setting	  with	  multiple	  observations	  at	  two	  or	  more	  different	  points	  
in	  time	  (Yin,	  2009:49).	  This	  allowed	  me	  to	  study,	   in-­‐depth,	  behaviour	  of	  the	  leading	  
actors	   involved	   in	   the	   digital	   cinema	   rollout,	   on	   a	   historical	   as	   well	   as	   a	   real-­‐time	  
basis.	   Such	  a	   research	  method	  matched	  my	  overall	  aim	  of	   studying	  a	  phenomenon	  
with	   a	   dynamic	   process	   nature,	   and	   in	   which	   the	   continual	   adjustments	   of,	  
improvisation	   and	   adaptation	   strategies,	   play	   an	   important	   role	   in	   building	  
explanations	   in	   knowledge	   networks	   (Martin	   &	  Matlay,	   2001).	   This	   was	   crucial	   as	  
knowledge	   development	   plays	   a	   central	   part	   of	   the	   entrepreneurial	   process;	   and,	  
what	   contribution	   entrepreneurs	  make	   to	   a	   national	   innovation	   system	  will	   largely	  
depend	   on	   how	   they	   engage	  with	   the	  market	   during	   and	   after	   adoption	   of	   a	   new	  
product	  or	  service.	  	  
3.6.3	  Statistical	  analysis	  
Statistical	  information	  for	  this	  research	  mainly	  came	  from	  public	  sector	  organisation	  
and	  film	  support	  institutions	  with	  a	  high	  authority	  such	  as	  the	  European	  Audiovisual	  
Observatory,	   Eurostat,	   the	   UK	   Film	   Council	   and	   the	   European	   Union	   Media	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Programme.	   Further	   statistical	   information	   came	   from	   the	   International	   Movie	  
Database	   and	   secondary	   data	   collected	   in	   trade	   journals	   such	   as	   Screen	   Finance,	  
Screen	   International,	   The	   Business	   of	   Film,	   Variety	   and	   The	   Hollywood	   Reporter.	  
These	   raw	   or	   compiled	   data	   were	   accessed	   both	   in	   print	   and	   electronic	   sources.	  
Further	   secondary	   data	   were	   collected	   during	   field	   trips	   to	   industry	   summits	   and	  
workshops	  (in	  a	  number	  of	  countries)	  and	  included	  sources	  such	  as	  sample	  and	  real	  
production	   budgets,	   financing	   structure	   outlines,	   draft	   policy	   documents,	  
presentation	  handouts	  and	  descriptive	  accounts	  of	  co-­‐productions.	  These	  documents	  
were	   obtained	   either	   through	   participation	   in	   a	   summit	   (thus	   gaining	   access	   to	  
restricted	   documents)	   or	   by	   specifically	   asking	   participants	   for	   written	  
documentation.	  	  
Statistical	   data	   on	   exhibition	   activities	   were	   compiled	   from	   European	   Audiovisual	  
Observatory	   datasets,	   as	   well	   as	   individual	   country	   sources,	   allowing	   for	   a	  
comparison	  of	   statistics	   in	   regards	   to	  different	   classification	   systems.	  All	  data	  were	  
critically	  evaluated	  in	  regards	  to	  their	  authenticity,	  credibility,	  representativeness	  and	  
whether	  their	  meaning	  was	  clear	  and	  comprehensible.	  Both	  trade	   journals	  and	  film	  
support	  institutions	  showed	  some	  bias	  in	  the	  presentation	  of	  collected	  data,	  but	  the	  
data	  collection	  methods	  themselves	  were	  generally	  found	  to	  be	  sound	  and	  reliable.	  	  
3.7	  	   Ethics	  
Finally,	  I	  need	  to	  speak	  to	  the	  question	  of	  research	  ethics	  as	  part	  of	  the	  registration	  
process	  for	  a	  PhD,	  which	  is	  a	  requirement	  of	  the	  University	  of	  Hertfordshire	  Business	  
School.	  The	  School’s	  Ethics	  Committee	  approved	  the	  application	  form.	   In	  approving	  
the	   request	   there	   was	   the	   question	   of	   anonymity	   to	   address.	   The	   University	   of	  
Hertfordshire	  Approvals	  Form	  stipulates	  that,	  “…the	  anonymity	  of	  Respondents	  must	  
be	  preserved.	  This	  involves	  not	  only	  withholding	  their	  names	  and	  addresses,	  but	  also	  
other	   information	   by	   or	   about	   them	   which	   could	   in	   practice	   identify	   them	   (for	  
example,	  their	  company	  and	  job	  title)	  must	  be	  safeguarded.”	  The	  (written	  and	  oral)	  
statement	   for	   respondents	   outlined	   that	   their	   participation	   would	   involve	   a	   semi-­‐
structured	   interview	   and	   that	   I	   would	   guarantee	   complete	   anonymity,	   unless	   they	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specifically	  wished	   to	  be	  named.	   I	   also	   granted	  anonymity	   to	   contributors	   in	  panel	  
discussions	   and	   workshops	   in	   which	   I	   participated,	   either	   in	   person	   or	   by	   other	  
means	  (e.g.	  webinars,	  online	  discussions	  and	  panel	  debates).	  	  
Of	   those	   respondents	   involved	   in	   the	   business	   of	   film	   and	   especially	   those	   with	  
strong	  ties	  to	  the	  US	  film	  studios,	  no	  respondent	  was	  prepared	  to	  waive	  their	  right	  to	  
anonymity.	   While	   some	   respondents	   were	   happy	   to	   provide	   commercially	  
confidential	   information,	   in	   two	  cases	   I	  was	  asked	   to	  write	  an	  assurance	   to	  protect	  
such	   information.	   Lincoln	   and	   Guba	   (1985)	   posit	   that	   a	   crucial	   technique	   for	  
establishing	  accuracy	  and	  credibility	   in	  case	  study	  research	   is	   for	  respondents	  to	  be	  
given	  the	  opportunity	  to	  check	  the	  accuracy	  of	  the	  facts	  presented	  in	  their	  interview	  
transcript	  –	   a	  process	  they	  refer	   to	  as	  “member	  checking”.	   It	   is	  possible	   to	  provide	  
the	  offer	   formally,	   or	   informally	   as	  opportunities	   arise	  during	   the	  normal	  course	  of	  
observation	  and	  conversation.	   I	  made	  this	  offer	  at	   the	  outset	  and	  at	   the	  debriefing	  
stage	  but	  only	  two	  respondents	  took	  up	  the	  opportunity.	  	  
This	   is	   not	   an	   uncontroversial	   technique.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   it	   does	   provide	   the	  
opportunity	  to	  understand	  and	  assess	  what	  the	  respondent	  intended	  to	  do	  through	  
their	   action	   and	   gives	   them	   a	   chance	   to	   correct	   errors	   and	   challenge	   what	   are	  
perceived	   as	   wrong	   interpretations.	   However,	   member	   checking	   does	   rely	   on	   the	  
assumption	   that	   there	   is	   a	   fixed	   truth	   of	   reality	   that	   can	   be	   accounted	   for	   by	   a	  
researcher	  and	  confirmed	  by	  a	  respondent.	  Equally,	  respondents	  may	  disagree	  with	  
the	   researcher’s	   interpretations.	   Then	   the	  question	  of	  whose	   interpretation	   should	  
stand	  becomes	  an	  issue	  (Morse,	  1994).	  Although	  with	  indirect	  measures	  (e.g.	  passive	  
observation,	   panel	   discussion)	   ethical	   issues	   are	   arguably	   less	   contentious,	   they	  
cannot	   be	   ignored.	   In	   an	   indirect	   measure	   you	   are,	   by	   definition,	   collecting	  
information	  without	  the	  respondent's	  knowledge.	   In	  doing	  so,	  you	  may	  be	  violating	  
their	   right	   to	  privacy	   and	   you	   are	   certainly	   not	   using	   informed	   consent.	  Of	   course,	  
some	   types	  of	   information	  may	  be	  public	   and	   therefore	  not	   involve	   an	   invasion	  of	  
privacy	  (Trochim,	  2000;	  Hsieh	  &	  Shannon,	  2005;	  Trochim	  et	  al.,	  2015).	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3.8	  	   Chapter	  summary	  
In	   this	   chapter,	   I	   have	   outlined	   the	   research	   philosophy	   and	   methodology	   I	   have	  
implemented	  to	  explore	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  the	  digital	  cinema	  rollout.	  The	   research	  
design	   for	   this	   dissertation	   required	   a	   novel	   approach	   in	   which	   to	   observe	   the	  
transnational	  dimension	  of	  the	  digital	  cinema	  rollout,	  and	  to	  gather	  data	  from	  a	  wide	  
range	   of	   institutions	   and	   professionals.	   	   My	   approach	   is	   based	   on	   a	   mixed	  
methodology	   strategy	   characterised	   by	   a	   complementary	   relationship	   between	  
historical	  research,	  case	  study	  research	  and	  statistical	  analysis.	  I	  have	  been	  fortunate	  
to	  attend	  a	  number	  of	  professional	  gatherings	  and	  temporary	  industry	  clusters	  (e.g.	  
industry	  workshops	  and	  film	  summits),	  which	  has	  allowed	  me	  to	  gather	  much	  of	  the	  
primary	   data;	   on	   occasions	   data	   has	   emerged	   following	   invitations	   to	   speak	   or	  
evolved	   out	   of	   participating	   in	   panel	   debates	   with	   intermediaries	   and	   film	  
professionals.	  	  
Such	   an	   approach	   was	   necessary	   as	   my	   work	   focuses	   on	   disruptive	   technology,	  
entrepreneurial	   innovation	  and	  national	  (and	  regional)	   innovation	  systems.	  As	  such,	  
the	  aim	  of	  this	  chapter	  was	  to	  offer	  a	  broad	  overview	  of	  the	  current	  understanding	  of	  
the	  current	  digital	  issues	  and	  draw	  comparisons	  to	  the	  introduction	  of	  technological	  
innovations	   in	   other	   parts	   of	   the	   media	   entertainment	   landscape,	   which,	   taken	  
together	   have	   not	   been	   the	   subject	   of	   previous	   debate	   and	   therefore	   remain,	  
underexplored.	  The	  conceptual	  framework	  was	  formulated	  to	  manage	  the	  different	  
concepts	   across	   the	   literature	   and	   structure	   the	  data	   gathering	   and	   analysis	   in	   the	  
dissertation.	   These	   components	   served	   as	   a	   lens	   through	   which	   to	   explore	   the	  
process	  and	  management	  of	  a	  high-­‐tech	  disruptive	  innovation	  adoption	  and	  diffusion	  
patterns	   that	   followed.	   Taken	   together,	   these	   components	  will	   help	   point	   towards	  
the	  need	  for	  a	  more	  nuanced	  approach	  about	  the	  potential	  role	  and	  contribution	  of	  
the	  digital	  cinema	  sector	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  national	  innovation	  systems.	  These	  involved:	  
Constituent	  1:	   A	  state	  of	  entrepreneurial	  innovation	  whereby	  a	  sector	  can	  take	  on	  
new	   paths	   of	   development	   or	   several	   paths	   at	   once	   without	   recourse	   to	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breakthrough	   technologies.	   It	   is	   resilient	   to	   change	   from	  outside	  and	  allows	   strong	  
co-­‐evolution	  between	  technological	  development	  and	  supportive	  institutions.	  
Constituent	  2:	   A	  state	  of	  responsive	  innovation	  of	  ‘incremental	  change’.	  These	  are	  
minor	   changes	   among	   sector	   incumbents,	   possibly	   leading	   to	   a	   state	   of	   hysteresis,	  
where	   there	   is	   a	   general	   unwillingness	   to	   change	   and	   little	   ability	   to	   renew	   or	  
reinvent	  an	  area.	  This	  may	  or	  may	  not	   lead	   to	   further	   institutional	   change	  and	   if	   it	  
does,	  only	  to	  minor	  adaptations.	  	  
Constituent	  3:	  The	  third	  and	  most	  negative	  outcome	  is	  that	  of	  the	  state	  of	  ‘lock-­‐in’.	  
The	  sector	  fails	  to	  adapt	  in	  any	  way	  to	  change	  and	  eventually	  faces	  economic	  decline	  
or	  redundancy.	  	  
Finally,	   the	   overall	   aim	   of	   this	   chapter	   has	   been	   to	   establish	   the	   methodology	  
employed	   has	   been	   rigorous	   and	   appropriate	   whilst	   using	   widely	   accepted	  
techniques,	   in	   order	   to	   obtain	   new	   insights	   to	   the	   research	   question(s)	   posed.	   I	  
believe	   a	   pragmatic	   approach,	   characterised	   by	   a	   complementary	   relationship	  
between	   historical	   analysis,	   case	   study	   research	   and	   statistical	   consideration	   has	  
provided	  a	  richness	  of	  data	  from	  observations	  spanning	  a	  period	  of	  ten	  years.	  Such	  a	  
method	   of	   ongoing	   triangulation	   has	   enabled	   me	   to	   provide	   a	   comprehensive	  
understanding	   of	   the	   digital	   cinema	   rollout,	   in	   the	   context	   of	   a	   country’s	   national	  
innovation	  system,	  which	  reflects	  the	  pragmatic	  research	  philosophy	  adopted	  in	  this	  
dissertation.	  
In	   the	   next	   Chapter	   I	   provide	   a	   brief	   overview	   of	   the	   eight	   published	   works	   that	  
support	  this	  dissertation.	  Taken	  together	  they	  highlight	  the	  need	  for	  policymakers	  to	  
focus	   their	   attention	   on	   emerging	   entrepreneurial	   innovations,	   the	   utilisation	   of	  
current	   knowledge	   and	   strategies	   for	   novel	   solutions	   in	   order	   to	   strengthen	   their	  
respective	   national	   innovation	   systems.	   The	   published	   works	   help	   explain	   the	  
creation,	  diffusion	  and	  adoption	  of	  digital	  cinema,	  explore	  the	  new	  content	  creation	  
opportunities	   they	   support,	   and	   how	   three	   nations	   in	   particular	   have	   sought	   to	  
innovate	  and	  reorientate	  themselves	  in	  relation	  to	  these	  novel	  phenomena.	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Chapter	  4:	  Research	  paper	  summaries	  
	  
4.1 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Overview	  
Between	  2003	  and	  2012	  my	  work	  on	  the	  impact	  of	  digital	  cinema	  on	  the	  global	  film	  
industry	   made	   me	   a	   leading	   national	   authority	   with	   an	   established	   international	  
presence	  in	  this	  field.1	  Situated	  within	  the	  very	  midst	  of	  the	  changes	  to	  cinema,	  my	  
outputs	   have	   made	   a	   significant	   contribution	   to	   the	   furtherance	   of	   knowledge	  
around	  institutional,	  business,	  technological	  and	  cultural	  impact	  of	  digital	  cinema	  on	  
film	  distribution	  and	  exhibition.	  
The	   disruptive	   nature	   of	   the	   digitalization	   of	   the	   film	   industry	   originally	   emerged	  
from	   research	   carried	   out	   on	   project-­‐based	  work	   in	   film	   production	   for	   FiRG	   (Film	  
Industry	  Research	  Group),	  which	  I	  co-­‐created	  in	  1998	  with	  Professor	  Keith	  Randle.	  	  
Early	   published	   findings	   established	   a	   counter-­‐argument	   to	   the	   popular	   idea	   that	  
‘Cool	   Britannia’,	   a	   phenomenon	   that	   occurred	   while	   New	   Labour	   were	   in	   power,	  
would	   be	   a	   source	   of	   ‘good	   jobs’	   in	   knowledge-­‐intensive	   and	   creative	   industries,	  
replacing	  some	  of	  those	  disappearing	  from	  manufacturing.	  Between	  2000	  and	  2004	  
Randle	   and	   I	   ran	   a	   longitudinal	   panel	   study	   of	   film	   crew	   in	   the	   US.	   An	   article	  
comparing	  the	  US	  and	  UK	  contexts	  demonstrated	  that	  the	  production	  process	  in	  film	  
gave	   rise	   to	   the	   informal,	   networked	   structure	  of	   labour	  market	   intelligence	   in	   the	  
sector	  (Culkin	  &	  Randle,	  2009	  [P4]).	  	  
Exposing	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   US	   participants	   were	   increasing	   their	   use	   of	   digital	  
technology	   over	   time,	   I	   then	   led	   a	   research	   project	   which	   produced	   the	   first	  
academic	  article	  on	  the	  disruptive	  nature	  of	  digitalization	  on	  existing	  business	  models	  
in	   the	   distribution	   and	   exhibition	   sector	   (Culkin	   &	   Randle,	   2003	   [P2]).	   This	   was	  
expanded	   into	   a	   longer	   study,	   which	   explored	   the	   impact	   of	   digitalisation	   across	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  In	  2006	  I	  was	  made	  the	  first	  International	  Fellow	  at	  the	  DeSantis	  Center	  for	  Motion	  Picture	  Industry	  
Studies,	   Florida	   Atlantic	   University,	   at	   a	   ceremony	   that	   followed	   my	   presentation	   entitled	   Digital	  
Cinema	  as	  Disruptive	   Technology	   (8th	  Annual	  DeSantis	   Center	  Workshop	   Summit	   in	  Motion	   Picture	  
Industry	  Studies,	  November).	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international	   boundaries,	   in	   countries	   producing	   comparative	   outputs	   on	   the	  
diffusion	   and	   adoption	   of	   innovation	   processes	   (the	   USA,	   India,	   Norway	   and	   UK)	  
(Culkin,	  2008	  [P1]).	  
The	  novel	  results	  prompted	  me	  to	  seek	  support	  to	  continue	  to	  explore	  these	  changes	  
in	   Europe.	   In	   2002,	   I	   secured	   the	   first	   of	   a	   number	   of	   applied	   research	   grants	   to	  
support	  this	  novel	  enquiry.	  The	  first,	   for	  £60,000,	  was	  commissioned	  by	  the	  East	  of	  
England	  Development	  Agency	   (EEDA)	   and	   built	   on	  my	   experiences	   of	   collaborating	  
with	  UK	  universities	  and	  professional	   intermediaries.	  The	  project,	   ‘Higher	  Education	  
and	   the	  Media	   Industries’,	   sought	   to	   examine	   the	   role	  HE	   could	   play	   as	   an	   anchor	  
institution	  in	  the	  creative	  enterprises,	  an	  industry	  consisting	  of	  entrepreneurs,	  micro-­‐
firms	  and	  a	  small	  number	  of	  international	  conglomerates	  (Culkin,	  2016a	  [P7]).	  I	  later	  
expanded	  the	  project	  to	  consider	  all	  regional	  enterprises	  (Culkin,	  2016b	  [P8]),	  which	  
helped	   inform	  my	   PhD	   student	   (D.	   James)	   successfully	   completing	   her	   dissertation	  
entitled,	   The	   Knowledge	   Economy,	   Marketisation	   and	   Value	   Chains:	   The	   case	   of	  
Higher	   Education	   in	   England	   (2013).	   Based	  on	   a	   survey	  of	   industry	   opinion	   leaders	  
and	  entrepreneurs	   the	   first	  of	   three	  groundbreaking	   reports	  was	  published	   in	  April	  
2004	  and	  circulated	  widely	  (Culkin	  &	  Morawetz,	  2004;	  2005;	  2007	  [P5]).	  	  
I	  also	  co-­‐authored	  a	  book	  chapter	  on	  digital	  cinema,	  which	  was	  the	  first	  to	  identify	  it	  
as	   a	   potential	   ‘disruptive	   innovation’.	   That	   piece	   focused	   on	   the	   development	   of	  
possible	   new	   business	   models	   in	   the	   global	   international	   entertainment	   industry,	  
examined	  the	  strategies	  of	  the	  companies	  at	  the	  forefront	  of	  the	  technology	  and	  the	  
financial	   implications	   associated	   with	   change,	   and	   how	   different	   territories	   were	  
adapting	  their	  business	  models	  in	  order	  to	  meet	  this	  disruptive	  technology	  (Culkin,	  et	  
al.,	  2006	  [P3]).	  	  
In	  2009,	  findings	  from	  the	  original	  study	  also	  gave	  rise	  to	  a	  chapter	  in	  a	  collection	  of	  
research-­‐based	   articles	   on	   labour	   in	   the	   creative	   industries	   (Culkin	  &	  Randle,	   2009	  
[P4]).	   The	   reputation	  of	   FiRG	   grew	  and	   resulted	   in	   further	   PhDs:	  The	  Marketing	   of	  
European	  Films	  (Kerrigan,	  2006)	  and	  Entrepreneurship	  in	  the	  Creative	  Industries:	  The	  
rise	  of	  new	  forms	  of	  co-­‐productions	  in	  the	  global	  film	  industry	  (Morawetz,	  2009).	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I	   was	   awarded	   £2.5	   million	   from	   a	   national	   competition	   through	   the	   Higher	  
Education	   Innovation	   Fund	   (HEIF2).	   Film	   and	   Digital	   Media	   Exchange	   (FDMX);	   a	  
project	  that	  ran	  from	  2005	  to	  2010.	  These	  collaborative	  centres	  were	  the	  forerunner	  
of	   the	   ‘Catapult’	   movement:	   a	   series	   of	   centres	   established	   by	   Innovate	   UK	   to	  
transform	   the	  UK’s	   capability	   for	   innovation	   in	   specific	   areas	   and	  help	  drive	   future	  
economic	   growth.	   However,	   these	   initiatives	   are	   informed	   by	   innovation	   policies	  
centred	   on	   STEM	   –	   science,	   technology,	   engineering	   and	   maths	   –	   and	   large	  
businesses.	  My	  research	  on	  digital	  cinema	  as	  a	  disruptive	  innovation	  suggests	  such	  an	  
approach	  does	  not	  necessarily	  lead	  to	  productivity	  gains	  that	  create	  the	  added	  value	  
to	   drive	   up	   wages	   and	   living	   standards,	   unless	   there	   is	   a	   more	   nuanced	  
understanding	  of	  decision-­‐making	  strategies	  of	  entrepreneurial	  innovators	  (Culkin	  &	  
Smith,	  2000	  [P6]).	  A	  further	  PhD,	  Entrepreneurial	  Characteristics	  of	  Owners	   in	  Small	  
Firms	   in	   High	   Growth	   Markets	   (Mourouti,	   2005),	   went	   on	   to	   develop	   these	   ideas	  
further.	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4.2 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Supporting	  papers	  
Paper	  No.	  1:	  Culkin,	  N.	  (2008)	  ‘Cinema:	  No	  Country	  for	  Old	  Entrepreneurs?’	  Journal	  of	  Retail	  
Marketing	  Management	  Research	  1(2).	  (4	  citations)	  
“Abstract:	  This	  paper	  reflects	  on	  current	  developments	  in	  the	  exhibition	  sector	  of	  the	  movie	  
industry.	   It	   will	   examine	   why	   the	   adoption	   of	   an	   innovation	   (digital	   cinema),	   capable	   of	  
revolutionising	   the	  movie	   industry,	  has	  stumbled	   in	   its	  attempts	   to	  cross	  Geoffrey	  Moore’s	  
‘chasm’	   (Moore,	   1991)	   and	  will	   argue	   that	   despite	   numerous	   setbacks,	   d-­‐cinema	   can	   now	  
rightly	  be	  considered	  within	  Christensen’s	  framework	  of	  disruptive	  technologies.	  	  
“The	   author	   will	   examine	   the	   strategies	   of	   exhibitors	   at	   the	   forefront	   of	   the	   adoption	  
process;	   describe	   some	   of	   the	   emerging	   business	   models	   being	   developed	   to	   facilitate	  
change;	  and	  analyse	  how	  two	  different	  territories	  (the	  international	  markets	  of	  the	  USA	  and	  
India)	  are	  realising	  the	  opportunities	  afforded	  by	  this	  technology.	  	  
“Finally	  he	  will	  project	  the	  overall	  implications	  of	  the	  advent	  of	  d-­‐cinema	  for	  the	  future	  of	  the	  
global	  movie	   industry	  and	  how	  (private	  and	  public)	  entrepreneurs	  are	  already	  changing	  the	  
basis	  of	  competition	  in	  certain	  sectors	  to	  create	  new	  markets.”	  
Fit	  to	  dissertation	  research	  question:	  
This	  paper	  was	   the	   first	   to	   suggest	   that,	  despite	   their	  best	  efforts,	   the	  US	  studios	   (working	  
collaboratively	  [in	  the	  open]	  for	  the	  very	  first	  time)	  had	  been	  unable	  to	  dictate	  to	  the	  global	  
market	   their	   preferred	   single	   standard	   for	   the	   digital	   rollout.	   As	   such,	   the	   adoption	   and	  
diffusion	  pattern	  reflected	  a	  Schumpeterian	  view	  that	  “every	  social	  environment	  has	  its	  own	  
ways	  of	  filling	  the	  entrepreneurial	  function,”	  rather	  than	  a	  path-­‐independent	  process	  leading	  
to	   a	   set	   of	   predictable	   outcomes	   in	   the	   form	   of	   a	   single	   global	   standard	   (1949:70).	   I	  
acknowledged	  that	  global	  standards	  may	  yet	  emerge	  but	  pointed	  out	  that	  this	  would	  require	  
territories	   such	   as	   China,	   Brazil	   and	   India	   (large	   and	   largely	   self	   sufficient)	   to	   acknowledge	  
that	   DCI	   standard	   had	   benefits	   above	   and	   beyond	   the	   technology	   they	   were	   currently	  
employing	   -­‐	   simpler,	   cheaper,	   and	   more	   reliable	   and	   convenient	   than	   established	  
technologies.	  Unlike	  other	  media	  entertainment	   technologies,	   I	  had	  argued	  previously	   that	  
the	  market	  for	  d-­‐cinema	  was	  not	  large	  enough	  to	  support	  more	  than	  one	  standard	  [P2]	  but	  
that	   was	   not	   the	   same	   as	   saying	   that	   DCI	   was	   the	   de	   facto	   solution.	   Territories	   such	   as	  
Europe	   faced	  with	  an	  opportunity	   to	  make	  their	  own	  path	  were	   in	  danger	  of	   following	   the	  
Hollywood	   herd	   rather	   than	   seeking	   entrepreneurial	   alternatives	   through	   a	   clear	   and	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integrated	  national	  innovation	  system.	  For	  example,	  in	  this	  paper	  I	  describe	  how	  a	  benefit	  in	  
reduced	   distribution	   costs	   could	   lead	   to	   a	   greater	   degree	   of	   flexibility	   providing	   improved	  
choice	   to	   the	   consumer,	   in	   terms	  of	   scheduling	   and	   content.	   I	   then	  demonstrate	   how	   this	  
could	   lead	   to	   an	   increase	   in	   entrepreneurial	   innovation	   involving	   local	   institutions	   to	   build	  
local	  markets.	  Entrepreneurs,	  such	  as	  Europa	  Cinemas,	  were	  just	  starting	  to	  understand	  that	  
such	   developments	   could	   create	   a	   need	   for	   more	   sophisticated	   customer	   relationship	  
management	   techniques,	   as	  well	   as	   better	  marketing,	   in	   the	   cinema	  business.	   Founded	   at	  
the	  start	  of	  the	  1990s	  and	  with	  funding	  from	  the	  MEDIA	  programme	  Europa	  Cinemas	  was	  the	  
first	   film	   theatre	   network	   focusing	   on	   European	   films.	   Its	   objective	   was	   to	   provide	  
operational	  and	  financial	  support	  to	  cinemas	  that	  commit	  themselves	  to	  screen	  a	  significant	  
number	  of	  European	  non-­‐national	  films,	  to	  offer	  events	  and	  initiatives	  as	  well	  as	  promotional	  
activities	  targeted	  at	  Young	  Audiences.	  
Finally,	  this	  paper	  concluded	  that	  research	  was	  needed	  to	  further	  explore	  strategies	  of	  new	  
entrants	  in	  this	  market	  and	  assess	  the	  performance	  of	  third	  party	  initiatives	  such	  as	  the	  UK	  
Film	  Council’s,	  Screen	  Network.	  
	  
Paper	  No.	  2:	  Culkin,	  N.	  &	  Randle,	  K.	  R.	  (2003)	  ‘Digital	  Cinema:	  Opportunities	  and	  Challenges’.	  
Convergence:	  The	  Journal	  of	  Research	   into	  New	  Media	  Technologies	  9(4)	  winter.	  pp.	  79-­‐98.	  
(24	  citations)	  	  
“Abstract:	  While	  the	  process	  of	  distributing	  and	  exhibiting	  a	  film	  has	  changed	  a	  little	  over	  the	  
past	   century,	   Digital	   Cinema,	   the	   process	   of	   using	   digitally	   stored	   data	   instead	   of	   strips	   of	  
acetate,	  has	  arrived.	  With	  technology	  continuing	  to	  develop,	  it	  is	  expected	  that	  d-­‐cinema	  will	  
overtake	  the	  quality	  of	  conventional	  cinema	  within	  the	  next	  two	  years.	  	  
“This	  paper	   considers	  how	   the	   film	   industry	  might	   affect	   the	   transition	   from	   film	   to	  digital	  
products.	   Rather	   than	   contributing	   to	   the	   continuing	   debate	   about	   the	   qualities	   of	   the	  
competing	   technologies	   or	   the	   creative	   merits	   or	   demerits	   of	   digital	   product,	   this	   paper	  
focuses	   on	   the	   search	   for	   new	   business	   models	   in	   an	   industry	   wedded	   to	   an	   analogue	  
process.	  	  
“It	   considers	   the	   strategies	   of	   implications	   associated	   with	   change;	   and	   how	   different	  
territories	  might	  adapt	  in	  order	  to	  accommodate	  to	  this	  transition.”	  	  
	  
	   68	  
Fit	  to	  dissertation	  research	  question:	  
When	  this	  paper	  was	   first	  submitted,	  digital	  cinema	  was	   in	   its	   infancy	  with	   fewer	  than	  160	  
screens	  converted	  globally	  –	  76	  in	  the	  US,	  22	  throughout	  Europe	  and	  33	  in	  China	  at	  the	  time	  
of	   publication.	   There	   was	   little	   awareness	   of	   the	   impact	   that	   digitalization	   –	   disruptive	  
innovation	  –	  was	  about	  to	  play	   in	  the	  music	   industry;	  companies	  offering	  technology	  could	  
push	   this	   evolution	   forward	   without	   approval	   from	   studios	   and	   acceptance	   from	   the	  
exhibitors.	   There	  was	   little,	   or	   no	   agreement	   between	   the	   parties	   about	   the	  way	   forward.	  
Technology	   firms	  could	  not	  push	  this	  evolution	   forward	  without	  approval	   from	  studios	  and	  
exhibitors;	  the	  reason	  being	  that	  unlike	  previous	  innovations	  in	  cinema	  like	  surround	  sound,	  
acetate/cellulose	   film,	   or	   35	   and	   70mm	   formats,	   digital	   cinema	   was	   incompatible	   with	  
conventional	   cinema	   technology.	   The	   two	   were	   mutually	   exclusive;	   meaning	   that	   before	  
digital	   cinema	  could	  be	   rolled	  out	  across	   screens	   it	  would	  have	   to	  have	   the	  backing	  of	   the	  
studios	   in	  order	   for	   them	  to	  provide	  product	   to	  the	  cinemas.	   It	  was	  assumed	  that	   in	  North	  
America,	   Western	   Europe	   and	   Japan	   investment	   from	   studios	   and	   exhibitors	   would	   be	  
required	   to	   fund	   the	   change.	   Therefore	   they	   would,	   no	   doubt,	   expect	   to	   have	   the	   final	  
decision	  on	  determining	  standards;	  at	  the	  time	  it	  was	  perceived	  to	  be	  uneconomic	  for	  others	  
to	  establish	  alternatives.	  	  
However,	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  digitisation	  of	  cinema	  would	  not	  impact	  on	  the	  technology	  
alone.	   In	  this	  paper	   it	  was	   (for	  the	  first	   time)	  proposed	  that	  a	  digital	  cinema	  would	  require	  
less	  human	  input	  into	  the	  running	  of	  the	  facility.	  In	  theory	  the	  potential	  of	  technology	  could	  
allow	  a	  cinema	  to	  run	  automatically,	  with	  internet	  bookings	  and	  ticketing,	  vending	  machines	  
for	  refreshments	  and	  a	  system	  of	  screening	  the	  film	  that	  is	  run	  from	  a	  central	  control	  centre.	  
In	  practice	  employees	  would	  continue	  to	  feature	  in	  the	  ‘front	  of	  house’	  running	  of	  cinemas	  if	  
for	  no	  other	  reason,	  to	  intervene	  if	  the	  system	  goes	  dark.	  However,	  backstage	  less	  labour	  will	  
be	  required	  and	  the	  role	  of	  projectionist	  may	  be	  taken	  on	  by	  managers.	  
	  
Paper	   3:	   Culkin,	   N.,	   Morawetz,	   N.	   &	   Randle,	   K.	   R.	   (2006)	   ‘Digital	   Cinema	   as	   Disruptive	  
Technology’.	   In	  Van	  Der	  Graaf,	  S.	  and	  Washida,	  Y.	   (eds.)	  (2006)	   Information	  Communication	  
Technologies	  and	  Emerging	  Business	  Strategies.	  Hershey:	  Idea	  Group.	  (3	  citations)	  
“Abstract:	  The	  distribution	  and	  exhibition	  of	  motion	  pictures	  are	  at	  a	  crossroads.	  Ever	  since	  
the	  medium	  was	  invented	  in	  the	  1890s	  the	  ‘picture’	  has	  been	  brought	  to	  the	  spectator	  in	  the	  
form	  of	  photochemical	  images	  stored	  on	  strips	  of	  celluloid	  film	  passed	  in	  intermittent	  motion	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through	  a	  projector.	  Now,	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  21st	  century,	  an	  entirely	  new	  method	  has	  
emerged,	  using	  digitally	  stored	  data	  in	  place	  of	  film	  and	  barely	  needing	  any	  physical	  support	  
other	   than	   a	   computerised	   file.	   This	   opens	   an	   intriguing	   portfolio	   of	   revenue-­‐generating	  
opportunities	   for	   the	   movie	   exhibitor.	   This	   chapter	   will	   give	   an	   overview	   of	   current	  
developments	  in	  digital	  cinema	  (d-­‐cinema).	  It	  will	  examine	  potential	  new	  business	  models	  in	  
an	   industry	   wedded	   to	   the	   analogue	   process.	   The	   authors	   will	   consider	   the	   strategies	   of	  
companies	  at	  the	  forefront	  of	  the	  technology;	   implications	  associated	  with	  the	  change;	  and	  
how	  different	  territories	  might	  adapt	  in	  order	  to	  accommodate	  this	  transition.”	  
Fit	  to	  dissertation	  research	  question:	  
This	   paper	   built	   on	   P2	   above,	   situating	   digital	   cinema	   adoption	   in	   2005/06	   within	  
Christensen’s	  framework	  of	  disruptive	  technologies.	  At	  the	  time,	  rollout	  had	  not	  yet	  reached	  
Moore’s	   chasm,	   never	  mind	   crossing	   it.	   As	   such,	   attention	  was	   focused	  on	   how	   the	  major	  
players	  in	  (US	  Studios)	  had	  sought	  to	  contain	  d-­‐cinema	  within	  the	  film	  industry	  supply	  chain.	  	  
Research	  indicated	  that	  the	  market	  for	  d-­‐cinema	  exhibited	  network	  externalities	  and	  that	  a	  
common	   standard	  was	  desirable	   from	   the	  perspective	  of	  major	   incumbents.	  However,	   the	  
discussion	   on	   standards	   also	   revealed	   the	   conflicting	   interests	   a	   diversified	   and	   vertical	  
integrated	   corporation	   such	   as	   Sony	   faced,	   as	   the	   competition	   had	   become	   a	   ‘preliminary	  
battle’	   for	   the	   consumer	   electronics	   market.	   Sony’s	   strategy	   (with	   its	   knowledge	   of	   the	  
consumer	   market)	   appeared	   to	   be	   geared	   towards	   delaying	   the	   progress	   of	   the	   whole	  
transition	  to	  digital	  cinema	  for	  its	  own	  benefit,	  in	  other	  media	  entertainment	  markets.	  	  
The	   paper	  was	   the	   first	   to	   discuss	   the	   complexities	   linked	   to	   the	   transition	   of	   celluloid	   to	  
digital	  and	  its	  impact	  on	  incumbents.	  The	  emergence	  of	  new	  markets	  and	  new	  entrants	  was	  
examined	   and	   it	   was	   speculated	   that	   d-­‐cinema	   had	   significant	   benefits	   to	   entrepreneurial	  
innovators	   (creative	   destruction);	   conversely,	   the	  US	   studios	   had	   a	   strong	   leverage	   (digital	  
rights	  management)	  to	  exploit	  the	  technology	  to	  their	  advantage	  (sustaining	  innovation).	  	  
The	   question	   was	   posed,	   that	   given	   the	   change	   in	   the	   terms	   of	   competition	   (linked	   to	  
potential	  hold	  up	  problem),	  possible	  future	  scenarios	  could	  lead	  to	  further	  diversification	  and	  
even	   the	   disintegration	   of	   major	   distributors.	   In	   addition	   the	   paper	   raised	   critical	   issues	  
associated	  with	  d-­‐cinema,	  such	  as	  alternative	  content,	   training	  and	   the	  possible	  dangers	  of	  
‘lock-­‐in’	   for	   the	  US	  studios	  via	  an	  over-­‐reliance	  on	  digital	   rights	  management	  as	  a	  strategic	  
tool.	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Working	  in	  films	  (book	  chapter)	  
Paper	  4:	  Culkin,	  N.	  &	  Randle,	  K.	  R.	  (2009)	  ‘Still	  “A	  Perfect	  World	  for	  Capital?”	  Hollywood	  in	  an	  
era	  of	  globalizing	   film	  production’.	   In	  Smith,	  C.	  and	  McKinlay,	  A.	   (eds.)	  Creative	  Labour	  and	  
the	  Labour	  Process.	  London:	  Palgrave.	  (52	  citations)	  
“Abstract:	   This	   chapter	   explores	   issues	   in	   film	   industry	   related	   employment	   in	   the	   US,	  
reporting	  on	  a	  study	  carried	  out	  between	  June	  1999	  and	  March	  2002	  around	  the	  themes	  of	  
‘getting	  in,	  staying	  in	  and	  getting	  on’	  in	  the	  Hollywood	  (Los	  Angeles)	  visual	  media	  industries.	  
The	   study	   set	  out	   to	  explore	   the	  experience	  of	   freelance	  workers	  within	  a	   sector	   changing	  
rapidly	   at	   both	   a	   global	   and	   local	   level	   (Wasko,	   1994)	   and	   is	   part	   of	   a	   wider	   comparative	  
project	  concerned	  with	  similar	  issues	  in	  the	  UK.”	  	  
Fit	  to	  dissertation	  research	  question:	  
The	  findings	  reported	  here	  emerged	  out	  of	  earlier	  work	  from	  members	  of	  the	  University	  of	  
Hertfordshire’s,	   Film	   Industry	   Research	   Group	   (FiRG);	   work	   concerned	   with	   the	   nature	   of	  
employment	  and	  management	  in	  the	  UK	  film	  industry,	  with	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  US	  
and	  UK	   industries	  and	  with	  a	  comparison	  between	  the	   industries	   in	  the	  two	  countries.	  Our	  
research	  suggested	  that	  technological	  change	  comprised	  the	  single	  most	  important	  influence	  
on	  employment	  and	  industrial	  relations	  in	  the	  electronic	  entertainment	  and	  media	  industries	  
in	  the	  20th	  Century,	  would,	  no	  doubt	  continue	  in	  to	  the	  next	  century.	  FiRG	  research	  into	  the	  
impact	   of	   digitalization	   on	   business	  models	  would	   aid	   the	   rise	   of	   regional	   film	   production	  
centres	  around	  the	  world	  that	  could	  finally	  mount	  a	  serious	  challenge	  to	  the	  Los	  Angeles	  film	  
cluster	   (Culkin	   &	   Morawetz,	   2007	   [P5]).	   If	   Hollywood	   had	   been	   the	   first	   choice	   for	   the	  
majority	   of	   US	   producers,	   other	   countries	   would	   not	   only	   offer	   aggressive	   competition	  
seeking	  to	  attract	  US	  investment	  but	  also	  seek	  to	  build	  their	  own	  capacity	  and	  competencies,	  
as	  part	  of	  a	  mission	  driven	  national	  innovation	  system	  (e.g.	  New	  Zealand,	  China	  and	  Brazil).	  	  
Our	  conclusions	  of	  freelance	  working	  in	  the	  US	  entertainment	  industries	  provided	  a	  graphic	  
picture	   of	   the	   insecurity	   and	   uncertainty	   of	   project	   based	   employment	   in	   the	   creative	  
industries.	   	   Nevertheless,	   we	   were	   able	   to	   demonstrate	   that	   this	   was	   a	   ‘structured	  
uncertainty’	  whereby	  industry	  features	  were	  well	  known,	  understood	  and	  acknowledged	  as	  a	  
fact	  of	  occupational	   life.	   If	  creative	  content	   jobs	   in	  the	  UK	  are	  seen	  simply	  as	  replacing	   lost	  
jobs	   from	   more	   traditional	   industries,	   we	   may	   will	   witness	   the	   growth	   of	   a	   (freelance)	  
workforce	  that	  is	  left	  to	  shoulder	  the	  burden	  of	  delegated	  risk	  against	  such	  a	  background	  of	  
structured	  uncertainty.	  In	  effect,	  UK	  policy	  makers	  would	  need	  to	  design	  a	  dynamic	  national	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innovation	  strategy	  that	   fully	  understands	  the	  nature	  and	  role	  of	   the	  creative	   industries,	   in	  
order	  to	  contribute	  the	  productivity	  growth	  afforded	  by	  more	  traditional	  industries.	  	  
	  
Digital	  cinema	  and	  disruptive	  technology	  (reports)	  
Paper	   5:	   Culkin,	   N.	   &	   Morawetz,	   N.	   (2004;	   2005;	   2007)	   Facing	   the	   digital	   future:	   Digital	  
Technology	   and	   the	   Film	   Industry.	   Industry	   report	   commissioned	   by	   the	   East	   of	   England	  
Development	  Agency.	  (7	  citations)	  
Between	  2000	  and	  2004	  Randle	  and	  I	  carried	  out	  a	  longitudinal	  research	  project	  investigating	  
how	  film	  and	   television	  employees	  operated	  within	   the	   largely	   freelance	  Hollywood	   labour	  
markets.	  The	  study	  also	  identified	  that	  the	  US	  participants	  were	  increasing	  their	  use	  of	  digital	  
technology	   over	   time,	   prompting	   Culkin	   to	   design	   a	   further	   study	   to	   consider	   the	   likely	  
impact	  of	  similar	  changes	  in	  the	  UK.	  This	  led	  to	  the	  commissioning	  of	  industry	  reports:	  Digital	  
Technology:	  Implications	  for	  the	  Film	  Industry	  in	  the	  Eastern	  Region	  of	  the	  UK	  for	  the	  East	  of	  
England	  Development	  Agency	  (2004)	  and	  in	  the	  same	  year	  Facing	  the	  Digital	  Future,	  Digital	  
Technology	  and	  the	  Film	  Industry,	  also	  for	  the	  EEDA.	  	  
Furthermore,	  it	  provided	  the	  underpinning	  research	  that	  led	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  Film	  and	  
Digital	  Media	   Exchange	   (FDMX).	   Overall,	   the	   various	   outputs	   provided	   significant	   insights,	  
over	   a	   decade	   on	   the	   developments,	   adoption	   and	   diffusion	   of	   various	   entrepreneurial	  
innovations	  and	  subsequent	  reactions	  of	  both	  incumbents	  and	  new	  entrants.	  
	  
Decision-­‐making	  in	  small	  firms	  
Paper	   6:	   Culkin,	   N.	   &	   Smith,	   D.	   V.	   L.	   S.	   (2000)	   ‘An	   Emotional	   Business:	   A	   Guide	   to	  
Understanding	   the	   Motivations	   of	   Small	   Business	   Decision	   Makers’.	   Qualitative	   Market	  
Research:	  An	  International	  Journal	  3(4).	  pp	  145-­‐157.	  (216	  citations)	  	  
“Abstract:	  This	  paper	  argues	  that	  the	  way	   in	  which	  the	  UK	  Government,	  operating	  through	  
various	  departments	  and	  quangos,	  approaches	  policy	   implementation	  designed	   to	   improve	  
the	  effectiveness	  of	   the	   small	   business	   sector,	   is	   based	  on	   a	   flawed	  understanding	  of	   how	  
small	   businesses	   actually	   operate.	   	   This	   naïve,	   over-­‐simplistic	   understanding	   of	   the	  
motivation	  of	  those	  in	  the	  small	  business	  sector	  means	  that	  many	  government	  interventions	  
that	  are	  made,	  are	  blunt	  instruments	  destined	  to	  fail,	  given	  the	  limited	  understanding	  shown	  
of	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  small	  business	  market.”	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Fit	  to	  dissertation	  research	  question:	  
This	  paper	  presented	  evidence	  from	  two	  recent	  studies	  among	  small	  firms:	  a	  series	  of	  large-­‐
scale	   qualitative	   studies	   undertaken	   for	   a	   blue	   chip	   company	   and	   a	   mixed	   study	   of	   the	  
Business	   Link	   network.	   The	   findings	   clearly	   demonstrated	   a	   need	   for	   UK	   government	   to	  
develop	  and	  refine	  their	  understanding	  of	  both	  the	  context	  and	  composition	  of	  small	   firms	  
and	   the	   markets	   within	   which	   they	   operate,	   in	   order	   to	   regardless	   of	   whether	   they	   saw	  
themselves	   having	   a	   legitimate	   role	   to	   play	   as	   an	   entrepreneurial	   agent	   in	   exploiting	   new	  
technologies.	  One	  key	  insight	  the	  research	  produced	  informed	  us	  that	  small	  business	  owners	  
describe	  themselves	  as	  ‘operating	  on	  their	  own	  in	  a	  “cruel	  world”’	  [P6:150],	  despite,	  having	  
an	  extensive	  support	  and	  information	  network,	  which	  included,	  accountants,	  	  suppliers,	  staff	  	  
and	  competitors.	  
The	  recommendations	  was	  based	  on	  first,	  getting	  to	  grips	  with	  the	  emotion,	  ambiguity	  and	  
complexity	   that	   characterises	   this	   market,	   and	   second,	   establishing	   an	   intervention	  
framework	   that	   stimulates	   entrepreneurial	   innovation	   among	   small	   firms.	   	   The	   paper	  
predicted	  that	  there	  would	  be	  a	  competitive	  advantage	  for	  a	  government	  who,	  at	  the	  outset	  
of	  the	  intervention	  process,	  can	  help	  define	  the	  problem	  in	  a	  manageable	  way,	  while	  at	  the	  
end	  of	  the	  intervention	  helping	  the	  decision	  maker	  through	  the	  decision	  making	  process.	  The	  
government	  at	  the	  time	  (through	  its	  Business	  Link	  network)	  was	  in	  the	  right	  position	  to	  take	  
advantage	  of	  that	  opportunity,	  but	  without	  a	  dynamic	  national	  innovation	  strategy,	  UK	  policy	  
makers	  did	  not	  have	  the	  vision	  to	  see	  it	  through.	  	  
	  
National	  and	  regional	  innovation	  systems	  (journal	  articles)	  
Paper	   7:	   Culkin,	   N.	   (2016a)	   ‘Anchor	   Institutions	   and	   Regional	   Innovation	   Systems	   for	  
supporting	   micro	   and	   small	   businesses’.	  e-­‐O&P,	   The	   Journal	   of	   the	   Association	   of	  
Management	  Education	  and	  Development	  (AMED).	  Summer.	  pp.	  22-­‐32.	  (0	  citations)	  
“Abstract:	  Universities	  should,	  and	  must	  take	  a	  lead	  role	  as	  an	  anchor	  institution	  within	  their	  
region,	   especially	   in	   light	   of	   the	   Brexit	   decision.	   Such	   a	   role	   will	   include	   providing	   a	   wide	  
range	  of	  formal	  and	  informal	  support,	  knowledge	  and	  resources	  targeted	  at	  micro	  and	  small	  
businesses	   (MSBs),	   complementing	   usual	   Small	   and	   Medium	   Enterprise	   (SME)	   support.	  
Drawing	   on	   my	   evaluation	   of	   the	   winners	   of	   the	   annual	   Times	   Higher	   Education	   (THE)	  
Entrepreneurial	  University	   of	   The	   Year	  Award	   and	   analysis	   of	   the	  Chartered	  Association	  of	  
Business	   School	   (CABS)	   Small	   Business	   Charter	   Awards,	   I	   suggest	   four	   different	   ways	   to	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enhance	   collaboration	   to	   enable	   MSBs	   to	   make	   maximum	   use	   of	   ‘anchor	   university’	  
support.”	  	  
	  
Paper	   8:	   Culkin,	   N.	   (2016b)	   ‘Entrepreneurial	   universities	   in	   the	   region:	   the	   force	  
awakens?’	  International	   Journal	   of	   Entrepreneurial	   Behavior	   &	   Research	  22(1).	   pp4-­‐16.	  
(Single	  author:	  0	  citations)	  
“Abstract:	  The	  growth	  in	  popularity	  of	  the	  Regional	  Innovation	  System	  (RIS)	  approach	  has,	  in	  
part,	   been	  driven	   by	   the	   need	   for	   economies	   to	   respond	   to	   the	   after	   shocks	   of	   the	   global	  
financial	  crisis.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  we	  see	  the	  term	  Anchor	  institutions	  is	  used	  increasingly	  to	  
describe	   organisations	   that	   have	   an	   important	   presence	   in	   the	   local	   community	   and	  make	  
some	  strategic	  contribution	   to	   the	   local	  economy.	  The	  purpose	  of	   this	  paper	   is	   to	  consider	  
the	  needs	  of	  the	  micro	  and	  small	  business	  ecosystem	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  the	  entrepreneurial	  
university	  as	  a	  regional	  anchor	  institution.”	  
Fit	  to	  dissertation	  research	  question	  [P7	  &	  P8]:	  
The	   results	   emerging	   from	   both	   papers	   point	   towards	   a	   need	   for	   national	   and	   regional	  
policymakers	   to	   embrace	   an	  entrepreneurial	   innovation	   culture	   that	   actually	   enables	   firms	  
and	   systems	   to	   evolve	   over	   time	   and	   this	   would	   be	   far	   more	   effective	   than	   the	   policies	  
proposed	   in	   the	  November	  2015	  Comprehensive	  Spending	  Review;	   the	  outcomes	  of	  which	  
will	   see	   some	  of	   the	  most	   robustly	  evaluated	  programmes,	  designed	   to	   support	   small	   firm	  
growth,	  closed	  down	  to	  be	  replaced	  with	  a	  commitment	  (by	  government)	  to	  further	  cut	  red	  
tape	  and	  extend	  small	  business	  rate	  relief	  for	  an	  extra	  year.	  	  
I	   propose	   that	   (national	   and)	   regional	   innovation	   systems	   for	   the	   glue	   that	   binds	   together	  
economic	   and	   social	   interaction	   between	   agents,	   span	   the	   public	   and	   private	   sector	   to	  
engender	  and	  diffuse	   innovation	  within	  a	  region,	  which	   is	  embedded	   in	  wider	  national	  and	  
global	  systems.	  I	  discuss	  the	  dimensions	  that	  underpin	  the	  RIS	  and	  NIS)	  concept,	  elsewhere	  in	  
this	   dissertation	   but	   briefly	   they	   are	   i)	   the	   interactions	   between	   different	   actors	   in	   the	  
innovation	  process,	  ii)	  the	  role	  of	  institutions,	  and	  iii)	  the	  use	  of	  regional	  systems	  analysis	  to	  
inform	  policy	  decisions.	   	  Finally,	  drawing	  on	  contemporary	  literature	  on	  the	  entrepreneurial	  
university	  and	  field	  visits	  to	  the	  eight	  Entrepreneurial	  Universities	  of	  the	  Year	  Award	  winners	  
I	  recommend	  a	  number	  of	  ways	   in	  which	  collaboration	  might	  be	  enhanced	  to	  ensure	  MSBs	  
can	  make	  maximum	   use	   of	   the	   advice	   and	   support	   on	   offer	   from	   universities	   playing	   the	  
anchor	  role,	  once	  occupied	  by	  the	  Business	  Link	  network.	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Technological	   know-­‐how	   is	   arguably	   the	   most	   important	   class	   of	   intangible	   assets	   not	  
universally	   available,	  but	   it	  does	   flow	   from	  universities.	   This	  may	  be	  one	  of	   the	  why	   social	  
researchers	   claim	   that	   technological	   innovation	   is	   a	   sociological	   concept	   and	   that	   the	  
concept	  of	  basic	  research	  originates	  from	  natural	  scientists.	  Overcoming	  ‘bottleneck	  assets’	  
enable	  entrepreneurial	  innovative	  firms	  to	  enter	  new	  markets	  and	  quickly	  establish	  a	  degree	  
of	   competitive	   advantage	   over	   incumbents.	   They	   are	   able	   to	   ‘scale-­‐up’	   a	   process,	   which	  
causes	   ‘hills’	   –	   and	   sometimes	   ‘mountains’	   –	   to	   appear	   on	   otherwise	   flat	   competitive	  
landscapes;	   in	   doing	   so,	   contribute	   to	   a	   nation’s	   productivity	   gains,	   which	   in	   itself	   major	  
driving	  force	  behind	  wealth	  creation	  and	  economic	  growth.	  
Finally,	   I	   demonstrate	   how	   value	   can	   flow	   to	   entrepreneurial	   innovative	   firms	   from	   the	  
astute	   creation,	   combination,	   transfer,	   accumulation	   and	   protection	   of	   intangible	   assets.	  
Such	  assets	  are	  the	  new	  ‘natural	  resources’	  of	  the	  global	  economy	  but	  they	  are	  not	  naturally	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Chapter	  5:	  Disturbing	  effects	  of	  digital	  cinema	  rollout	  
	  
D-­‐cinema	  is	  certainly	  a	  new	  technology	  but	  there	  is	  limited	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  this	  is	  
delivering,	  or	  is	  likely	  to	  deliver,	  a	  new	  culture	  for	  cinema.	  
(McDonald,	  2016)	  
5.1	  	   Introduction	  
Productivity	   is	   the	   main	   determinant	   of	   economic	   development.	   Growth	   in	  
productivity	  is,	  therefore,	  one	  of	  the	  major	  driving	  forces	  behind	  wealth	  creation	  and	  
economic	  prosperity;	  and,	  strong	  economic	  growth	  is	  behind	  enhancements	  in	  living	  
standards.	  We	  can	  measure	  productivity	  growth	  as	   the	  ability	   to	  produce	  more	   for	  
less,	   and	   inter	   alia	   it	   is	   the	   result	   of	   improved	   products,	   services,	   processes,	  
technologies,	  organisational	  structures	  and	  ideas.	  These	  measures	  can	  inform	  us	  how	  
efficient	  an	  economy	   is	   functioning	   in	  both	  a	  static	  and	  dynamic	  sense.	  Economists	  
usually	   distinguish	   between	   two	  main	   types	   of	   efficiency:	   allocative	   or	   productive	  
efficiency,	   and	  dynamic	   efficiency	   (Hodgson,	   1988).	   The	   former	   is	   a	   static	   concept,	  
concerned	   with	   how	   much	   can	   be	   produced	   from	   a	   given	   mix	   of	   resources	   at	   a	  
particular	  moment	  in	  time	  (e.g.	  firms	  operating	  at	  the	  current	  technological	  frontier).	  
The	   latter	   is	   a	   dynamic	   concept,	   concerned	   with	   directly	   pushing	   forward	   the	  
technological	   frontier;	   in	   the	  past	   this	  has	  often	   involved	  governments	   investing	   in	  
new	   technologies	   to	   encourage	   firms	   to	   adopt	   best	   practices	   of	   the	   moment	  
(Mazzucato,	  2013).	  
In	   this	   dissertation	   I	   have	   sought	   to	   answer	   one	   question	   –	   ‘can	   a	   high-­‐tech	  
breakthrough	  approach	  deliver	  a	  novel	   supply	  and	  demand	  solution’	  –	   through	   the	  
lens	   of	   digital	   cinema.	   To	   arrive	   at	   the	   answer,	   I	   looked	   at	   whether	   institutional	  
activity	  could	  help	  to	  explain	  the	  outcome,	  i.e.	  does	  government	  or	  public	  institutions	  
have	  any	  role	  in	  pushing	  forward	  the	  technological	  frontier?	  	  
In	  the	  McDonald	  quotation,	  used	  at	  the	  start	  of	  this	  Chapter,	  he	  appears	  to	  suggest	  
that	  given	  the	  [implied]	  power	  of	  the	  US	  Studio	  system,	  the	  answer	  is	  no.	  However,	  
the	  creative	  industries	  contain	  a	  multitude	  of	  players	  across	  its	  value	  networks.	  These	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range	  from	  creative	  talent	  to	  production	  companies,	  distributors,	  exhibitors,	  finance	  
players,	   sales	   agents,	   broadcasters,	   cable	   companies,	   home	   video	   retailers,	   and	   a	  
plethora	   of	   Internet	   companies,	   from	   individual	   creative	   entrepreneurs	   to	   micro	  
(project-­‐based)	   firms,	   independents,	  medium	  and	   large	   incumbents,	   right	  up	  to	  the	  
US	  (major	  and	  micro)	  studios	  and	  their	  distributors.	  
In	  2007,	  I	  recognised	  that	  having	  transformed	  content	  production,	  the	  digital	  frontier	  
had	  moved	  on	  to	  distribution	  and	  exhibition,	  an	  area	  previously	  under	  the	  complete	  
control	   of	   the	   US	   studios	  and	   specialised	   distributors,	   broadcasters	   and	   home	  
entertainment	   retailers	   (Culkin	   &	  Morawetz,	   2007).	   It	   became	   apparent	   that	   new	  
business	   models	   would	   be	   required	   and	   experimentation	   with	   release	   strategies	  
would	   become	   the	   norm.	   This	   would	   present	   opportunities	   for	   entrepreneurial	  
innovators	  to	  respond	  to	  changes	  in	  the	  means	  of	  distribution	  to	  usher	  in	  an	  era	  that	  
was,	   less	   about	  delivering	   content	   and	  more	  about	  providing	   content	   and	  allowing	  
consumers	  to	  find	  it	  for	  themselves.	  In	  essence,	  digital	  distribution	  would	  reduce	  the	  
distance	  between	  consumer	  and	  producer,	  across	  a	  range	  of	  platforms.	  In	  turn,	  this	  
would	  speed	  up	  consumer	  response	  to	  product,	  and	  make	  demand	  more	  immediate;	  
and	  present	  cinema	  with	  the	  opportunity	  to	  reposition	  itself	  from	  the	  last	  stop	  on	  an	  
analogue	  train	  line	  to	  that	  of	  a	  major	  hub	  for	  audiences	  on	  the	  digital	  highway.	  Based	  
on	  my	  observations	  of	  what	  doors	  Napster	  and	  others	  had	  opened	  in	  other	  parts	  of	  
the	   creative	   content	   industries,	   I	  was	  of	   the	  view	   that	   those	  who	  could	  not	   supply	  
their	  product	  instantly,	  on	  multiple	  platforms	  would	  miss	  out	  on	  a	  growing	  business	  
(best	  case)	  or	  find	  themselves	  out	  of	  business	  (worst	  case).	  Moreover,	  new	  emerging	  
delivery	   channels	   would	   substitute	   established	   and	   understood	   channels	   of	  
distribution	  (for	  example,	  television,	  pay-­‐per-­‐view	  and	  DVD).	  	  
For	   the	  next	   phase	  of	   the	  digital	   cinema	   rollout	   concern	  would	  be	   less	   focused	  on	  
technology	  and	  more	  about	  distribution,	  market	  access	  and	  audience	  development.	  
What	   was	   not	   obvious	   was	   how	   revenues	   would	  be	   generated	   and,	   more	  
importantly,	  shared	  between	  the	  	  new	  distribution	  channels.	  Revenue	  streams	  would	  
emerge	  if	  players	  were	  allowed	  to	  experiment	  by,	  and	  between,	  incumbents	  and	  new	  
entrants	   especially	   in	   the	   area	   of	   exhibition,	   as	   this	   is	   where	   revenue	   is	   first	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generated.	  The	  major	  US	  studios	  had	  already	  staked	  out	  their	  digital	  claims	  -­‐	  building	  
technical	  infrastructure	  to	  maintain	  control	  of	  the	  process.	  But	  in	  cost-­‐efficient	  online	  
environments,	   entrepreneurs	   would	   have	   plenty	   of	   opportunities	   to	   circumvent	  
costly	   intermediaries.	  Activity	   in	  the	  digital	  cinema	  rollout	   in	  the	  three	  countries,	  at	  
the	  time	  of	  the	  global	  economic	  crisis,	  is	  summarised	  in	  Table	  5.1.	  What	  we	  can	  see	  
from	  the	  paths	  followed	  is	  the	  newly	  digitised	  film	  industry	  has,	  over	  the	  last	  decade	  
lived	  a	  great	   revolution	  that	  now	  embraced	  cinema.	  Perkis	   (2009)	  suggested	  digital	  
projection	  was	   a	   silent	   revolution	   for	   the	   cinema	   audience.	  While	   Hanson	   (2007a)	  
argued	   it	   involved	  a	   technical	   innovation	  with	   the	  potential	   to	   change	   the	   industry	  
and	   create	   new	   business	   models	   for	   entrepreneurial	   firms	   prepared	   to	   take	  
advantage	   of	   the	   possibilities	   brought	   about	   through	   the	   transformation.	   Such	   a	  
technical	   innovation	   can	   also	   make	   an	   economic	   and	   cultural	   contribution	   to	   a	  
nation’s	  growth	  in	  productivity.	  	  
On	   the	   other	   hand,	   digital	   cinema	   provided	   a	   low-­‐risk	   opportunity	   for	   cost	  
eradication	  and	  value	  extraction	  for	  the	  US	  studios.	  Although,	  such	  benefits	  could	  not	  
occur	   until	   exhibitors	   had	   embraced	   the	   new	   technology.	   Once	   global	   technical	  
standards	  were	   published	   in	   2005	   (the	  Digital	   Cinema	   Initiative	   specifications),	   the	  
main	  obstacle	  for	  adopting	  the	  technology	  was	  the	   lack	  of	  a	  viable	  business	  model,	  
one	  that	  made	  commercial	  sense	  for	  the	  exhibitors	  (Culkin	  et	  al.,	  2006).	  The	  adoption	  
and	  diffusion	  phase	  literature	  informs	  us	  that	  only	  when	  mutually	  attractive	  business	  
models	  are	  agreed	  between	  players	  can	  the	  value	  chain	  grow.	  Or,	  perhaps	  as	  Weiser	  
speculated,	  “The	  most	  profound	  technologies	  are	  those	  that	  disappear.	  They	  weave	  
themselves	   into	   the	   fabric	   of	   everyday	   life	   until	   they	   are	   indistinguishable	   from	   it”	  
(1991:94);	  echoing	  the	  view	  of	  Perkis	  above	  (Perkis	  op.	  cit.).	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An	  industry-­‐wide	  approach	  has	  been	  taken	  for	  the	  d-­‐screen	  conversion.	  All	  major	  players	  are	  financing	  a	  
comprehensive	   study	   into	   technology,	  business	  models	  and	   financing	   implications	  and	  permutations	  of	  
the	  digital	  rollout.	  There	  are	  two	  R&D	  projects	  taking	  place	  at	  present:	  the	  NORDIC	  project,	  an	  innovative	  
idea	   in	   its	  own	   right	  was	   trialled	   in	  11	   screens	  with	  a	   second	  10-­‐screen	   trial	  organised	  with	   the	  Digital	  
Cinema	   Alliance.	   Both	   of	   these	   schemes	   highlighted	   the	   importance	   attached	   to	   cinema	   by	   the	  
government.	   Complete	   conversion	   is	   anticipated	   within	   the	   next	   2-­‐3	   years.	   Learning	   for	   rapid	   digital	  
conversion	  is	  based,	  in	  part,	  on	  the	  experience	  of	  screen	  advertising	  company	  CAPA	  who	  switched	  from	  
35mm	  to	  digital	  screen	  advertising	  overnight	  in	  January	  2002.	  	  
	  
In	   addition	   to	   the	   NORDIC	   project,	   Norway	   is	   also	   home	   to	   a	   unique	   exhibition	   structure	   in	   which	  
municipally	  owned	  and	  operated	  cinemas	  hold	  in	  excess	  of	  70	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  market.	  All	  cinemas	  (both	  
municipally	  and	  privately	  owned)	  co-­‐operate	  under	   the	  aegis	  of	   the	  Norwegian	  exhibitors’	  organisation	  
Film	  &	  Kino.	  Under	  a	  Films	  and	  Videograms	  Act	  (1987)	  a	  ‘Cinema	  Fund’	  levy	  was	  imposed	  on	  all	  cinema	  
ticket	   sales	   (2.5%)	  and	  on	  video/DVD	  sale	  and	   rental	   transactions	   (NOK	  3.50	  per	   transaction).	   The	   levy	  
currently	  brings	  some	  EUR	  7.5–8	  million	  per	  year	  into	  the	  Fund.	  
	  
Film	   &	   Kino	   has	   negotiated	   a	   virtual	   print	   fee	   (VPF)	   financing	  model	   directly	   with	   Hollywood	   studios.	  
Producers	  and	  distributors	  provide	  40%	  by	  way	  of	  VPFs,	  and	  the	  cinemas	  will	  contribute	  60%.	  Film	  &	  Kino	  
will	   use	  NOK	   100	  million	   from	   the	   Cinema	   Fund	   to	   subsidise	   the	   cinemas’	   contribution	   to	   the	   system.	  
Producers	  and	  distributors	  pay	  VPFs	  over	  a	  period	  of	  up	  to	  six	  years,	  while	  cinemas	  can	  choose	  whether	  






Europe’s	  most	  advanced	  digital	  cinema	  territory	  due	  to	  government	  action	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  UKFC	  Digital	  
Screen	  Network	  (DSN)	  initiative.	  Arts	  Alliance,	  the	  project’s	  facilitator,	  is	  in	  charge	  of	  this	  publicly-­‐funded	  
rollout	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  increasing	  admissions	  to	  specialised	  films.	  On	  the	  commercial	  front,	  Odeon	  has	  
recently	  converted	  two	  multiplexes	  to	  all-­‐digital	  as	  part	  of	  a	  nine-­‐month	  test.	  	  
	  
There	   is	   considerable	  movement	  behind	   the	   scenes	   in	   the	  UK,	  which	  could	   translate	   to	   relatively	   rapid	  
rollout	  when	  the	  conditions	  are	  right.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  this	  process	  the	  UKFC	  will	  have	  helped	  to	  convert	  7	  
per	   cent	   of	   the	   total	   UK	   screen	   base.	   Unlike	   Norway,	   public	   involvement	   has	   merely	   facilitated	   the	  






By	  the	  end	  of	  2007,	  the	  number	  of	  digital	  screen	  globally	  stood	  at	  5,500	  across	  44	  territories.	  In	  the	  US	  
some	  2,000	  d-­‐screens	  (total	  market	  of	  40,000)	  had	  been	  deployed,	  driven	  primarily	  by	  cinemas	  in	  the	  d-­‐
screen	  network	  from	  AccessIT,	  who	  had	  been	  backed	  by	  the	  US	  distributors	  with	  a	  VPF	  deal.	  Technicolor	  
also	  received	  support	  but	  is	  yet	  to	  move	  from	  beta-­‐test	  mode.	  Predictions	  suggest	  the	  market	  will	  evolve	  
towards	  full	  compliance	  with	  the	  Digital	  Cinema	  Initiative	  (DCI)	  specifications,	  released	  in	  June	  2005.	  	  
	  
However,	  the	  market	   is	  not	  fully	  defined	  for	  one	  major	  factor:	  the	  grouping	  of	  three	  leading	  exhibitors,	  
the	  NCM	  umbrella	  and	  more	  recently	  DCIP	  (Regal,	  AMC/Loews,	  Cinemark),	  is	  yet	  to	  pronounce	  on	  what	  
course	  of	   action	   it	   is	   to	   take	   to	   convert	   its	   screens	   to	  digital	   technology.	   The	   scale	  of	   its	   circuit,	  which	  
bringing	  together	  nearly	  14,000	  screens	  (35	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  market),	  means	  that	  whatever	  it	  intends	  to	  do	  
will	  have	  a	  significant	  effect	  on	  market	  development.	  
	  
Postscript	   By	  the	  end	  of	  2012,	  global	  digital	  screen	  conversion	  stood	  at	  90,000	  or	  75	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  world's	  screens.	  
Converting	   the	   remaining	   25	   per	   cent	   presented	   a	   real	   challenge.	   In	   North	   America,	   85	   percent	   of	  
auditoriums	  (36,000	  screens)	  were	  digital	  while	  in	  Europe	  the	  figure	  stood	  at	  67	  percent	  (25,000	  screens).	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To	  explain	  how	  the	  digital	  cinema	  rollout	  continued,	  the	  original	  research	  questions	  
were	  formulated	  to	  explore	  the	  constituents	  of	  my	  conceptual	  framework:	  
•  Constituent	   1:	   A	   state	   of	   entrepreneurial	   innovation	   whereby	   a	   sector	  
can	   take	  on	  new	  paths	  of	  development	  or	   several	  paths	  at	  once	  without	  
recourse	   to	   breakthrough	   technologies.	   It	   is	   resilient	   to	   change	   from	  
outside	   and	   allows	   strong	   co-­‐evolution	   between	   technological	  
development	  and	  supportive	  institutions.	  
• Constituent	  2:	   A	  state	  of	  responsive	  innovation	  of	  ‘incremental	  change’.	  
These	  are	  minor	  changes	  among	  sector	   incumbents,	  possibly	   leading	  to	  a	  
state	  of	  hysteresis,	  where	   there	   is	  a	  general	  unwillingness	   to	  change	  and	  
little	   ability	   to	   renew	   or	   reinvent	   an	   area.	   This	  may	   or	  may	   not	   lead	   to	  
further	  institutional	  change	  and	  if	  it	  does,	  only	  to	  minor	  adaptations.	  	  
• Constituent	  3:	  The	  third	  and	  most	  negative	  outcome	  is	  that	  of	  the	  state	  
of	  ‘lock-­‐in’.	  The	  sector	  fails	  to	  adapt	  in	  any	  way	  to	  change	  and	  eventually	  
faces	  economic	  decline	  or	  redundancy.	  	  
Over	  the	  next	  three	  sections,	  the	  overall	  goal	  is	  to	  present	  findings	  from	  my	  fieldwork	  
and	   publications	   to	   arrive	   at	   the	   answer	   to	   my	   research	   question(s)	   in	   regard	   to	  
business,	  industrial	  and	  technological	  change.	  The	  objective	  being	  to	  explore	  the	  new	  
content	   creation	   opportunities	   the	   innovation	   supports,	   and	   how	   three	   nations,	   in	  
particular,	  have	  sought	   to	   innovate	  and	  reorientate	   themselves	   in	   relation	   to	   these	  
novel	  phenomena.	  In	  the	  spirit	  of	  this	  approach,	  the	  paper	  draws	  upon	  a	  selection	  of	  
interview	  quotes,	  where	  appropriate	  to	  explore	  the	  creation,	  diffusion,	  and	  adoption	  
of	   a	   high-­‐tech	   breakthrough	   product.	   The	   findings	   reported	   seek	   to	   explain	   the	  
distinct	  characteristics	  of	  digital	   technologies	   that	  are	   implicit	   in	  an	  evolution	   from,	  
stable	   to	   fragile	   product	   innovation,	   and	   further	   highlight	   the	   need	   for	   a	   dynamic	  
approach	   to	   entrepreneurial	   innovation	   within	   a	   nation’s	   innovation	   system.	   The	  
wider	   implications	   build	   on	   extant	   innovation	   literature	   to	   examine	   the	   diffusion,	  
adoption,	  and	  use	  of	  knowledge	  in	  the	  rollout	  of	  digital	  cinema	  technology.	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The	   conclusions	   reported	   in	   Chapter	   6	   will	   suggest	   a	   radically	   different	   reading	   of	  
both	  disruptive	  innovations	  and	  national	  innovation	  systems	  than	  has	  been	  offered	  in	  
previous	   accounts.	   By	   viewing	   the	   digital	   cinema	   rollout,	   as	   a	   case	   study	   situated	  
within	   an	   increasingly	   mobile	   sector,	   I	   suggest	   that	   technological	   factors	   need	   to	  
retreat	   in	   importance,	   behind	   entrepreneurial	   innovation,	   as	   a	   key	   driving	   force	   in	  
reaching	  markets	  and	  building	  audiences.	  
5.2	  	  	   From	  supply	  chain	  to	  value	  networks	  
Throughout	  the	  fieldwork	  for	  this	  dissertation	  it	  became	  increasingly	  apparent	  that,	  
in	   creating	   the	   DCI,	   the	   US	   studios	   saw	   digital	   technology	   as	   the	   vehicle	   through	  
which	  they	  could	  continue	  farming	  the	  first-­‐run	  movie	  market,	  to	  reap	  the	  financial	  
benefits	   from	   exploiting	   bytes	   to	   project	   content	   in	   cinema.	   Despite	   the	  
opportunities	   digital	   cinema	   presented	   the	   studios,	   through	   their	   insistence	   on	  
compliance	  to	  the	  exacting	  standards	  proposed	  via	  the	  DCI,	  once	  again	  demonstrated	  
their	   capacity	   to	   shape	   the	   speed	   and	   direction	   of	   the	   latest	   entrepreneurial	  
innovation	   in	   an	   increasingly	   networked	   entertainment	   environment.	   This	  
protectionist	  mindset	  remained	  at	  all	  levels	  during	  the	  adoption	  phase;	  despite	  views	  
expounded	  at	  temporary	  clusters	  (e.g.	  increase	  in	  choice	  and	  the	  flexibility	  offered	  by	  
adopting	   digital	   cinema	   over	   celluloid)	   that	   would	   bring	   to	   the	   US	   and	   European	  
markets.	  However,	  during	   the	   information-­‐gathering	  phase,	   it	   became	  evident	   that	  
both	  industry	  and	  audience	  alike	  were	  largely	  unaware	  of	  the	  range	  of	  opportunities	  
digital	  cinema	  was	  capable	  of	  delivering.	  Exhibitors	  especially	  were	  simply	  unfamiliar	  
with	   the	   process	   for	   accessing	   knowledge	   about	   its	   potential	   value.	   As	   we	   know,	  
innovation	   propels	   markets	   with	   Schumpeter’s,	   gales	   of	   creative	   destruction,	  
whereby	   new	   technologies	   blow	   away	   the	   old.	   However,	   only	   radical	   innovations	  
create	  major	   disruptive	   changes	   and	   for	   that	   to	   happen,	   continual	   adjustments	   of	  
improvisation	   and	   adaptation	   strategies	   emerge	   from	   entrepreneurial	   managers	  
actively	  engaging	  in	  knowledge	  networks	  (Martin	  &	  Matlay,	  2001).	  
When	   asked	   about	   the	   digital	   cinema	   would	   be	   disruptive	   or	   deliver	   the	   same	  
product	  more	  effectively,	  at	  the	  American	  Film	  Market,	  one	  respondent	  said:	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I	   fail	   to	  see	  how	  we…[the	  theater	  owners]…	  are	  going	  to	  benefit	   from	  this	  change.	  
Most	  of	  our	  profit	  comes	  from	  the	  concessionary	  business,	  out	  front	  [of	  house].	  The	  
distributors	  will	  make	  certain	  they	  have	  their	  backsides	  covered	  before	  they’ll	  offer	  
something	  outside	  the	  box.	  	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (Sen	  Exec	  [1]:	  US	  Cinema	  Chain)	  
	  	  
This	  view	  is	  juxtaposed	  with	  the	  views	  of	  the	  Studio:	  
	  
	  You	   ain’t	   seen	   nothing	   yet.	   Digital	   will	   give	   you	  more	   choice	   than	   you	   have	   ever	  
thought	  possible.	  Adoption	  and	  DCI	  standardization	  will	  lead	  to	  the	  most	  significant	  
and	   fundamental	   change	   to	   the	  way	  movies	   are	  made	   and	   exhibited…….and	   then	  
there’s	  3D.	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  (Senior	  Exec	  [1]:	  US	  Studio)	  
	  
A	   very	   similar	   position	  was	   taken	   at	   a	  major	   conference	   in	  Amsterdam;	   suggesting	  
new	  entrants	  had	  recognized	  its	  value:	  
As	  you	  see	  with	  3D,	  digital	  cinema	  has	  opened	  up	  many	  great	  opportunities	  for	  the	  
market.	   I	   know	   the	   Met	   Opera	   is	   looking	   seriously	   at	   making	   their	   productions	  
available…	  	  	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (Sen	  Exec	  [1]:	  US	  Digital	  Intermediary)	  
 
When,	   in	   fact	  3D	  was	  never	  part	  of	   the	  DCI	   specification;	  however,	   in	   Scandinavia,	  
the	  need	  for	  exhibitors	  to	  invest	  in	  technology	  to	  support	  3D	  projection	  was	  further	  
enhanced	  through	  such	  views:	  
They	   can	   say	  whatever	   they	   like…[about	   3D]…but	   quality	   will	  make	   a	   difference…	  
eventually	  the	   latest	  technology	  will	  be	  an	  asset.	  Exhibitors	  must	   innovate	  because	  
in	  a	  fast	  evolving	  technology	  world	  the	  highest	  3D	  cinema	  experience	  will	  make	  their	  
cinema	  different.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (Sen	  Exec	  [1]:	  US	  Digital	  Intermediary)	  
	  
And:	  
3D	  is	  getting	  everybody	  excited.	  	  3D	  is	  making	  people	  go	  from	  this……….“well	  I’m	  not	  
really	  sure”…….to……	  “we’ve	  got	  to	  get	  onto	  this	  3D	  stuff”	  because	  you	  heard	  stories	  
about	  the	  multipliers……………when	  anybody	  suddenly	  gives	  you	  a	  multiplier	  at	  4,	  5,	  
6,	   7	   8	   times	   the	   normal	   box	   office,	   you’d	   better	   watch	   out	   because	   that’s	  
serious……..	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (Sen	  Exec	  [2]:	  US	  Studio)	  
The	  introduction	  of	  3D	  into	  the	  digital	  cinema	  narrative	  was	  difficult	  to	  comprehend	  
for	  three	  reasons.	  First,	  there	  was	  no	  mention	  of	  3D	  in	  the	  DCI	  specifications;	  second,	  
the	  technology	  had	  stalled	  on	  more	  than	  one	  occasion	  in	  the	  past,	  first	  appearing	  in	  
the	   1950s	   in	   Arch	   Oboler’s	   film,	  Bwana	   Devil	   with	   a	   second	  wave	   initiated	   by	   the	  
same	   producer	   in	   his	   film,	   The	   Bubble;	   finally,	   the	   costs	   for	   digital	   cinema	  
conversation	  were	  high	  compared	  to	  35mm	  projectors	  without	  the	  added	  cost	  of	  a	  
silver	  screen	  (and	  polarized	  glasses)	  required	  to	  view	  3D	  films.	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5.2.1	  The	  Strength	  of	  the	  straitjacket	  	  
It	  was	  challenging	  to	  reconcile	  such	  public	  expressions	  with	  the	  position	  of	  the	  MPAA	  
who,	  in	  a	  2002	  press	  release,	  quoting	  its	  then	  President,	  Jack	  Valenti	  “that	  unless	  we	  
find	   suitable	   technological	   armor	   to	   protect	   the	   digital	   movie,	   we	   will	   soon	   be	  
standing	   in	   the	   ruins	   of	   a	   once-­‐great	   enterprise.”	   This	   is	   not	   an	   isolated	   case	   of	  
myopia;	  earlier	  in	  1974,	  Valenti	  warned	  that	  the	  infant	  cable	  industry	  would	  become	  
“a	  huge	  parasite	  in	  the	  marketplace,	  feeding	  and	  fattening	  itself	  off	  of	  local	  television	  
stations	  and	  copyright	  owners	  of	  copyrighted	  material.	  We	  do	  not	  like	  it	  because	  we	  
think	   it	   wrong	   and	   unfair”	   (Corliss,	   2007).	   And,	   later	   during	   talks	   to	   establish	   the	  
WTO,	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  US	  film,	  television,	  music	  and	  publishing	  industries	  were	  at	  
the	   forefront	   of	   Valenti’s	   thinking,	   when	   it	   came	   to	   discussions	   around	   cultural	  
exceptions.	   French	   negotiators	   proposed	   at	   the	   General	   Agreement	   on	   Tariffs	   and	  
Trade	  (GATT)	  round	   in	  1993	  that	  an	  exception	  or	  exemption	  rule	  be	  applied,	  which	  
was	   eventually	   supported	   by	   the	   European	   Commission.	   The	   USA	   voiced	   strong	  
opposition	  to	  such	  a	  proposal	  -­‐	  whereby	  cultural	  goods	  and	  services	  were	  recognized	  
differently	  from	  other	  commercial	  products	  -­‐	  and	  exempt	  from	  international	  treaties	  
and	  agreements.	  Valenti	  who	  had	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  the	  lobbying	  and	  negotiations	  
was	  angered	  by	  the	  defeat	  for	  the	  US	  audiovisual	  industry,	  which	  he	  would	  refer	  to	  
as	  the	  jewel	  in	  America’s	  trade	  crown,	  making	  over	  US$530	  billion,	  in	  excess	  of	  5	  per	  
cent	  of	  gross	  domestic	  in	  2001	  (Bruner,	  2008).	  What	  this	  position	  did	  make	  clear	  was	  
the	  central	  role	  that	  the	  audiovisual	  industries	  played	  within	  a	  US	  innovation	  system;	  
a	   system	   that	   relies	   heavily	   on	   and	   benefits	   from	   the	   basic	   precept	   of	   free	   trade	  
whereby	   goods	   should	   circulate	   the	   global	   market	   without	   distinctions	   based	   on	  
national	   origin.	   As	   Pager	   (2011)	   posed	   the	   question,	   why	   culture,	   and	   why	  
audiovisuals	  in	  particular?	  Answering	  his	  own	  question,	  Pager	  went	  on	  to	  argue	  that	  
the	  basic	  economics	  of	  creative	  content	  production	   -­‐	   subject	  both	   to	  economies	  of	  
scale	  and	  consumer	  preferences	  for	  homegrown	  content	  -­‐	  matters	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  
full-­‐length	  feature	  films.	  Throughout	  history,	  the	  high	  fixed	  costs	  required	  to	  produce	  
original	   content,	   compared	   to	   the	   marginal	   costs	   of	   exhibiting	   it,	   favoured	   a	   US	  
system	  whereby	  producers	   could	   rely	  on	  a	   large,	  wealthy	  domestic	   audience.	   	   In	   a	  
largely	   linear	   (or	   non-­‐networked)	   world	   Hollywood's	   resultant	   scale	   economies	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supported	   bigger	   budget	   productions	   that	   experienced	   a	   competitive	   advantage	   in	  
global	  markets	  (2011:69).	   In	  short,	  the	  audiovisual	   industries	  are	  an	   integral	  part	  of	  
the	  DNA	  of	  the	  US	  export	  machine.	  
	  
This	  position	  was	  preserved	  during	  recent	   (and	  ongoing)	  negotiations	  the	  proposed	  
Transatlantic	   Trade	   and	   Investment	   Partnership	   (TTIP). The	   European	   Commission	  
stated	  that,	  they	  would	  ensure	  that	  any	  agreement	  with	  the	  US	  would	  not	  jeopardize	  
the	  ability	  of	  the	  EU	  and	  its	  Member	  States	  to	  maintain	  their	  commitment	  to	  cultural	  
diversity	  and	   fully	   implement	  and	  adapt	   their	  policies	  and	   instruments	   to	   the	   rapid	  
evolutions	   of	   the	   environment	   (EC,	   2013).	   The	   obvious	   goal	   was	   to	   protect	   and	  
promote	  not	  only	  domestic	  culture	  but	  to	  maintain	  measures	  to	  limit	  the	  diffusion	  of	  
non-­‐EU	  creative	  works	  (e.g.	  French	  TV	  Channel	  quotas	  and	  subsidies	  to	  cinema).	  The	  
European	   Parliamentary	   Research	   Service	   (EPRS)	   reported	   that	   the	   European	  
Parliament	  had	  adopted	  a	  resolution	  calling	  for	  all	  cultural	  and	  audiovisual	  services,	  
to	  be	  excluded	  from	  the	  TTIP	  negotiating	  mandate.	  Furthermore,	  in	  2013	  the	  Council	  
had	  agreed	  that	  audiovisual	  services	  would	  not	  be	  covered	   in	  the	  mandate;	   the	  EU	  
argued	  it	  was	  under	  the	  legal	  obligation	  (2005	  UNESCO	  Convention	  [unsigned	  by	  the	  
US])	   to	   protect	   and	   promote	   the	   diversity	   of	   cultural	   expressions,	   a	   principle	   also	  
enshrined	  in	  the	  EU	  Treaties.	  	  
	  
In	   bypassing	   the	   UNESCO	   convention,	   the	   US	   simply	   turned	   to	   Foreign	   Trade	  
Agreements	   brokered	  on	   a	   one-­‐to-­‐one	  basis	  with	  other	   countries.	   As	   Crane	   (2013)	  
described,	   FTAs	   eliminated	   film	  quotas	   and	  promoted	   exports	   of	  US	   films	   to	   other	  
countries.	  The	  US	  government’s	   reaction	   to	   the	  UNESCO	  Convention	  and	   its	  use	  of	  
FTAs	  further	  reflected	  the	  enormous	  importance	  that	  the	  US	  government	  attaches	  to	  
its	   film	   industry.	   Cultural	   industries,	   such	   as	   film,	  music,	   and	   television,	   are	  major	  
sources	   of	   US	   exports.	  What	   is	   equally	   important	   is	   that	   of	   the	   20	   countries	   who	  
signed	  FTAs	  with	  the	  US,	  many	  saw	  a	  rapid	  decline	  in	  their	  domestic	  film	  markets	  as	  
indicated	   by	   the	  market	   share	   of	   domestic	   films	   e.g.	   Canada	   and	   Australia,	   which	  
were	  no	  longer	  able	  to	  adequately	  protect	  their	  industries	  (2013:372).	  Moreover,	  in	  
relation	   to	   trade	   agreements,	   individual	   EU	   member	   states	   have	   a	   veto	   in	   areas	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related	  to	  culture	  and	  the	  audiovisual	  sector	  if	  an	  agreement	  threatens	  cultural	  and	  
linguistic	   diversity	   (EPRS,	   2014).	   The	   Audiovisual	   Media	   Services	   Directive,	   which	  
contains	  measures	   to	  promote	  European	  audiovisual	  content	  both	   for	  broadcasting	  
services	   and	   video-­‐on-­‐demand	   services,	  would	  also	   remain	  outside	  any	   future	  TTIP	  
agreements.	  The	  implication	  being	  that	  public	  institutional	  instruments	  (e.g.	  taxes	  on	  
film	   tickets,	   co-­‐production	   agreements,	   digital	   rights	   management)	   would	   remain	  
available	   for	   Member	   States	   as	   a	   way	   to	   maintain	   their	   commitment	   to	   cultural	  
diversity.	   The	   Nordic	   Councils	   of	   Artists	   (NCA)	   sent	   an	   open	   letter	   to	   the	   trade	  
commissioner,	   to	   ensure	   that	   the	   aims	   and	  obligations	   of	   the	  UNESCO	  Convention	  
were	   fully	   respected	   in	   the	   TTIP	   negotiations,	   further	   reinforced	   the	   European	  
position.	   Specifically,	   they	   asked	   that	   any	   agreement	   should	   secure	   a	   broad	   and	  
future-­‐proof	   exclusion	   of	   audiovisual	   services	   that	   were	   both	   technologically	   and	  
platform	  neutral	  (NCA,	  2014).	  
	  
It	  is	  not	  difficult	  to	  see	  the	  dominant	  position	  held	  by	  the	  US	  approach	  to	  trade	  and	  
culture,	   especially	  when	   it	   comes	   to	   the	   important	   box	   office	   league	   tables,	  which	  
form	   a	   major	   marketing	   component	   for	   the	   US	   studios	   and	   their	   overseas	  
distributors.	   In	   2015,	   cinema	   admissions	   growth	   in	   the	   EU	  was	   down	   to	  US	   studio	  
titles	  that	  accounted	  for	  18	  of	  the	  top	  20	  performing	  films,	  exhibited	  that	  year.	  It	   is	  
also	  worth	  highlighting	  that	  nine	  of	   the	  top	  ten	  grossing	   films	  consisted	  of	  sequels,	  
prequels	   or	   spin-­‐offs	   According	   to	   the	   European	   Audiovisual	   Observatory	   (EAO,	  
2016),	   admissions	   for	   European	   films	   declined	   in	   2015,	   causing	   European	   market	  
share	  in	  the	  EU	  to	  drop	  to	  26	  per	  cent	  with	  only	  two	  European	  films	  appearing	  in	  the	  
top	  20,	   French	  action	   thriller	  Taken	  3	   and	  German	  comedy	   Fack	   ju	  Göhte	  2;	   at	   the	  
same	   time	   US	   studios	   continued	   to	  make	   less	  movies	   and	   the	   EU	   produced	  more	  
movies.	   Boosted	   by	   the	   success	   of	   films	   such	   as	   Spectre,	   UK	   (qualifying)	   films	  
captured	  a	  record	  domestic	  market	  share	  of	  44.5	  per	  cent,	  and	  giving	  it	  the	  highest	  
share	  of	  the	  EU	  market.	  However,	  the	  year	  before	  without	  Spectre	  the	  UK	  domestic	  
market	  share	  stood	  at	  approx.	  26	  per	  cent,	  a	  figure	  similar	  to	  Norway	  (EAO	  op.cit.).	  In	  
addition	   to	   the	   state	  of	  EU	  Cinema	  market	   in	  2015,	   the	  TTIP	  negotiations	  highlight	  
the	   twin	  concerns	  of	   fragmentation	  and	   territorial	  barriers,	  which	  do	  not	  exist	   in	  a	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physical	  single	  market	   (e.g.	   the	  US)	  but	  have	   long	  been	  argued	  hold	  the	  EU	  market	  
back	   (e.g.	   only	   7%	   of	   European	   SMEs	   sell	   cross-­‐border).	   If	   Europe	   could	   create	   a	  
Digital	   Single	   Market	   (DSM),	   it	   could	   contribute	   €415	   billion	   to	   the	   European	  
economy	  allowing	  business	   to	   trade,	   innovate	   and	   interact	   legally,	   safely,	   securely,	  
and	  at	  an	  affordable	  cost	  (Junker,	  2016).	  Once	  complete,	  significant	  opportunities	  for	  
entrepreneurial	  innovation	  and	  a	  new	  space	  for	  true	  scale-­‐up	  of	  businesses	  -­‐	  given	  a	  
market	  of	  500	  million	  consumers	  -­‐	  to	  compete	  with	  the	  largest	  US	  firms	  will	  exist.	  	  
5.2.2	  The	  value	  of	  nothing	  
Given	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  US	   did	   not	   sign	   up	   to	   the	  UNESCO	  Convention,	   it	   is	   hardly	  
surprising	  that	  the	  representatives	  of	  their	  audiovisual	  industries	  carry	  on	  in	  the	  spirit	  
of	   Jack	   Valenti.	   According	   to,	   President	   of	   Independent	   Film	  &	   Television	   Alliance,	  
based	  in	  Los	  Angeles,	  when	  asked	  about	  the	  DSM:	  
“It’s	   like	   Chinese	   water	   torture….[w]hen	   you	   look	   across	   the	   full	   spectrum	   of	  
proposals,	   it’s	   terrifying.	   Each	   proposal	   has	   a	   lot	   of	   detail…the	   Commission	   is	  
attempting	   to	   do	   two	   different	   things,	   which	   operate	   together:	   Firstly,	   limit	   the	  
ability	   of	   copyright	   holders	   to	   license	   content,	  whether	   it’s	   film	   or	   television,	   on	   a	  
territorial	  exclusive	  basis,	  and	  secondly,	  which	  we	  are	  finding	  increasingly	  difficult	  to	  
justify,	   is	   the	   persistent	   taking	   pieces	   of	   our	   rights,	   such	   as	   the	   ancillary	   online	  
services	  of	  broadcast	  and	  catch-­‐up	  rights.”	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	  (Jean	  Prewitt,	  2016)	  
Elsewhere,	  McDonald	  (2016)	  has	  constructed	  a	  coherent	  argument,	  which	  similar	  to	  
the	  IFTA	  stance	  lays	  clear	  that,	  combating	  protectionism	  and	  anti-­‐piracy	  have	  always	  
been	   fundamental	   policy	   priorities	   for	   the	   MPAA.	   The	   organsiation	   had,	   over	   the	  
years,	   built	   a	   coalition	   of	   partners	   in	   order	   to	   protect	   their	   members:	   the	   legal,	  
through	  anti-­‐piracy	   litigation;	   the	  political,	   by	   joining	  with	  other	   trade	  groups	   from	  
across	   the	   copyright	   industries	   to	   lobby	   for	   stronger	   domestic	   copyright	   laws	   (and	  
influence	  US	  trade	  policy);	  and	  the	  discursive,	  seen	  in	  the	  production	  of	  statistics	  to	  
evidence	  the	  value	  of	  copyright	  to	  the	  US	  economy	  and	  consequent	  harms	  caused	  by	  
piracy	   (2016:686).	   Not	   surprisingly,	   given	   the	   economic	   value	   placed	   on	   the	  
audiovisual	  industry	  by	  the	  US	  government,	  Prewitt	  joined	  IFTA	  after	  nearly	  a	  decade	  
as	   a	   senior	   US	   government	   official	   and	   lobbyist	   in	   Washington	   D.C.,	   where	   she	  
represented	   film	   and	   entertainment	   interests	   and	   the	   high-­‐technology	   community.	  
Before	   that,	   she	   was	   Senior	   Vice	   President	   and	   General	   Counsel	   of	   United	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International	  Pictures	  (the	  international	  distribution	  entity	  formed	  by	  then-­‐Universal,	  
Paramount	  and	  MGM-­‐UA	   studios)	   and	  managed	   legal	   and	  government	  affairs	  on	  a	  
worldwide	  basis	  (IFTA,	  2016).	  
	  
It	   is	  not	  difficult	   to	  see	  that	  the	  MPAA’s	   ‘protectionism’	  policy	  has	  had	  a	  significant	  
cultural	  and	  economic	  influence	  on	  the	  US	  approach	  to	  national	  innovation	  from	  the	  
days	   of	   its	   founding	   fathers.	   Such	   a	   linear	   approach	   to	   innovation	  management	   is	  
further	  reinforced	  through	  the	  work	  of	  Andrew	  Currah	  (2006)	  who	  in	  the	  course	  of	  a	  
major	   study	   interviewed	   senior	   managers	   across	   the	   media,	   entertainment	   and	  
technology	   industries,	   including	  unique	  access	  to	  decision-­‐makers	   in	  each	  of	  the	  six	  
Hollywood	  studios.	  He	  arrived	  at	   the	  conclusion	  that	  managers	   in	   these	   firms	  were	  
tied	   to	   a	   specific	   view	  of	   the	   networked	   environment,	  which	   advocates	   the	   use	   of	  
Digital	  Rights	  Management	  (DRM)	  to	  realize	  the	  absolute	  defense	  of	  property	  rights	  
around	   the	   world.	   Crucially,	   this	   vision	   has	   steadily	   been	   globalized	   through	  
intellectual	   property	   laws,	  which	   are	   bolstered	   by	   the	   influence	   of	   the	  US	   state	   in	  
trade	   negotiations.	   However,	   the	   approach	   advocated	   by	   the	   US	   studios	   will	   be	  
shown	   to	   have	   slowed	   down	   the	   market	   development	   opportunities	   offered	   by	  
digital	   cinema,	   provided	   new	   entrants	   with	   gaps	   to	   compete	   in	   and	   leave	   certain	  
entrepreneurial	   incumbents	   with	   alternative	   strategies	   to	   follow.	   The	   question	   of	  
whether	   this	  would	   be	   another	   example	   of	   a	   disruptive	   innovation	   or	   the	   gales	   of	  
creative	  destruction	  will	  now	  be	  explored.	  
	  
Despite	  the	  possibilities	  of	  improved	  choice	  and	  an	  increase	  in	  flexible	  programming	  
(Culkin,	  2008),	  the	  DCI	  standards	   looked	  far	  more	  disruptive	  when	  observed	  from	  a	  
linear	  lens	  situated	  in	  the	  US	  domestic	  theatrical	  market:	  	  
It	   would	   be	   wrong	   to	   say	   that	   there	   aren’t	   some	   amongst	   our	  members	   [theater	  
owners]	  who	  are	  concerned	  they’re	  going	  to	  lose	  control	  of	  their	  business;	  and	  that	  
d-­‐cinema	  gives	  back	  control	  to	  the	  studios,	  digitally.	  	  
(Senior	  Exec	  [1]:	  US	  Trade	  Assoc.)	  
	  
A	  similar	  view	  from	  one	  of	  its	  members	  was	  equally	  concerned:	  
This	  is	  not	  a	  situation	  [in	  reference	  to	  the	  DCI	  standards]	  we	  have	  not	  seen	  coming.	  
The	  Studios	  are	  getting	  more	  powerful.	  If	  they’re	  not	  being	  swallowed	  up	  by	  bigger	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media	  firms	  they’re	  making	  more	  and	  more	  of	  the	  same.	  When	  will	  we	  get	  Toy	  Story	  
4	  or	  a	  Fast	  and	  Furious	  4,	  5	  or	  6?	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (Sen	  Exec	  [1]:	  US	  Cinema	  Chain)	  
And,	  
The	  new	  kids	  on	  the	  block	  [in	  reference	  to	  digital	   intermediares]	  are	  quick	  to	  point	  
out	   that	  we	   can	  make	   a	   killing	   by	   digitising	   adverts	   and	   running	  more	   before	   the	  
movie	  starts.	   It	  won’t	   take	   long	  before	  three	  or	   four	  of	   them	  merge	  and	  we’re	   left	  
buying	  from	  one	  national	  supplier.	  	  	  That’s	  less	  choice	  in	  my	  language	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (Sen	  Exec	  [2]:	  US	  Cinema	  Chain)	  
	  
Such	   fears	   were	   not	   unfounded	   as	   consolidation	   in	   the	   film	   industry	   continued	  
throughout	   the	   digital	   cinema	   rollout	   via	   a	   series	   of	  mergers	   and	   acquisitions.	   The	  
impact	  can	  be	  clearly	  seen	  in	  Table	  5.2	  below	  and	  highlights	  the	  intricate	  network	  of	  
firms	   that	   forms	   the	  US	  Studio	  oligopoly	  of	   today.	   In	  2005,	   the	  Paramount	  Motion	  
Pictures	  Group	  purchased	  Dreamworks	  SKG	  in	  a	  deal	  worth	  US$1.6	  billion.	  However,	  
this	  did	  not	  include	  Dreamworks	  Animation,	  which	  went	  public	  in	  2004.	  That	  did	  not	  
stop	  NBCUniversal	  acquiring	   it	   for	  US$3.8	  billion	   in	  2016;	  while	   in	  between,	  Disney	  
acquired	  Lucasfilm	  for	  US$4.04	  billion,	  in	  2012.	  As	  such	  Disney	  took	  ownership	  of	  the	  
Indiana	   Jones	   and	   Star	   Wars	   franchise	   and	   also	   included	   Lucasfilm's	   operating	  
businesses	  in	  animation,	  audio	  post-­‐production,	  consumer	  products,	   live-­‐action	  film	  
production	  video	  games	  and	  visual	  effects.	  A	  year	  later,	  Walt	  Disney	  Studios	  bought	  
the	  distribution	  and	  marketing	  rights	   to	   future	   Indiana	  Jones	   films	   from	  Paramount	  
Pictures,	   although	   the	   latter	   would	   maintain	   distribution	   rights	   to	   the	   first	   four	  
Indiana	   Jones	   films	   and	   receive	   ‘financial	   participation’	   from	   any	   additional	   films	  
(Kroll,	  2013).	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In	   Europe,	   similar	   concerns	   of	   the	   potential	   bifurcation	   in	   cinema	   were	   being	  
expressed;	   this	  one	  describing	  a	   conversation	  with	  a	   senior	  US	   studio	  Executive,	  at	  
the	  Screen	  Association:	  
…while	   they	   recognise	   the	   issue	   around	   the	   smaller	   guys,	   I’ve	   heard	   nothing	   from	  
the	  studios	  or	  their	  distributors..[the	  big	  guys]..that	  the	  position	  of	  the	  small	  guys	  is	  
a	  consideration	  in	  terms	  of	  what	  they	  want	  from	  digital.	   It’s	  a	  very	  broad	  brush,	  as	  
many	   need	   to	   convert	   as	   quickly	   as	   possible.	   	   And	   we	   need	   to	   re-­‐frame	   the	  
discussion,	  just	  so	  we	  don’t	  end	  up	  with	  a	  big	  guys	  versus	  small	  guys	  scenario,	  which	  
is	  a	  particular	  concern	  for	  me.	  	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (Sen	  Exec	  [1]:	  EU	  Trade	  Assoc.)	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Remarkably,	   despite	   being	   a	   founding	   member	   of	   the	   European	   Free	   Trade	  
Association	   (AFTA)	   –	   an	   organisation	   that	   operates	   in	   parallel	   with	   the	   EU	   and	  
participates	  in	  the	  single	  market	  –	  the	  view	  from	  Norway	  did	  not	  necessarily	  support	  
the	   immediate	  position	  above.	   In	  an	   interview,	  with	  a	  Senior	  Executive	  from	  one	  of	  
the	  largest	  Cinema	  Operators,	  their	  reaction	  to	  whether	  a	  collective	  response	  to	  the	  
digital	   rollout	   was	   good,	   or	   bad	   for	   the	   cinema	   ecosystem	   was	   the	   complete	  
opposite:	  
Yes,	  absolutely.	  	  We	  were	  able	  to	  just	  turn	  the	  tables	  overnight	  or	  certainly	  during	  a	  
year;	  of	  course	  the	   largest	  exhibitors,	  we	  have	  paid	  more	  than	  we	  could	  have	  paid,	  
and	  the	  smaller	  cinemas,	  they	  got	  away	  cheaper	  and	  more	  simple....[laughter]…they	  
wouldn’t	  have	  been	  able	  to	  have	  done	  a	  single	  switch	  from	  35	  to	  digital	  on	  their	  own.	  	  
Teeny	  weeny	  small	  cinemas.	  But	  together	  we	  are	  fine.	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (Sen	  Exec	  [4]:	  Norwegian	  Cinema	  Chain)	  
And,	  when	  asked,	  how	  they	  -­‐	  the	  Norwegians	  -­‐	  persuaded	  the	  US	  studios	  to	  allow	  the	  
smallest	  of	  cinemas	  to	  participate:	  
….not	   for	   the	   financiers,	   not	   for	   the	   Hollywood	   studios	   at	   least,	   but	   most	   of	   the	  
money	   came	   from	   Norwegian	   Government,	   about	   a	   hundred	   million	   Norwegian	  
Crowns	  came	  from	  the	  Norwegian	  Government,	  and	  all	  that	  money	  is….taken	  care	  of	  
by	   Film	  &	  Kino…they	  have	  a	   fund,	   the	  Norwegian	  Film	  and	  Cinema	  Fund;	   they	  are	  
operating	  that	  fund	  on	  behalf	  of	  all	  of	  us..protecting	  us	  all.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (Sen	  Exec	  [2]:	  Norwegian	  Cinema	  Chain)	  
In	   the	   UK,	   three	   interviewees	   responded	   to	   a	   question	   about	   how	   the	   cinema	  
landscape	  might	  look	  if	  the	  US	  studios	  placed	  more	  value	  on	  democracy	  as	  opposed	  
to	  DRM,	  as	  had	  been	  promised:	  
Chance	   would	   be	   a	   fine	   thing,	   but	   who’s	   to	   say	   in	   a	   certain	   number	   of	   years	   the	  
Windows	  collapse,	  for	  example.	  	  Cinemas	  might	  turn	  in	  to	  venue	  like	  the	  O2	  one	  that	  
collects	  all	  sorts	  of	  different	  forms	  of	  entertainment	  from	  all	  sorts	  of	  things	  and	  re-­‐
distribute	  it	  and	  show	  it	  digitally.	   	   	  	  	  	  	  (Senior	  Exec	  [1]:	  UK	  Trade	  Assoc.)	  
If	  you	  look	  around	  the	  world….all	  the	  Hollywood	  major	  studios	  [have]	  got	  what	  they	  
call	   a	   classics	   division,	   an	   independent	   division,	   every	   single	   one.	   Why?	   Because	  
they’ve	  seen	  the	  value	  of	  having	  them	  not	  just	   in	  their	  own	  domestic	  market	  but	   in	  
the	  markets	  they	  operate	  round	  the	  world,	  ownership	  of	  a	  wider,	  more	  diverse	  range	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What	  you	  fail	  to	  realize	  is	  that	  digital	  cinema	  was	  not	  on	  top	  of	  the	  Studios	  ‘To	  Do”	  
list.	  It	  was	  maybe	  27.	  	  So,	  the	  idea	  that	  sharing	  screen	  space,	  which	  may	  cost	  them	  
money	  would	  have	  been	  much	  lower	  down	  the	  food	  chain,	  in	  their	  thinking.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (Sen	  Exec	  [1]:	  UK	  Govt	  Agency)	  
Given	   the	   UK	   dependence	   on	   US	   product,	   any	   opportunities	   for	   growing	   the	   UK	  
market,	  would	  be	  stifled	  due	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  appetite	  from	  the	  US	  to	  enable	  a	  radical	  
change	   from	   a	   supply	   chain	   to	   value	   network.	   However,	   in	   Scandinavia	   in	   general	  
and,	  Norway	  in	  particular,	  such	  opportunities	  had	  not	  only	  been	  recognized	  but	  were	  
actually	  playing	  out	  in	  the	  market.	  
I	  think	  most	  of	  what	  the..[audience]	  notice	  is	  that	  they	  have	  content	  they	  didn’t	  have	  
before…like	  Opera,	  we	  had	  great	   success	  with	   screening	  Metropolitan	  Opera.	   	  We	  
started	   with	   that	   quite	   early,	   2008…an	   immediate	   success…..soccer	   from	   South	  
Africa	   in	   3D…heavy	   metal	   concerts	   from	   Sofia;	   ballet;	   symphonic	   orchestras.…it’s	  
really	  starting	  to	  grow……..[T]hey	  notice	  the	  quality	  in	  the	  screening……it’s	  the	  same	  
quality	  the	  first	  and	  screening	  number	  a	  thousand.	   	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (SenExec	  [1]:	  Norwegian	  Cinema	  Chain)	  
A	  Swedish	  interviewee	  suggested	  that	  the	  content	  was	  spread	  right	  across	  the	  sector,	  it	  was	  
just	  the	  timing	  of	  the	  presenting	  content	  that	  differed:	  
[T]he	   flexibility	   in	   programming	   has	   been	   a	   great	   achievement	   for	   us…..both	  
alternative	   content	   and	   also	   the	   flexibility	   in	   putting	   up	   shows,	   that’s	   the	   biggest	  
victories	  we	  have	  won,	  I	  think,	  because	  for	  larger	  cities,	  it	  has	  never	  been	  a	  challenge	  
to	  have	  films.	  	  The	  distributors	  have	  always	  provided	  us	  with	  films,	  so	  for	  the	  smaller	  
cinemas,	  that	  is	  an	  issue,	  but	  not	  anymore.	  	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (Sen	  Exec	  [1]:	  Swedish	  Cinema	  Chain)	  
Notwithstanding	  the	  position	  that	  the	  audiovisual	  industries	  play	  in	  the	  US	  economy,	  
such	   views	   from	   leading	   stakeholders	   highlights	   the	   opportunity	   for	   domestic	  
policymakers	   to	   focus	   their	  attention	  on	  emerging	  entrepreneurial	   innovations,	   the	  
utilisation	  of	  current	  knowledge	  and	  strategies	  for	  novel	  solutions	  to	  strengthen	  their	  
respective	  national	  innovation	  systems.	  
5.2.3	  The	  charge	  of	  the	  rollout	  	  	  
All	  of	  the	  trade	  and	  culture	  tensions	  between	  the	  US	  and	  European	  markets	  raise	  a	  
number	   of	   questions	   around	   the	   effects	   the	   digital	   cinema	   rollout	   had	   on	   the	  
European	  market.	  In	  this	  section	  I	  describe	  the	  adoption	  process	  of	  change	  across	  the	  
European	   cinema	  market,	   as	   part	   of	   a	   recent	   research	   project	  with	   a	   colleague	   in	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Spain.	  To	  achieve	  the	  goal,	   the	  time	  taken	  to	  adopt	  the	  technology	   in	  cinemas	  was	  
analysed.	   The	   adoption	   phases	   were	   identified	   on	   the	   diffusion	   curve	   (following	  
Rogers,	   2003),	   which	   allowed	   us	   to	   build	   a	   country	   classification	   according	   to	  
penetration	  rates	  across	  Europe	  (2005	  –	  2013).	  	  
To	   recap,	   Rogers	   (2003)	   work	   on	   the	   diffusion	   of	   innovations	   brought	   together	  
diffusion	   research	   traditions	   from	   a	   number	   of	   different	   fields.	   Diffusion	   is	   ‘the	  
process	  in	  which	  an	  innovation	  is	  communicated	  through	  certain	  channels	  over	  time	  
among	  the	  members	  of	  a	  social	  system.	  It	  is	  a	  special	  type	  of	  communication	  in	  that	  
the	  messages	   are	   concerned	  with	   new	   ideas’	   (2003:5).	   Rogers	   proposed	   four	  main	  
elements	   of	   the	   diffusion	   of	   innovations,	   which	   arise	   from	   this	   definition:	   an	  
innovation,	   time,	   communicated	   [through	   certain]	   channels	   and	   a	   social	   system.	  
Because	  of	  this,	  ‘individuals	  can	  be	  classified	  into	  adopter	  categories	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  
when	  they	  first	  begin	  using	  an	  idea’	  (2003:253).	  	  For	  this	  part	  of	  the	  analysis,	  we	  were	  
only	   concerned	  with	   the	   innovation	   use	   over	   time;	   feedback	   from	   interviews	  with	  
individuals	   are	   reported	   and	   treated	   separately	   in	   this	   dissertation.	  Once	   adoption	  
phases	  and	   country	   clustering	  were	  developed,	  we	   investigated	   the	   rate	  of	   change	  
over	  the	  pan-­‐European	  exhibition	  market2.	  The	  prevalent	  business	  model	  employed	  
to	  facilitate	  this	  change	  was,	  in	  the	  US	  principally	  through	  the	  use	  of	  the	  third	  party	  
intermediaries	  and	  the	  Virtual	  Print	  Fee	  (VPF).	  As	  detailed	  elsewhere,	  under	  the	  VPF	  
system,	   the	   distributor	   paid	   a	   fee-­‐per-­‐print	   to	   contribute	   to	   the	   purchase	   of	   the	  
digital	   equipment	   (Culkin,	   2008).	   But	   what	   worked	   for	   the	   US	   market	   is	   not	  
necessarily	   replicable	   across	   the	   European	   cinema	   landscape.	   In	   comparison,	   the	  
European	   cinema	   market	   is	   fragmented,	   consists	   of	   a	   long	   tail	   of	   small	   cinemas,	  
embraces	  multiple	  languages	  and	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  operators	  with	  limited	  knowledge	  
network	  flows.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  A	  HBS	  Working	  Paper	  is	  currently	  in	  production.	  It	  will	  describe	  the	  building	  of	  research	  model,	  data	  and	  
methodology	   employed;	   the	   analysis	   of	   the	   diffusion	   curve	   and	   country	   clustering	   according	   to	   the	  
innovation	  adoption	  (over	  time)	  and	  the	  findings	  and	  conclusions	  (Culkin	  &	  Marco,	  2017).	  An	  overview	  of	  
the	  approach	  and	  conclusions,	  including	  issues	  for	  future	  research	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  this	  dissertation.	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As	   a	   result,	   a	  major	  problem	  existed	   in	   establishing	  VPF	   contracts.	   For	   example,	   in	  
2007,	   31	  per	   cent	   of	   European	   screens	  were	  mono-­‐screen	   cinemas	   and	  only	   9	   per	  
cent	  of	  European	  cinemas	  were	  classified	  as	  multiplexes,	  compared	  to	  35	  per	  cent	  in	  
the	  US.	  It	  was	  argued	  that	  this	  would	  probably	  slow	  down	  the	  diffusion	  and	  adoption	  
rates	  across	  Europe	  (European	  Commission,	  2010).	  What	  I	  was	  also	  keen	  to	  evaluate	  
was	   the	   constructs	   involved	   in	   the	   post-­‐adoption	   diffusion	   stages	   of	   acceptance,	  
routinization,	   and	   assimilation	   to	   try	   and	   understand,	  which	   cinemas	   accepted	   the	  
technology	  (e.g.	  sustaining	  innovation)	  and	  which	  cinemas	  embraced	  the	  technology	  
to	  create	  novel	  supply	  and	  demand	  solutions.	  For	  this	  purpose,	  a	  battery	  of	  key	  film	  
industry	   indicators	   were	   collected	   and	   analysed,	   for	   example	   market	   dimensions,	  
cinema	   density,	   demand,	   profitability,	   ticket	   price,	   market	   film	   shares	   and	   the	  
concentration	   in	  the	  distributor	  and	  the	  exhibitor	  sector.	  Based	  on	  discussions	  with	  
industry	   commentators	   this	   is	   the	   first	   time	   such	   an	   approach	   (modeling	   empirical	  
data)	  has	  been	  undertaken	  in	  the	  European	  cinema	  market.	  	  As	  a	  Senior	  Executive	  in	  
an	  international	  consulting	  firm	  commented:	  
If	   the	   motive	   of	   the	   UKFC	   was	   to	   increase	   choice	   in	   the	   market,	   it	   will	   be	   very	  
interesting	  to	  see	  if	  you	  can	  pull	  off	  this	  piece	  of	  analysis.	  If	  I	  can	  help	  fill	  in	  any	  of	  the	  
country	  gap	  data	  that	  you	  can’t	  access,	  let	  me	  know.	  I’m	  intrigued.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   (Sen	  Exec	  [1]:	  UK	  Digital	  Intermediary)	  
The	   findings	   from	   the	   statistical	   analysis	   of	   the	   digital	   cinema	   are	   explained	   in	   the	  
next	  section.	  
5.3	   The	  disruption	  of	  markets	  
As	  digital	  cinema	  rollout	  involved	  potential	  change	  in	  the	  supply	  chain,	  one	  question	  
arises	  over	  how	  the	  concentration	   in	   the	  distributor	  and	  the	  exhibitor	  sector	  might	  
be	  affected.	  While	  digitalization	   lowers	  barriers	   to	  entry	   into	  the	  distributor	  sector;	  
simultaneously,	   it	   increases	  the	  economies	  of	  scale	  related	  to	  both	  film	  distribution	  
and	  exhibition.	  In	  theory,	  the	  largest	  companies,	  therefore,	  stand	  to	  benefit	  far	  more	  
from	  the	  transition	  to	  digital	  than	  smaller	  players.	  For	  example,	  concentration	  levels	  
in	  markets	  could	  increase	  through	  mergers	  and	  acquisition	  activity,	  at	  one	  end	  of	  the	  
spectrum	   and	   a	   percentage	   of	   smaller	   firms	   exiting	   at	   the	   other	   end.	   The	   lower	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barriers	   to	   entry	   to	   the	   distributor	   sector	   and	   the	   likely	   increase	   in	   economies	   of	  
scale	   could	   lead	   to	   fundamental	   changes	   across	   a	   fragmented	   European	   theatrical	  
landscape.	   Given	   what	   we	   know	   of	   the	   potential	   disruptive	   opportunities	   of	   the	  
digital	   cinema	   rollout,	   a	   number	   of	   outcomes	   were	   possible.	   To	   what	   extent	   they	  
manifested	   themselves	   in	   the	   market	   would	   depend	   on	   the	   power	   relationships	  
among	  the	  many	  actors	  and	  their	  often	  mutually	  exclusive	  objectives.	  
Distribution,	  you	  know,	  the	  studios	  are	  obsessed	  about	  the	  big	  release,	  even	  though	  
they	  have	  their	  own	  platform	  to	  release	   independent	   films,	   their	  budgets	  and	  their	  
incentives	  are	  set	  around	  the	  big	  releases.	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (Sen	  Exec	  [1]:	  UK	  Studio)	  
The	  film	  industry	  is	  by	  definition….becoming	  more	  global	  and	  it’s	  going	  to	  be	  harder	  
and	   harder	   for	   the	   single	   territory	   insular	   company,	   so	   for	   that	   reason	   alone,	  
digitalisation	  is	  accelerating,	  which	  depending	  on	  where	  you’re	  sitting	  will	  signal	  the	  
success	  or	  failure	  of	  these	  companies.	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (Sen	  Exec	  [2]:	  UK	  Govt	  Agency)	  
Our	   motive	   was	   not	   to	   play	   with	   this	   new	   technology.	   	   Our	   motive…[was]..to	   get	  
more	  choice	  in	  cinemas.	  	  	  	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (Sen	  Exec	  [1]:	  UK	  Govt	  Agency)	  
This	   analysis	   will	   seek	   to	   explore	   the	   impact	   of	   the	   digitalization	   process	   on	   the	  
European	   cinema	   market.	   	   To	   this	   end,	   data	   was	   employed	   to:	   first,	   defined	   the	  
adoption	   phases	   on	   the	   innovation	   diffusion	   curve	   and	   developed	   a	   country	  
clustering	  by	  phase,	  and:	  second,	  assessed	  statistically	  the	  changes	  related	  to	  digital	  
cinema	   through	   the	   analysis	   of	   a	   set	   of	   indicators	   representing	   the	   multiple	  
dimensions	  of	  the	  film	  industry.	  Table	  5.3	  describes	  the	  selected	  indicators	  and	  data	  
availability	   across	   these	   years.	   The	  original	   database	   included	  annual	   data	   from	  36	  
European	  countries	  covering	  the	  period	  2005	  to	  20133.	  The	  data	  was	  accessed	  from	  
two	  main	  sources,	  the	  European	  Audiovisual	  Observatory’s	  Yearbook	  and	  the	  World	  
Bank	  database.	  	  
Our	   model	   sought	   to	   uncover	   what,	   if	   any	   relationships	   existed	   between	   the	  
variables.	   Due	   to	   its	   dynamic	   nature,	   we	   created	   a	   longitudinal	   design	   to	   utilize	  
repeated	   assessments	   of	   the	   dependent	   variable	   (cinema	   screen)	   at	   different	   time	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  The	  authors	  are	  in	  the	  process	  of	   incorporating	  new	  data	  for	  the	  years’	  2014,	  2015	  &	  2016,	  prior	  to	  the	  
completion	  of	  the	  HBS	  Working	  Paper.	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points.	   The	   phases	   defined	   over	   the	   diffusion	   curve	   according	   the	   digital	   cinema	  
adoption	   provided	   us	   with	   the	   specific	   time	   moments	   where	   the	   indicator	   is	  
measured.	   This	   is	   a	   repeated	   measures	   design,	   since	   the	   same	   subjects	   (the	  
European	  countries)	  are	  measured	  at	  different	  times.	  
Table	  5.3:	  Cinema	  indicators,	  2005	  –	  2013	  
	  
Indicator	   Years	   Description	  
DigScreens	  %	  	   2005-­‐2013	   Digital	  screens	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  total	  screens,	  in	  %	  
3D	  DigScreens	  %	   2009-­‐2013	   3D	  screens	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  digital	  screens,	  in	  %	  	  
Screens	  x	  Site	   2007-­‐2013	   Number	  of	  screens	  per	  site,	  in	  units	  
Screen	  Density	   2005-­‐2013	   Number	  of	  screens	  per	  100	  000	  people,	  in	  units.	  	  
Admiss	  x	  Person	   2005-­‐2013	   Cinema	  admissions	  per	  inhabitant,	  in	  units	  per	  person.	  	  
Ticket	  Price	   2005-­‐2013	   Ave.	  cinema	  ticket	  price,	  in	  Euros	  (total	  GBO	  divided	  by	  Admissions)	  
Ticket	  at	  constant	  price	   2005-­‐2013	   Average	  cinema	  ticket	  at	  constant	  2005	  base	  price,	  in	  Euros	  
GBO	  x	  Screen	   2005-­‐2013	   GBO	  per	  Screen,	  in	  EUR	  thousand.	  
Nat	  Share	   2005-­‐2013	   National	  market	  share,	  in	  %	  of	  total	  admissions	  
Non-­‐Nat	  Share	   2005-­‐2013	   European	  Non-­‐national	  film	  market	  share,	  in	  %	  of	  total	  admissions	  
US	  share	   2005-­‐2013	   US	  market	  share,	  in	  %	  of	  total	  admissions	  
RoW	  share	   2005-­‐2013	   Rest	  of	  World	  market	  share,	  in	  %	  of	  total	  admissions	  	  
Top5	  Distr	  %	   2005-­‐2013	   Top	  5	  Distributors	  market	  share,	  by	  revenues,	  in	  %	  
Top5	  Exhib	  %	   2005-­‐2013	   Top	  5	  Exhibitors	  market	  share,	  by	  screens,	  in	  %	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Source:	  Culkin	  &	  Marco	  (2017	  [forthcoming]).	  
The	  observations	  are	  not	   independent	  when	  repeated	  measures	  are	  taken	  over	  the	  
same	   subjects,	   breaking	   one	   of	   the	   assumptions	   of	   the	   independent	   or	   unrelated	  
ANOVA	  model.	   Hence,	   a	   repeated-­‐measures	  ANOVA	  was	   required	   for	   dealing	  with	  
non-­‐independent	  data.	   	  The	  mixed	  design	  ANOVA	  dealt	  with	  non-­‐independent	  data	  
as	  the	  model	   involves	  two	  types	  of	   independent	  variables,	  referred	  to	  as	  factors	  by	  
Raykov	   and	  Marcoulides	   (2008);	   first,	   a	   between-­‐subjects	   factor,	   whose	   levels	   are	  
represented	   by	   independent	   subjects,	   which	   provides	   unrelated	   measurements,	  
whereby	  each	   subject	  gives	   rise	   to	  only	  one	   score	  on	   this	   factor.	   Second,	  a	  within-­‐
subject	   factor,	   whose	   levels	   represent	   repeated	   measurements	   conducted	   on	   the	  
same	  subjects	  (time	  factor).	  	  
As	  a	  direct	  consequence,	  the	  specific	  model	  employed	  was	  a	  two-­‐way	  mixed	  ANOVA	  
model,	   as	   we	   had	   one	   within-­‐subject	   factor	   and	   one	   between-­‐subject	   factor	   (See	  
Appendix	  2	  for	  complete	  model	  and	  descriptive	  statistics).	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5.3.1	  The	  diffusion	  of	  digital	  cinema	  
The	  diffusion	  of	  the	  digital	  cinema	  rollout	  was	  measured	  by	  the	  percentage	  of	  digital	  
screens	   over	   total	   screens	   at	   the	   end	   of	   each	   year	   (DigScreen%)	   and	   the	   rate	   of	  
adoption	   over	   time	   defines	   the	   diffusion	   S-­‐curve	   (Rogers,	   2003).	   In	   Fig	   5.1	   the	  
diffusion	  curve	  of	  digital	  screen	  deployment	  since	  2003	  and	  adopter	  phases	  are	  built	  
on	  the	  work	  of	  Rogers	  (2003).	  The	  five	  original	  phases	  have	  been	  reduced	  to	  four	  by	  
merging	  the	  Innovators	  and	  Early	  Adopters	  phases,	  which	  creates:	  	  
The	  Innovators	  /	  Early	  Adopter	  phase	  (2002-­‐08):	  represents	  a	  little	  over	  4	  percent	  of	  
digital	   screens.	   	   After	   the	   first	   digital	   projection	   in	   1999	   (Star	  War	   I:	   The	   phantom	  
menace)	  uptake	  was	  minimal.	  The	  diffusion	  rate	  gathered	  pace	  in	  2005,	  in	  line	  with	  
the	  announcement	  of	   the	  DCI	  Specification.	   In	   the	  US	  digital	  projection	  was	   largely	  
embraced	   on	   a	   commercial	   basis,	   in	   larger	   theater	   chains	   as	   part	   of	   the	   AcessIT	  
network.	   In	   Europe,	   take-­‐up	   remained	   in	   what	   might	   be	   referred	   to	   as	   the	  
experimental	  or	  exploration	  phase.	  	  The	  European	  rollout	  was	  moving	  out	  of	  adopter	  
phase	   and	   into	   the	   early	  majority	   phase,	   when	   the	   global	   financial	   crisis	   struck	   in	  
2007.	  	  
Fig	   5.1:	   European	   diffusion	   S-­‐curve	   of	   digital	   screen	   innovation.	   Digital	   screens	   over	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
total	  screens	  (%)	  
	  
	  














	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Innovators	  /	  Early	  Adopters	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Early	  Major	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Late	  Major	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Laggard	  
Adopt	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The	  uncertainty	  of	   the	  VPF	  as	   the	   sole	   financial	  model	   also	  prevented	  acceleration	  
among	  the	  early	  majority	  adopters.	  The	  first	  European	  VPF	  was	  signed	  in	  mid-­‐2007,	  
but	   the	   availability	   of	   VPF	   financing	   alone	   did	   not	   account	   for	   the	   rates	   of	  
deployment	  found	  in	  the	  US	  (EAO,	  2011).	  	  
The	   Early	   Majority	   phase	   	   (2008–11):	   saw	   adoption	   rate	   reach	   the	   mainstream	  
tipping	  point	  of	  51	  per	  cent.	  Momentum	  can	  be	  seen	  gathering	  in	  2009,	  underpinned	  
by	  a	   sudden	  growth	   in	   interest	  of	  3D,	   following	   the	  phenomenal	   success	  of	  Avatar	  
and	  the	  marketing	  ‘buzz’	  surrounding	  its	  reception.	  Alice	  in	  Wonderland,	  Toy	  Story	  3	  
and	   other	   3D	   content	   followed	   in	   2010.	   It	   was	   argued	   that	   the	   rebirth	   of	   3D	  was	  
crucial	   for	   digital	   cinema	   crossing	   Geoffrey	   Moore’s	   “chasm”	   an	   argument	   which	  
purports	  a	  chasm	  exists	  between	  the	  early	  adopters	  of	  a	  new	  product	  and	  the	  early	  
majority	  and	  very	  few	  products	  make	  it	  over	  the	  chasm	  and	  into	  the	  EM	  phase.	  For	  a	  
period	  digital	  3D	  movies	  out-­‐performed	  their	  2D	  versions	  at	  the	  box	  office,	  increasing	  
dramatically	  digital	   screen	  conversion	   rates.	  Belton	   (2012)	  even	  postulated	   that	  3D	  
created	   the	   novelty	   crucial	   to	   product	   differentiation	   for	   the	   customer	   and	   the	  
economic	  incentive	  required	  for	  the	  innovation	  adoption	  took	  place.	  However,	  in	  the	  
course	  of	   this	  work	  3D	  failed	  to	  provide	  a	  business	  model	   for	  exhibitors	   to	  digitize,	  
merely	   a	   revenue	   generating	   exercise	   during	   the	   2D	   digital	   rollout.	   	   In	   fact,	   James	  
Cameron	  (Director	  of	  the	  film,	  Avatar)	  arrived	  at	  a	  similar	  view,	  arguing	  that	  the	  US	  
studios	  were	  not	  concerned	  with	  the	  artistic	  possibilities	  of	  3D	  more	  as	  a	  means	  to	  
make	  money	  (Foxx,	  2013).	  Other	  factors	  that	  did	  contribute	  to	  the	  rate	  of	  diffusion	  
included	   the	   price	   of	   equipment	   –	   the	   average	   cost	   of	   a	   projector	   in	   2009	   was	  
€52,000	   compared	   to	   €83,000	   in	   2005	   (EAO,	   2011)	   -­‐	   and	   the	   existence	   of	   a	  
government	   intervention	   subsidizing	   conversion	   costs	   not	   only	   on	   commercial	   but	  
also	  on	  cultural	  grounds.	  The	  introduction	  of	  a	  number	  of	  public	  initiatives	  in	  2009-­‐10	  
led	  to	  two	  smaller	  countries	  -­‐	  Luxembourg	  and	  Norway	  -­‐	  converting	  all	  their	  cinema	  
screens	  to	  digital	  during	  2011.	  
The	   Late	   Majority	   phase	   (2012-­‐2013):	   saw	   the	   average	   rollout	   across	   the	   32	  
countries	   reach	   84	   per	   cent	   and	   two	   out	   of	   three	   countries	   pass	   the	   80	   percent	  
conversion	  mark	   and	   2D	   again	   becoming	   the	  market	   driver	   during	   this	   phase.	   The	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contributing	  factor	  for	  the	  re-­‐emergence	  of	  2D	  came	  with	  full	  conversion	  under	  VPF	  
schemes	   of	   large	   in-­‐country	   circuits	   apropos	   a	   necessity	   for	   creating	   sufficient	   3D	  
screening	   capacity	   in	   which	   to	   take	   advantage	   of	   the	  Avatar	   effect.	   However,	   the	  
findings	  also	  uncovered	  the	  existence	  of	  public	  initiatives	  encouraged	  smaller	  cinema	  
screen	  providers	  to	  convert	  to	  digital.	  	  
The	   Laggard	   Adopters	   phase	   (end	   2013-­‐	   ):	   saw	   a	   position	  whereby	   almost	   85	   per	  
cent	  of	  screens	  had	  converted	  to	  digital;	  seven	  territories	  had	  reached	  100	  per	  cent	  
conversion,	   and	   high	   penetration	   rates	   could	   be	   identified	   in	   most	   European	  
markets.	   These	   findings	   signal	   the	   end	   of	   35mm	   celluloid	   film	   thereby	   increasing	  
pressure	   on	   those	   distributors	   and	   exhibitors	   still	   dependent	   on	   it.	   The	   pace	   of	  
change	   towards	  digitalisation	   could	  be	  described	  as	  a	   sense	  of	  urgency	   to	  end	   this	  
dual-­‐distribution	  system	  (Crofts,	  2011;	  Hancock,	  2013;	  EAO,	  2016).	  	  	  	  
5.3.2	  Member	  state	  clustering	  	  	  
Once	   the	   timing	   and	   phases	   of	   digital	   diffusion	   were	   defined,	   a	   country	   cluster	  
analysis	   was	   undertaken.	   Each	   country	   was	   classified	   into	   one	   of	   four	   groups	  
corresponding	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  digital	  screens	  in	  each	  country	  at	  December	  2008,	  
2011	  and	  2013.	  The	  results	  are	  described	  below:	  
Early	   Adopters	   (EA	   cluster)	   is	   formed	   from	   the	   top	   quartile	   of	   digital	   screens	   in	  
existence	  by	  country	  as	  at	  December	  2008	  (see	  Fig	  5.2).	  The	  nine	  EA	  countries	  in	  this	  
upper	   quartile	   comprised,	   Luxemburg	   (LUX),	   Belgium	   (BEL),	   Bulgaria	   (BGR),	   Iceland	  
(ISL),	  Austria	   (AUT),	  Norway	   (NOR),	  Romania	   (ROM),	   Ireland	   (IRL)	   and	  Great	  Britain	  
(GBR).	   As	   demonstrated	   in	   Fig.	   5.2	   below,	   this	   cluster	   achieved	   a	   digital	   screen	  
conversion	   rate	   of	   ≥	   8.4	   per	   cent	   by	   the	   end	   of	   2008,	   which	   is	   nearly	   double	   the	  
average	  rate	  (4.4%)	  across	  all	  countries	  and	  is	  represented	  by	  the	  horizontal	  orange	  
line	  in	  Fig	  5.2.	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Source:	  Culkin	  &	  Marco	  (2017	  [forthcoming]).	  
	  
Most	  of	  the	  countries	  in	  this	  upper	  quartile	  benefited	  from	  public	  initiatives	  or	  early	  
VPF	   agreements,	   including	  UK	   Film	  Council	  who	   chose	  Arts	  Alliance	  Media	   (a	   third	  
party	  Integrator)	  to	  implement	  its	  Digital	  Screen	  Network	  between	  2005	  and	  2007	  on	  
behalf	  of	  the	  UK	  Government.	  As	  a	  senior	  executive	  from	  UKFC	  said	  at	  the	  time:	  
We	  were	  about	  and	   still	   about	  on	   the	  whole	   just	   to	  make	   sure	   that	   there’s	  a	  wide	  
range	   of	   films	   then	   being	   seen	   in	   the	   cinema,	   so	   you	   know,	   it	   was…that	   was	  
the….that	  was	  what	   it’s	   about.	   	  But	  people	   forget	   that,	   they	   think	   it’s	   about	  digital	  
cinema;	  it	  wasn’t.	  	  Absolutely	  wasn’t.	  	   	   	   	  	  	  	  (Senior	  Executive	  A;	  UKFC)	  
Another	   member	   of	   this	   cluster,	   Norway	   was	   remarkable	   for	   three	   keys	   reasons.	  
First,	  the	  country’s	  unique	  exhibition	  structure,	  which	  was	  created	  in	  1913	  (as	  part	  of	  
the	  Film	  Theaters’	  Act)	  was	  fully	  implemented	  in	  1925.	  This	  approach	  recognised	  all	  
parts	   of	   the	   cinema	   business	   were	   important.	   It	   also	   broke	   with	   the	   US	   vertical	  
economy,	  which	  linked	  production	  and	  exhibition,	  and	  enabled	  Hollywood	  to	  dictate	  
what	   content	  was	   shown,	  where	   and	  when,	   leading	  many	   Norwegian	   Directors	   to	  
claim	  that	  too	  little	  of	  the	  economic	  profit	  was	  fed	  back	  into	  feature	  film	  production	  
(Solum,	  2016:185).	  Over	  the	  next	  90	  years,	   this	  system	  saw	  municipally	  owned	  and	  
operated	  cinemas	  hold	  up	  to	  90	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  market,	  organizing	  themselves	  first	  
as	  the	  National	  Association	  of	  Municipal	  Cinemas	  (NAMC)	  and	  now	  as	  ‘Film	  &	  Kino’.	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NAMC	  (known	  as,	  the	  Norwegian	  Cinema	  and	  Film	  Fund),	  rendered	  obligatory	  a	  2.5	  
per	   cent	   cinema	  and	   video	   transaction	   levy	   and	  with	   it,	   a	  mandate	   to	  develop	   the	  
exhibition	  sector	  with	   the	   fund.	   In	  2011,	   the	  year	  of	   the	  digital	  cinema	  rollout,	   this	  
amounted	   to	  some	  €8	  million.	  Even	  before	   the	  digital	   conversation	  had	  begun,	   the	  
government	   had	   recognised	   the	   standing	   of	   a	   nation-­‐wide	   cinema	   structure,	   as	   a	  
means	   of	   disseminating	   film	   culture.	   Through	   a	   series	   of	   green	   and	   white	   papers	  
(1990	  -­‐	  2005)	  the	  government	  created	  a	  de-­‐centralised	  cinema	  structure	  via	  a	  series	  
of	  film	  and	  cultural	  policy	  instruments	  designed	  to	  promote	  not	  only	  the	  Norwegian	  
film	  industry	  but	  also	  ensure	  their	  cinema	  system	  provided	  audiences	  with	  the	  ‘best	  
cinema	   system	   in	   the	   world’	   (Asbjørnsen	   &	   Solum,	   2003).	   Third,	   Film	   &	   Kino	  
negotiated	   directly	   with	   the	   US	   studios	   a	   VPF	   financing	   model.	   Producers	   and	  
distributors	  contributed	  40	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  VPF	  costs,	  and	  cinemas	  the	  remaining	  60	  
per	  cent.	  Film	  &	  Kino	  used	  NOK	  100	  million	  from	  the	  Cinema	  Fund	  to	  subsidise	  the	  
cinema’s	  contribution	  to	  complete	  the	  rollout.	  Producers	  and	  distributors	  repaid	  the	  
VPF	  over	  a	  period	  of	  up	  to	  six	  years,	  while	  cinemas	  were	  free	  to	  choose	  whether	  they	  
paid	  cash,	  in	  instalments	  or	  took	  out	  a	  six-­‐year	  loan	  (Cabrera	  Blázquez,	  2010).	  
	  
Early	  Majority	  adopters	  (EM	  cluster)	  are	  those	  countries	  not	  previously	  identified	  as	  
EA	  countries,	  which	  are	   in	  the	  top	  half	  of	  the	  digital	  screen	  rate	  at	  December	  2011	  
(see	  Figure	  5.3).	  All	  of	  them	  had	  reached	  penetration	  rates	  above	  the	  51%	  average	  
rate	   at	   this	   time	   (orange	   line	   in	   Fig.	   5.3).	   These	   are	   10	   countries:	   Denmark	   (DNK),	  
Portugal	   (PRT),	   Netherlands	   (NLD),	   France	   (FRA),	   Finland	   (FIN),	   Croatia	   (HRV),	  
Switzerland	  (CHE),	  Russian	  Federation	  (RUS),	  Estonia	  (EST)	  and	  Poland	  (POL).	  
	  
By	   2011,	   two	   countries,	   Luxemburg	   and	  Norway,	  were	   100	   per	   cent	   digital.	  When	  
compared	   to	   the	   first	   wave	   from	   2008,	   the	   2011	   ranking	   reveals	   some	   obvious	  
country	  jumps;	  most	  of	  which	  coincide	  with	  the	  launch	  of	  a	  public	  initiative	  and	  /	  or	  
the	  signing	  of	  VPF	  deals,	  but	  not	  all	   from	   incumbent	   firms.	  For	  example,	   in	  France,	  
Ymagis	  a	  young	  digital	  intermediary	  firm	  deployed	  1,000	  digital	  systems	  by	  the	  end	  of	  
2011.	   ZON	   Lusomundo	   Portugal’s	   largest	   cinema	   chain	   completed	   its	   digital	  
	   100	  
deployment	   of	   213	   full	   digital	   cinema	   systems	   with	   XDC,	   another	   young	   digital	  
intermediary,	  formed	  in	  2004	  as	  a	  spin	  out	  from	  EVS	  Broadcast	  Equipment.	  	  
	  
Fig	  5.3:	  European	  digital	  screen	  penetration	  as	  at	  December	  2011	  (%)	  (	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ave	  51%)	  
	  
Source:	  Culkin	  &	  Marco	  (2017	  [forthcoming]).	  
What	   is	   significant	   about	   these	   two	   young,	   entrepreneurial	   firms	   is	   that	   the	   US	  
studios	  assumed	  that	  digital	  cinema	  would	  strip	  out	  costs	  and	  reduce	  the	  number	  of	  
links	  in	  the	  film	  supply	  chain.	  	  However,	  within	  five	  years	  of	  operating,	  Ymagis	  posted	  
a	  turnover	  of	  €39.7	  million	  (2012)	  with	  38	  per	  cent	  of	  its	  revenues	  generated	  outside	  
France.	   The	   following	   year,	   it	   raised	  €11.6	  million	  when	   it	   floated	  on	   the	   Euronext	  
stock	  market,	  accelerating	  growth	  by	  60,000%	  in	  five	  years	  (Deloitte,	  2013).	  Ymagis	  
went	   on	   to	   acquire	   XDC	   (at	   the	   time	   trading	   as	   Dcinex)	   in	   2014	   to	   create	   the	  
European	  leader	  in	  supply	  of	  digital	  services	  and	  equipment	  to	  the	  cinema	  industry.	  
At	   the	   end	   of	   2016,	   the	   Ymagis	   Group	   had	   a	   market	   capitalization	   of	   some	   €80	  
million.	   This	   new	   group	   is	   now	   structured	   around	   three	   main	   units:	   CinemaNext	  
(exhibitor	  services:	  sales	  and	  field	  services,	  software	  solutions,	  customer	  service	  and	  
consulting),	   Eclair	   (content	   services:	   post-­‐production,	   theatrical	   delivery,	   digital	  
distribution,	   versioning	   and	   accessibility,	   restoration	   and	   preservation)	   and	   Ymagis	  
(financial	   services).	   In	   2016,	   CinemaNext	   had	   6,400	   screens	   installed	   under	   VPF	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supply	   and	  demand	   solutions	   in	   the	   digitalization	  process	   of	   a	   very	   traditional	   and	  
formerly	  linear	  industry.	  	  
The	  Late	  Majority	  (LM	  group)	  countries	  are	  those	  not	  previously	  identified	  as	  EA	  or	  
EM	   countries	   but	   occupy	   the	   three	   first	   quartiles	   of	   the	   digital	   penetration	  
distribution	  at	  December	  2013	   (Fig.	  5.4:	   average	  84.4	  per	   cent	   rate	  as	  depicted	  by	  
the	  horizontal	  orange	  line);	  this	  equates	  to	  a	  market	  penetration	  level	  of	  70	  per	  cent	  
and	  above.	  These	  8	  countries	  consist	  of	  Cyprus	  (CYP),	  Sweden	  (SWE),	  Germany	  (DEU),	  
Hungary	  (HUN),	  Malta	  (MLT),	  Slovak	  Republic	  (SVK),	  Italy	  (ITA)	  and	  Spain	  (ESP).	  Seven	  
countries	  are	  now	  100	  per	  cent	  digital	  and	  several	  more	  were	  edging	  ever	  closer	  to	  
complete	   conversion.	   There	   were	   supranational	   supporting	   programmes	   launched	  
during	  this	  stage,	  with	  all	  of	  the	  Dutch	  cinema	  chains	  (plus	  independent	  distributors)	  
signing	  up	   to	  a	  VPF	  scheme	  financed	  through	  the	  collective	  buying	  group	   initiative,	  
Cinema	   Digitaal	   BV.	   The	   scheme	   was	   supported	   by	   €5.0	   million	   from	   the	   Dutch	  
government.	   With	   the	   exception	   of	   Pathe,	   Utopolis,	   and	   some	   independents,	   all	  
circuit	  and	  independent	  sites	  in	  the	  Netherlands	  were	  part	  of	  this	  scheme	  and	  helped	  
to	  propel	  the	  country	  to	  100	  per	  cent	  digital	  in	  September	  2012.	  	  
Fig	  5.4:	  European	  digital	  screen	  penetration	  at	  December	  2013	  (%)	  	  (	  	  	  	  ave	  84.4%)	  
 





Source:	  Culkin	  &	  Marco	  (2017	  [forthcoming]).	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Finally,	  the	  Laggard	  Adopters	  (LA	  cluster)	  are	  those	  countries	  in	  the	  fourth	  quartile	  at	  
December	  2013	   (see	  again	  Fig	  5.4).	  This	  cluster	  contains	  all	   countries	  whose	  digital	  
penetration	  rate	  stood	  at	   less	  than	  70	  per	  cent	  and	  consisted	  of	  7	  countries:	  Czech	  
Republic	   (CZE),	   Lithuania	   (LTU),	   Bosnia	   and	  Herzegovina	   (BIH),	   Latvia	   (LVA),	   Turkey	  
(TUR),	  Slovenia	  (SVN)	  and	  Greece	  (GRC).	  For	  a	  full	  list	  of	  the	  countries	  in	  each	  of	  the	  
four	  clusters	  contained	  in	  this	  analysis,	  see	  Appendix	  3.	  	  	  	  
5.3.3	  Digital	  diffusion	  curve	  observations	  	  	  
The	  statistical	  analysis	  of	   the	  digital	  diffusion	  curve	   (following	  Rogers,	  2003)	  clearly	  
identifies	   that	   a	   country	   shift	   does	   correspond	   with	   the	   presence	   of	   national	  
institutional	  activity;	  and,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Norway	  cinema,	  where	  cinema	  is	  situated	  at	  
the	  heart	  of	  its	  national	  economic	  and	  innovation	  system	  (Iversen,	  1998;	  Asbjørnsen	  
&	   Solum	   (1999);	   Newman-­‐Baudais,	   2011;	   Iversen,	   2016).	   As	   Solum	   (2016)	   and	  
Bjerkeland	   (2015)	   highlighted,	   the	   incoming	   Labour	   government	   of	   2005	  had	   great	  
ambitions	  on	  behalf	   of	  Norwegian	   cinema.	   Their	  White	   Paper	   entitled,	   ‘Veiviseren.	  
For	  det	  norske	  filmløftet’	  (‘Pathfinder.	  For	  the	  Norwegian	  Film	  Effort’),	  named	  after	  a	  
Norwegian	   Oscar	   candidate	   (White	   Paper	   No.	   22	   2006-­‐2007)	   consolidated	   the	  
economic	  agenda	  of	  film	  policy	  by	  introducing	  specific	  performance-­‐based	  objectives	  
that	   were	   to	   be	   achieved	   through	   new	   automatic	   and	   market	   oriented	   subsidy	  
schemes	  (2015:129). 	  
Returning	  to	  the	  data,	  two	  elements	  used	  to	  test	  the	  integrity	  of	  the	  research	  model	  
were	  extracted	  from	  the	  curve	  diffusion.	  First,	  we	  defined	  the	  key	  dates,	  which	  act	  as	  
time-­‐points	   where	   the	   countries	   (subjects)	   are	   measured.	   This	   repeated-­‐measures	  
design	  provides	  the	  within-­‐subject	  factor	  -­‐	  the	  time	  effect.	  The	  four	  key	  dates	  are:-­‐	  	  
-­‐	  December	  2005:	  pre-­‐digital	  stage	  (0.6%	  screens	  digital);	  	  
-­‐	  December	  2008:	  final	  date	  of	  the	  early	  diffusion	  phase	  (4.4%	  screens	  digital);	  
-­‐	  December	  2011:	  final	  date	  of	  the	  early	  majority	  phase	  (51%	  screens	  digital);	  and,	  
-­‐	  December	  2013	  as	  the	  end	  of	  the	  maturity	  phase	  (84.4%	  screens	  digital).	  	  
Secondly,	  we	   tested	   country	   clustering	   according	   to	   digital	   penetration	   by	   the	   key	  
dates	  above.	  Two	  types	  of	  variables	  are	  used	  in	  statistical	  analysis	  -­‐	  quantitative	  and	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qualitative.	  Quantitative	  variables	  are	  numerical	   variables	   (e.g.	   counts,	  percents,	  or	  
numbers);	   whereas	   qualitative	   variables	   are	   descriptions	   of	   groups	   (e.g.	   breeds	   of	  
horses	  or	  voting	  preference).	  
The	   clustering	   provides	   a	   between-­‐subjects	   factor	   and	   is	   therefore	   a	   qualitative	  
variable	  used	  to	  split	  the	  countries	  into	  four	  groups	  (or	  categories),	  which	  are:-­‐	  
-­‐	  Early	  Adopters;	  	  
-­‐	  Early	  Majority;	  
-­‐	  Late	  Majority;	  and,	  	  
-­‐	  Laggard	  Adopters.	  	  
This	  categorical	   (or	  qualitative)	   factor	   is	   called	  Adopter	  and	   it	   is	   significant	   that	   the	  
country	   classification	   follows	   Rogers,	   along	   the	   innovation	   diffusion	   phase.	   This	  
means	  that	  our	  model	  does	  explain	  or	  account	  for	  the	  dynamic	  of	  the	  rollout.	  Figure	  
5.5	   depicts	   the	  marginal	  means	   of	   digital	   screen	   penetration	   for	   each	   cluster	   over	  
time	   or	   the	   clusters’	   time	   profile.	   Graphically,	   the	   so-­‐called	   ‘goodness	   of	   fit’	   did	  
predict	  the	  EA	  cluster	  has	  the	  steepest	  slope	  in	  the	  early	  adopter	  phase	  (2005-­‐08,	  see	  
double-­‐line).	  The	  EM	  group	  has	  the	  steepest	  slope	  in	  the	  early	  majority	  phase	  (2009-­‐
2011)	   and	   the	   LM	   cluster	   has	   the	   steepest	   slope	   in	   the	   late	  majority	   phase	   (2012-­‐
2013).	  We	  would	  expect	  that	  the	  LA	  group	  to	  possess	  the	  steepest	  slope	  during	  the	  
laggard	   adopter	   phase	   (post-­‐Jan	   2014),	   considering	   that	   the	   laggard	   countries	   will	  
need	   to	   complete	   the	   rollout	   and	   the	   other	   clusters	   are	   very	   close	   to	   the	   100%	  
penetration	  rate.	  	  	  
The	   correspondence	   between	   cluster	   gradients	   and	   diffusion	   phases	   provide	  
consistency	   and	   robustness	   to	   the	   model	   (i.e.	   statistically	   it	   is	   fit	   for	   purpose).	  
Therefore,	   the	  model	   provides	   confidence	   in	   the	   inputs	   to	   explain	   any	   (significant)	  
change	  in	  country	  behaviour	  brought	  about	  through	  the	  digital	  cinema	  rollout.	  
	   	  
	   104	  
Fig	  5.5:	  Marginal	  means	  of	  digital	  screen	  penetration	  by	  adopter	  clustering	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
	  
In	   the	   upcoming	  Working	   Paper	   we	   examine	   a	   number	   of	   socio/economic/market	  
components;	   however	   for	   the	   purposes	   of	   this	   dissertation	   I	   focus	   on	   just	   two	  
measures.	   	   Ticket	   pricing	   at	   the	   cinema	   (to	   test	   for	   cost	   savings)	   and	   film	  market	  
shares	  (to	  test	  for	  choice	  of	  film	  and	  [as	  a	  proxy	  for]	  programme	  flexibility).	  
5.3.4	  The	  price	  of	  cinema	  tickets	  	  	  
The	  average	  cinema	  ticket	  price	  over	  the	  time	  period	  is	  expressed	  as	  the	  total	  gross	  
box	  office	  takings	  (GBO)	  divided	  by	  total	  admissions.	  The	  time	  period	  over	  which	  the	  
European	  ticket	  price	  is	  calculated	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  Figure	  5.6	  below.	  The	  ticket	  price,	  
extracted	   from	  our	   Two-­‐way	  mixed	   ANOVA	  model	   clearly	   shows	   a	   significant	   time	  
effect	  (p-­‐value=0.000,	  see	  Appendix	  4)	  consistent	  with	  the	  positive	  observed	  trend,	  
as	  while	  admissions	  have	  increased,	  GBO	  has	  outstripped	  the	  increase	  in	  admissions.	  	  






















	   105	  
Fig	  5.6:	  Ticket	  price	  at	  European	  box	  office	  in	  Euros	  (€)	  
	  
In	  Figure	  5.7	  below,	  movement	  in	  the	  price	  of	  tickets,	  over	  time,	  is	  observed	  by	  each	  
component	   of	   the	   Adopter	   cluster.	   The	   main	   difference	   in	   ticket	   prices	   occurs	  
primarily	  between	  the	  LA	  cluster	  and	  the	  other	  three	  clusters,	  however,	  at	  no	  time	  
does	  the	  gap	  become	  statistically	  significant	  (i.e.	  there	  is	  no	  adopter	  effect).	  Similarly,	  
there	  is	  no	  Interaction	  effect,	  as	  clusters	  share	  similar	  profiles.	  What	  is	  perhaps	  more	  
interesting	   is	   that	   the	   price	   gap	   between	   the	   extreme	   EA	   and	   LA	   clusters	   remains	  
stable	  over	  time.	  As	  such,	  the	  observed	  upward	  trend	  is	  caused	  by	  other	  factors:	  by	  a	  
decrease	   in	   admissions	   in	   the	   LM	   cluster	   and	   increase	   in	   gross	   box	   office	   receipts	  
GBO	   in	   the	   other	   clusters	   (see	  Appendix	   2,	   Table	   A1:	  Main	   Descriptive	   Statistics).	  	  
The	  premium	  price	  charged	  for	  3D	  films	  could	  explain	  the	  steepest	  slope	  observed	  in	  
both	   the	   EA	   and	   EM	  markets	   in	   the	   2008-­‐11	   phase.	   But	   the	   increase	   observed	   in	  
2011-­‐13	  cannot	  be	  explained	  by	  premium	  price	  charged	  for	  3D	  films.	  
This	  leads	  to	  the	  next	  question	  to	  ask:	  can	  the	  movement	  be	  explained	  if	  ticket	  prices	  
are	   held	   constant	   to	   allow	   for	   inflation?	   The	   two	   lines	   -­‐	   showing	   ticket	   prices	   by	  
current	  (at	  each	  time	  period)	  and	  fixed	  (at	  2005)	  -­‐	  in	  Fig.	  5.6	  provide	  the	  answer.	  As	  
we	   can	   see,	   ignoring	   for	   any	   inflationary	   effect,	   the	   aggregate	   constant	   price	   has	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Fig	  5.7:	  Marginal	  means	  of	  ticket	  price	  at	  European	  box	  office	  in	  Euros	  (€)	  
	  
The	  two-­‐way	  ANOVA	  outcome	  for	  the	  ticket	  at	  constant	  price	  is	  similar	  to	  the	  Ticket	  
at	   current	   price,	   but	   the	   time	   effect	   is	   not	   significant	   since	   the	   upward	   trend	  
disappears.	  In	  short,	  digitisation	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  have	  affected	  ticket	  price,	  either	  
at	  current	  or	  at	  constant	  prices.	  As	  such,	  the	  observed	  increase	  in	  admission	  prices	  is	  
due	  to	  inflation.	  If,	  as	  commentators	  claimed,	  the	  effect	  of	  switching	  from	  celluloid	  to	  
digital	  was	  to	  generate	  substantial	  cost	  saving,	  all	  or	  part	  of	  these	  savings	  have	  not	  
yet	  manifested	   themselves	   in	   the	  market	  place	   (e.g.	   ticket	  price	   at	   the	  box	  office).	  
However,	   as	  market	   agents	   operating	   under	   VPF	   deals	   are	   tied	   into	   a	   fixed	   price,	  
future	  work	  will	  be	  necessary	  to	  assess	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  ‘out	  of	  contract’	  position	  to	  
test	  if	  our	  analysis	  holds	  firm.	  	  
Obviously,	   cost	   savings	   are,	   to	   a	   large	   extent,	   dependent	   on	   how	   European	   digital	  
screens	  were	   financed.	  According	   to	   the	  EAO	   (2011),	   approximately	  33	  per	   cent	  of	  
digital	   screens	  were	   self-­‐financed	   and	   some	  51	   per	   cent	   by	  VPF	   deals	   (third	   party,	  
direct	  VPF	  and	  collective	  VPF)	  at	  the	  end	  of	  2010.	  This	  leaves	  16	  per	  cent	  supported	  
through	   public	   initiatives	   e.g.	   Norway	   and	   Italy.	   Until	   more	   recent	   market	   data	  
becomes	  available,	  there	  is	  a	  small	  possibility	  that	  the	  prevalent	  VPF	  financing	  model	  
is	  counteracting	  the	  cost	  savings	  stemming	  from	  switching	  from	  celluloid	  to	  digital.	  











Source:	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5.3.5	  Film	  market	  shares,	  by	  admissions	  
In	  the	  previous	  section,	  I	  looked	  at	  whether	  the	  audience	  has,	  as	  yet,	  benefited	  from	  
the	  cost	  savings	  from	  digital	  cinema	  rollout.	  The	  answer	  suggests	  that	  whatever	  the	  
extent	  of	  the	  savings,	  the	  US	  studios	  and	  their	  distributors	  had	  not	  passed	  that	  on	  to	  
either	  the	  cinema	  operator	  or	  cinema	  goer.	  I	  will	  now	  turn	  my	  attention	  to	  the	  other	  
claim	   for	   digital	   cinema	   –	   increased	   choice	   and	   programme	   flexibility.	   In	   his	   2007	  
book,	   ‘From	   silent	   screen	   to	   Multi-­‐screen,’	   Hanson	   leaves	   the	   reader	   with	   an	  
apocalyptic	  view	  of	  the	  cinema:	  
The	   days	   in	   which	   cinema	   assumed	   a	   position	   of	   primacy	   as	   both	   a	   mass-­‐leisure	  
activity	  and	  the	  ‘best	  place	  to	  see	  a	  film’	  are	  gone.	  Many	  of	  us	  will	  continue	  to	  love	  
older	   cinemas:	   however	   the	   future	   of	   film	   exhibition,	   at	   least	   in	   the	   immediate	  
future,	  looks	  increasingly	  tied	  up	  with	  that	  of	  the	  multiplexes.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (Hanson,	  2007:186)	  
In	  order	  to	  test	  the	  precision	  of	  Hanson’s	  concerns	  above,	  I	  examine	  the	  composition	  
of	  film	  shares	  across	  the	  four	  components	  of	  the	  European	  market	  across	  the	  period	  
2002-­‐13	  in	  Figure	  5.8	  below.	  The	  National,	  Non-­‐National,	  US	  and	  Rest	  of	  the	  World	  
market	  shares	  (Nat,	  Non-­‐Nat,	  US	  and	  RoW	  shares	  respectively)	  are	  presented	  along	  
with	   the	   aggregate	   European	   film	   market	   share	   (National	   +	   Non-­‐nat	   films).	   The	  
stability	  in	  the	  observed	  measures	  of	  National	  share	  is	  significant,	  suggesting	  a	  strong	  
relationship	   between	   the	   increases	   seen	   for	   US	   film	   shares	   against	   the	   decrease	  
found	   in	   Non-­‐National	   and	   RoW	   film	   shares.	   The	   narrowest	   gap	   between	   the	  
European	  and	  the	  US	  share	  was	  in	  2008,	  arguably	  the	  height	  of	  the	  global	  economic	  
crisis.	  From	  that	  point	  on	  when	  the	  digital	  rollout	  took	  off	  the	  US	  film	  share	  maintains	  
a	  slow	  and	  steady	  increase	  up	  to	  the	  end	  of	  2013.	  
Based	  on	  the	  most	  recently	  released	  data,	  this	  position	  worsened	  in	  2015;	  a	  year	  in	  
which	  admissions	  growth	  was	  driven	  by	  a	  number	  of	  US	  studio	  titles	  (e.g.	  Star	  Wars:	  
The	   Force	   Awakens,	   Minions	   and	   Jurassic	  World)	   all	   of	   which,	   sold	   more	   than	   30	  
million	  tickets	  in	  the	  EU,	  according	  to	  Kanzler	  &	  Milla	  (2016).	  On	  a	  cumulative	  basis,	  
admissions	  to	  US	  films	  increased	  by	  around	  50	  million	  leading	  to	  a	  market	  share	  of	  64	  
per	   cent.	  Admissions	   for	  European	   films	  on	   the	  other	  hand,	  declined	  by	  around	  50	  
million	  causing	  European	  market	  share	  in	  the	  EU	  to	  drop	  from	  2014	  level	  of	  33.5	  per	  
cent	  to	  an	  estimated	  26.1	  per	  cent	  (Kanzler	  &	  Milla,	  2016:15).	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Fig.	  5.8:	  Film	  shares	  in	  the	  European	  market	  by	  admissions	  (%)	  
 
	  
During	  the	  diffusion	  phase,	  conflicting	  views	  were	  held	  as	  to	  the	  likely	  impact	  on	  the	  
market	  share	  of	  European	  and	  US	  films	  once	  the	  digital	  conversion	  was	  completed.	  
One	   argument	   ran	   that	   the	   promise	   of	   increased	   flexibility	   and	   diversity	   of	  
programming	  on	  offer	   from	  digital	  cinema	  would	   lead	  to	  an	   increase	   in	   the	  market	  
share	  of	  European	  films.	  Such	  a	  view	  was	  expressed	  by	  public	  funding	  agencies	  in	  the	  
UK	   and	   Norway.	   However,	   given	   that	   US	   distributors	   underwrote	  most	   integrator-­‐
VPF	  financing	  models	  and	  they	  supplied	  US	  studio	  films	  exhibitors’	  were	  faced	  with	  
contracts	  weighted	  towards	  showing	  high	  turn	  rates	  of	  US	  content,	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  
European	   and	   other	   independent	   films.	   As	   we	   saw	   in	   the	   previous	   section,	   the	  
commercial	   VPF	   scheme	   facilitated	   the	   conversation	   of	   51	   per	   cent	   of	   screens	  
digitized,	   the	   VPF	   deals	   would,	   at	   the	   very	   least,	   consolidate	   the	   US	   share	   of	   the	  
market,	  helping	  to	  widen	  the	  Eur-­‐US	  gap.	  The	  other	  contributory	  factor	  to	  propel	  the	  
US	  film	  market	  share	  up	  towards	  70	  per	  cent	  was	  3D,	  especially	  as	  the	  US	  accounted	  
for	  19	  out	  of	  the	  20	  top	  3D	  films	  released	  in	  Europe	  during	  2009	  and	  2010.	  	  
So,	   when	   we	   look	   at	   the	   anticipated	   benefits	   of	   digital	   cinema	   -­‐	   flexibility	   and	  
diversity	  of	  programming	  –	  we	  are	   left	   to	   consider	   that	  Hanson	   (2007,	  op.cit.)	  was	  
correct.	   Regarding	   specialised	   cinema,	   the	  market	   share	  of	  Non-­‐National	   European	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has	  occurred,	   the	  market	   share	  of	  European	   film	  has	  decreased;	   to	  be	   replaced	  by	  
more	  US	  mainstream	  content.	  This	  outcome	  was	  underpinned	  by	  the	  VPF	  financing	  
model	  (US	  backed)	  and	  the	  short-­‐term	  success	  of	  3D	  films	  (US	  created).	  	  
Perhaps	  we	  should	  not	  be	  surprised	  given	  the	  view	  expressed	  by	  one	  respondent	  vis-­‐
à-­‐vis	  their	  approach	  to	  decision-­‐making:	  
There	   is	   a	   suggestion	   that	   the	   real	   battle	   cinema	   faces	   has	   nothing	   to	   do	  with	   big	  
battles	   over	   the	   rules	   and	   regulations	   of	   distributors	   contributing	   towards	   digital	  
cinema	  equipment	  or	  a	  VPF	  deal.	  	  The	  US	  studios	  biggest	  concern	  was	  that	  once	  you	  
don’t	  have	  a	  cost	  barrier	  of	  getting	  into	  the	  cinema,	  or	  indeed	  a	  practical	  barrier,	  i.e.	  
35mm,	  as	   it’s	  opened	  out	  to	  anything	  because	   it’s	  digital,	   then	  cinemas	  will	  change	  
their	  operational	  offer	  or	  actually	  stat	  a	  dialogue	  with	  consumers	  then	  they	  will	  show	  
less	  films.	  	  	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Later	  on	  in	  the	  interview,	  the	  same	  respondent	  elaborated	  with:	  
And	  they	  are	  a	  film	  business,	  so	  it	  is	  not	  in	  their	  interest,	  so	  they	  do	  what	  they	  have	  
been	  trained	  to	  do	  to	  try	  and	  stop	  that.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (Sen	  Exec	  [2]:	  US	  Digital	  Intermediary)	  
One	  strategy	  employed	  by	  the	  US	  studios	  to	  sustain	  their	  version	  of	  the	  film	  business	  
can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  number	  of	  high-­‐profile	  releases	  already	  announced	  during	  2016.	  
If	  digital	  cinema	  represents	  a	  sustaining	  innovation,	  then	  CGI	  inspired	  franchise	  films	  
will	  continue	  to	  supply	  mainstream	  cinemas	  for	  at	  least	  six	  to	  ten	  years.	  Perhaps,	  in	  
such	   circumstances,	   we	   should	   not	   be	   surprised	   at	   the	   view	   of	   cinema	   operators	  
across	  Europe,	  as	  presented	  by	  this	  senior	  industry	  figure:	  
Right….on	   the	   whole	   exhibitors	   don’t	   programme	   for	   a	   local	   audience,	   they	  
programme	  to	  what	  the	  distributors	  will	  offer	  to	  them.	   	  And	  actually	   in	  many	  cases	  
they’ll	  play	  what	  the	  distributors	  want	  them	  to	  play,	  the	  mainstream	  big	  distributors,	  
even	  the	  shit,	  even	  if	  they’re	  pretty	  certain	  it’s	  not	  going	  to	  make	  any	  money.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (Sen	  Exec	  [1]:	  Govt	  Agency)	  
However,	   while	   any	   potential	   disruption	   appears	   to	   have	   been	   subjugated	   to	   the	  
market	   by	   the	   power	   exerted	   by	   the	   US	   studios	  marketing	   efforts,	   two	   issues	   are	  
raised	  in	  the	  above	  quotations.	  First,	  that	  the	  decisions	  taken	  by	  the	  US	  studios	  are	  
grounded	   in	   the	   traditional	   and	   linear	   lived	   experience	   of	   first-­‐run	   films	   placed	   in	  
cinemas	   to	   market	   sell-­‐on	   opportunities	   for	   copyright	   material.	   And,	   second,	   the	  
response	  of	  the	  exhibitor	  is	  centered	  on	  a	  lived-­‐in	  experience	  of	  being	  the	  recipient	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of	  a	  film	  product	  situated	  at	  the	  end	  of	  a	  linear	  supply	  chain.	  
In	  the	  next	  section,	  I	  want	  to	  explore	  further	  the	  notion	  of	  what	  learning	  took	  place	  
during	   the	   digital	   cinema	   rollout;	   and,	   how	   this	  might	   impact	   on	   incumbents,	   new	  
entrants	   and	   entrepreneurial	   innovation	   within	   the	   context	   of	   national	   innovation	  
systems.	  
5.4	  	  	   Disruption	  of	  learning	  
It	  is	  my	  contention	  that	  the	  studios	  have	  sought	  to	  control,	  rather	  than	  explore,	  the	  
emerging	  social	  and	  technological	  possibilities	  of	  the	  Internet	  	  
(Currah,	  2007:360).	  
Whether	  or	  not	  Currah	  was	  thinking	  of	  Sean	  Parker	  -­‐	  the	  entrepreneur	  responsible	  in	  
part,	   for	  Napster	   and	   Facebook	  was	   not	   clear;	   however	  within	   three	   years,	   Parker	  
was	   quoted	   as	   saying,	   ‘re-­‐architecting	   society.	   It’s	   technology,	   not	   business	   or	  
government,	   that’s	  the	  real	  driving	  force	  behind	   large-­‐scale	  societal	  shifts’	   	   (Parker,	  
2010).	   In	   2016,	   Parker	   appeared	   at	   Hollywood's	   premier	   annual	   convention,	  
CinemaCon;	  here,	  according	   to	  Ryan	  Faughnder	   (writing	   in	   the	  LA	  Times),	   ‘the	  best	  
story	  wasn’t	  on-­‐screen.	  Instead,	  it	  was	  the	  attendees’	  murmurings	  about	  what	  some	  
might	  consider	  to	  be	  a	  terrifying	  new	  technology:	  The	  Screening	  Room’	  (Faughnder,	  
2016).	   Parker’s	   early	   stage	   technology	   start-­‐up	  would	   allow	   audiences	   to	   take	   the	  
multiplex	   into	   their	   living	   room	   to	   stream	   first-­‐run	  movies	   for	   US$50	   per	   viewing,	  
having	  first	  installed	  the	  technological	  device	  (US$150).	  During	  a	  presentation	  at	  the	  
same	   event,	   Warner	   Bros.	   Entertainment	   Chairman	   and	   CEO	   Kevin	   Tsujihara	  
promised	   the	   theater	   owners	   that	   the	  US	   studios	  would	  not	   allow	  a	   third	  party	  or	  
middleman	  come	  between	  them.	  
I	   sat	   with	   a	   Senior	   Vice-­‐President	   from	   another	   US	   Studio,	   ten	   years	   before	  
Tsujihara’s	  made	  his	  comment	  and	  wrote	  down	  almost	  the	  same	  words;	  although	  at	  
the	   time,	   there	   was	   equal	   weighting	   given	   to	   sharing	   knowledge	   and	   building	  
partnerships.	  
Gate-­‐keepers	   are	   a	   bad	   thing,	   so	  we’re	   not	   adding	   new	  middle-­‐men	   or	   new	   gate-­‐
keepers	   along	   the	   way.	   	   And	   ultimately,	   we	   want	   the	   exhibitors	   to	   own	   the	  
equipment	  that	   is	  being	  deployed….we	  want	  to	  have	  better	  access	  to	  the	  theatrical	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information,	   just	   like	   our	   retail	   partners	   give	   us	   feedback	   rapidly	   on	   what	  
works…..Let’s	  make	   sure	  we	  understand	   the	  audience	  appreciation	  of	  what’s	   going	  
on.	  	   	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  (Sen	  Exec	  [1]:	  US	  Studios)	  
5.4.1	  It’s	  all	  about	  the	  windows,	  stupid.	  
In	  a	  discussion	  on	  the	  possible	  collapse	  of	  the	  ‘release	  window’	  agreement	  between	  
studios,	  their	  distributors	  and	  cinema	  operators,	  I	  advocated	  that	  once	  screens	  were	  
converted	   to	   digital,	   US	   studios	   could	   break	   away	   from	   its	   traditional	   (region-­‐by-­‐
region)	   release	   strategies	   (Culkin,	   2008).	   An	   experiment	   with	   global,	   single	   day	  
release	   dates	   for	   ‘tent	   pole’	   movies,	   including	   Lord	   of	   the	   Rings,	   The	   Matrix	   and	  
Pirates	  of	  the	  Caribbean,	  instead	  of	  sequential	  releases	  by	  country,	  had	  been	  tested.	  
In	   addition	   to	   building	   a	   global	   marketing	   campaign	   -­‐	   reducing	   costs	   between	   a	  
theatrical	  and	  home	  entertainment	  release	  -­‐	  such	  a	  strategy	  would	  contribute	  to	  that	  
other	  great	  concern	  in	  Hollywood,	  the	  piracy	  issue.	  If	  the	  US	  studios	  took	  advantage	  
of	   the	   interest	   derived	   from	   a	   successful	   marketing	   campaign	   by	   releasing	   a	   film	  
simultaneously	   across	   several	   territories,	   why	   not	   release	   a	   film	   simultaneously	  
across	  several	  platforms	  in	  one	  country	  to	  maximise	  marketing	  spending	  for	  a	  smaller	  
film	  (Culkin,	  2008	  op.	  cit)?	  The	  National	  Association	  Of	  Theatre	  Owners	   (NATO)	  has	  
always	   maintained	   that	   the	   window	   between	   theatrical	   release	   and	   successive	  
platforms	  was	  negotiated	  by	  studios	  and	  exhibitors	  and	  remained	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  
the	   exhibition	   business.	   Despite	   the	   position	   held	   by	   NATO,	   the	   position	   of	   the	  
release	  windows	  slowly	  been	  eroded	  with	  the	  average	  time	  between	  first-­‐run	  theater	  
and	  other	  platforms	  down	  from	  4	  months	  in	  2013	  to,	  3	  months	  and	  17	  days	  in	  2016,	  
as	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  Figure	  5.9	  below.	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The	   window	   release	   discussion	   continued	   to	   play	   out	   when	   in	   2011,	   DirecTV	   (a	  
satellite	  television	  provider)	  launched	  a	  premium	  VOD	  service	  with	  the	  Sony	  Pictures	  
film,	   Just	  Go	  With	   It,	   starring	  Adam	  Sandler	  only	  69	  days	  after	   its	   theatrical	  debut.	  
Later,	  in	  2015,	  Paramount	  experimented	  with	  two	  films,	  Scouts	  Guide	  to	  The	  Zombie	  
Apocalypse	   and	   Paranormal	   Activity:	   The	   Ghost	   Dimension,	   with	   a	   group	   of	   US	  
theaters	   including,	   AMC	   Theatres,	   National	   Amusements,	   and	   Landmark	   Cinemas	  
that	  saw	  the	  titles	  available	  on	  VOD	  just	  39	  and	  53	  days	  respectively	  following	  their	  
release	   in	   a	   little	   less	   than	   300	   domestic	   theaters.	   As	   part	   of	   the	   agreement,	   the	  
theater	  owners	  shared	  a	  percentage	  of	  Paramount’s	  digital	  revenues,	  equal	  to	  their	  
share	  of	   the	   theatrical	  box-­‐office	  gross	  of	  each	   film,	  up	   to	   the	  end	  of	   the	   industry-­‐
norm	   90-­‐day	   window.	   According	   to	   David	   Lieberman	   a	   film	   analyst,	   Scouts	   Guide	  
grossed	   US$3.7M	   domestically,	   plus	   US$10.3	   million	   abroad;	   whereas	   Paranormal	  
Activity	   delivered	   US$18.3M	   in	   domestic	   sales	   and	   US$59.2	   million	   internationally	  
(Lierberman,	  2015).	  Despite	  the	  time	  taken	  to	  set	  up	  the	  test,	  the	  learning	  required	  
for	  a	  flexible	  distribution	  model	  did	  provide	  Paramount	  with	  evidence	  as	  to	  how	  the	  
revenue	  potential	  of	   these	   films	   (albeit	  not	  mainstream	  films)	  provide	  novel	  supply	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and	   demand	   solutions	   via	   legitimate	   digital	   access,	   within	   the	   exclusive	   theatrical	  
window.	   However,	   as	   the	   US	   studios	   continued	   to	   experiment	   with	   the	   release	  
windows,	  James	  Murdoch	  took	  a	  different	  approach,	  while	  speaking	  at	  the	  Goldman	  
Sachs	  Communacopia	  conference	  in	  New	  York:	  
	  ‘We	  have	   to	   think	  about	   these	  crazy	  hold-­‐backs	   that	   theatre	  owners	  put	   in	  place	   -­‐	  
these	   blackout	   periods…….A	   customer	   really	   doesn’t	   care	   that..[NATO]..wants	  
members	   to	   have	   exclusive	   access	   to	   films	   for	   about	   90	  days	   before	   they	  move	   to	  
other	  venues…[it	  was	   incumbent	  on	  studios	  to	  price	  films]…in	  a	  smart	  way”	  and	  do	  
something	   about	   windowing,	   including	   the	   possibility	   of	   electronic	   sell-­‐through.	  
There	  are	  a	   lot	  of	   changes	  over	   the	  next	   couple	  of	   years	   that	   are	  going	   to	  be	   very	  
exciting	  for	  the	  film	  business.	  	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (Murdoch,	  2016)	  	  
In	   response,	  NATO	   suggested	   that	  Mr.	  Murdoch	  was	  new	   to	   the	   film	  business	   and	  
appeared	  to	  moving	  too	  fast	  for	  his	  own	  good.	  In	  addition,	  it	  was	  they	  that	  had	  called	  
for	   a	  dialogue	  on	  more	   sophisticated	   release	  models,	   in	  order	   to	   grow	   the	   ‘pie	   for	  
everyone;’	   and,	   Mr.	   Murdoch	   should	   take	   care	   not	   to	   undermine	   the	   trust	  
established	   between	   Fox	   and	   exhibitors	   (Kay,	   2016).	   However,	   while	   such	   power	  
struggles	  were	  being	  conducted	  in	  public,	  the	  learning	  that	  Reid	  Hoffman	  excelled	  in	  
was	  market-­‐driven.	   He	   and	  Marc	   Randolph	   co-­‐founded	   Netflix	   to	   offer	   online	   film	  
rentals,	   which	   at	   the	   time	   of	   launch	   appeared	   to	   be	   targeting	   incumbents	   further	  
downstream	   to	   cinemas	   (i.e.	   Blockbusters).	   However,	   the	   following	   year	   they	  
launched	  their	  website	  and	  in	  2000	  announced	  a	  personalised	  film	  recommendation	  
system,	   which	   uses	   members’	   ratings	   to	   accurately	   predict	   choices	   for	   other	  
members.	  In	  the	  same	  year	  that	  the	  DCI	  released	  Version	  1.0	  of	  its	  specification,	  the	  
number	   of	   Netflix	   members	   rises	   to	   4.2	   million;	   within	   seven	   years,	   Netflix	   had	  
introduced	   a	   streaming	   service,	   which	   enabled	  members	   to	   view	   television	   shows	  
and	   films	   on	   their	   personal	   computers.	   By	   2011,	   the	  Netflix	   product	  was	   available	  
across	   the	   Apple	   platform	   and	   other	   Internet	   connected	   devices;	   its	   geographical	  
reach	  had	  extended	  to	  Canada,	  throughout	  Latin	  America	  and	  the	  Caribbean	  and	  in	  
2012	  the	  UK.	  
The	  most	  revealing	  aspect	  of	  introducing	  Netflix	  to	  the	  discussion	  is	  that	  throughout	  
the	  latter	  stages	  of	  my	  fieldwork,	  as	  the	  business	  was	  scaled	  up	  (content	  and	  market	  
penetration),	   was	   the	   apparent	   lack	   of	   concern	   to	   Netflix	   among	   film	   industry	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respondents,	   especially	  when	  one	   reflects	   on	   the	   Currah	   (2007)	   quote	   used	   at	   the	  
start	  of	  this	  Section.	  
When	  asked	   about	  where	   learning	   took	  place	   there	  was	   a	   general	   feeling	   that	   the	  
film	   industry	   was	   different	   to	   other	   industries	   and	   Netflix,	   Amazon	   et	   al.,	   were	  
retailers.	   In	   William	   Goldman’s	   1984	   book,	   Adventures	   in	   the	   Screen	   Trade:	   A	  
Personal	  View	  of	  Hollywood	  and	  Screenwriting,	  the	  quote,	  ‘Nobody	  knows	  anything…	  
[for	   a	   certainty]…Every	   time	  out	   it's	   a	   guess	   and,	   if	   you're	   lucky,	   an	   educated	  one’	  	  
has	   been	   employed	   by	   many	   people.	   However,	   in	   the	   context	   of	   learning	   in	   the	  
context	  of	  this	  dissertation	  there	  is	  an	  even	  more	  confounding	  quote:	  
One	  major	  studio	  executive	   told	  me	  recently,	   “Of	  course	   the	   failures	  are	  upsetting.	  
But	   there	   have	   always	   been	   failures.	   What’s	   got	   us	   so	   immobilized	   now	   is	   that	  
whatever	  it	  is	  that	  we’re	  making,	  we’re	  missing	  the	  audience	  by	  a	  wider	  margin	  than	  
ever	  before.	  We	  don’t	  know	  what	  they	  want.	  All	  we	  do	  know	  is	  that	  they	  don’t	  want	  
what	  we’re	  giving	  them.4	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	  	  	  (Goldman,	  1984:xi)	  	  
In	   terms	  of	   learning,	   I	  drew	  parallels	  with	  the	  Eastman	  Kodak	  case,	  who	  developed	  
the	   first	   megapixel	   sensor	   in	   1986.	   However,	   they	   did	   not	   attend	   the	   annual	   Las	  
Vegas	  Consumer	  Electronics	  Show	  until	  2004;	  instead	  they	  had	  continued	  to	  rely	  on	  a	  
strategy	   that	  had	   served	   them	  well	   in	   the	  past,	   to	   fuel	   growth	  and	  profits,	   despite	  
what	  their	  market	  research	  had	  revealed.	  Kodak’s	  success,	  not	  unlike	  the	  US	  Studios,	  
was	  heavily	  dependent	  on	  the	  highly	  profitable	  margins	  generated	  from	  celluloid	  and	  
paid	  progressively	   less	  attention	  to	  the	  market	  until	   it	  was	  too	   late	  to	  ask	  the	  right	  
questions	  of	  its	  relationship	  with	  evolving	  markets.	  
Two	   US	   respondents,	   when	   asked	   about	   the	   potential	   threat	   from	   technology	   in	  
general	  and,	  audience	  consumption	  patterns	  in	  general	  replied:	  	  
Well,	  everything's	  a	  competitive	  threat;	  the	  thing	  is	  when	  you	  have	  a	  good	  story,	  you	  
don't	  have	  to	  worry	  about	  it.	   	  Look	  how	  well	  Avatar	  did;	  it	  was	  just	  what,	  five	  years	  
ago,	  the	  Internet	  existed	  then	  as	  well.	  	  Cinema	  had	  competition	  from	  radio	  and	  then	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	   Interestingly,	   the	   year	   after	  Goldman’s	   book	  was	   published,	   of	   the	   top	   ten	   1984	   released	   films	   by	   box	  
office	   gross	   in	   North	   America,	   eight	   were	   the	   first	   installment	   or	   part	   of	   a	   sequel	   	   (including	   Star	   Trek,	  
Ghostbusters,	  Police	  Academy	  and	  Indiana	  Jones)	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it	  had	  competition	  from	  television	  and	  radio	  and	  so…	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (Exec	  [1]:	  US	  Distribution)	  
There’s	  an	  enduring	  quality	  about	  seeing	  a	  new	  movie	  at	  the	  theater,	  with	  friends	  or	  
family.	  No	  matter	  what	  [new]	  comes	  along	  the	  US	  audience	  just	  loves	  to	  come	  out	  on	  
that	  opening	  weekend	  and	  eat,	  drink	  and	  watch	  movies.	  It’s	  just	  how	  it	  is.	  	  
(Exec	  [1]:	  US	  Producer)	  
This	   type	   of	   response	   was	   mirrored,	   by	   other	   US	   based	   respondents	   who	   turned	   the	  
question	  into	  learning	  about	  technology:	  
…..[we	   will	   see]…an	   increase	   in	   people	   going	   to	   movies	   if	   they’re	   projected	  
properly…[and]…they're	   going	   to	   pay	   more,	   we're	   going	   to	   get	   more	   people	   in,	   I	  
think,	  higher	  dynamic	  range,	  higher	  brightness,	  increased	  colour	  palette,	  will	  just	  be	  
even	   better	   for	   the	   audience,	   they'll	   eventually	   understand	   that	   because	   you're	  
right….we've	  got	  to	  work	  together	  to	  at	  least	  get	  the	  standards	  we	  have	  now	  [35mm	  
film].	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (Exec	  [1]:	  US	  Producer)	  
The	  response	  from	  a	  UK	  Executive	  suggested	  that	  their	  counterparts	  in	  the	  US	  were	  
not	  aware	  of	  their	  own	  isolation	  when	  it	  came	  to	  learning	  about	  new	  threats:	  
….big	   markets	   20	   years	   down	   the	   line,	   China	   and	   India,	   I	   think	   are	   going	   to	   be	  
enormous…[and]…unless	  Hollywood	   embraces	   them	   and	   their	   technology	   one	  way	  
or	  the	  other,	  they….will	   lose…..so	  much	  business.	  They’ve	  got	  to	  accommodate	  that	  
in	  their	  thinking	  and	  then	  if	  they	  say	  operate	  in	  China…	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (Exec	  [2]:	  UK	  Govt	  Agency)	  
When	   probed	   further	   on	   how	   disruptive	   the	   learning	   could	   be,	   given	   the	   answer	  
above	  they	  responded:	  
It’s	  not	  a	  good	  situation.	  They	  will	  have	  to	  accept	   less	   than	  2K	  or	   less	   than	  DCI	  but	  
they	   won’t	   in	   Europe,	   there’s	   a	   tension	   there.	   	   That	   is	   truly	   disruptive,	   so	   I	   think	  
there’s	  a	  very	  important	  point	  to	  understand.	  It	  won’t	  end	  well.	   	  	  
(Exec	  [2]:	  UK	  Govt	  Agency)	  
It	   became	   apparent	   in	   the	   UK	   that	   while	   public	   intervention	   was	   possible	   in	  
knowledge	  sharing	  (and	   learning)	  and	  potentially	  a	  good	  idea,	  nothing	  was	  possible	  
until	  the	  standards	  issue	  was	  resolved:	  
[digital	   cinema]…what	   it	   is,	   is	   an	   upgrade.	   	   It’s	   a	   new	   technology,	   but	   it’s	   not	   a	  
panacea;	  it’s	  not	  going	  to	  solve	  anyone’s	  problems,	  nor	  is	  it	  a	  revolution	  that’s	  going	  
to	  change,	  you	  know,	  as	  they	  said	  in	  Star	  Trek,	  life	  as	  we	  know	  it.	  	  
(Sen	  Exec	  [2]:	  UK	  Govt	  Agency)	  
However,	   any	   entrepreneurial	   innovation,	   or	   early	   stage	   experiments	   could	   not	  
happen	  until:	  	  
One,	  it’s	  not	  a	  revolution.	  	  Two,	  you	  ignore	  it	  at	  your	  peril,	  but	  Three,	  let’s	  hope	  the	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industry	  collectively	  both	  here	  and	  in	  America	  makes	  the	  right	  decision.	  	  
(Exec	  [2]:	  UK	  Govt	  Agency)	  
Turning	  to	  the	  network	  effect	  on	  learning,	  a	  small	  group	  of	  respondents	  in	  the	  US	  and	  
UK	   suggested	   that	   their	   country	   trade	   associations	   were	   involved	   in	   exploring	  
audience	  development,	  but	  only	  for	  mainstream	  cinema	  businesses:	  
There	  are	  conventions	  being	  put	  together	  by	  NATO	  but	  it’s	  really	  just	  the	  same	  old,	  
same	  old.	  We’re	   supposed	   to	  provide	  everything	  and	   I’m	  yet	   to	   see	  what’s	   coming	  
along	  from	  the	  studios.	  	  	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (Sen	  Exec	  [1]:	  US	  Cinema	  Chain)	  
The	  CEA	  have	  got	  this	  roadshow	  together,	  but	  it	  feels	  it’s	  all	  about	  3D	  and	  I’m	  yet	  to	  
understand	  how	   I	  pay	   for,	   install	  and	  train	  up	  my	  people	   for	  2D.	  Not	  really	  helpful.	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (Sen	  Exec	  [1]:	  UK	  Cinema	  Chain)	  
It’s	   an	   interesting	  event;	   but	  when	   the	  presenter’s	  own	  kit	  not	  working	  doesn’t	   fill	  
you	  with	  a	  huge	  amount	  of	  confidence,	  does	  it?	  The	  other	  problem	  is	  we’re	  all	  in	  the	  
same	  boat	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  In	  the	  lunch	  break	  I	  want	  to	  speak	  with	  [cinema	  owners]	  
who’ve	  been	  running	  with	  the	  new	  equipment….not	  from	  [one	  of	  the	  major	  cinema	  
chains]	  but	  someone	  in	  the	  same	  position	  as	  me.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (Sen	  Exec	  [2]:	  UK	  Cinema	  Chain)	  
When	  you	  speak	  to	  Sales	  Agents	  they’re	  limiting	  their	  exposure	  by	  taking	  less	  films.	  
They	   claim	   because	   of	   workloads…[due	   to	   growth	   in	   digital	   media]…they	   have	  
stopped	  working	  with	  mid-­‐budget	  films,	  or	  smaller	  independent	  films.	  The	  conclusion	  
is	  that	  you	  have	  a	  lot	  of	  titles	  without	  sales	  agents.	  How	  do	  we	  find	  them?	  	  
	  (Sen	  Exec	  [3]:	  UK	  Cinema	  Chain)	  
However,	   in	  Norway	  a	  very	  different	  picture	  emerged,	  one	  respondent	  when	  asked	  
about	  who	  was	  involved	  in	  the	  project,	  first	  talked	  about	  the	  national	  project,	  	  
I	   think	   the	   fact	   that	  we	   have	   Film	  &	   Kino.	   	   That	  was	   the	   key	   thing.	   	   That	   and	   the	  
Nordic	  Project…with	  all	  the	  partners	  that	  brought	  together…..the	  whole	  business	  and	  
all	   the	  members	  of	  Film	  &	  Kino,	   they	  prioritised	  digitalising	   the	  highest,	   so	  we	  said	  
that	  we	  will	  do	  this	  too.	  	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (Sen	  Exec	  [1]:	  Norwegian	  Cinema	  Chain)	  
And,	  then	  went	  on	  to	  describe	  the	  standing	  of	  cinema	  within	  the	  country:	  
	  [Norway	  is]	  people	  are	  living	  so	  spread	  around,	  and	  it	  was	  a	  political	  issue	  most	  of	  all	  
a	   political	   issue,	   to	   maintain	   a	   structure	   where	   we	   have,	   where	   we	   still	   can	   have	  
cinemas	  because…this	  industry	  is	  going	  digital….a	  lot	  of	  people	  in	  Norway	  would	  lose	  
their	  cinema..…so	  that	  was	  really	  most	  of	  all	  a	  political	  solution	  ….[and]	  because	  Film	  
&	  Kino	  has	  this	  fund	  built	  up	  by	  these	  little	  taxes.	  	  
(Sen	  Exec	  [2]:	  Norwegian	  Cinema	  Chain)	  
Finally,	  this	  and	  another	  respondent	  spoke	  about	  the	  learning	  within	  their	  business.	  
…it	   was	   a	   good	   decision..there	   were	   some	   problems………but	   I	   would	   say	   that	   we	  
learned	  a	   lot……I	   think	   that	  was	  much	  of	   the	  success	   that	  made	  us	  have	  very	  small	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failure[s]…when	  we	  were	  fully	  digitalised,	  we	  knew	  a	   lot	  about	   it,	  and….what	   is	   the	  
words….[NC:	  a	  catastrophe	  I	  think]…Yes,	  a	  catastrophe.	  	  	  
	  
We	   had	   few	   of	   those	   compared	   to	  what	   I	   have	   seen	   from	   foreign	   companies	   that	  
were	  digitalised.	  	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (Sen	  Exec	  [1]:	  Norwegian	  Cinema	  Chain)	  
	  
Indeed	   we	   know	   [Professor	   of	   Digital	   Systems].	   His	   former	   department	   was	   an	  
important	   partner	   in	   the	   research	   and	   groundwork	   that	   was	   done	   prior	   to	   the	  
digitalization	  of	  the	  Norwegian	  cinemas.	  [Professor	  of	  Cinema]	  is	  also	  a	  person	  I	  meet	  
frequently.	  	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (Sen	  Exec	  [1]:	  Norwegian	  Cinema	  Chain)	  
We	  have	  had	  a	  long	  lasting	  cooperation	  with	  [two	  universities	  in	  Norway].	  I	  am	  a	  part	  
of	  the	  program	  council	  for	  the	  Institute,	  and	  the	  program	  manager	  at	  our	  film	  festival	  
presently	  is	  doing	  a	  PhD	  there.	  We	  also	  use	  the	  Institute	  in	  the	  work	  to	  document	  the	  
history	  of	  all	  our	  historical	  films,	  made	  by	  the	  cinema	  from	  1905	  to	  the	  mid-­‐60s.	  For	  
our	  100	  year	  anniversary….we	  are	  making	  a	  documentary	  based	  on	  the	  old	  films,	  and	  
[Professor	  at	  the	  Institute]	  will	  do	  research	  on	  this	  project.	  	  
(Sen	  Exec	  [3]:	  Norwegian	  Cinema	  Chain)	  
They	   [local	   and	   one	   of	   largest	   universities	   in	   Norway]	   also	   hand	   out	   a	   prize	   for	   a	  
filmmaker	  during	  Kosmorama.	  Also	  [local	  and	  one	  of	   largest	  universities	   in	  Norway]	  
use	  one	  of	  our	  screens	  for	  lectures	  5	  days	  a	  week.	  They	  have	  done	  so	  for	  at	  least	  6-­‐7	  
years,	  due	  to	  lack	  of	  rooms	  at	  the	  university.	  I	  think	  that	  it	  differs	  a	  lot	  on	  how	  close	  
relation	   there	   is	   between	   the	   cinemas	   and	   the	   universities,	   but	   we	   been	   very	  
fortunate	  to	  cooperate	  closely	  with	  [local	  and	  one	  of	  largest	  universities	  in	  Norway].	  
(Sen	  Exec	  [3]:	  Norwegian	  Cinema	  Chain)	  
A	   similar	   pattern	   emerged	   when	   the	   topic	   turned	   to	   audiences.	   The	   US	   and	   UK	  
situation	  remained	  for	  a	  long	  period	  one	  steeped	  in	  a	  linear	  supply	  chain	  debate:	  
The	   upside	   of	   digital	   cinema	   is	   it's	   so	  much	   cheaper	   to	   deliver	   content….there	   are	  
opportunities..[when]..there's	   just	   no	   one	   in	   the	   theatres	   on	  Monday	   and	   Tuesday	  
nights	   especially,	   is	   that	   a	   night	   that	   you	   can	   air	   some	   classic	   movie,	  
…..[the]…complexities	   are	  how	   they	   collect	  box	  office;	  when	   I	   talked	   to	   the	  CEO	  at	  
[US	   Studio]…that	  was	   the	   barrier,	   how	   they	   attribute	   the	   box	   office	   and	   how	   they	  
collect	  it…	  	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (Sen	  Exec	  [2]:	  US	  Digital	  Intermediary)	  
And,	   a	   debate	   primarily	   concerned	   with	   revenue	   sharing,	   as	   opposed	   to	   audience	  
development.	  
Exactly.	   	   Exactly.	   	   The	   problem	   is,	   that	   exhibitors	   are	   traditional,	   you	   know,	   their	  
historical	  costs	  for	  real	  estate	  and	  stuff,	  they’re	  not	  actually	  bringing	  anything	  to	  the	  
table.	  	  They	  only	  offer	  their	  space.	  	  So	  you	  know,	  what	  are	  they	  doing	  in	  return	  for	  us	  
giving	  that	  exclusivity	  window	  is	  what	  I’m	  asking.	  	  By	  the	  same	  token,	  the	  models	  in	  
my	  view	  haven’t	  changed	  with	  time.	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (Exec	  [1]:	  UK	  Distribution	  &	  Exhibition)	  	  
The	   experience	   of	   those	   digital	   cinemas	   that	   had	   experimented	   with	   alternative	  
content	   for	   audiences	   (e.g.	   live	   sporting	  events	   and	  opera)	  was	   that	  potential	   now	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existed	   for	   this,	   once	   niche	   area,	   to	   become	   a	   significant	   focal	   point	   for	   audience	  
development	   and	   revenue	   growth	   for	   cinemas.	   But,	   as	   one	   respondent	  who	   ran	   a	  
small	   cinema	   chain	   and	   intrigued	   by	   the	   opportunities	   afforded	   by	   alternative	  
content:	  
The	  key	  to	  success	  was	  in	  marketing…working	  with	  specialised	  distributors	  was	  vital.	  
Most	   UK	   cinema	   operators	   know	   they	   lack	   expertise	   in	   areas	   such	   as	   opera	   and	  
theatre	  and	  so	  would	  need	  to	  rely	  heavily	  on	  external	  advice	  and	  that’s	  a	  problem.	  
There’s	  nowhere	  to	  go	  and	  learn.	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (Exec	  [1]:	  UK	  Distribution	  &	  Exhibition)	  
There	  resides	  a	  key	  problem	  for	  the	  European	  cinema	  market	  in	  general	  and	  the	  UK	  
in	  particular.	  At	  the	  European	  level:	  
I’m	  very	  keen	  that,	  in	  presenting	  to	  some	  extent	  the	  public	  or	  the	  public	  affairs	  face	  
of	  the	  industry,	  it’s	  not	  possible	  for	  us	  to	  be	  categorised	  as	  we	  have	  been	  in	  the	  past	  
as,	   you	   know,	   kind	  of	   Luddite	  or	   anti-­‐development	   kind	  of	   a	  mix…..For	   a	   very	   long	  
time	  we’ve	  been	  a	  very	  mechanical	  business,	  we’re	  now	  a	  digital	  business	  and	  there’s	  
more	   innovation	   taking	  place	  across	   the	  cinema	   landscape	   than	   there	  has	  been	   for	  
the	  past	  sixty	  years.	  	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  (Senior	  Exec	  [1]:	  UK	  Trade	  Assoc.)	  
While	  at	  the	  country	  level,	  reflecting	  on	  how	  and	  where	  the	  cinema	  sees	  itself:	  
…to	  some	  extent	  the	  industry’s	  not	  helped	  itself	  in	  that	  regard,	  but	  it’s	  an	  interesting	  
kind	   of	   discipline	   sometimes	  when	   sat	   down	   talking	   to	   colleagues	   from	   the	   rest	   of	  
Europe,	  step	  outside	  of	  our	  own	  context	  and	  think	  about,	  well	  if	  you	  were	  there	  how	  
would	  you	  have	  dealt	  with	  it.	  	  	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  (Exec	  [1]:	  UK	  Govt	  Agency)	  
Perhaps,	  this	  is	  why	  when	  asked	  about	  the	  UK	  Film	  Council’s	  managing	  of	  the	  digital	  
screen	  network	  (DSN),	  another	  respondent	  was	  critical	  about	  the	  missed	  opportunity	  
for	  using	  the	  network	  as	  a	  catalyst	  to	  draw	  more	  people	  into	  the	  project:	  
We	  could	  do	  more,	  and	  more	  could	  be	  done	  and	  certainly	  my	  observation	  of	  the	  DSN	  
is	  that	  it	  hasn’t	  achieved	  anything	  like	  the	  aspirations	  that	  were	  placed	  to	  the	  public	  
when	  the	  DSN	  was	  originally	  mooted.	  We’re	  told	  it	  will	  give	  us	  greater	  flexibility	  but	  
for	  that	  to	  really	  take	  off	  we	  need	  more	  expertise	  round	  the	  table.	  	  
(Senior	  Exec	  [1]:	  UK	  Trade	  Assoc.)	  
In	  a	  later	  interview	  the	  same	  person,	  in	  the	  same	  post,	  they	  responded	  to	  a	  question	  
on	  ‘big	  data’	  with:	  	  
And	  funny	  that	  you	  should	  mention	  data…..it’s	  clearly	  a	  big	  thing	  (no	  pun	  intended)	  
for	  our	  industry	  and	  something	  on	  which	  I	  think	  we	  probably	  need	  to	  help	  guide	  our	  
smaller	  members	   in	   particular.	   For	   that	   reason,	  we’re	   about	   to	   announce	   that	   our	  
next	   conference	   will	   major	   on	   this.	   It’s	   a	   game	   of	   one	   and	   half	   halves,	   with	   an	  
opening	  day	  on	  data	  and	  a	  second	  half-­‐day	  on	  emerging	  technologies.	  	  
(Senior	  Exec	  [1]:	  EU	  Trade	  Assoc.)	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5.4.1	  A	  different	  window.	  
It	   became	   apparent	   during	   the	   interviews	   that	   knowledge	   was	   perceived	   in	   its	  
broadest	   sense	   as	   something	   bounded	  within	   the	   film	   industry.	   As	   the	   digitization	  
process	  gathered	  pace,	  post-­‐2008,	  a	  senior	  executive	  at	   the	  UK	  Film	  Council	   stated	  
that	  one	  of	   the	  reasons	   that	   film	  production	  was	  doing	  so	  well,	  particularly	   in	   the	  UK	  was	  
down	  to:	  
…the	  quality	  of	  the	  television	  drama	  has	  shrunk	  dramatically	  and	  the	  consumer	  will	  
pay	  to	  watch	  a	  film	  in	  cinemas	  or	  rent	  it	  or	  buy	  it,	  if	  it’s	  superior	  to	  his	  free	  television,	  
and	  the	  reason	  that	  television	  drama’s	  shrunk	  is	  because	  with	  digitalisation	  obviously	  
with	  television,	  you’ve	  got	  a	  huge	  proliferation	  of	  channels.	  	  
(Sen	  Exec	  [2]:	  UK	  Govt	  Agency)	  
The	  question	  raised	  from	  such	  a	  position	  is,	  what	  happens	  if	  and	  when	  that	  situation	  
is	   reversed?	   The	   notion	   of	   knowledge	   was	   being	   deliberately	   transformed	   to	  
maintain	  a	  linear	  flow	  of	  US	  Studio	  owned	  content.	  The	  technology	  would	  not	  allow	  
the	  film	  industry	  to	  be	  disrupted	  in	  the	  way	  that	  the	  music	  industry	  had	  experienced.	  
The	  use	  of	  the	  DCI	  specification	  would	  erect	  walled	  gardens	  in	  which	  to	  keep	  out	  new	  
entrants.	  However,	  while	  the	  US	  studios	  continued	  to	  erode	  their	  Windows	  Release	  
patterns,	  2015	  saw	  Netflix,	  the	  one-­‐time	  video	  rental	  firm	  purchase	  worldwide	  rights	  
to,	   Beasts	   of	   No	   Nation	   for	   US$12M	   and	   release	   it	   in	   US	   theatres,	   and	   at	   Curzon	  
cinemas	   in	   the	  UK.	   In	   a	  Guardian	  Newspaper	  article	   (2015),	   Ted	  Sarandos,	  head	  of	  
content	   acquisition	   at	   Netflix,	   stated	   that	   over	   three	   million	   people	   watched	   the	  
company’s	   original	   drama	   in	   its	   first	   two	   weeks.	   In	   the	   same	   interview,	   Sarandos	  
claimed	   (while	   not	   disclosing	   actual	   figures)	   that	   the	   film	  had	  become	   the	  number	  
one	   in	  diverse	   countries	   such	  as	   Japan,	  Brazil	   and	  Mexico	  places	  where	   these	   type	  
films	  typically	  never	  open.	  This	  experiment	  furthers	  the	  streaming	  media	  company’s	  
strategy	  to	  release	  high	  profile,	  exclusive	  films.	  And	  as,	  Koljonen	  (2016)	  suggests,	  the	  
experiment	   was	   not	   for	   the	   theatrical	   release	   to	   make	   money;	   it	   was	   to	   draw	  
attention	  to	  the	  premiere,	  helped	  in	  Netflix’s	  strategy	  to	  be	  recoginsed	  as	  an	  (online)	  
studio	  and	  enabled	  the	  film	  to	  be	  eligible	  for	  awards.	  	  
Given	   that	   the	   UK	   alone	   released	   over	   800	   films	   in	   2015,	   this	   new	   “global	  
major”	  entering	   into	   day-­‐and-­‐date	   experimentation	   of	   traditional	   release	   patterns	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demonstrates	  that	   films	  cannot	  be	  released	   in	  mainstream	  cinemas	  and	  nor	  should	  
they	  be	  released	  the	  exact	  same	  way.	  The	  learning	  to	  take	  away	  here	  could	  lead	  to	  a	  
bifurcation	   of	   the	   industry;	   one	   built	   on	   regions,	   one	   on	   global	   and	   platform	  
availability.	  To	  conclude	  this	  Chapter,	   it	   is	  worth	  recalling	  Director	  and	  Actor,	  Kevin	  
Spacey’s	  talk	  at	  the	  Edinburgh	  Festival.	  He	  is	  clear	  in	  his	  view	  that	  the	  success	  of	  the	  
Netflix	  model,	   releasing	   the	   entire	   season	   of	   House	   of	   Cards	   at	   once,	   proved	   one	  
thing:	  The	  audience	  wants	  the	  control.	  They	  want	  the	  freedom.	  
So	  I	  predict	   in	  the	  next	  decade	  or	  two,	  any	  differentiation	  between	  these	  platforms	  
will	  fall	  away.	  Is	  13	  hours	  watched	  as	  one	  cinematic	  whole	  really	  any	  different	  from	  a	  
film?	  Do	  we	  define	  film	  as	  something	  being	  two	  hours	  or	  less?	  Surely	  it	  goes	  deeper	  
than	  that.	  If	  you’re	  watching	  a	  film	  on	  your	  television,	  is	   it	  no	  longer	  a	  film	  because	  
you’re	   not	  watching	   it	   in	   a	   theatre?	   If	   you	  watch	   a	   TV	   show	  on	   your	   iPad,	   is	   it	   no	  
longer	  a	  TV	  show?	  The	  device	  and	   the	   length	  are	   irrelevant;	   the	   labels	  are	  useless,	  
except	   perhaps	   to	   agents	   and	   managers	   and	   lawyers,	   who	   use	   these	   labels	   to	  
conduct	  business	  deals.	  But	  for	  kids	  growing	  up	  now,	  there’s	  no	  difference	  watching	  
Avatar	  on	  an	  iPad	  or	  watching	  YouTube	  on	  TV	  or	  watching	  Game	  of	  Thrones	  on	  their	  
computer.	  It’s	  all	  content.	  It’s	  just	  story.	  	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (Spacey,	  2013)	  
5.5	  	  	   Chapter	  summary	  
Drawing	   on	   the	   experience	   of	   leading	   figures	   from	  within	   the	   film	   industry	   and	   a	  
statistical	   analysis	   of	   the	   European	   exhibition	   market	   (2005-­‐2013),	   the	   chapter	  
documented	  the	  impact	  of	  digital	  cinema	  from	  that	  of	  stakeholder	  perspectives	  and	  
published	  market	  data.	  What	  this	  mix	  of	  qualitative	  and	  quantitative	  data	  indicates	  is	  
that	   the	  diffusion	  of	  a	  high-­‐tech	  breakthrough	  was	   largely	  managed	  as	  a	  sustaining	  
process	   innovation,	  with	   little	  regard	  paid	  to	  the	  changing	  consumption	  patterns	  of	  
audiovisual	  products.	  While	  it	  was	  extremely	  difficult	  to	  obtain	  an	  accurate	  picture	  of	  
the	   value	   of	   costs	   extracted	   by	   the	   near-­‐end	   of	   the	   process,	   wider	   marketing	  
research	   indicates	   that	  US	   content	   owners	   benefitted	   from	   significant	   savings.	   The	  
market	   data	   appears	   to	   suggest	   that	   none	   of	   the	   savings	   have	   been	   passed	   on	   to	  
existing	   customers	   (cinema	   audience);	   nor	   have	   customers	   attending	   mainstream	  
cinema	  witnessed	  an	  increase	  in	  product	  	  (content	  delivery).	  
What	  was	  evident	  was	  that	  the	  digitization	  process	  did	  not	  simply	  extract	  costs	  from	  
a	  supply	  chain,	  which	  was	  a	  key	  driver	   for	   the	  US	  Studios.	  Of	  particular	   insight	  was	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the	   fact	   that	   while	   incumbents	   focused	   on	   technology	   standards	   to	   deliver	   a	  
sustaining	   innovation,	   entrepreneurial	   innovations	   have	   helped	   certain	   cinemas	   to	  
differentiate	   themselves	   with	   the	   support	   of	   public	   intervention	   measures	   that	  
recognize	   the	   contribution	   cinema	   could	   make	   to	   the	   well-­‐being	   of	   a	   nation.	   In	  
essence,	  we	   can	   view	   the	   digital	   cinema	   rollout	   as	   a	   case	   study	   of	   an	   increasingly	  
mobile	   sector,	   in	   which	   technological	   factors	   retreat	   in	   importance	   behind	  
entrepreneurial	  innovation	  as	  a	  key	  driving	  force	  in	  reaching	  audiences.	  
It	   is	  evident	   from	  the	  responses	   in	   this	  chapter	   that	   the	  digitization	  of	  cinemas	  has	  
encouraged	  entrepreneurial	  firms,	  supported	  by	  a	  radically	  different	  reading	  of	  both	  
national	   innovation	   systems	   enabled	   some	   countries	   (e.g.	   Norway)	   to	   reorientate	  
their	  value	  chains	  in	  novel	  ways	  that	  ensure	  the	  cinema	  experience	  is	  made	  resilient,	  
in	   an	   era	   of	   increased	   competition	   for	   society’s	   leisure	   time.	   The	   growth	   of	  
technology	   equivalence	   -­‐	   between	   the	   cinema	   and	   the	   home	   -­‐	   has	   particularly	  
demonstrated	   the	   viability	   of	   a	   global	   production	   and	   consumption	   pattern	   to	  
produce	  medium	  to	  high	  budget	   level	   films	  for	   international	  audiences,	  which	  have	  
until	  today	  been	  the	  sole	  domain	  of	  US	  studies.	  As	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  the	  Kevin	  Spacey	  
quotation	  and	  the	  experiments	  with	  Beasts	  of	  No	  Nation,	  Netflix	  has	  demonstrated	  a	  
propensity	   to	   replicate	   Schumpeter’s	   ‘gales	   of	   creative	   destruction,’	   while	   the	   US	  
studios	  focused	  on	  creating	  a	  walled	  garden	  to	  protect	  its	  profitable	  product	  line.	  In	  
Brian	   Arthur’s	   influential	   book,	   ‘The	   Nature	   of	   Technology,’	   he	   states	   that	  
‘Technology	  is	  what	  separates	  us	  from	  the	  Middle	  Ages;	  indeed	  it	   is	  what	  separates	  
us	   from	   the	   way	   we	   lived	   50,000	   or	   more	   years	   ago.	   More	   than	   anything	   else	  
technology	  creates	  our	  world.	   It	  creates	  our	  wealth,	  our	  economy,	  our	  very	  way	  of	  
being’	   (2009:10).	   	   However,	   incumbents	   have	   a	   vested	   interest	   in	   maintaining	  
consistency	  because	  their	  own	  identity	   is	  at	  risk,	  which	  as	   I	  have	  demonstrated	  can	  
be	  seen	  in	  the	  response	  from	  the	  US	  studios	  and	  the	  larger	  cinema	  chains;	  the	  latter	  
of	  which	  has	  been	  transformed	  by,	  and	  now	  dependent	  on	  the	  prequel,	  sequel	  and	  
spin-­‐off	   films.	   	  The	  higher	  the	  perceived	  risk,	   the	   longer	   incumbents	  will	  commit	  to	  
the	   current.	   And,	   Arthur	   correctly	   predicts	   a	   period	   of	   hysteresis	   –	   a	   delayed	  
response	  to	  a	  change	  –	  will	  ensure;	  the	  new	  delayed	  by	  the	  very	  success	  of	  the	  old,	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makes	   changeover	   in	   technologies	   neither	   easy	   nor	   smooth	   (2009:140).	   The	   US	  
studios	   appear	   to	   have	   a	   position	   appears	   to	   have	   taken	   little	   or	   no	   notice	   of	   the	  
market	  conditions	  unfolding	  around	  them,	  arguably	  learning	  nothing	  from	  the	  digital	  
impact	   on	  music	   and	  photography.	   	   The	   response	   appears	   to	   reflect	   the	  dominant	  
linear	  view	  of	  technological	  change,	  one	  that	  has	  proved	  difficult	  to	  dislodge;	  driven	  
or	   pushed	   by	   STEM-­‐based	   innovation	   policies	   adopted	   and	   dare	   I	   say	   adored,	   by	  
western	  governments.	  Drawing	  on	   findings	   from	  Chapter	  2,	   I	  have	  also	  shown	  how	  
one	  nation’s	  innovation	  system	  (Norway)	  has	  benefited	  from	  recognizing	  cinema	  as	  a	  
legitimate	   service	   sector	   innovation,	  which	   to	   date	   has	   been	   poorly	   served	   by	   the	  
dominant	   technological	   product	   and	   process	   (TPP)	   approaches	   (Cunningham,	  
2014:38).	  	  
However,	   such	   opportunities	   will	   continue	   to	   be	   ill-­‐served	   for	   entrepreneurial	  
innovation	  in	  Europe	  if	  the	  policy	  narratives	  do	  not	  follow	  practice.	  In	  a	  recent	  major	  
independent	   research	   report	   entitled,	   ‘Building	   sustainable	   film	   businesses:	   the	  
challenges	   for	   industry	   and	   government,’	   sponsored	   by	   Film	   i	   Väst,	   PACT	   and	   the	  
Swedish	  Film	  Institute	  the	  report’s	  author	  indicated	  that,	   ‘[F]or	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  
report	  a	   ‘film	  business’	   is	  defined	  as	  an	   independent	   company	  undertaking	   feature	  
film	   production	   as	   its	   core	   activity’	   (Olsberg,	   2012:9).	   But,	   as	   Head	   of	   Industry	  
Programmes,	   Marché	   du	   Film,	   Julia	   Bergeron	   reminds	   us,	   the	   majority	   of	   films	  
produced	   are	   not	   finding	   their	   way	   to	   the	   audience,	   either	   in	   theatres	   or	   on	   the	  
digital	  platforms.	  There	  are	  less	  and	  less	  theatres.	  In	  addition,	  if	  Europe	  wants,	  in	  five	  
years,	   to	   an	   have	   audience,	   it	   needs	   cinema	   education	   for	   the	   young	   as	   a	  
counterpoint	  to	  video	  games,	  in	  order	  to	  experience	  film	  in	  a	  theatre	  and	  understand	  
why	   it’s	  different,	  why	   it’s	  as	  powerful.	   It	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  bigger	  opportunity	  than	  
before	  for	  films,	  because	  there	  are	  more	  ways	  of	  presenting	  independent	  film	  today.	  
And	   public	   institutions	   all	   over	   Europe	   need	   to	   support	   diversity	   and	   the	   creative	  
initiatives	  of	  the	  exhibitors	  and	  distributors	  (Bergeron,	  2016:15).	  
With	   respect	   to	   the	  European	  cinema	  system,	   the	  digital	   single	  market	  can	  also	  be	  
seen	   as	   means	   to	   reinvigorate	   opportunities	   for	   national	   and	   non-­‐national	   film	  
consumption.	  This	  previously	  operated	   in	  a	   regional	  or	  national	   context,	   towards	  a	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more	   integrated	  networked	   cross	  border	   industry	   supported	  by	   temporary	   clusters	  
(e.g.	  Europa	  Cinema	  network)	  with	  links	  across	  the	  media	  entertainment	  landscape.	  
However,	   while	   the	   implications	   of	   Brexit	   are	   beyond	   the	   parameters	   of	   this	  
dissertation,	   the	  UK	   is	  unlikely	   to	  benefit	   from	  a	  DSM	   to	   the	   same	  degree,	   if	   at	   all	  
across	  remaining	  member	  states.	  
Despite	  periods	  of	  change	  and	  potential,	  the	  overall	  technological	  evolutions	  have	  up	  
until	   now	   been	   to	   the	   advantage	   of	   Hollywood	   (De	   Vinck	   &	   Lindmark,	   2014:122;	  
Hanson,	  2007b).	  Rather	  than	  focusing	  on	  the	  destructive	  tone	  of	  Christensen’s	  work,	  
a	   path	   from	   Schumpeter	   to	   Mazzucato	   informs	   us	   how	   interactions	   between	  
business,	   consumer	   and	   institutions	   (public	   and	   private)	   facilitate	   innovation	   and	  
technology	  diffusion.	  Before	   its	   closure,	   the	  UK	  Film	  Council	   had	   started	  down	   this	  
route.	   According	   to	   Doyle	   (2015)	   from	   2007,	   the	   UKFC	   had	   begun	   to	   add	   to	   an	  
existing	   array	   of	   commitments	   in	   order	   to	   demonstrate	   how	   it	   was	   progressively	  
broadening	   its	   mandate	   and	   embracing	   a	   growing	   set	   of	   economic	   and	   industry	  
imperatives,	  greater	  responsibilities	  for	  cultural	  aspects	  of	  the	  film	  remit,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  
more	   sustained	   focus	   on	   digital	   technology	   (2015:60).	   Also,	   the	   Council	   had	  
recognised	   the	  opportunity	   for	   it	   to	   ‘help	  make	   the	  UK	  a	  global	  hub	   for	   film	   in	   the	  
digital	  age,	  with	  the	  most	  imaginative,	  diverse	  and	  vibrant	  film	  culture,	  underpinned	  
by	   a	   flourishing,	   competitive	   film	   industry	   (UKFC,	   2007:2).	   Following	   its	   closure	   in	  
2011,	   the	  remit	   for	  supporting	   the	  UK	   film	   industry	  was	  handed	  over	   to	   the	  British	  
Film	  Institute	  (BFI).	   In	  addition	  to	  acting	  as	  the	  lead	  strategic	  agency,	  the	  BFI	   is	  also	  
responsible	   for	   certification	   of	   UK	   films	   (e.g.	   tax	   credit	   qualifying	   status)	   and	  
dispersing	  National	  Lottery	  money	  to	   film	  production.	   	  A	  major	  criticism	  of	   the	  BFI,	  
however,	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  its	  role	  is	  unevenly	  split	  between	  film	  and	  TV.	  
The	   BFIs	   remit	   cultural	   responsibilities	   include	   TV,	   whereby	   its	   industrial	   remit	   is	  
confined	   to	   film.	   This	   was	   brought	   to	   the	   UK	   Government’s	   attention	   on	   two	  
separate	  occasions	  in	  work	  commissioned	  by	  the	  Department	  for	  Culture,	  Media	  and	  
Sport.	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The	   Film	   Policy	   Review	   Panel,5	   stated	   that	   the	   BFI	   had	   failed	   to	  make	   headway	   in	  
getting	  the	  Broadcasters	   to	  do	  more	  to	  support	   the	   industry,	  going	  as	   far	  as	  saying	  
there	  had	  been,	  ‘no	  progress	  on	  the	  Film	  Policy	  Review	  recommendations	  concerning	  
Memoranda	   of	  Understanding	   between	   broadcasters	   and	   an	   investigation	   into	   the	  
UK	   film	   acquisition	   market	   (33)’	   going	   further	   to	   remind	   the	   government	   that	   ‘it	  
accepted	  and	  agreed	  these	  recommendations,	  and	  strongly	  urges	  the	  government	  to	  
prioritise	   their	   implementation	   as	   a	   key	   strategic	   component	   of	   an	   effective	   UK	  
national	  film	  policy’	  (2014:17).	  The	  Panel	  also	  considered	  the	  role	  of	  hard	  evidence	  in	  
policymaking	  in	  assessing	  the	  performance	  of	  public	  film	  bodies.	  In	  the	  Research	  and	  
Knowledge	  section,	  the	  BFI	  was	  reminded	  of	  its	  duty	  (to	  implement	  the	  Panel’s	  2012	  
recommendation)	  to	  establish	  a	  Research	  &	  Knowledge	  function,	  focused	  on	  creating	  
knowledge	  and	  an	  evidence-­‐base,	  as	  well	  as	  on	  the	  publication	  of	  statistics	  to	  create	  
an	   industrial	   policy	   for	   the	   independent	   UK	   industry.	   While	   the	   UK’s	   innovation	  
ecosystem	   is	  a	   complex,	  non-­‐linear	  process,	   future	   film	  policy	   support	  mechanisms	  
for	  research	  and	  development	  could	  recoginse	  business	  engagement	  in	  collaborative	  
activities,	   especially	   for	  entrepreneurial	   innovation.	   Further,	   a	  number	  of	  examples	  
of	  the	  urgent	  need	  for	  research	  to	  support	  a	  national	  film	  policy	   included,	  research	  
into	  the	  UK	  film	  acquisition	  market;	  the	  economic	  effect	  of	  VPFs	  as	  against	  traditional	  
print	   fees	   and	   access	   to	   and	   analysis	   of	   international	   VoD	   data.	   The	   Panel	   also	  
suggested	  that	  as	  BFI	  matures	   its	  role	  as	   lead	  agency	  for	  film	  in	  the	  UK,	   it	  needs	  to	  
find	   an	   optimum	   balance	   between	   providing	   strong	   industry	   leadership	   and	   truly	  
collaborative	   partnership	   working	   that	   allows	   partners	   the	   necessary	   licence	   to	  
deliver	  against	  their	  remit	  (2014:24).	  The	  suggestion	  through	  the	  review	  process	  was	  
that	   disquiet	   existed	   in	   the	   exhibition	   and	   education	   sector	   around	   the	   BFI’s	  
tendency	  to	  be	  somewhat	  over-­‐directive	  in	  its	  approach	  to	  partnership	  working.	  They	  
may	  have	  a	  case,	  especially	  given	  that	  it	  was	  only	  in	  late	  November	  2016	  that	  the	  BFI	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Following	  the	  closure	  of	  the	  UK	  Film	  Council,	  the	  Department	  for	  Culture,	  Media	  and	  Sport	  commissioned	  
two	   independent	   reports	   from	  The	  Film	  Panel	  chaired	  by	   the	   former	  Labour	  Government	  Minister,	  Chris,	  
now	  Lord	  Smith.	  First	  in	  2012	  came,	  A	  Future	  For	  British	  Film	  It	  begins	  with	  the	  audience...	  .	  And,	  in	  2014	  the	  
Panel	  published,	  It’s	  still	  about	  the	  audience:	  two	  years	  on	  from	  the	  Film	  Policy	  Review	  (2014).	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announced	  on	   its	  website6	   that	   it	   ‘has	   begun	   the	   search	   for	   a	   partner	   to	   deliver	   a	  
comprehensive	   research	   and	   statistics	   programme,	   providing	   quantitative	   and	  
qualitative	  analysis	  of	  film	  and	  supporting	  an	  ambitious	  programme.’	  
	  
This	  Chapter,	  combined	  with	  the	  papers,	  illustrates	  how	  the	  distinct	  characteristics	  of	  
digital	   technologies	   are	   implicit	   in	   an	   evolution	   from	   stable	   to	   fragile	   product	  
innovation	   and	   highlights	   the	   need	   for	   a	   dynamic	   approach	   to	   entrepreneurial	  
innovation	  within	  national	  innovation	  systems.	  The	  wider	  implications	  of	  the	  findings	  
build	  on	  the	  innovation	  literature	  in	  order	  to	  reassess	  the	  diffusion,	  adoption	  and	  use	  
of	   knowledge	   in	   the	   rollout	   of	   digital	   cinema	   technology.	   These	   findings	   suggest	   a	  
radically	   different	   reading	   of	   both	   disruptive	   innovations	   and	   national	   innovation	  
systems	  than	  has	  been	  offered	  in	  previous	  accounts,	  Chapter	  six	  sets	  out	  to	  respond	  
to	  the	  research	  questions	  raised	  in	  Chapter	  One.	  
	  
	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  http://www.bfi.org.uk/news-­‐opinion/news-­‐bfi/announcements/bfi-­‐boost-­‐uk-­‐film-­‐research-­‐new-­‐4m-­‐fund	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6	   Conclusions	  
 
	  
	  “Film	  matters.	  It	  matters	  because	  it	  is	  both	  a	  powerful	  engine	  of	  the	  creative	  economy,	  	  	  	  	  	  
and	  a	  form	  of	  cultural	  expression,	  which	  reaches	  huge	  audiences	  and	  influences	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
lives.	  Yet	  without	  a	  well-­‐structured	  set	  of	  interventions	  by	  Government,	  the	  	  
UK	  film	  sector	  cannot	  begin	  to	  realise	  its	  potential.	  The	  UK	  Film	  Council	  	  
was	  set	  up	  to	  provide	  a	  framework	  [for	  such]	  intervention[s].”	  
Woodward	  (2004)	  
6.1	  	  	   Introduction	  
When	   Mazzucato	   speaks	   of	   the	   Entrepreneurial	   State	   behind	   US	   entrepreneurial	  
audiovisual	   endeavours,	   I	   have	   sought	   to	   demonstrate	   the	   parallels	   that	   can	   be	  
drawn	   from	   the	   Norwegian	   approach	   to	   audiovisual	   innovations.	   However,	   apart	  
from	  a	  short	  period	  when	  the	  UK	  Film	  Council	  reoriented	  film	  to	  be	  closer	  to	  a	  wider	  
economic	  story,	  successive	  UK	  Governments	  have	  failed	  to	  create	  a	  strong	  narrative	  
around	   a	   national	   or	   regional	   innovation	   system.	   The	   current	   Government	   has	  
continued	  to	  back	  the	  scientific	  push	  model,	  despite	  the	  limitations	  identified	  in	  this	  
dissertation.	  With	  the	  Brexit	  result	  all	  regions	  of	  the	  UK	  will	  be	  forced	  develop	  a	  new	  
identity,	   free	   from	  the	  European	  Union,	   to	  compete	  globally.	   	  The	  conclusion	  to	  be	  
drawn	   is,	   for	   the	   UK	   to	   compete,	   it	   must	   develop	   what	  Mazzucato	   refers	   to	   as	   a	  
mission-­‐orientated,	  as	  opposed	  to	  a	  market	  failure	  framework.	  One	  that	  sits	  outside	  
the	   narrow	   finance-­‐driven	   approach	   and	   enables	   regions	   to	   become	   active	  
contributors	  to	  economic	  growth.	  However,	  as	  Berry	  (2016)	  argues,	  	  
…the	  Northern	  Powerhouse	  enables	  the	  current	  government	  to	  further	  demonstrate	  
its	  apparent	  understanding	  of	  popular	  concerns	  around	  ‘place’.	  Place,	  and	  associated	  
concerns	   around	   identity	   and	   belonging,	   has	   therefore	   become	   an	   important	  
dimension	  of	  numerous	  political	   and	  policy	  dilemmas.	   It	   is,	   however,	   impossible	   to	  
devolve	   powers	   that	   do	   not	   exist.	   Britain	   has	   no	  meaningful	   tradition	   of	   industrial	  
policy,	   as	   it	   would	   be	   understood	   in	   a	   continental	   context.	   Its	   leadership	   of	   the	  
industrial	  revolution	  meant	  it	  has	  never	  needed	  to	  develop	  tools	  by	  which	  to	  ‘catch	  
up’.	   Industrial	   policy	   powers	   should	   be	   devolved,	   so	   that	   northern	   city-­‐regions	   can	  
support	  existing	  industries	  and	  develop	  new	  ones	  –	  but	  the	  centre	  will	  have	  to	  take	  
the	  lead,	  in	  the	  first	  instance,	  in	  creating	  and	  fuelling	  adequately	  the	  means	  of	  doing	  
industrial	  policy	  within	  the	  British	  state	  at	  all	  levels.	  	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (Berry,	  2016)	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6.2	  	   From	  supply	  chain	  to	  value	  networks	  
What	  we	  can	  take	  from	  Berry	  is	  that	  context	  is	  crucial.	  Given	  the	  potential	  upheaval	  
in	  markets	  caused	  by	  Brexit	  and	  the	  US	  Presidential	  election	  leading	  to	  an	  immediate	  
shift	   towards	   nationalism	   in	   the	   US	   creates	   new	   contexts	   for	   policy-­‐makers	   and	  
practitioners.	   By	   comparing	   three	   countries	   diffusion	   and	   adoption	  patterns	   in	   this	  
dissertation,	   I	   have	   demonstrated	   how	   different	   contextual	   factors	   can	   and	   do,	  
influence	  the	  disruption	  process.	  Disruptions	  in	  markets	  can	  lead	  to	  development;	  it	  
is	   happening	   in	   the	   audiovisual	   market	   in	   the	   US	   due	   partly	   in	   response	   to	   the	  
conditions	  set	  by	  the	  US	  studios	   in	  the	  digital	  cinema	  rollout.	  The	  culture	  operating	  
within	   the	   US	   Film	   Industry	   did	   not	   encourage	   entrepreneurial	   innovation.	   	   The	  
disruption	   is	   taking	  place	   in	  parallel	   to	  the	  film	   industry,	  online	  and	  globally,	  across	  
platforms,	   led	  by	  Netflix	   and	  Amazon.	   Such	   trading	   companies	  have	  built	   financing	  
and	   audience-­‐driven	   knowledge	   systems	   that	   are	   highly	   effective	   and	   efficient	   and	  
are	  geared	   to	   support	   the	  development	  of	  disruptive	   ideas,	  globally.	  The	  economic	  
conditions	   and	   entrepreneurial	   culture	   explained	   the	   distinctive	   results	   between	  
incumbents	  and	  new	  entrants.	   Following	  Chesbrough	   (1999)	   these	   findings	   suggest	  
that	   success	   in	   disruptive	   innovation	   depends	   on	   the	   variation	   in	   some	   contextual	  
factors	   such	   as	   technology	   standards,	   entrepreneurial	   culture	   and	   economic	  
conditions	  of	  different	  firms	  following	  similar	  strategies.	  
The	   Digital	   Cinema	   Initiative’s	   primary	   purpose	   was	   to	   establish	   and	   document	  
voluntary	  specifications	  for	  an	  open	  architecture	  for	  digital	  cinema	  that	  would	  ensure	  
a	   uniform	   and	   high	   level	   of	   technical	   performance	   reliability	   and	   quality	   control	  
within	   a	   completely	   digitised	   supply	   chain.	   The	   conclusion	   drawn	   from	   this	  
dissertation	   follows	   Currah	   (2006)	   in	   that	   the	   US	   studios	   primary	   objective	  was	   to	  
prevent	  unauthorised	  redistribution	  of	  digital	  media,	  retain	  control	  of	  the	  channels	  of	  
distribution	  and	  thereby	  avoid	  an	  outcome	  similar	  to	  the	  music	  industry	  in	  which,	  “a	  
partial	   collapse	   of	   the	   oligopoly	   of	   reproduction	   may	   free	   us…..from	   the	  
industrialisation	   of	   music	   and	   encourage	   artists	   and	   listeners	   to	   (re)construct	   the	  
direct	   relationship	   upon	  which	  music	   has	   always	   thrived”	   (May,	   2007:1).	   A	   further	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conclusion	  was	  that	  shipping	  a	  series	  of	  bits	  and	  bytes	  around	  the	  world	   instead	  of	  
reels	  of	  35mm	  film	  would	  also	  lead	  to	  significant	  cost	  reductions.	  In	  the	  next	  section,	  I	  
demonstrate	   that	   these	   cost	   reductions	   did	   not	   find	   their	  way	   to	   the	   consumer	   in	  
reduced	   ticket	  prices	  and	  were	  most	   likely	  extracted	   from	  the	  audiovisual	   industry,	  
rather	  than	  developing	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  value	  network.	  As	  such,	  by	  2012,	  both	  film	  and	  
music	   supply	   chains	   had	   reached	   a	   tipping	   point.	   No	   longer	   dependent	   on	   atomic	  
matter,	   computer	   bits	   had	   finally	   replaced	   vinyl	   and	   celluloid,	   and	   the	   traditional	  
linear	  film	  industry	  value	  chain	  consisting	  of	  producer,	  distributor	  and	  exhibitor	  was	  
now	  an	  industry	  at	  a	  crossroads.	  This	  scenario	  was	  foresaw	  by	  Negroponte	  (1995)	  in	  
his	  book	  Being	  Digital,	  in	  which	  he	  predicted	  that	  all	  forms	  of	  information	  that	  were	  
made	  of	  atoms	  (i.e.	  DVDs	  and	  CDs)	  would	  eventually	  be	  made	  into	  bits;	  and	  it	  is	  here	  
–	   the	  outcome	  of	  a	  heady	  mix	  of	   cost	  extraction,	  value	  creation,	  piracy	  eradication	  
and	  technological	  breakthroughs	  –	  that	  the	  US	  studios	  failed	  to	  take	  a	  leading	  role	  in	  
the	   shift	   from	  producer-­‐led	   to	   consumer-­‐led	   value	   creation.	  Not	   only	   has	   this	   final	  
piece	  of	  digitalisation	  transformed	  the	  entire	  film	  value	  chain,	  but	  it	  has	  also	  shifted	  
the	  boundaries	   of	   the	   film	   sector	   and	   added	   additional	   layers	   of	   complexity	   to	   the	  
film	  network	  structure,	  within	   the	  context	  of	   the	  knowledge	  economy.	  As	  De	  Vinck	  
and	  Lindmark	  stated:	  	  
	  	  …digital	   technology	   in	   itself	   is	   not	   an	   independent	   influencing	   factor	   in	   this	  
equation.	   Rather,	   the	   digitisation	   of	   the	   film	   landscape	   is	   the	   story	   of	   interaction	  
between	  various	  elements	   including	   technological	   innovations,	   socio-­‐cultural	   sector	  
characteristics,	   economic-­‐industrial	   business	   considerations	   and	   the	   political-­‐
regulatory	  framework.	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  (2012:89)	  
In	  fact,	  such	  transformations	  consist	  of	  several	  parallel	  evolutions	  that	  are	  significant	  
to	   entrepreneurs,	   institutions	   and	   policymakers	   alike,	   the	   outcome	   of	   which	   can	  
impact	  on	  the	  national	  innovation	  system,	  especially	  in	  respect	  to	  a	  role	  the	  creative	  
content	  industries	  might	  play	  in	  an	  increasingly	  knowledge-­‐driven	  economy.	  
At	  the	  time	  of	  writing	  this	  chapter,	  and	  during	  the	  Screen	  Film	  Summit,	  Grater	  (2016)	  
reported	   that	   close	   to	   900	   films	  would	  be	  distributed	   theatrically	   in	  UK	   cinemas	   in	  
2016.	  This	   is	  a	  record	  figure,	  equating	  to	  an	  average	  of	  16	  films	  per	  week	  and	   is,	   in	  
part,	  a	  consequence	  of	  a	  financial	  innovation	  created	  under	  the	  Labour	  government	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in	   1997,	   in	   an	   attempt	   to	   stimulate	   investment	   in	   film	   productions.	   This	   in	   itself	  
turned	   out	   to	   be	   an	   example	   of	   the	   classic,	   scientific-­‐push	   logic	   to	   increasing	  
economic	   productivity.	   Tax	   breaks	   were	   provided	   (e.g.	   rebate	   orientated	   fiscal	  
incentives)	  to	  investors,	  in	  exchange	  for	  helping	  the	  industry	  to	  produce	  more	  films;	  
as	  production	  costs	  were	  reduced,	  so	  were	  the	  risks	  for	  financial	  investors.	  The	  other	  
driver	  was	   the	   digitization	   across	   all	   areas	   of	   film	   production	   and	   post-­‐production,	  
which	  accounted	  for	  a	  surge	  in	  micro-­‐budget	  feature	  films	  production	  (budget	  up	  to	  
£500,000)	   in	   the	   late	  2000s.	   	  This	  effectively	  peaked	   in	  2010	  when	  147	   low	  budget	  
films	  were	  produced	  or	  the	  equivalent	  of	  60	  per	  cent	  of	  all	  films	  produced	  in	  the	  UK	  
(BFI,	  2011:144).	   	  Despite	  an	   increase	   in	  worldwide	  gross	  box	  office	   takings,	   I	   assert	  
that	   notwithstanding	   the	   potential	   offered	   by	   digital	   cinema,	   the	   current	   business	  
model,	   which	   is	   supply	   chain	   driven	   has	   manufactured	   an	   indolent	   market	   with	   a	  
growing	   number	   of	   films	   produced	   and	   released	   that	   simply	   do	   not	   correlate	  with	  
demand	  from	  existing	  audiences.	  	  
There	  are	  country	  examples,	   such	  as	  Norway,	   that	  have	  developed	   their	  own	  value	  
network,	   with	   the	   advent	   of	   national	   institutional	   support,	   which	   has	   led	   to	   an	  
increase	  in	  cinema	  going.	  For	  example,	  in	  Norway	  GBO	  receipts	  increased	  by	  11.7	  per	  
cent	   in	   2016	   over	   the	   previous	   year	   (NOK	   1.375M),	  while	   admissions	   increased	   by	  
almost	  10	  per	  cent	  (up	  to	  13.1M,	  in	  2016).	  According	  to	  provisional	  data	  released	  by	  
UNIC	  (2017),	   in	  the	  UK	  the	  GBO	  figure	  was	  static,	  and	  admissions	  fell	  by	  just	  over	  2	  
per	  cent.	   	  Also,	  there	  are	  small	  clusters	  of	  entrepreneurial	   innovators	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  
beyond	  who,	   despite	   a	   lack	   of	   interest	   from	   national	   institutions	   represent	   one	   of	  
two	  growth	  areas,	  outside	  mainstream	  cinema	  (e.g.	  Event	  Cinema	  and	  national	  films).	  
The	  UK	  is	  now	  a	  global	  leader	  in	  event	  cinema,	  with	  35	  active	  distributors	  of	  content	  
and	   the	   only	   trade	   body	   for	   the	   industry,	   the	   Event	   Cinema	   Association	   (Cogavin,	  
2016).	  In	  2014	  event	  cinema	  was	  worth	  over	  £35	  million	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  accounted	  for	  
over	  3	  per	  cent	  of	  total	  box	  office	  sales.	  In	  2006,	  according	  to	  David	  Hancock	  (cinema	  
analyst	   at	   IHS	  Technology),	   the	  entire	  alternative	   content	   sector	  accounted	   for	   just	  
£200,000	  of	  the	  UK	  box	  office,	  whereas	  by	  2012	  this	  had	  grown	  to	  £12.5	  million.	  	  For	  
comparison,	  that	  is	  more	  that	  the	  UK	  film	  ranked	  9th	  at	  the	  UK	  box	  office	  -­‐	  The	  Iron	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Lady	   -­‐	   which	   earned	   £9.9	   million.	   Over	   the	   last	   3	   years,	   the	   compounded	   annual	  
growth	  rate	  (CAGR)	  of	  event	  cinema	  in	  the	  UK	  has	  been	  51	  per	  cent	  while	  film	  stands	  
at	  0.1	  per	  cent.	   In	  releasing	  the	  Event	  Cinema	  Report,	  Hancock	  (2016)	  stated,	   ‘Now	  
that	   the	   digital	   conversion	   has	   finished	   and	   the	   market	   understands	   what	   the	  
technology	  can	  do,	  IHS	  forecasts	  event	  cinema	  revenues	  globally	  will	  hit	  US$1	  billion	  
by	   2019..[it]..has	   an	   integral	   part	   to	   play	   in	   re-­‐defining	   the	   cinema	   experience,	  
assisted	  by	  new	  experience-­‐enhancing	  technologies’.	  	  
One	   final	   conclusion	   for	   this	   section	   is	   in	   findings	   on	   how	   alternative	   content	   can	  
impact	  on	  industrial	  organization,	  and	  may	  lead	  to	  a	  reorienting	  of	  exhibition	  within	  
the	  whole	  audiovisual	  value	  chain.	  This	  development	  addresses	  a	  gap	   in	  the	  service	  
innovation	   literature,	   which	   I	   have	   examined	   through	   this	   dissertation,	   fails	   to	  
adequately	   capture	   or	   explain	   the	   contribution	   of	   cinema	   to	   local	   cultural	   and	  
economic	  growth.	  Accordingly,	   through	   the	   statistical	   analysis	  of	   the	  European	   film	  
market,	   which	   has	   not,	   previously,	   been	   captured	   in	   the	   literature,	   I	   have	  
demonstrated	   the	   viability	   of	   a	   research	   focus	   on	   alternative	   content.	   This	  
dissertation	   can	  provide	   a	   springboard	   for	   further	  model	   building	  on	   the	   impact	  of	  
alternative	   content	   on	   industrial	   organization	   in	   the	   cinema	   market.	   I	   would	   also	  
contest	   that	   it	   will	   act	   as	   a	   companion	   following	   Barker	   (2012)	   whose	   analysis	   of	  
audience	  responses	  to	  a	  range	  of	  alternative	  content	  employs	  the	  term	  investment	  to	  
capture	  their	  effective	  engagement	  with	  a	  particular	  experience.	  	  
6.3	  	   The	  disruption	  of	  markets	  
At	  the	  European	   level,	   the	  digital	  cinema	  rollout	  has	  failed	  to	  deliver	  on	  product	  or	  
content	   availability	   to	   the	   audience.	   In	   fact,	   one	   can	   make	   a	   case	   that	   the	  
mainstream	   audience	   is	   entering	   a	   period	   of	   contraction	   regarding	   the	   offer	   (e.g.	  
growth	  of	  prequels,	  sequels	  and	  spin-­‐offs).	  Also,	  the	  promise	  of	  flexible	  programming	  
to	  a	  European	  audience	  has	  also	  failed	  to	  materialise.	  Anecdotally,	  one	  only	  need	  to	  
look	  at	  the	  latest	  schedule	  for	  a	  ‘tent-­‐pole’	  release	  to	  see	  that	  it	  is	  available	  at	  most	  
times	  of	  the	  day	  and	  evening,	   in	  2D	  or	  3D	  format,	   for	  at	   least	  the	  next	  seven	  days.	  
About	  the	  disruptive	   impact	  of	  digital	  cinema,	   it	  was	  evident	  that	  certain	   indicators	  
	   131	  
exhibited	   a	   clear	   relationship	   with	   the	   Adopter	   clustering	   (following	   Rogers)	   after	  
launch.	  Such	   findings	   indicate	   that	  certain	  characteristics	  within	   the	  cinema	  market	  
have	  favoured	  the	  digital	  rollout.	  These	  pro-­‐digital	  characteristics	  are	  the	  Screens	  per	  
Site	   rate,	   the	   Admission	   per	   Person	   rate,	   the	   GBO	   per	   Screen	   and	   the	   Exhibitor	  
concentration.	  Consistently,	  the	  digital	  conversation	  accelerated	  at	  the	  highest	  level	  
in	  those	  countries	  that	  possessed	  the	  greatest	  number	  of	  Screens	  per	  Site;	  those	  that	  
had	   the	   highest	   number	   of	   admission	   per	   Person	   and	   the	   largest	  Gross	   Box	  Office	  
(GBO)	   returns	   per	   Screen.	   These	   indicators	   represent	   demand	   and	   business	  
profitability	   of	   the	   cinema	  market(s),	   respectively;	   and,	   certainly	   suggests	   that	   the	  
closer	   the	   country	   resembles	   an	   oligopolistic	   market,	   the	   easier	   the	   diffusion	   and	  
adoption.	  	  	  
However,	  not	  only	  have	  two	  of	  the	  major	  delivery	  outcomes	  of	  digital	  cinema	  failed	  
to	  materialise,	  certain	  negative	  behaviours	  among	  Adopter	  clusters	  were	  found	  to	  be	  
attributable	   during	   the	   diffusion	   process.	   These	   differences	   are	   most	   apparent	  
between	   the	   majority	   groups:	   the	   Early	   Majority	   and	   the	   Late	   Majority	   markets.	  
Those	  countries	  that	  did	  not	  adopt	  the	  technology	  during	  the	  early	  phase	  suffered	  a	  
decline	   in	   Screen	   Density	   and	   Admissions	   per	   Person	   rates,	   together	   with	   overall	  
reductions	   in	   the	   gross	   number	   of	   Admissions,	   Screens,	   and	   Sites.	   This	   downward	  
trend	   continued	   even	   after	   the	   Late	   Majority	   cluster	   joined	   the	   digital	   process	  
between	   2011	   and	   2013.	   The	   Early	   Majority	   countries	   took	   full	   advantage	   of	   the	  
digitization	  process,	  underpinned	  by	  the	  (short-­‐term)	  3D	  phenomenon,	  and	  enjoyed	  
the	  greatest	  improvements	  in	  Admission	  per	  Person	  and	  GBO	  per	  Screen	  rates.	  These	  
conclusions	   draw	   parallels	   with	   the	   Double	   Jeopardy	   principle	   developed	   by	  
Ehrenberg	   (1959;	   1966;	   1990).	   This	   principle	  holds	   that	   the	   smaller	   the	  brand	   is	   in	  
market-­‐share,	   the	  greater	   it	   suffers	   from	   the	  additional	   indignity	  of	  possessing	   less	  
customer	  loyalty.	  	  Ehrenberg	  argued	  that	  repeat	  business	  is	  essentially,	  a	  function	  of	  
how	  popular	  the	  brand	  is	  with	  consumers.	  One	  comparable	  conclusion	  to	  draw	  is	  the	  
mission	  (concentration	  strategy)	   followed	  by	  the	  US	  studios	  and	  the	   largest	  cinema	  
chains,	  is	  to	  increase	  market	  penetration	  at	  all	  costs.	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Contrary	  to	  expectations,	  certain	  indicators	  were	  unaffected	  by	  the	  digital	  rollout,	  at	  
aggregate	  and	  by	  Adopter	  group	  level.	  It	  was	  suggested	  that	  as	  digitization	  would	  pull	  
closer	   together	   the	  studio	  and	  audience,	  one	  outcome	  could	   lead	  to	  a	   reduction	   in	  
the	  number	  of	  film	  distributors.	  However,	  concentration	  among	  distributors	  remains	  
stable	  based	  on	  the	  latest	  data	  (2013).	  Such	  an	  outcome	  could	  be	  due	  to	  a	  period	  of	  
hysteresis	  –	  a	  delayed	  response	  to	  the	  process	  change	  –	  where	  new	  business	  models	  
are	   delayed	   by	   the	   very	   success	   of	   the	   old,	   thus	   making	   purchasing	   changeover	  
neither	  easy	  nor	  smooth.	  The	  other	  main	  indicator	  that	  demonstrated	  no	  change	  in	  
the	  market	  is	  the	  Cinema	  Ticket	  at	  constant	  price,	  which	  remained	  stable	  at	  €5.30	  –	  
5.60.	  The	  main	  conclusion	  to	  be	  drawn	  is	  while	  significant	  costs	  were	  extracted	  from	  
production	  and	  distribution	  no	  price	  reductions	  were	  passed	  on	  to	  the	  market	  place,	  
during	  this	  period	  under	  investigation.	  	  
Finally	  in	  this	  section,	  despite	  the	  opportunity	  to	  increase	  the	  range	  and	  diversity	  of	  
film	   on	   offer,	   no	   changes	   in	   film	  market	   share	   of	   films	   exhibited	   could	   be	   found.	  
Digital	   cinema	  has	   had	  no	   effect	   on	  Non-­‐National	   and	   the	  Rest	   of	  World	   shares	   in	  
mainstream	  cinemas.	  In	  fact,	  the	  gap	  between	  total	  European	  film	  and	  US	  Film	  Share	  
has	  widened	  slightly,	  since	  the	  Early	  Majority	  Cluster	  phase	   in	  2008.	  The	  success	  of	  
3D	  during	  2009	  and	  2010	  was	  a	  contributory	  factor	  here	  as	  almost	  all	  3D	  films	  were	  
US	   funded	  productions.	  However,	   the	  main	  conclusion	   to	  draw	   is	   the	  gap	  was	   first	  
maintained,	   and	   then	   grown	  by	   the	  deals	   involved	   in	   the	   Integrator-­‐VPF	   contracts,	  
which	   have	   now	   ceased.	   Unfortunately,	   access	   to	   the	   actual	   wording	   in	   those	  
contracts	  have	  been	  at	  best,	  anecdotal,	  so	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  know	  the	  exact	  lengths	  of	  
the	  operating	  agreements;	  consequently	  we	  do	  not	  know	  when	  the	  film	  industry	  will	  
be	  a	  VPF-­‐free	  market.	  	  
All	  of	  the	  above,	  suggests	  that	  the	  answer	  to	  the	  research	  questioned	  posed,	  ‘can	  a	  
high-­‐tech	  breakthrough	  approach	  deliver	  novel	  supply	  and	  demand	  solutions,’	   is,	   in	  
the	   case	   of	   the	   digital	   cinema	   rollout,	   no,	   certainly	   not	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   behaviour	  
within	   the	   film	   market.	   The	   US	   Studios,	   through	   the	   introduction	   of	   the	   DCI	  
specification	   and	   the	   inherent	   restrictions	   of	   the	   VPF	   financing	   model,	   have	  
counteracted	   the	   disruptive	   effects	   of	   the	   digital	   cinema.	   Although	   the	   ten	   years	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taken	   to	   complete	   the	   rollout	   of	   sustaining	   innovation	   has	   produced	   unintended	  
consequences,	   which	   are	   usually	   measured	   across	   three	   criteria:	   positive	   effects,	  
potential	   problems	   that	  may	   result	   in	   a	   reduction	   of	   quality,	   and	   negative	   effects.	  	  
Maintaining	   quality	   was	   delivered	   via	   the	   threat	   of	   DCI	   non-­‐compliance	   (e.g.	   US	  
studios	  would	  withhold	  films	  from	  cinemas	  who	  did	  not	  own	  and	  operate	  using	  DCI	  
V1.0	  equipment).	  However,	  only	  14	  of	  the	  34	  specifications	  are	  in	  use	  in	  the	  market	  
today,	   and	   the	   VPF	   model	   has	   now	   ended.	   As	   with	   all	   oligopolistic	   behaviour,	  
incumbents	   keep	   quality	   thresholds	   high	   as	   a	   device	   to	   keep	   out	   new	   entrants.	  	  
Maintenance	   of	   and	   compliance	   with	   the	   DCI	   standards	   will	   only	   be	   feasible	   if	  
membership	   of	   the	   DCI	   itself	   is	   open	   to	   representatives	   from	   stakeholders.	   As	   of	  
today,	   membership	   remains	   open	   to	   the	   US	   studios	   only,	   which	   appears	   to	   look	  
remarkably	  like	  a	  ‘closed	  shop’.	   If	  entrepreneurial	   innovators,	  such	  as	  China’s	  Wang	  
Jianlin,	  the	  former	  Red	  Army	  soldier	  who	  built	  the	  Dalian	  Wanda	  entertainment	  and	  
real	  estate	  empire,	  continues	  to	  grow	  his	  cinema	  chain	  it	  will	  be	  difficult	  for	  the	  US	  
studios	   to	  maintain	   their	   position.	   	  Wanda	   currently	   controls	   AMC	   (US	   chain	   with	  
5048	   screens);	  Hoyts	   (Australian	   chain	  with	  450	   screens);	   and,	   the	  Odeon	  group	   in	  
the	  UK	   (2202	  screens)	  among	  others;	   this	   is	   in	  addition	   to	  being	   the	   largest	   screen	  
operator	  in	  China	  as	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  Figure	  6.1	  and	  follows	  the	  2016	  purchase	  of	  Los	  
Angeles	  production	  firm	  Legendary	  Entertainment.	  
Fig.	  6.1:	  Wanda	  cinema	  group	  timeline	  (Dec	  2016)	  
	   	  
Cinema	   Country	   Founded	  
Year	  
Purchased	  
Cinemas	   Screens	  
Wanda	   China	   2000	  
	  
311	   2700	  
AMC	   US	   1926	   2012	   346	   5048	  
Hoyts	   Australia	   1926	   2015	   50	   450	  
Carmike	   US	   1982	   2016	   271	   2917	  
Odeon	  &	  
UCI	   UK	  
1828	  &	  
1989	   2016	   244	   2202	  
	   	   	   	  
1222	   13317	  
Source:	  Various	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Assuming	  Wanda’s	  present	  trajectory	  continues,	  one	  possible	  conclusion	  will	  be	  that	  
it	  extends	  the	  content	  channel	  with	  strong	  box-­‐office	  potential,	  which	  may	  lead	  to	  it	  
reorienting	   itself	   as	   an	   independent	   producer,	   much	   the	   same	   way	   as	   Netflix	   is	  
seeking	  to	  do	  (e.g.	  The	  Crown	  and	  Beasts	  of	  Burden).	  Both	  firms	  have	  recognised	  the	  
value	  of	  market	  (audience	  preference)	  data;	  they	  are,	  unlike	  their	  counterparts	  in	  US	  
Studios,	  aggressive	  data	  aggregators	  and	  can	  deliver	  content	   to	   local	  markets	   in	  an	  
effective	  and	  at	  a	  relatively	   low	  cost	  across	  a	  number	  of	  platforms	  (e.g.	  the	  cinema	  
and	  Over	  The	  Top	  [OTT]	  services).	  	  
In	   the	   course	  of	   this	  dissertation,	   I	  would	  argue	   that	  Goldman’s	  maxim	  of	   ‘nobody	  
knows	   anything’	   can	   be	   refuted.	   The	   existence	   of	   the	   data	   aggregators	   operating	  
within	   audiovisual	   industries	   from	   entrepreneurial	   firms	   such	   as	   Netflix	   and	   Hula	  
providing	  sales	  estimates	  for	  film	  projects,	  and	  the	  statistical	  modeling	  skills	  of	  their	  
internal	   analysts	   who	   can	   predict	   the	   returns	   on	   investment	   by	   title	   means	   they	  
really	  do	  know	  where	  you	  live.	  In	  such	  a	  highly	  networked	  market,	  both	  firms	  will	  be	  
able	  to	  produce	  content	  for	  local	  markets	  by	  working	  with	  creative	  talent	  and	  below	  
the	   line	   freelance	   specialists	   to	   further	   extract	   production	   costs	   and	   ultimately	  
displace	  the	  US	  studio	  system	  as	  global	  system	  integrators.	  
Given	   the	   situation	   in	  Norway,	   digital	   cinema	  does	   appear	   to	   have	   favoured	   those	  
agents	   who	   did	   not	   operate	   alone	   under	   a	   VPF	   environment.	   As	   of	   2013,	   the	  
conclusion	   can	   be	   explained	   through	   the	   unique,	   in-­‐country	   situation	  whereby	   the	  
long-­‐term	   presence	   of	   public	   institution	   activity	   enabled	   a	   diffusion	   and	   adoption	  
process	   to	   take	  place	   in	  a	   shorter	  period	  and	  with	   less	  negative	  effects	   than	  many	  
other	   countries.	   Certainly,	   the	   conclusion	   drawn	   from	   analogue	   to	   digital	   cinemas	  
advertising	  conversion	  (24-­‐hour	  switchover)	  must	  be	  likened	  to	  the	  gales	  of	  creative	  
destruction;	   every	   cinema	   benefited,	   which	   meant	   the	   diffusion	   and	   adoption	  
strategy	   followed	   for	   the	   digital	   cinema	   conversion	   suffered	   no	   evidence	   of	  
hysteresis	  and	  enabled	  the	  country	  to	  retain	  its	  position	  as	  the	  ‘best	  cinema	  system	  
in	  the	  world’.	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For	  a	  period	  (2005-­‐2009)	  the	  UK	  Film	  Council	  appeared	  to	  have	  created	  a	  team	  that	  
was	   capable	   of	   delivering	   similar	   successes	   to	   that	   of	   Norway.	   A	   considerable	  
achievement	   given	   the	   different	   economic	   scales	   between	   the	   two	   countries.	   The	  
conclusion	  drawn	  from	  this	  dissertation	  is	  that	  UK	  politics	  has	  impeded,	  as	  opposed	  
to	   intervened,	   by	   maintaining	   the	   focus	   on	   a	   scientific-­‐push	   world	   of	   innovation,	  
which	   has	   allowed	   a	   narrative	   to	   exist	   whereby	   innovation	   is	   the	   sole	   preserve	   of	  
new-­‐to-­‐market	  products	  or	  services.	   In	  essence,	  this	  has	   led	  to	  a	  situation	  whereby	  
the	   UK	   has	   been	   slower	   than	   its	   competitors	   to	   adopt	   and	   deploy	   existing	  
technologies,	   ignoring	   the	   opportunity	   for	   entrepreneurial	   bricolage:	   for	   example,	  
the	  UK	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  recognize	  the	  wider	  benefits	  of	  independent	  cinema	  and	  
the	  high	  growth	  potential	  of	  events	  cinema	   in	   the	  way	  that	  certain	  other	  countries	  
do,	   in	   the	   European	   Union.	   Promoting	   broader	   deployment	   of	   technologies,	  
especially	  those	  that	  enable	  smaller	  firms	  to	  build	  local	  consumer	  data	  would	  help	  to	  
counter	   inequalities	   in	   competitiveness	   by	   raising	   productivity	   levels	   among	   less	  
productive	  UK	   firms	   (Love	  &	  Roper,	  2015).	   Innovation	   remains	  a	   two-­‐edged	  sword.	  
And,	   in	  a	   recent	  piece	   for	   the	  Enterprise	  Research	  Centre,	  Roper	   (2017)	  spoke	   that	  
while	   innovation	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  drive	  growth	  and	  productivity,	   it	  can	  also	  fuel	  
inequality.	  	  
If	   the	   recent	   Green	   Paper	   on	   Industrial	   Growth,	   embraces	  what	   Zehavi	   &	   Breznitz	  
(2017)	  refer	  to	  as,	   ‘Distribution	  sensitive	   innovation	  policies	  (DISP)	  then	  established	  
government	   interest	   in	   innovation	   (e.g.	   R&D	   investment	   leading	   to	   patentable	  
knowledge	  outputs;	   regulatory	   frameworks	   for	  competition)	  may	  be	  encouraged	  to	  
shift	   attention	   towards	   new	   geographies	   and	   emergent	   networks	   of	   creative	  
producers	  and	  consumers.	  
6.4	  	   The	  disruption	  of	  learning	  
It	   has	   long	   been	   held	   that	   policymakers	   require	   an	   understanding	   of	   innovation	  
systems	   to	  help	   identify	   leverage	  points	   for	  enhancing	   innovative	  performance	  and	  
overall	   competitiveness.	   Such	   appreciation	   helps	   direct	   their	   attention	   to	   possible	  
systemic	  failures	  that	  can	  accompany	  the	  more	  generally	  recognised	  market	  failures	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in	   the	   development	   of	   technology	   (OECD,	   1999).	   However,	   Schumpeter	   cautioned	  
that	  neoclassic	  economics	  methods	  on	  which	  such	  learnings	  were	  based	  (e.g.	  treated	  
technical	   change	   as	   an	   exogenous	   process)	   and	   accepted	   by	  market	   failure	   theory	  
was	  insufficient	  to	  explain	  the	  real	  development	  of	  the	  economy	  (Schumpeter,	  1912).	  
From	   the	   work	   of	   Rosenberg,	   Dosi,	   Nelson	   and	   Winter	   in	   the	   1980s,	   through	   to	  
Mazzucato	   in	   2013,	   evolutionary	   economists	   sought	   to	   view	   the	   black	   box	   of	  
technical	   change	   (following	   Schumpeter)	   through	   a	   different	   lens,	   one	   based	   on	  
historical	   analysis	   and	   empirical	   evidence,	   in	   order	   to	   understand	   the	   process	   that	  
links	   technical	   change	   (innovation),	   economic	   growth	   and	   development.	   By	  
embracing	   such	   notions	   as	   technological	   paradigms	   and	   technological	   trajectories,	  
evolutionary	  economists	  have	  shown	  the	  inadequacies	  of	  market	  forces	  in	  providing	  
a	   path	   to	   economic	   development.	   Technology	   development	   is	   a	   problem-­‐solving	  
activity,	   and	   a	   technological	   paradigm	   embodies	   strong	   prescriptions	   on	   the	  
directions	   of	   technical	   change	   (Dosi,	   1982:152).	   In	   turn,	   technological	   trajectory	  
represents	  the	  direction	  of	  progress	  within	  a	  technological	  paradigm,	  which	   is	  why,	  
according	   to	   Mazzucato	   (2015),	   market	   signals	   are	   limited	   in	   terms	   of	   providing	  
direction	   to	   techno-­‐economic	   development.	   	   Such	   signals	   only	   work	   within	   the	  
parameters	   of	   the	   paradigm	   and	   thus	   influence	   more	   the	   rate	   of	   change	   than	   its	  
direction	  (2015:14).	  This	   issue	  becomes	  problematic	  when	  a	  Government	   is	  seeking	  
to	   change	   the	   trajectory;	   or	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   recent	   Green	   Paper	   on	   Industrial	  
Growth,	   the	   paradigm	   itself,	   the	   first	   step	   to	   developing	   a	   national	   innovation	  
system.	  
The	   generally	   agreed	   definition	   for	   national	   innovation	   systems	   is,	   “the	   set	   of	  
organizations,	  institutions,	  and	  linkages	  for	  the	  generation,	  diffusion,	  and	  application	  
of	  scientific	  and	  technological	  knowledge	  operating	   in	  a	  specific	  country”	   (Galli	  and	  
Teubal,	   1997:345)	   and	   they	   involve	   the	   creation,	   diffusion	   and	   adoption	   of	  
knowledge.	   However,	   a	   lack	   of	   interaction	   between	   the	   actors	   in	   the	   system,	  
mismatches	  between	  basic	  research	  in	  the	  public	  sector	  and	  more	  applied	  research	  
in	   industry,	  malfunctioning	  of	   technology	   transfer	   institutions,	  and	   information	  and	  
absorptive	   deficiencies	   on	   the	   part	   of	   industry	   may	   all	   limit	   innovation	   and	   the	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diffusion	  of	  knowledge.	  In	  search	  of	  improved	  interactions,	  governments	  can	  provide	  
the	   foundations	   for	  effective	  partnering	  among	   the	  elements	   in	   the	   system.	  At	   the	  
heart	  of	  the	  NIS	  concept	  lies	  “the	  needs	  of	  policy	  makers	  and	  students	  of	  innovation”	  
(Lundvall,	   2002:215),	   which	   echoes	   an	   evolutionary	   development	   encompassing	  
reflection	   on	   economic	   theory.	   Since	   the	   1950s,	   “a	   linear	   model	   of	   science	   and	  
technology	   ‘push’	   was	   often	   dominant	   in	   the	   new	   science	   councils	   that	   advised	  
governments.	  It	  seemed	  so	  obvious	  that	  the	  Atom	  Bomb	  was	  the	  outcome	  of	  a	  chain	  
reaction:	   basic	   physics	   =>	   large-­‐scale	   development	   in	   big	   labs	   =>	   applications	   and	  
innovations	   (whether	   military	   or	   civil)”	   (Freeman,	   1995:9).	   Despite	   the	   approach	  
being	   reinforced	   through	   innumerable	   policy	   initiatives	   across	   the	   years,	   I	   have	  
demonstrated	   it	   is	   incapable	   of	   accounting	   for	   differential	   rates	   of	   technological	  
innovation	  and	  economic	  development	  experienced	  by	  industrialised	  countries	  (Dosi,	  
1982;	   Feinson,	   2003;	   Mazzucato,	   2013).	   Also,	   Freeman	   argued,	   “…evidence	  
accumulated	   that	   the	   rate	   of	   technical	   change	   and	   of	   economic	   growth	   depended	  
more	  on	  efficient	  diffusion	  than	  on	  being	  first	   in	  the	  world	  with	  radical	   innovations	  
and	  as	  much	  on	  social	  innovations	  as	  on	  technical	  innovations”	  (op.cit.:10).	  Lundvall	  
ventured	  that	  interest	  in	  NIS	  grew	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  “mainstream	  macroeconomic	  
theory	   and	   policy…	   failed	   to	   deliver	   an	   understanding	   and	   control	   of	   the	   factors	  
behind	   international	   competitiveness	   and	   economic	   development”	   (2002:214).	  
Implicit	  in	  this	  thinking	  was	  a	  need	  for	  domestic	  policymakers	  to	  focus	  their	  attention	  
on	   emerging	   entrepreneurial	   innovations,	   the	   utilisation	   of	   current	   knowledge	   and	  
strategies	   for	   novel	   solutions	   to	   strengthen	   their	   respective	   national	   innovation	  
systems.	  
In	  maintaining	  the	  currency	  of	   its	  creative	   infrastructure	   inside	  a	  highly	  competitive	  
commercial	  market,	  Norway	  has	  managed	  to	  embrace	  entrepreneurial	  innovation	  at	  
all	   levels	   in	   the	  audiovisual	   industries.	  The	  most	  successful	  Norwegian	   films	  and	  TV	  
programme	   are	   increasingly	   recognised	   at	   the	   international	   level.	   As	   a	   result,	   they	  
contribute	   to	   the	   cultural	   heritage	  of	   the	   country	   and	   region.	  Also,	   it	   is	   difficult	   to	  
imagine	  that	  without	  the	  continued	  -­‐	  and	  some	  would	  argue	  unique	  -­‐	  involvement	  of	  
national	  and	  local	  public	  support	  has	  worked	  against	  the	  more	  laissez-­‐faire	  policies	  in	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Scandinavia	  and	  the	  wider	  European	  market.	  The	  Norwegian	  case	  does	  demonstrate	  
the	   potential	   for	   interventionism	   at	   Government	   level	   to	   catalyse	   investment	   and	  
encourage	   greater	   private	   entrepreneurial	   innovation	   to	   bring	   about	   technological	  
and	   institutional	   change.	  While	   stakeholder	   conflict	  did	  provide	  a	   certain	  balancing	  
act	   in	   this	   case,	   the	   learning	  built	   from	   the	   knowledge	   sources	   shortened	   levels	   of	  
hysteresis	   to	   reflect	   constituent	  1	  of	  my	  Conceptual	   Framework,	  which	  purports,	   a	  
state	  of	  entrepreneurial	  innovation	  whereby	  a	  sector	  is	  able	  to	  take	  on	  new	  paths	  of	  
development	   or	   several	   paths	   at	   once	   without	   recourse	   to	   breakthrough	  
technologies.	   It	   is	   resilient	   to	   change	   from	   outside	   and	   allows	   strong	   co-­‐evolution	  
between	  technological	  development	  and	  supportive	  institutions.	  	  
The	  Norwegian	  national	  innovation	  system	  acknowledges	  that	  the	  creative	  industries	  
can	  deliver	  novel	  and	  supply	  and	  demand	  solutions	  to	  support	  economic	  growth.	  As	  a	  
result,	   I	   see	   this	   dissertation	   as	   contributing	   to	   our	   understanding	   of	   the	   need	   for	  
enhanced	   levels	  of	   interaction	  between	   institutions	   to	   facilitate	  new	   trajectories	   in	  
industries,	  which	  are	  characterised	  by	  a	  high	  demand	  uncertainty,	  and	  a	  dependency	  
on	  entrepreneurial	  innovation.	  
I	   would	   also	   wish	   to	   point	   out	   this	   dissertation’s	   contribution	   to	   the	   empirical	  
literature	   on	   the	   film	   and	   audiovisual	   industry	   itself.	   Here	   I	   want	   to	   highlight	   in	  
particular	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  study,	  which	  has	  attempted	  to	  combine	  its	  own	  findings	  
and	  that	  of	  previous	  research	  to	  describe	  developments	  that	  impact	  on	  the	  cultural	  
and	  commercial	  exhibition	  system	  of	  a)	  the	  film	  industry	  and	  b)	  national	   innovation	  
systems,	  which	  has	  not	  previously	  been	  captured	  academically	  in	  such	  a	  way.	  
6.5	   Chapter	  summary	  
In	  this	  chapter	  I	  have	  sought	  to	  explain	  the	  primary	  objective,	  which	  is	  to	  perform	  a	  
reflexive	  and	  future	  scenario	  analysis	  of	  what	  digitalization	  means	  for	  the	  distribution	  
and	   consumption	   of	   film	   and	   audiovisual,	   taking	   up	   a	   three-­‐fold	   assessment	  
consisting	   of	   disruptive	   technologies,	   entrepreneurial	   innovation,	   and	   national	  
innovation	  systems.	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This	   chapter	   has	   considered	   the	   limitations	   of	   the	   market	   failure	   framework	   that	  
continues	   to	   guide	   innovation	   policy.	   It	   has	   argued	   that	   putting	   innovation	   at	   the	  
centre	  of	  growth	  policy	  requires	  an	  emphasis	  on	  shaping	  and	  creating	  markets	  rather	  
than	  just	  fixing	  them.	  Market	  failure	  theory	  says	  little	  about	  cases	  in	  which	  the	  state	  
is	   the	   lead	   investor	  and	   risk	   taker	   in	   capitalist	  economies.	  Having	  a	  vision	  of	  which	  
way	  to	  drive	  an	  economy	  requires	  direct	  and	  indirect	  investment	  in	  particular	  areas,	  
not	  just	  creating	  the	  conditions	  for	  change.	  Crucial	  choices	  must	  be	  made,	  the	  fruits	  
of	  which	  will	  create	  some	  winners,	  but	  also	  many	  losers	  (Mazaccuti,	  2013).	  
Given	  the	  Brexit	  vote	  was	  soon	  followed	  by	  the	  US	  electorate	  deciding	  that	  Donald	  
Trump	   would	   make	   America	   ‘great	   again’,	   perhaps	   it	   is	   worth	   reflecting	   on	   the	  
following	  quote	  to	  finish.	  
In	  June	  2016,	  Russian	  Minister	  of	  Culture	  Vladimir	  Medinsky	  asserted	  that	  Netflix	   is	  
part	  of	  the	  US	  government	  plot	  to	  influence	  the	  world	  culture,	  "to	  enter	  every	  home,	  
get	  into	  every	  television,	  and	  through	  that	  television,	  into	  the	  head	  of	  every	  person	  
on	   earth".	   This	   was	   part	   of	   his	   argument	   for	   the	   increase	   of	   funding	   for	   Russian	  
cinema,	  to	  pitch	  it	  against	  the	  dominance	  of	  Hollywood	  (Parfitt,	  2016).	  
6.6	   Limitations	  and	  future	  research	  
A	  limitation	  of	  the	  research	  has	  been	  timing	  in	  regard	  to	  political	  changes	  that	  have	  
taken	   place	   recently	   in	   each	   of	   the	   three	   countries	   examined.	   As	   policy	   at	  
supranational,	  international	  and	  national	  levels	  continues	  to	  evolve	  (post-­‐Brexit	  and	  
with	  a	  new	  US	  President	   in	  place)	   future	   research	  should	  be	  undertaken	  at	   regular	  
intervals	   to	   assess	   these	   changes	   in	   light	   of	   the	   impact	   they	   will	   have	   on	   the	  
audiovisual	  landscape.	  
A	   further	   limitation	  of	   the	  present	   study	  comes	   from	  the	   lack	  of	  data	  on	  screening	  
alternative	  content,	  which	  makes	  it	  difficult	  to	  assess	  the	  expected	  diversification	  of	  
programming	  and	  wide	  screening	  of	  alternative	  content	  brought	  about	  by	  the	  digital	  
cinema	  rollout	  across	  the	  European	  market.	  At	  country	  level,	  one	  study	  on	  the	  Dutch	  
market,	  100	  per	  cent	  digitalization	  since	  2012,	  found	  that	  the	  digitisation	  of	  cinemas	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leads	   to	   wider	   choice	   of	   content	   for	   the	   audience	   (Netherlands	   Film	   Research	  
Foundation,	  2014).	  	  
A	  final	  limitation	  revolves	  around	  the	  countries	  examined	  and	  whether	  they	  provided	  
a	  global	   insight	   to	   the	   film	  and	  audiovisual	   industries.	  The	  original	   intention	  was	  to	  
incorporate	   either	   China	   and/or	   India,	   as	   they	   represented	   regions	   that	   were	   not	  
likely	  to	  fall	  into	  line	  with	  the	  US	  studios	  directives	  around	  DCI	  standards.	  However,	  
given	  the	  resources	  available	  (in	  human	  and	  financial	  terms)	  that	  strand	  of	  work	  was	  
not	  maintained	  and	  subsequently	  fell	  away	  during	  the	  early	  stages	  of	  the	  fieldwork.	  
Finally,	   this	   dissertation	   has	   suggested	   certain	   gaps	   in	   the	   literature	   and	   raised	   a	  
number	   of	   ideas	   and	   questions	   for	   further	   research	   projects,	   which	   are	   briefly	  
outlined	  below:	  
First,	   conclusions	   suggest	   further	   changes	   to	   the	   industry	   structure	   of	   the	   industry	  
and	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  platforms	  will	  impose	  constraints	  on	  the	  strategic	  behaviour	  of	  the	  
studios	   in	   this	  new	  borderless	  environment.	   Through	   the	  use	  of	   the	  DCI	   and	  DRM,	  
the	  US	  studios	  sought	  to	  build	  a	  walled	  garden	  of	  innovation,	  which,	  can	  be	  regulated	  
in	  a	  way	  that	  displaces	  rather	  than	  nurtures	  disruptive	  technologies.	  Now	  the	  digital	  
conversion	   is	  95	  per	  cent	  complete	  we	  are	   in	  a	  position	  to	  test	  whether,	   (following	  
Curragh,	  2006)	  the	  results	  will	  lead	  to	  a	  bifurcation	  of	  the	  networked	  environment.	  
Second,	   most	   incentive	   schemes	   are	   production	   focused,	   thereby	   reducing	  
production	   costs	   and	   the	   risk	   for	   financiers.	   It	   would	   be	   interesting	   to	   explore	   a	  
scheme	   that	   rewarded	  producers	   to	  a)	   take	  a	  greater	   share	  of	   revenues	  generated	  
from	  a	  successful	   film	  and	  audiovisual	  project	  and	  b)	  reinvest	  profits	   in	  subsequent	  
projects	  via	  a	  randomized	  control	  test	  (RCT).	  
Third,	  courtesy	  of	  his	  speech	  delivered	  to	  BBC	  staff	  by	  its	  Director-­‐General,	  Tony	  Hall	  
(January	   2017),	   an	   opportunity	   exists	   to	   test	   the	   integrity	   of	   C.	   P.	   Snow’s	   ‘two	  
cultures’	  missive.	  	  This	  term	  has	  stood	  almost	  unopposed,	  in	  the	  corridors	  of	  power,	  
since	  the	  1950s.	  A	  term	  Cunningham	  claims	  has,	  allowed	  modern	  science	  to	  become	  
so	   closely	   associated	  with,	   and	   regarded	   as	   the	  wellspring	   of,	   the	   advancement	   of	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knowledge	   and	   technological	   progress	   so	   that	   the	   concept	   of	   innovation	   has	   been	  
virtually	   soldered	   to	   science	   (2014:3-­‐4).	   In	   his	   speech,	   Lord	   (Tony)	   Hall	   effectively	  
provided	   five	   research	  projects	   that	  could	  be	  developed	   from	  this	  dissertation	   (See	  
Appendix	   5	   for	   full	   transcript	   of	   the	   speech).	   I	   have	   reworked	   certain	   parts	   of	   his	  
speech	  to	  act	  as	  companions,	  or	  case-­‐studies,	  building	  on	  my	  own	  findings	  for	  future	  
research:	  
From	  Supply	  Chains	  to	  Value	  Networks	  
1.	   Hall	  wants	   the	   BBC	   to	   reinvent	   public	   service	   broadcasting	   for	   a	   new	   generation,	   so	  
that	  it	  works	  for	  all	  audiences,	  so	  that	  everyone	  gets	  value	  from	  the	  BBC.	  He	  claims	  that	  
audiences	  continue	  to	  value	  what	  the	  BBC	  does,	   in	  fact,	  they	  value	  it	  more	  than	  ever	  as	  
Ofcom's	  research	  shows,	  young	  people	  value	  public	  service	  broadcasting	  as	  much	  as	  all	  of	  
us.	  Increasingly,	  younger	  audiences	  and	  older	  audiences	  are	  consuming	  media	  in	  different	  
ways.	  So	  the	  BBC	  has	  to	  respond	  in	  a	  media	  landscape	  has	  changed	  beyond	  recognition.	  It	  
is	  hugely	  more	  global	  and	  more	  competitive;	  one	  where	  Amazon,	  Netflix,	  and	  others	  are	  
willing	  to	  invest	  huge	  amounts	  of	  money	  with	  no	  certain	  return	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  capture	  
market	  share	  where	  Facebook	   is	   looking	  at	  commissioning	   its	  own	  TV	  programmes,	  and	  
where	  moves	  such	  as	  the	  Fox-­‐Sky	  merger	  are	  making	  the	  very	  biggest	  players	  even	  bigger.	  
	  
We	  have	  a	  major	  advantage	  that	  we	  have	  the	  stability	  of	  an	  11-­‐year	  settlement,	  and	  are	  
sure	  of	  our	  budget	  for	  the	  next	  five	  years.	  And,	  we've	  also	  learnt	  over	  the	  last	  year	  that	  
when	  we	  innovate	  online,	  we	  can	  have	  a	  similar	  impact.	  
	  
Disruption	  of	  Markets	  
2.	  We	  need	  to	  reinvent	  iPlayer	  -­‐	  It	  was	  the	  biggest	  revolution	  of	  the	  last	  Charter.	  It’s	  been	  
the	   number	   one	   video-­‐on-­‐demand	   service	   in	   the	   UK,	   reaching	   more	   people	   than	   any	  
other.	   Now	   we	   need	   it	   to	   make	   the	   leap	   from	   a	   catch-­‐up	   service	   to	   a	   must-­‐visit	  
destination	  in	  its	  own	  right.	  Our	  goal,	  even	  in	  the	  face	  of	  rapid	  growth	  by	  our	  competitors,	  
is	  for	  iPlayer	  to	  be	  the	  number	  one	  online	  TV	  service	  in	  the	  UK.	  That	  will	  mean	  doubling	  
our	  reach,	  and	  quadrupling	  the	  time	  each	  person	  spends	  on	  it	  every	  week.	  And	  we	  want	  
to	  do	  it	  by	  2020.	  I	  think	  we	  can	  do	  so	  much	  more	  with	  our	  world-­‐class	  content.	  And,	  by	  
the	  way,	  win	  new	  global	  audiences.	  
	  
Disruption	  of	  Learning	  
3.	  Data	  is	  creating	  a	  flight	  to	  quality.	  It	  means	  audiences	  can	  find	  the	  best	  of	  public	  service	  
broadcasting	   -­‐	   but	   only	   if	   they	   sign	   in.	   Each	  month,	  we	  now	  have	   around	   three	  million	  
active	   signed-­‐in	   users.	   I	   want	   to	   make	   that	   20	   million.	   And	   I	   want	   us	   to	   get	   there	   as	  
quickly	   as	   possible.	   And	   the	   thing	   that	   brings	   all	   these	   challenges	   together	   is	  
personalisation.	  This	  is	  a	  major	  priority.	  
	  
Entrepreneurial	  innovation	  
4.	  More	  than	  anything	  else,	  this	  is	  what	  our	  future	  success	  will	  depend	  on.	  By	  finding	  out	  
more	  about	  our	  audiences	  and	  what	  they	  like,	  we	  can	  make	  better	  content,	  make	  it	  more	  
relevant,	   and	   bring	   it	   to	   them	   more	   effectively.	   The	   closer	   and	   more	   personal	   our	  
relationship	  with	  our	  audiences,	  the	  more	  I'm	  certain	  they	  will	  choose	  the	  BBC.	  I	  want	  us	  
to	  examine	  what	  big	  technological	  changes	  -­‐	  such	  as	  voice	  recognition,	  and	  virtual	  reality	  -­‐	  
mean	  for	  us.	  How	  can	  we	  push	  boundaries,	  do	  new	  things,	  in	  the	  way	  that	  we	  have	  done	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so	  well	  with	  new	  developments	  in	  the	  past?	  The	  priority	  has	  to	  be	  that	  we’re	  able	  to	  work	  
together	   across	   teams,	   and	   work	   fast.	   Because,	   for	   me,	   the	   old	   way	   of	   doing	   things	   -­‐	  
working	  in	  silos	  -­‐	  simply	  can’t	  succeed.	  Nor	  can	  the	  traditional	  ways	  of	  delivering	  services	  
-­‐	   big	   project	   plans,	  with	   budgets	   allocated	   five	   years	   out.	  We’ve	   got	   to	   be	  much	  more	  
entrepreneurial	  in	  our	  make-­‐up.	  
	  
5.	  My	  priority	   is	  to	  be	  much	  more	  ambitious	  for	  the	  BBC	  globally.	  We	  punch	  well	  above	  
our	  weight	  worldwide.	  And,	  as	  one	  of	   the	  country’s	  most	  valuable	  exports,	  we	  help	  the	  
UK	   punch	   above	   its	   weight	   too.	   I	   believe	   that,	   right	   now	   in	   the	   post-­‐Brexit	   world,	   the	  
country	  needs	  us	  more	  than	  ever	  and	  we	  need	  to	  do	  more	  than	  ever	  for	  Britain.	  I	  believe	  
there	  are	   two	  major	   factors	   that	  will	  be	  critical	   to	  our	   future	  global	   success.	  The	   first	   is	  
BBC	  Studios	  -­‐	  and	  now	  we	  have	  the	  go-­‐ahead,	  which	  represents	  a	  true	  revolution	  in	  the	  
way	   we	   source	   and	   make	   our	   programmes.	   It’s	   a	   risk,	   but	   it	   is	   also	   an	   incredible	  
opportunity.	   And	   there’s	   one	   announcement	   we’ll	   be	   making	   very	   shortly	   that	   will	  
highlight	  just	  how	  great	  that	  opportunity	  is.	  
	  
In	  both	  radio	  and	  television,	  we	  need	  to	  own	  intellectual	  property	  rights	  for	  the	  future.	  I	  
don't	  want	  us	  ever	  to	  become	  a	  publisher-­‐broadcaster.	  I’m	  convinced	  that	  Studios	  is	  the	  
only	   way	   we	  will	   secure	   our	   future	   as	   one	   of	   the	   very	   best	   programme-­‐makers	   in	   the	  
world.	   	  But	   I	   don’t	  want	  us	   just	   to	  be	  brilliant	   at	  making	  high-­‐quality,	  distinctive	  British	  
programmes.	  I	  want	  us	  to	  be	  truly	  brilliant	  at	  exporting	  them	  across	  the	  globe.	  That’s	  why	  
we	  need	  BBC	  Worldwide	  to	  thrive	  as	  a	  strategic	  partner	  for	  BBC	  Studios,	  making	  the	  very	  
most	   of	   our	   global	   reach.	  My	   challenge	   to	  Worldwide	   is	   to	   look	   again	   at	   how	  we	   best	  
grow	  our	  business	  to	  deliver	  more	  returns	  back	  to	  BBC	  public	  service	  -­‐	  to	  reinvest	  in	  yet	  
more	  great	  British	  programmes	  and	  services.	  
	  
Fourth,	   in	   September	   2013,	   the	   centre-­‐left	   coalition	   that	   governed	   Norway	   since	  
2005	  was	  replaced	  by	  a	  coalition	  of	   the	  Conservatives,	   junior	  partner,	  The	  Progress	  
Party	   (and,	   as	   they	   don’t	   have	   a	  majority)	   supported	   in	   parliament	   by	   the	   centrist	  
Liberal	   and	   Christian	   parties.	   According	   to	   Sand	   (2016)	   in	  May	   2015,	   the	   coalition	  
government	   introduced	   a	   new	   film	   policy,	   ‘En	   fremtidsrettet	   filmpolitikk’	   (‘A	  
provident	   film	  policy’	   -­‐	  White	   Paper	  No.	   30	   2014-­‐2015).	   It	   placed	   a	  much	   stronger	  
emphasis	   on	   regional	   film	   than	   the	   previous	   government,	   arguing	   that	   that	   the	  
distribution	  of	  power	  and	  regionalisation	  of	  film	  policy	  would	   increase	  competition,	  
diversity,	   and	   the	   quality	   in	   Norwegian	   film	   (White	   Paper	   No.	   30	   2014–2015:65).	  
Future	   research	   could	   focus	   on	   the	   impact	   of	   the	   policy	   from	   a	   single	   country	  
perspective;	  across	  Scandinavia;	  a	  two-­‐country	  perspective	  with	  the	  UK	  (post	  Brexit)	  
and	  its	  impact	  on	  economic	  growth.	  
Finally,	   as	  discussed	  earlier,	   an	  empirical	   generalisation	  based	  on	  Ehrenberg’s	  work	  
that	   has	   had	   wide	   application	   in	   Marketing	   is	   Double	   Jeopardy,	   as	   described	   in	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“Double	   Jeopardy	   Revisited”	   (Ehrenberg,	   et	   al.,	   1990).	   A	   small	   brand	   not	   only	   has	  
fewer	   buyers	   than	   a	   large	   brand	   but	   they	   also	   tend	   to	   be	   somewhat	   less	   loyal.	   A	  
simple	  model	  will	  relate	  the	  number	  of	  buyers	  and	  the	  rate	  of	  purchase	  in	  a	  particular	  
market.	   The	   Double	   Jeopardy	   effect,	   which	   occurs	   in	   practice	   in	   many	   different	  
consumer	   choice	   situations,	   has	   implications	   for	   the	   future	  of	   cinema,	   given	   that	   if	  
the	   medium	   is	   not	   film	   then	   the	   business	   is	   not	   one	   of	   screening	   movies	   but	   of	  
crafting	  experiences	  and	  building	  relationships.	  
	  
	   	  
	   144	  
7	   Contribution	  to	  knowledge	  
 
	  
“[I	  see	  Netflix]…..producing	  content	  all	  over	  the	  world,	  for	  the	  world…..evolving	  past	  the	  
Hollywood	  enclave…..we	  have	  87	  million	  subscribers…..we’re	  going	  to	  focus	  on	  movies	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and	  tv	  shows	  on	  a	  global	  basis	  for	  the	  next	  10-­‐15	  years….no	  sports,	  no	  news.”	  
(Reed	  Hastings,	  2016).	  
While	  the	  mainstream	  innovation	  literature	  has	  increased	  dramatically	  over	  the	  past	  
50	  years,	  we	   still	   know	   less	  about	  why	  and	  how	  such	   innovations	  occur	   than	  what	  
they	   deliver.	   Over	   the	   past	   20	   years,	   studies	   on	   discontinuous	   or	   disruptive	  
innovation	  have	  focused	  on	  trying	  to	  provide	  explanations	  about	  change	  –	  primarily	  
through	  a	  policymaker	  or	  innovation	  management	  lens.	  In	  both	  cases,	  the	  discourse	  
has	   concentrated	   on	   the	   notion	   that	   the	   rate	   of	   technical	   change	   and	   economic	  
growth	  depends	  on	  efficient	  diffusion	   i.e.	  a	   linear	  model	  of	  science	  and	  technology	  
‘push’;	  it	  is	  this	  thinking	  that	  has	  continued	  to	  dominate	  UK	  Science	  Council	  advice	  to	  
government.	  Although	   this	  approach	  has	  been	   reinforced	   through	  numerous	  policy	  
initiatives	   over	   the	   years,	   it	   has	   proven	   unable	   to	   account	   for	   differential	   rates	   of	  
technological	   innovation	   and	   economic	   development	   experienced	   across	   many	  
western	  economies.	  	  
As	   such,	   the	   film	   and	   audiovisual	   industry	   offered	   an	   excellent	   case	   study	   to	  
demonstrate	   my	   first	   contribution	   to	   knowledge,	   specifically	   in	   the	   area	   of	   field	  
research	  -­‐	  a	  qualitative	  data	  collection	  method	  designed	  for	  considering,	  observing,	  
and	   interacting	   with	   individuals	   in	   their	   natural	   environments.	  Over	   time,	   I	  
established	   that	  digital	   cinema	  was	  capable	  of	  delivering	  novel	   supply	  and	  demand	  
solutions	  -­‐	  starting	  from	  a	  few	  unrelated	  scraps	  of	  data,	  through	  the	  establishment	  of	  
personal	  networks	  with	  communities	  of	  practice	  in	  the	  UK,	  US	  &	  Norway)	  to	  building	  
rich,	   and	   complex	   quantitative	   data	   sets	   that	   measured	   the	   whole	   diffusion	   and	  
adoption	  phase	  of	  the	  digital	  cinema	  rollout.	  However,	  successive	  governments	  have	  
artificially	   increased	   production	   capacity,	   via	   policy	   initiatives	   (incl.	   tax	   incentives)	  
with	  little	  or	  no	  interest	  in	  how	  new	  content	  would	  reach	  audiences.	  	  
While	  mainstream	   innovation	   theory	   and	   policy	   failed	   to	   deliver	   an	   understanding	  
and	   control	   of	   the	   factors	   behind	   international	   competitiveness	   and	   economic	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development,	   we	   have	   seen	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	   research	   agenda	   in	   national	  
innovation	   systems	   (NIS).	  A	  definition	  of	   an	  NIS	   is	   typically	  presented	  as	   the	   set	  of	  
organisations,	  institutions,	  and	  linkages	  for	  the	  generation,	  diffusion	  and	  application	  
of	   scientific	   and	   technological	   knowledge	   operating	   in	   a	   specific	   country.	   The	   NIS	  
concept	  rests	  on	  the	  premise	  that	  understanding	  the	  linkages	  among	  actors	  involved	  
in	  innovation	  (e.g.	  joint	  research,	  personnel	  exchanges,	  cross-­‐patenting,	  purchase	  of	  
equipment	   and	   a	   variety	   of	   other	   channels)	   is	   key	   to	   improving	   technology	  
performance.	  The	  innovative	  performance	  of	  a	  country	  depends	  on	  how	  these	  actors	  
relate	  to	  each	  other	  as	  elements	  of	  a	  collective	  system	  of	  knowledge	  creation	  and	  is	  
employed,	   as	  well	   as	   the	   technologies	   they	   use.	   These	   actors	   are	   primarily	   private	  
enterprises,	  universities	  and	  public	   research	   institutes	  and	   the	  people	  within	   them.	  
As	  such,	  the	  novel	  field	  research,	  employed	  in	  this	  dissertation	  has	  delivered	  a	  better	  
understanding	   of	   the	   role	   of	   entrepreneurial	   innovation	   for	   regional	   and	   national	  
innovation	  systems.	  The	  impact	  of	  my	  work	  in	  this	  area	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  my	  agreement	  
to	   write	   a	   Monograph	   on	   ‘Brexit	   and	   its	   impact	   on	   entrepreneurial	   innovation,’	  
though	  Emerald	  Publishing	  (final	  draft	  due	  Autumn	  2017).	  	  
In	   this	  work	   I	  have	  sought	   to	  build	  on	  the	  NIS	   literature	   in	  examining	  the	  diffusion,	  
adoption	  and	  incorporation	  of	  knowledge	  in	  the	  rollout	  of	  digital	  cinema	  technology.	  
My	   findings	   also	   suggest	   a	   radically	   different	   reading	   of	   the	   national	   innovation	  
system	  than	  has	  been	  offered	  by	  many	  previous	  accounts,	  seeing	   it	  as	  a	  case	  study	  
for	  an	  increasingly	  mobile	  sector,	  in	  which	  technological	  factors	  retreat	  in	  importance	  
behind	   entrepreneurial	   innovation	   as	   a	   key	   driving	   force	   in	   reaching	   audiences.	  
Implicit	   in	   the	   contribution	   is	   that	   novel	   supply	   and	   demand	   solutions	   can	   be	  
explained	   in	  the	  absence	  and	  presence	  of	  national	  or	  sector	   institutional	  activity	  as	  
firms	   do	   not	   innovate	   in	   isolation	   but	   depend	   on	   extensive	   interaction	   with	   their	  
environment.	   The	   impact	   of	  my	  work	   in	   this	   area	   can	   be	   found	   in	   an	   engagement	  
with	   two	   leading	   industry	   bodies,	   to	   look	   at	   how	   cinema	   operators	   can	  work	  with	  
universities	  to	  develop	  	  
As	   I	   have	   shown	   in	   this	   dissertation,	   there	   is	   a	   need	   for	   domestic	   policymakers	   to	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focus	   their	   attention	   on	   emerging	   entrepreneurial	   innovations,	   the	   utilisation	   of	  
current	  knowledge	  and	  strategies	   for	  novel	  solutions	   to	  strengthen	  their	   respective	  
national	  innovation	  systems.	  	  
I	  have	  developed	  my	  argument	  by	  firstly	  demonstrating	  the	  importance	  of	  learning-­‐
by-­‐doing	  in	  the	  deployment	  of	  digital	  cinema	  over	  a	  10-­‐year	  period,	  which	  in	  itself	  is	  
now	   situated	   in	   a	   wider	   international	   entertainment	   value	   network.	   Based	   on	   a	  
critical	   review	   of	   existing	   literature	   and	   empirical	   studies,	   I	   have	   proposed	   that	   to	  
arrive	   at	   a	   satisfactory	   understanding	   of	   the	   digitalization	   phenomenon,	   it	   is	  
necessary	   to	   look	   beyond	   technological	   factors	   associated	  with	   cost	   reduction	   and	  
copyright	   protection,	   and	   examine,	   instead,	   the	   dynamics	   that	   impact	   on	   the	  
industrial	  organisation	  of	  the	  value	  network.	  
Following	   indications	   from	   the	   literature,	   I	   have	   particularly	   focused	  on	   the	   crucial	  
role	  entrepreneurial	  innovation	  plays	  in	  the	  distribution	  and	  exhibition	  process.	  Here	  
I	   have	   found	   that	   in	   the	   context	   of	   incumbent	   inertia	   to	   find	   novel	   solutions	   as	   a	  
contribution	   to	   the	   concept	   of	   national	   innovation	   systems,	   the	   research	   identifies	  
differences	   in	   how	   the	  main	   actors	   responded	   to	   the	   digitisation	   of	   cinema	   in	   the	  
international	   entertainment	   value	   network.	   In	   particular,	  the	   findings	   confirm	   the	  
importance	  of	   learning-­‐by-­‐doing	  lies	   in	   a)	   managing	   the	   adoption	   of	   a	   potentially	  
disruptive	   innovation	   and	   b)	   firm-­‐level	   decision	   making	   and	   national	   innovation	  
system	   thinking.	   The	   research	   also	   establishes	   the	   nature	   of	   entrepreneurial	  
innovation	  in	  coping	  with	  diffusion,	  disruption	  and	  destruction	  in	  the	  entertainment	  
industry.	  
Finally,	   I	   have	   argued	   that	   to	   explain	   the	   growth	   of	   novel	   supply	   and	   demand	  
solutions	  empirically,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  understand	  that	  digital	  cinema	  was	  proposed	  
(by	   incumbents)	   as	   a	   replacement	   technology	   for	   film	  projection.	  As	  digital	   cinema	  
offered	  a	  new	  value	  proposition	  to	  distributors,	  and	  as	  the	  US	  studio	  system	  continue	  
to	  rely	  on	  a	  highly	  developed	  value	  chain,	  the	  new	  technology	  was	  carefully	  nurtured	  
into	  play	  to	  avoid	  the	  disruption	  faced	  by	  incumbents	  in	  the	  music	  industry.	  As	  part	  
of	   a	   disruption	   avoidance	   process,	   the	   US	   studios	   subsidised	   equipment	   costs,	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referred	  to	   in	  the	  market	  as	  virtual	  print	   fees	  (VPF)	  to	  ensure	  their	  objectives	  were	  
fully	   met.	   This	   empirical	   evidence	   adds	   to	   our	   understanding	   of	   the	   diffusion	   and	  
adoption	  literature	  and	  is	  therefore	  a	  contribution	  to	  knowledge.	  	  
Digital	  cinema	  did	  not	  create	  a	  new	  market;	  it	  only	  improved	  an	  existing	  one,	  and,	  in	  
that,	  the	  improvement	  initially	  benefited	  only	  one	  side	  of	  the	  supply	  chain.	  Earlier	  in	  
the	  diffusion	  phase,	  Hanson	   (2007a)	   speculated	  on	   the	  differing	  approaches	   to	   the	  
deployment	  of	  digital	  cinema	  between	  Europe	  and	  the	  US.	  
In	   continental	   Europe,	   Europa	   Cinemas	   –	   supported	   by	   the	   European	   Union’s	  
MEDIA	  Programme	  –	  have	   set	  up	  a	   series	  of	   initiatives	   to	   ‘assist	   theatres	   in	   their	  
transition	   to	   digital	   cinema’..[e.g.]..financial	   support	   for	   the	   installation	   of	   digital	  
projectors.	   Like	   the	   UKFC’s	   Digital	   Screen	   Network	   ….	   the	   continental	   European	  
initiative	  aims	  to	  encourage	  and	  support	  specifically	  European	  film.	  These	  initiatives	  
share	   a	   common	   feature:	   state	   intervention	   through	   subsidy.	   In	   the	   UK	   and	  
continental	  Europe	  the	  strategies	  are	  bolstered	  by	  a	  desire	  to	  promote	  specialised	  
and,	  by	  implication,	  domestic	  film	  cultures.	  	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (Hanson,	  2007:379)	  
While	   Hanson’s	   insights	   recognise	   the	   obvious	   weakness	   in	   a	   broad	   continental	  
Europe	  approach,	  they	  approach	  the	  phenomena	  from	  a	  traditional	  view	  of	  cinema.	  
As	  such,	  they	  do	  not	  consider	  that	  all	  key	  stakeholders,	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  Atlantic,	  
were	  engaged	  in	  a	  subsidy	  war	  outside	  of	  a	  simplistic	  public	  vs.	  private	  debate.	  The	  
US	  strategy	  was	  implemented	  across	  each	  link	  in	  the	  supply	  chain,	  an	  approach	  that	  
reflected	   a	   more	   rounded	   understanding	   of	   the	   commercial	   and	   cultural	  
opportunities,	   than	   their	   continental	   Europe	   counterparts.	   Had	   the	   digital	   cinema	  
transition	   occurred	   as	   a	   disruptive	   innovation	   -­‐	   encouraged	   by	   a	   similar	   approach	  
from	   continental	   Europe	   -­‐	   it	   would	   have	   been	   driven	   by	   new	   sources	   of	   content,	  
opening	  up	  new	  markets	  for	  that	  content,	  and	  possibly	  introducing	  new	  and	  different	  
venues	  for	  consuming	  that	  content.	  	  
Instead,	   in	   two	  markets	   (the	  US	  and	  UK),	  public	   institutional	   involvement	   in	  VPFs	   -­‐	  
designed	  to	  match	  the	  fulfillment	  costs	  of	  wide	  release	  films	  -­‐	  was	  largely	  shunned.	  
Although,	  as	  Olsberg	  points	  out,	  the	  UK	  system	  does	  combine	  tax	  credits	  that	  reward	  
expenditure	  with	   lottery	   funding	   for	  projects	  deemed	   to	  have	   significant	  artistic	  or	  
commercial	   potential.	   However,	   the	   largest	   proportion	   of	   public	   subsidy	   goes	   to	  
Hollywood	  studio	  films	  using	  the	  UK	  as	  a	  production	  based	  (2014:50).	  I	  propose	  that	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such	  systemic	  approaches,	  based	  on	  transactions	  and	  exchanges,	  do	  little	  to	  develop	  
a	   domestic	   industry,	   as	   they	   do	   not	   focus	   on	   the	  market	   from	   an	   entrepreneurial	  
perspective	  and	  should	  not,	  therefore,	  be	  considered	  a	  viable	  policy	  option.	  Despite	  
the	   fact	   that	   the	   approach	   is	   grounded	   in	   the	   field	   of	   private	   sector	   development,	  
such	  blunt	  (fiscal)	   instruments	  alone	  simply	  help	  to	  maintain	  a	  skilled	  workforce	  for	  
US	  product,	  as	  and	  when	  it	  is	  necessary.	  	  
The	   twin	   approaches	   described	   above	   resulted	   in	   market-­‐entry	   barriers	   being	  
erected	   to	   new	   sources	   of	   content	   by	   raising	   costs	   for	   nonwide-­‐release	   fulfilment.	  
While,	  in	  Norway,	  which	  did	  operate	  with	  public	  institutional	  involvement,	  we	  saw	  a	  
different	   pattern	   of	   diffusion	   and	   adoption,	   which	   delivered	   a	   novel	   supply	   and	  
demand	   solution	   within	   an	   NIS.	   This	   insight	   advances	   our	   understanding	   of	   the	  
diffusion	  and	  adoption	   literature,	  within	   the	  context	  of	   the	  NIS	  and	   is,	   therefore,	  a	  
contribution	  to	  knowledge.	  	  
While	  digital	  cinema	  was	  not	  meant	  to	  be	  a	  disruptive	  technology	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  US,	  
the	  seeds	  are	  growing	   for	  disruption	  to	  occur.	  New	  entrants	  are	  exploring	   low-­‐cost	  
techniques	   such	   as	   social	   networks	   and	   private	   platforms	   to	   market	   films	   to	  
audiences	  they	  understand.	  So,	  the	  first	  part	  of	  the	  proposition	  was	  demonstrated	  to	  
be	  wrong	  and	  has	  consequences	  for	  innovation	  theory	  and	  policy,	  which	  ignores	  the	  
role	   of	   public	   engagement	   throughout	   the	   value	   network.	   The	   second	   part	   of	   the	  
proposition	   delivered	   unforeseen	   consequences,	   which	   showed	   poor	   long-­‐term	  
decision	   making	   (path-­‐dependent)	   strategies	   from	   incumbents.	   They	   appeared	   to	  
learn	   little	   from	   consumption	   patterns	   in	   the	   music	   industry,	   post-­‐Napster.	   Film	  
today	   is	   more	   transportable	   across	   different	   platforms,	   not	   regions.	   Returning	   to	  
Gabriel	  Tarde	  (1902)	  for	  one	  last	  time,	  he	  may	  have	  been	  predicting	  the	  aspirations	  
of	  the	  entrepreneur	  Reid	  Hoffman,	  (or	  Tony	  Hall	  from	  the	  BBC),	  when	  Tarde	  wrote:	  	  
…when	  he	  predicts	  that	  the	  inequality	  of	  different	  nations	  will	  continue	  to	  diminish,	  
he	  should	  have	  said	  social	  dissimilarity,	  and	  not	  inequality.	  For	  between	  the	  smallest	  
and	  largest	  states	  the	  disproportion	  of	  power,	  of	  territory,	  and	  even	  of	  wealth,	  goes	  
on	  increasing,	  and	  yet	  this	  condition	  does	  not	  stand	  in	  the	  way	  of	  a	  constant	  progress	  
of	  international	  assimilation.	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  (1902:xxiii)	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8	   Epilogue	  
 
The	  current	  state	  aid	  system	  predominantly	  supports	  film	  production,	  without	  sufficient	  
corresponding	  emphasis	  on	  distribution.	  In	  2009,	  European	  public	  film-­‐funding	  bodies	  
spent	  on	  average	  69%	  of	  their	  budget	  on	  creation	  of	  works,	  while	  only	  8.4%	  went	  to	  
distribution	  and	  3.6%	  to	  promotion.	  Katsarova	  (2014)	  
In	   2016	   the	   European	   Parliament	   report	   on	   EU	   policy	   for	   cultural	   and	   creative	  
industries	   claimed	   that	   culture	   represented	   an	   extensive	   economic	   asset	   and	   a	  
valuable	   source	   of	   creativity	   and	   innovation.	   	   To	   unlock	   the	   potential	   of	   these	  
industries,	   and	   support	   cross-­‐border	   activity	   between	   SMEs,	   the	   European	  
Commission	  launched	  a	  series	  of	  support	  programmes,	  with	  a	  total	  budget	  of	  €1.46	  
billion.	   The	   question	   is	   will	   the	   Cultural	   and	   Creative	   Industries	   (CCIs)	   deliver	  
economic	  growth,	  for	  the	  EU?	  It	  is	  claimed	  that	  the	  CCIs	  account	  for	  11	  per	  cent	  of	  all	  
private	  enterprises	  and	  7.5	  per	   cent	  of	   all	   employed	  persons	  across	   the	  EU.	   	  Aside	  
from	  their	  economic	  contribution,	  CCIs	  have	  also	  built	  a	  bridge	  between	  arts,	  culture,	  
business	  and	  technology.	  Some	  of	  this	  €1.46	  billion	  investment	  will	  invariably	  involve	  
subsidised	  education	  and	  training	  programmes	  to	  support	  skills	  development	   in	  the	  
CCIs.	   Despite	   the	   risks	   faced	   by	   incumbents	   in	   the	   CCIs	   brought	   about	   by	   digital	  
technologies,	  in	  general,	  and	  the	  impending	  launch	  of	  the	  digital	  single	  market,	  some	  
commentators	  argue	  that	  the	  EU	  should	  do	  more	  to	  support	  production,	  especially	  in	  
film	   and	   audiovisual	   sector.	   	   They	   claim	   that	   since	   it	   devotes	   few	   resources	   to	  
production	   and	   co-­‐productions,	   a	   larger	   public	   engagement	   should	   invest	   to	   allow	  
the	   planning	   of	   activities	   and	   at	   the	   same	   time,	   reduce	   fragmentation	   of	   projects	  	  
(Zambardino,	  2016:127).	  So,	  is	  the	  quote	  from	  Katsarova	  at	  the	  top	  of	  the	  page	  still	  
relevant	  or	  not?	  
On	  November	  29th,	  2016,	  Johanna	  Koljonen	  gave	  the	  keynote	  speech	  at	  the	  UK	  film	  
exhibition	  innovation	  conference,	  This	  Way	  Up.	  	  During	  her	  talk,	  Koljonen	  referenced	  
her	  work	  on	  the	  Nostradamus	  Project,	  how	  audiences	  decide	  to	  spend	  their	  time,	  on	  
what	  and	  where:	  	  
[W]hen	  we	   listen	   to	   actual	   humans	  discussing	  how	   to	   spend	  an	  evening,	   they	   very	  
often	   decide	   to	   go	   to	   the	   cinema	   before	   even	   picking	   the	   film.	   The	   film	   is	   not	  
irrelevant,	  but	  it	  is	  quite	  often	  a	  secondary	  consideration;	  and	  even	  when	  it	  is	  at	  the	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core,	  the	  discussion	  is	  not	  about	  seeing	  the	  work	  in	  general	  but	  seeing	  it	  in	  a	  specific	  
manner	   (because	   you	   could	   just	   pirate	   it	   and	   watch	   it	   for	   free	   at	   home).	   This	   all	  
means	  we	  should	  think	  a	   little	   less	  about	  films	  and	  a	   little	  more	  about	  experiences.	  
And	   if	   your	  business	  model	   involves	   repeat	  customers	  –	  as	  of	   course	   it	  must	  –	  you	  
are	  also	   in	   the	  business	  of	  building	   relationships.	   In	  other	  words	   you	  are	  designing	  
communities	  of	  people	  –	  who	  have	  a	  relationship	  to	  you;	  and	   ideally	   in	   fact	  also	  to	  
each	  other.	  When	  people,	  even	  some	  exhibitors,	   talk	  about	   the	  challenges	  cinemas	  
are	   facing,	   they	   often	   make	   it	   sound	   as	   though	   the	   service	   provided	   by	   movie	  
theatres	  are	  exclusive	  access	  to	  the	  work.	  Or,	  if	  they’re	  slightly	  smarter,	  they	  will	  say	  
what	  especially	  arthouse	  cinemas	  offer	  is	  curation	  –	  which	  is	   indeed	  very	  important	  
in	  an	  age	  of	  abundance.	  	  
	  
In	  essence,	  Koljonen	  core	  message	  supports	  findings	  developed	  in	  this	  dissertation,	  in	  
that,	  if	  the	  medium	  is	  not	  film	  but,	  in	  fact,	  cinemas	  then	  the	  business	  we	  are	  in	  is	  not	  
one	  of	  screening	  movies	  but	  of	  crafting	  experiences	  and	  building	  relationships.	  	  
While	  the	  decision	  for	  the	  UK	  to	  leave	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  election	  of	  the	  45th	  President	  
of	   the	   United	   States	   was	   not	   to	   everyone’s	   liking,	   it	   could	   prove	   helpful	   to	   the	  
audiovisual	   industries	   of	   certain	   countries.	   If	   as	   appears	   likely,	   US	   antitrust	  
regulations	  are	  relaxed	  under	  the	  Trump	  administration,	  this	  will	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  
net	  neutrality	  rules.	  Netflix	  recently	  announced,	  in	  a	  letter	  to	  shareholders,	  that	  any	  
weakening	  of	  net	  neutrality	  laws	  would	  not	  affect	  its	  business	  in	  any	  significant	  way,	  
but	  stressed,	  as	  many	  advocates	  have	  done,	  that	  it	  would	  hinder	  competition	  across	  
the	   board.	   However,	   at	   the	   same	   time,	   producing	   original	   content	   had	   proved	  
successful;	   600	  hours	  of	  original	  programming	   in	  2016	   -­‐	   and	   seeks	   to	   grow	   that	   to	  
some	  1,000	  hours	  in	  2017.	  It	  has	  allocated	  a	  budget	  US$6bn	  to	  achieve	  this	  objective	  
–	  an	  increase	  of	  US$1bn	  over	  the	  previous	  year.	  Further	  proof	  that	  the	  strategy,	  built	  
on	  creating	  relationships	  with	  its	  audience,	  had	  added	  7.05	  million	  new	  subscribers	  in	  
the	   last	   three	   months	   of	   2016.	   That’s	   far	   greater	   than	   the	   5.2	   million	   they	   had	  
anticipated,	   and	   left	   them	   ending	   the	   year	   with	   almost	   100	  million	   subscribers	   in	  
total.	   In	   all,	   2016	   saw	   Netflix	   take	   in	   US$8.83bn	   in	   revenue	   -­‐	   with	   a	   profit	   of	  
US$186.7m	   (Lee,	   2017).	   As	   Edström	   &	   Koljonen,	   (2017)	   most	   recently	   argued,	  
changes	   in	   the	  US	  entertainment	   industry	  have	  global	   ripple	  effects.	   It	   is	  also	   likely	  
that	  the	  cultural	  importance	  of	  US	  content	  specifically	  will	  diminish	  in	  the	  long	  term,	  
a	  tendency	  that	  could	  be	  accelerated	  by	  isolationist	  policies	  and	  the	  media	  landscape	  
is	  liable	  to	  consolidate	  dramatically	  during	  the	  next	  four	  years	  (2017:4).	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As	   US	   content	   has	   always	   depended	   on	   high	   exposure	   levels	   across	   mainstream	  
screens,	   the	   fact	   that	   a	   Chinese	   entrepreneur	   now	   controls	   AMC	   and	   Carmike	  
Cinemas	   in	   the	  US	   and	  Odeon	   in	   the	  UK	  may	  well	   be	   a	   sign	  of	   things	   to	   come.	  As	  
recently	  as	  January	  2017,	  it	  was	  reported	  in	  the	  Financial	  Times	  that	  Wanda	  (through	  
its	   subsidiary,	  AMC	  Entertainment)	  had	  entered	   into	  a	  definitive	  agreement	   to	  buy	  
Stockholm-­‐based	  Nordic	  Cinema	  Group	   for	  US$929m	   from	  Bridgepoint,	   the	  private	  
equity	  group,	  and	  Bonnier,	  the	  Swedish	  media	  company.	  Nordic	  owns	  68	  cinemas	  in	  
seven	   northern	   European	   countries	   and	   is	   a	   partner	   in	   another	   50	   locations.	   It	  
recorded	  box	  office	  revenues	  of	  US$229m	  in	  2015.	  In	  Fedor’s	  report	  in	  the	  Financial	  
Times,	  she	  quoted	  Leo	  Kulp,	  an	  analyst	  at	  RBC	  Capital	  Markets	  who	  said	  the	  deal	  was	  
‘sizeable’	   and,	   combined	   with	   the	   Odeon	   acquisition,	   would	   give	   AMC	   ‘greater	  
leverage	   in	  negotiations	  with	   its	  partners….Odeon	  gives	  AMC	  not	  only	  an	  attractive	  
platform	   to	   drive	   value	   through,	   executing	   its	   premium	   strategy,	   but	   also	   as	   a	  
platform	   to	   consolidate	   the	   European	   exhibition	   industry’.	   Assuming	   that	   the	  
European	  Commission	  grants	  antitrust	  clearance,	  Nordic	  will	  maintain	  its	  Stockholm	  
headquarters	   but	   will	   also	   operate	   as	   a	   subsidiary	   out	   of	   London-­‐based	   Odeon	  
(Fedor,	  2017).	  Equally	   important	   is	  the	  fact	  that	  AMC	  Entertainment	  and	  two	  other	  
US	  cinema	  operators,	  own	  Fathom	  Events	  as	  a	  joint	  venture.	  Fathom	  was	  conceived	  
as	   an	   experiment	   in	   2002	   and	   is	   today	   a	   major	   player	   in	   the	   alternative	  
entertainment	   industry	   (including	   live,	   high-­‐definition	   performances	   of	   the	  
Metropolitan	  Opera).	  It	  also	  runs	  the	  live	  digital	  broadcast	  network	  (DBN),	  the	  largest	  
cinema	   broadcast	   network	   in	   North	   America.	   As	   the	   founder	   of	   Cineuropa.org,	  
Domenico	   La	   Porta	   was	   quoted	   in	   Edström	   &	   Koljonen’s	   future	   scenarios	   report	  
Nostradamus:	  Screen	  Visions	  2017):	  
I	  was	  in	  Brussels	  moderating	  the	  European	  Film	  Forum	  and	  heard	  twice	  on	  stage	  that	  
‘theatres	  are	  still	  the	  best	  place	  to	  watch	  a	  film’.	  The	  guy	  was	  saying	  that	  as	  if	  it	  was	  
obvious.	   I'm	  sorry	  –	   it's	  not	  obvious.	   It	  depends	  on	  what	  kind	  of	   film,	   the	   time	  you	  
have	  at	  your	  disposal,	  your	  family	  life,	  your	  level	  of	  film	  addiction,	  your	  culture,	  the	  
communities	   you	   are	   part	   of...	   It's	   2017	   and	   that	   statement	   hasn't	   been	   proven	  
[right]	  for	  a	  while	  now	  although	  it	  might	  have	  been	  remotely	  accurate	  50	  years	  ago.	  
	  (La	  Porta,	  2017)	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Interviews	  were	  undertaken	  with	  20	  senior	  executives,	  analysts	  and	  commentators	  in	  
a	   mix	   of	   private	   and	   public	   institutions	   across	   the	   three	   countries.	   In	   light	   of	   my	  
participation	  in	  a	  number	  of	  temporary	  cluster	  events	  gained	  me	  access	  to	  a	  further	  
25	  global	  motion	  picture	  business	  people	  and	  cinema	  professionals.	  
	  
Industry	  events	  attended	  
	  
Foreign-­‐language	  film	  in	  the	  UK:	  at	  the	  cinema	  and	  beyond:	  MEDIA	  Desk	  UK	  and	  the	  
French	  Institute,	  UKFC.	  23	  April	  2010.	  London	  
	  
1	  Overview	  
Moderator:	  Why	  do	  we	  need	  foreign-­‐language	  film?	  -­‐	  Dave	  Calhoun,	  Time	  Out	  
2	  The	  landscape	  of	  foreign-­‐language	  film	  in	  the	  UK	  
Sean	  Perkins	  from	  the	  UK	  Film	  Council	  Research	  and	  Statistics	  Unit	  will	  give	  an	  
overview	  of	  the	  UK	  exhibition	  sector	  and	  foreign-­‐language	  market	  share	  in	  
comparison	  with	  other	  European	  countries.	  
3	  This	  is	  the	  reality,	  let’s	  deal	  with	  it!	  
Discussion	  by	  key	  industry	  figures	  on	  the	  current	  state	  of	  play,	  challenges	  and	  
opportunities	  for	  foreign-­‐language	  exhibition.	  
Speakers:	  Michael	  Gubbins	  (moderator)	  
Steve	  Perrin,	  Digital	  Funding	  Partnership	  
Alex	  Stolz,	  UK	  Film	  Council	  (P&A	  Fund,	  DSN)	  
Clare	  Binns,	  City	  Screen	  
Danny	  Perkins,	  Optimum	  Releasing	  
3	  EU	  public	  funding	  for	  non-­‐national	  film	  -­‐	  Europa	  Cinemas	  
Ian	  Christie,	  Europa	  Cinemas	  
4	  Europa	  Cinemas	  in	  the	  UK	  
Moderator:	  Ian	  Christie,	  Europa	  Cinemas	  	  
Rob	  Kenny,	  Curzon	  Artificial	  Eye	  
Guillaume	  Silvy-­‐Leligois,	  Ciné	  Lumière	  
Mark	  Cosgrove,	  Watershed,	  Bristol	  
Catharine	  Des	  Forges,	  Independent	  Cinema	  Office	  
5	  Innovative	  techniques	  and	  strategies	  for	  attracting	  cinema	  audiences	  
Discussion	  about	  how	  digital	  tools	  can	  help	  increase	  box	  office	  for	  foreign-­‐language	  
film,	  including	  cinema-­‐on-­‐demand	  and	  the	  building	  of	  online	  audience	  communities.	  
Moderator:	  Michael	  Gubbins	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Pete	  Buckingham	  /	  Alex	  Stolz	  –	  UKFC	  Innovation	  Fund	  
Tobias	  Bauckhage,	  Moviepilot	  
Daniel	  Robey,	  Jam	  –	  digital	  promotion	  agency	  
Ross	  Fitzsimons,	  Curzon	  Artificial	  Eye	  
Michel	  Peters,	  Content	  Republic	  
6	  Foreign-­‐language	  film	  in	  the	  UK	  at	  festivals,	  on	  television,	  online,	  in	  schools	  
Moderator:	  Michael	  Gubbins	  	  
Steve	  Jenkins,	  BBC	  
Helen	  de	  Witt,	  London	  Film	  Festival	  
Mark	  Reid,	  BFI	  (member	  of	  Film:	  21st	  Century	  Literacy)	  
Ian	  Wall,	  Film	  Education	  (member	  of	  Film:	  21st	  Century	  Literacy)	  
	  
CEA	  Conference:	  23	  February	  2010.	  London	  
3D	  SYSTEMS:	  The	  technology.	  The	  costs.	  The	  in-­‐cinema	  experience	  
1	  Overview	  
Moderator:	  Phill	  Clapp,	  Chief	  Executive,	  Cinema	  Exhibitors’	  Association	  
2	  3D	  Systems	  on	  the	  Market	  
Moderator:	  Anthony	  Williams,	  Specialist	  Cinema	  Consultant	  
Real	  D	  Richard	  Phillips,	  Vice	  President,	  Engineering,	  Arts	  Alliance	  Media	  
Dolby	  3D	  Max	  Bell,	  Managing	  Director,	  Bell	  Theatre	  Services	  
Master	  Image	  3D	  David	  Pope,	  Cinema	  Consultant	  
XpanD	  3D	  (formerly	  Nu-­‐Vision)	  Peter	  Hall,	  Managing	  Director,	  Future	  Projections	  
Technicolor	  3D	  Tom	  Cotton,	  VP	  International	  Business	  Development,	  Technicolor	  
3	  Cinema	  practicalities	  
Moderator:	  Anthony	  Williams,	  Specialist	  Cinema	  Consultant	  
David	  Williams,	  Managing	  Director	  WTW	  Cinemas;	  	  
Peter	  Hoare,	  Managing	  Director	  Scott	  Cinemas;	  	  
Gerald	  Parkes,	  Managing	  Director	  Parkway	  Entertainment	  	  
Andrew	  Poole,	  Director	  Pavilion	  Galashiels	  
4	  Ask	  the	  Panel	  
Moderator:	  Steve	  Perrin,	  Chief	  Executive,	  UK	  Digital	  Funding	  Partnership	  
	  
IBC	  Conference:	  11	  September	  2006.	  Amsterdam.	  
1	  The	  Good	  the	  bad	  and	  the	  ugly:	  technology	  to	  business	  	  
Moderator:	  Jerry	  Pierce,	  VP	  D-­‐Cinema,	  Universal	  Pictures,	  USA	  
2	  Creating	  the	  standards	  for	  digital	  cinema	  –	  the	  progress	  and	  the	  issues	  	  
Moderator:	  David	  Bancroft,	  Thompson,	  UK	  
Mark	  Kimball,	  The	  Walt	  Disney	  Company	  and	  DCI,	  USA	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Wendy	  Aylsworth,	  Vice	  President	  of	  Engineering,	  Warner	  Bros	  &	  SMPTE,	  USA	  
Siegfried	  Foessel,	  Fraunhofer	  IIS,	  Germany	  
Thierry	  Delpit,	  CST,	  France	  
Patrick	  von	  Sychowski,	  Unique	  Digital,	  Norway	  
Curt	  Behlmer,	  Technicolor	  Digital	  Cinemas,	  USA	  
3	  Global	  D-­‐cinema	  report	  
Moderator:	  David	  Hancock,	  Screen	  Digest,	  UK	  
Zhu	  Zhu,	  Cinergy,	  Hong	  Kong	  
Kiran	  Reddy,	  Sathyam	  Cinemas,	  India	  
Michael	  Karagosian,	  MKPE	  Consulting,	  USA	  
Nico	  Simon,	  Utopia	  Group,	  Luxembourg	  
4	  The	  business	  plans	  –	  who	  pays	  the	  bill?	  
Moderator:	  Steve	  Perrin,	  UK	  Film	  Council,	  UK	  
Chick	  Goldwater,	  AccessIT	  &	  Christie/AIX,	  USA	  
Bernard	  Collard,	  XDC	  International,	  Belgium	  
Curt	  Behlmer,	  Technicolor	  Digital	  Cinemas,	  USA	  
5	  A	  look	  into	  the	  D-­‐cinema	  future	  	  
Moderator:	  Bill	  David	  Monk,	  City	  Univesity,	  UK	  
Matt	  Cowan,	  RealD,	  Canada	  
Michael	  Kaye,	  In-­‐Three,	  USA	  
Andrew	  Robinson,	  Harkness	  Hall,	  UK	  
Kevin	  Wakeford,	  Sony	  Europe,	  UK	  
Thomas	  Hoegh,	  Arts	  Alliance	  Group,	  UK	  
	  
UK-­‐wide	  programme	  of	  11	  digital	  roadshows	  	  27	  April	  –	  08	  June	  2009	  
Organised	  by	  The	  Cinema	  Exhibitors’	  Association,	  UK	  Film	  Council	  and	  Screen	  Digest,	  
to	  raise	  awareness	  and	  understanding	  amongst	  the	  exhibition	  sector	  of	  issues	  around	  
digital	  cinema.	  
Digital	  Cinema	  Roadshow,	  Manchester	  (April,	  2009)	  
Digital	  Cinema	  Roadshow,	  Hull	  (April,	  2009)	  
Digital	  Cinema	  Roadshow,	  Cambridge	  (April,	  2009)	  
Digital	  Cinema	  Roadshow,	  Wolverhampton	  (June,	  2009)	  




American	  Film	  Market	  Conference:	  2	  November	  2007.	  Los	  Angeles.	  
1	  Film	  Financing	  -­‐	  Year	  in	  Review	  
Moderator:	  P.	  John	  Burke,	  Head	  of	  Entertainment	  Group,	  Akin	  Gump	  Strauss	  Hauer	  &	  
Feld	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Morgan	  Rector,	  Regional	  Manager	  Beverly	  Hills	  and	  Los	  Angeles,	  Comerica	  Bank	  
Bob	  Hayward,	  Chief	  Operating	  Officer,	  Summit	  Entertainment	  LP	  
David	  Molner,	  Principal,	  Screen	  Capital	  
Roy	  Salter,	  Principal,	  Salter	  Group	  	  
2	  Emerging	  Trends	  in	  Film	  Financing	  
Moderator:	  Benson	  Berro,	  Senior	  Manager,	  Federal	  Tax	  services,	  KPMG	  
Jeff	  Begun,	  VP	  Business	  Development,	  Axium	  International	  
Trevor	  Short,	  Chief	  Financial	  Officer,	  Nu	  Image	  
Christa	  Thomas,	  Managing	  Director,	  JPMorgan	  Securities,	  Entertainment	  Industries	  
Group	  
3	  Hong	  Kong:	  Your	  preferred	  destination	  for	  Asian	  co-­‐production	  and	  gateway	  to	  
China	  
Moderator:	  Patrick	  Frater,	  Asia	  Editor,	  Variety	  
Peggy	  Chiao,	  Producer,	  Arc	  Light	  Films	  (Taiwan)	  
Yu	  Dong,	  Board	  Chairman/President,	  Beijing	  Polybona	  Film	  Distribution	  Co.,	  Ltd	  
Nansun	  Shi,	  Executive	  Director,	  Film	  Workshop	  Co.	  Ltd.	  
	  
Workshops	  attended	  
Old	  Dogs,	  New	  Tricks:	  film	  and	  their	  audience:	  17	  October	  2013.	  London	  
Presenter:	  Professor	  Ian	  Christie,	  Europa	  Cinema	  
	  
European	  Digital	  Cinema:	  25	  September	  2008.	  London.	  
Moderator:	  David	  Hancock,	  Senior	  Analyst,	  Film	  and	  Cinema	  Screen	  Digest	  
John	  Fithian,	  President,	  National	  Association	  of	  Theatre	  Owners	  (NATO)	  
Stewart	  Till,	  Chairman,	  UK	  Film	  Council	  
Howard	  Kiedaisch,	  CEO,	  Arts	  Alliance	  Media	  
Michael	  Karagosian,	  Digital	  Cinema	  Consultant,	  NATO	  
Bernard	  Collard,	  SVP	  and	  General	  Manager,	  XDC	  Cinema	  
Tim	  Richards,	  CEO,	  Vue	  Cinemas	  
Phil	  Clapp,	  CEO,	  Cinema	  Exhibitors’	  Association	  
Peter	  Seabrook-­‐Harris,	  Regional	  Sales	  Director,	  Pearl	  &	  Dean	  
	  
THE	   9th	   DeSantis	   Center	   Workshop	   Summit	   in	   Motion	   Picture	   Industry	   Studies:	  
November	  02-­‐03,	  2007.	  Los	  Angeles.	  
Chaired	  by:	  Bruce	  Mallen	  
	  
The	  8th	  DeSantis	  Center	  Workshop	  Summit	  in	  Motion	  Picture	  Industry	  Studies:	  10-­‐11	  
November	  2006.	  Fort	  Lauderdale.	  
Chaired	  by:	  Bruce	  Mallen	  
Film:	  The	  Once	  and	  Future	  Business	  Models:	  Gigi	  Johnson,	  UCLA	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Robust	  Analysis	  of	  Movie	  Earnings:	  W.	  D.	  Walls,	  University	  of	  Calgary	  	  
Impact	  of	  Individual	  Critics:	  Suman	  Basuroy,	  Florida	  Atlantic	  University	  	  
Consumption	  of	  Motion	  Pictures:	  Morris	  B.	  Holbrook,	  Columbia	  University	  
Movie	  Star	  Salaries	  and	  Revenue	  Volatility:	  Amit	  Joshi,	  University	  of	  Central	  Florida	  	  
Knowledge	  Integration	  in	  Bollywood	  Film	  Production:	  Jamal	  Shamsie,	  MSU	  	  
An	  Empirical	  Analysis	  of	  the	  Platform	  Release	  Strategy:	  Xinlei	  Chen,	  UBC	  
Digital	  Cinema	  as	  Disruptive	  Technology:	  Nigel	  Culkin,	  UH	  
Uniform	  Pricing	  at	  the	  Box	  Office":	  Barak	  Y.	  Orbach,	  University	  of	  Arizona	  
How	  Box	  Office	  Revenue	  Cycles	  Influence	  Movie	  Exhibition	  Rivalry":	  Darlene	  
Chisholm,	  Suffolk	  University	  
	  
European	  Digital	  Cinema:	  28	  September	  2006.	  London.	  
Moderator:	  David	  Hancock,	  Senior	  Analyst,	  Film	  and	  Cinema	  Screen	  Digest	  
Julian	  Levin,	  EVP,	  Digital	  Exhibition&	  Non-­‐Theatrical	  Sales,	  Fox	  
Kurt	  Hall,	  President	  and	  CEO,	  National	  CineMedia	  
David	  Kerr,	  Vice	  President,	  Print	  and	  Related	  Services,	  UIP	  
Tony	  Chambers,	  Vice	  President	  of	  Sales	  and	  Finance,	  BVI	  Europe	  
Fiona	  Deans,	  Director	  of	  Digital	  Cinema,	  Arts	  Alliance	  Media	  
Tim	  Richards,	  CEO,	  Vue	  Cinemas	  
Etienne	  Traisnel,	  Director,	  CN	  Films	  
Edward	  Fletcher,	  Managing	  Director,	  Soda	  Pictures	  
Peter	  Wilson,	  Chairman,	  Technical	  Module,	  EDCF	  
	  
European	  Digital	  Cinema	  Forum:	  12	  September	  2006.	  Amsterdam.	  
Chaired	  by:	  David	  Monk,	  City	  University	  and	  MonkVision,	  UK	  
Participants	  included:	  
Patrick	  von	  Sychowski,	  Unique	  Digital,	  Norway	  
David	  Hancock,	  Senior	  Analyst,	  Film	  &	  Cinema,	  Screen	  Digest,	  UK	  
Steve	  Perrin,	  UK	  Film	  Council,	  UK	  	  
Olivier	  Hillaire,	  Manice,	  France	  
Rolv	  Gjestland,	  Film	  &	  Kino,	  Norway	  
Nico	  Simon,	  Utopia	  Group,	  Luxembourg	  
Bernard	  Collard,	  XDC	  International,	  Belgium	  
Siegried	  Foessel,	  Project	  Manager,	  Fraunhofer,	  Germany	  
John	  Graham,	  EDCF,	  UK	  
Francois	  Helt,	  Doremi,	  UK	  
Peter	  Wilson,	  HDDC,	  UK	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The	  7th	  DeSantis	  Center	  Workshop	  Summit	  in	  Motion	  Picture	  Industry	  Studies:	  11-­‐12	  
November	  2005.	  Fort	  Lauderdale.	  
Chaired	  by:	  Bruce	  Mallen	  
The	  Movie	  Rating	  System:	  Tino	  Balio,	  University	  of	  Wisconsin	  	  
The	  Consumption	  Characteristics	  of	  Film:	  An	  Historical	  Viewpoint:	  John	  Sedgwick,	  
LMU	  
Industry	  Trends	  in	  American	  Film	  and	  TV:	  1984-­‐2001:	  Eli	  Noam,	  Columbia	  University	  
Global	  Hollywood	  and	  the	  Cultural	  Labor:	  Toby	  Miller,	  University	  of	  California	  
Cross-­‐Country	  Analysis	  of	  Motion	  Picture	  Piracy:	  W.	  David	  Walls,	  University	  of	  
Calgary	  
Prior	  Learning	  by	  Production	  Companies:	  Jamal	  Shamsie,	  Michigan	  State	  University	  
Movie	  Advertising	  and	  the	  Stock	  Market	  Valuation	  of	  Studios:	  Amit	  Joshi,	  UCF	  
	   	  
Super	  Bowl	  Advertising	  for	  Movies	  Charles	  B.	  Weinberg,	  University	  of	  British	  
Columbia	  
Improving	  Contract	  Design	  in	  the	  Exhibition	  Market:	  Darren	  Filson,	  Claremont	  
University	  
When	  to	  Exit	  a	  Product:	  Evidence	  from	  U.S.	  Motion	  Pictures	  Exhibition	  Market:	  
Darlene	  C.	  Chisholm,	  Suffolk	  University	  &	  George	  Norman,	  Tufts	  University	  
Is	  Silence	  Golden?	  An	  Inquiry	  into	  the	  Meaning	  of	  Silence	  in	  Movie	  Critics	  
Evaluations:	  Suman	  Basuroy,	  Florida	  Atlantic	  University,	  Peter	  Boatwright,	  Carnegie	  
Mellon	  University	  and	  Wagner	  A.	  Kamakura,	  Duke	  University	  
Impact	  of	  Critics	  on	  Movie	  Revenues	  and	  Returns:	  S.	  Abraham	  Ravid,	  Rutgers	  
University	  
Measuring	  Word	  of	  Mouth’s	  Impact	  on	  Theatrical	  Movie	  Admissions:	  Charles	  Moul,	  
Washington	  University	  
	  
European	  Digital	  Cinema	  Forum:	  13	  September	  2006.	  Amsterdam.	  
Chaired	  by:	  Peter	  Wilson	  
Participants	  included:	  
Peter	  Walford,	  Plexipus	  Consulting,	  Netherlands	  
David	  Hancock,	  Senior	  Analyst,	  Film	  &	  Cinema,	  Screen	  Digest,	  UK	  
Peter	  Dinges,	  CEO,	  FFA,	  Germany	  
Olivier	  Hillaire,	  Manice,	  France	  
Rolv	  Gjestland,	  Film	  &	  Kino,	  Norway	  
Charles	  Flynn,	  Executive	  Director,	  DCinema	  Compliance	  Group,	  France	  
Kommer	  Kleijn,	  Freelance,	  Direcctor	  of	  Photography	  -­‐	  Stereographer,	  Belgium	  
Siegried	  Foessel,	  Project	  Manager,	  Fraunhofer,	  Germany	  
John	  Graham,	  EDCF,	  UK	  
Francois	  Helt,	  Doremi,	  UK	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Appendix	  2:	  Research	  model,	  data	  and	  methodology	  	  
Table	  1.	  Main	  descriptive	  statistics	  	  
Variable	   Repeated	  measures	  	   n	   Minimum	   Maximum	   Mean	   Median	  
Std	  
Dev.	  
Dig	  Screens	  %	   2005,	  08,	  11,	  13	   135	   .00	   100.00	   36.16	   17.07	   37.35	  
3D	  Dig	  Screens	  %	   2009,	  11,	  13	   99	   3.15	   100.00	   46.86	   54.33	   28.99	  
Screen	  Density	   2005,	  08,	  11,	  13	   140	   .55	   15.17	   5.34	   5.24	   2.96	  
Screens	  x	  Site	   2007,	  09,	  11,	  13	   141	   1.00	   6.74	   2.89	   2.49	   1.33	  
Admiss	  x	  Person	   2005,	  08,	  11,	  13	   140	   .04	   4.92	   1.54	   1.37	   1.00	  
GBO	  x	  Screen	   2005,	  08,	  11,	  13	   134	   20.90	   347.41	   181.09	   168.63	   86.26	  
Ticket	  Price	  
2005,	  08,	  11,	  13	  
136	   2.00	   12.96	   5.99	   5.82	   2.32	  
Ticket	  at	  constant	  price	  	   134	   1.73	   12.02	   5.22	   5.16	   2.20	  





125	   .00	   52.25	   14.30	   10.38	   12.38	  
Non	  National	  Share%	   110	   1.45	   44.20	   14.63	   13.49	   7.19	  
US	  Share	  %	   113	   31.50	   95.00	   67.65	   68.19	   12.52	  
RoW	  Share	  %	   112	   .17	   24.30	   2.27	   1.74	   3.07	  
Top	  5	  Distrib	  %	   2005,	  08,	  11,	  13	   101	   44.70	   99.40	   79.19	   79.50	   13.12	  
Top	  1	  Exhib	  %	  
2005,	  08,	  11,	  13	  
117	   2.10	   86.11	   25.26	   23.44	   14.93	  
Top	  5	  Exhib	  %	  	   118	   5.77	   100.00	   50.50	   52.90	   22.23	  
Notes:	  Maximum	  number	  of	  countries	  is	  36.	  Main	  descriptive	  statistics	  of	  pooled	  repeated	  measures.	  	  
	  
The	   complete	   model	   is	   formed	   by	   the	   two	   main	   effects	   and	   the	   interaction	   between	  
them:	  
Y	  =	  f	  (	  BSFactor,	  WSFactor,	  WSFactor	  x	  BSFactor	  )	  	   (1)	  
The	  model	  underlying	  in	  (1)	  can	  be	  written	  as	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   yigj	  =	  µ	  +	  αg	  +	  βj	  +	  γgj	  +	  eigj	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   (2)	  
where	  the	  score	  yigj	  of	   the	   ith	  subject	  belong	  to	  gth	  group	  and	  at	   jth	  assessment	   is	  
decomposed	   into	  an	  overall	  mean	   (µ),	   a	   group	  effect	   (αg),	   an	  assessment	  occasion	  
effect	   (βj),	   an	   interaction	   between	   group	   and	   occasion	   (γgj)	   and	   an	   error	   (eigj);	   	   n	  
denoting	  as	  usual	   sample	  size	   i	  =	  1,	   ...,	  n;	  g	  being	   the	   level	  of	   the	  between-­‐subject	  
factor	  g	  =	  1,	  ...	  G,	  and	  m	  the	  repeatedly	  observed	  occasions	  j	  =	  1,	  ...,	  m.	  
The	  main	  between-­‐subject	  factor	  (BSFactor)	  tests	  for	  no	  overall	  group	  differences.	  The	  
level	  hypothesis	   states	   that	  disregarding	   time,	   the	  group	  means	  are	   the	  same	  (i.e.,	  
the	  marginal	  means	  by	  group,	  averaging	  over	  all	  occasions).	  The	  main	  within-­‐subject	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effect	  (WSFactor)	  tests	  for	  no	  change	  over	  time.	  The	  null	  hypothesis	  is	  the	  equal	  yearly	  
marginal	  means	   (the	   flatness	  hypothesis),	   regardless	  of	   the	   rest	  of	  variables	   in	   the	  
model.	   The	   interaction	   effect	   (WSFactor	   x	   BSFactor)	   tests	   for	   no	   time-­‐by-­‐group	  
interaction.	   This	   is	   also	   called	   parallelism	   hypothesis	   because	   the	   group-­‐specific	  
profiles	   (connecting	  the	  group	  means	  across	   time)	  would	  be	  parallel	  under	   the	  null	  
hypothesis.	  The	  interaction	  effect	  is	  the	  most	  interesting	  one	  in	  this	  research	  context,	  
since	   it	   tests	   a	   relation	   between	   the	   time	   evolution	   and	   the	   factor	   clustering	   that	  
produces	  different	  means	  on	  the	  response	  variable.	  	  
Besides	  the	  usual	  ANOVA’s	  assumptions,	   in	  the	  mixed	  design	  ANOVA	  the	  validity	  of	  
the	  within-­‐subject	  test	  is	  based	  on	  the	  special	  assumption	  of	  sphericity	  (Maxwell	  and	  
Delaney,	  2004).	  	  The	  sphericity	  condition	  implies	  that	  any	  two	  repeated	  assessments	  
correlate	   to	   the	   same	   extent,	   an	   assumption	   that	   is	   not	   very	   likely	   in	   most	  
longitudinal	   studies.	   When	   sphericity	   condition	   is	   not	   plausible,	   the	   e-­‐correction	  
procedure	  is	  then	  used.	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Appendix	  3:	  Country	  clustering	  according	  to	  the	  d-­‐cinema	  adoption	  









Country	   Code	   Country	   Code	   Country	   Code	   Country	   Code	  





Belgium	   BEL	   Portugal	   PRT	   Sweden	   SWE	   Lithuania	   LTU	  










Iceland	   ISL	   France	   FRA	   Hungary	   HUN	   Latvia	   LVA	  




MLT	   Turkey	   TUR	  




SVK	   Slovenia	   SVN	  
Romania	   ROM	   Switzerland	   CHE	   Italy	   ITA	   Greece	   GRC	  




RUS	   Spain	   ESP	  




GBR	   Estonia	   EST	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Appendix	  4:	  Two-­‐way	  mixed	  ANOVA	  model	  
	  
Two-­‐way	  mixed	  ANOVA	  model	  
	  
Variable	   Years	  
Mauchly’s	  test	   Time	  Effect	   Adopter	   Interaction	  
W	   p-­‐value	   F	   p-­‐value	   F	   p-­‐value	   F	   p-­‐value	  
1	   3D	  Dig	  Screens	  %	   2009,	  11,	  13	   .931	   .366	   367.011	   .000	   .677	   .573	   4.810	   .000	  
2	   Screen	  Density	   2005,	  08,	  11,	  13	   .044	   .000	   .736	   .448	   1.325	   .285	   2.065	   .094	  
3	   Screens	  x	  Site	   2007,	  09,	  11,	  13	   .162	   .000	   11.727	   .000	   2.384	   .090	   1.577	   .167	  
4	   Admiss	  x	  Person	   2005,	  08,	  11,	  13	   .175	   .000	   1.648	   .206	   2.254	   .054	   3.366	   .011	  
5	   GBO	  x	  Screen	   2005,	  08,	  11,	  13	   .244	   .000	   11.607	   .000	   5.824	   .003	   1.362	   .243	  
6	  
Ticket	  Price	  
2005,	  08,	  11,	  13	  
.118	   .000	   30.646	   .000	   1.951	   .144	   .743	   .606	  
Ticket	  at	  constant	  price	  	   .171	   .000	   .934	   .387	   1.973	   .141	   .825	   .541	  
7	  





.539	   .020	   2.801	   .046	   .585	   .631	   .751	   .661	  
Non	  National	  Share%	   .707	   .327	   4.680	   .006	   1.437	   .265	   .939	   .499	  
US	  Share	  %	   .369	   .003	   4.003	   .016	   1.203	   .336	   1.034	   .423	  
RoW	  Share	  %	   .669	   .212	   3.610	   .019	   1.422	   .267	   .975	   .470	  
8	   Top	  5	  Distrib	  %	   2005,	  08,	  11,	  13	   .732	   .354	   .138	   .937	   .719	   .553	   1.259	   .279	  
9	  
Top	  1	  Exhib	  	  
2005,	  08,	  11,	  13	  
.233	   .000	   8.407	   .000	   2.201	   .114	   .270	   .964	  
Top	  5	  Exhib	  %	  	   .186	   .000	   16.717	   .000	   4.060	   .018	   .699	   .657	  
Notes:	  Years	  informs	  the	  time	  moments	  where	  the	  dependent	  variable	  is	  repeated	  measured.	  W	  test	  is	  the	  Mauchly’s	  sphericity	  test.	  W	  and	  F	  
statistic	  values,	  and	  associated	  p-­‐values	  are	  reported.	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Appendix	  5:	  Speech	  by	  Tony	  Hall,	  Director-­‐General	  of	  the	  BBC	  
	  
Speech	  by	  Tony	  Hall,	  Director-­‐General	  of	  the	  BBC,	  to	  BBC	  staff	  in	  Birmingham	  on	  11	  
January	  2017.	  
	  
Check	  against	  delivery	  
	  
Good	  morning,	  and	  -­‐	  if	  it's	  not	  too	  late	  to	  say	  so	  -­‐	  a	  very	  Happy	  New	  Year!	  
	  
For	  me,	  and	  for	  the	  whole	  of	  the	  BBC,	  this	  new	  year	  is	  a	  particularly	  important	  one	  –	  because	  
it's	  year	  one	  of	  our	  11-­‐year	  charter.	  It's	  a	  great	  moment:	  the	  beginning	  of	  a	  new	  chapter.	  
	  
And	  that's	  why	  this	  morning	  I	  want	  to	  start	  a	  conversation	  with	  you:	  about	  where	  the	  BBC	  is	  
going,	  what	  we	  want	  it	  to	  be,	  and	  what	  we’re	  going	  to	  do	  -­‐	  together	  -­‐	  to	  get	  it	  there.	  
	  
And	  what	  better	  place	  to	  talk	  about	  the	  future	  than	  in	  Birmingham?	  
	  
I'm	  always	  pleased	  to	  come	  back	  here.	  I	  remember	  my	  first	  visit,	  a	  week	  into	  the	  job,	  and	  
being	  shocked	  at	  how	  empty	  the	  place	  was.	  Sure,	  our	  news	  teams,	  the	  daytime	  drama	  village	  
The	  Archers,	  and	  the	  Asian	  Network,	  were	  all	  doing	  great	  things…	  but	  I	  left	  determined	  that	  
the	  BBC	  could	  do	  so	  much	  more	  for	  the	  midlands	  -­‐	  and	  for	  you.	  
	  
Three	  years	  on,	  and	  the	  Mailbox	  is	  now	  full	  -­‐	  over	  700	  people.	  This	  building	  is	  now	  the	  centre	  
for	  skills	  and	  development	  for	  the	  whole	  of	  the	  BBC,	  with	  HR	  and	  the	  Academy	  all	  based	  
here.	  And	  we're	  preparing	  the	  place	  for	  BBC	  Three	  next	  year	  –	  working	  with	  our	  digital	  
teams,	  universities	  and	  partners	  around	  the	  city	  to	  make	  the	  move	  a	  big	  success.	  
	  
We’re	  making	  this	  building	  one	  of	  the	  vital	  hubs	  for	  innovation	  and,	  in	  doing	  so,	  we	  are	  
drawing	  on	  Birmingham’s	  status	  as	  a	  diverse	  young	  city	  -­‐	  one	  of	  the	  youngest	  in	  Europe,	  with	  
nearly	  a	  third	  under	  20,	  and	  home	  to	  some	  of	  the	  voices	  that	  most	  need	  to	  be	  heard	  around	  
the	  UK.	  It’s	  an	  outstanding	  turnaround,	  and	  I’d	  like	  to	  thank	  every	  one	  of	  you	  here	  today	  
who’s	  helped	  make	  it	  happen.	  
	  
The	  BBC	  has	  a	  proud	  past	  in	  Birmingham,	  and	  what	  you've	  all	  been	  doing	  is	  making	  sure	  it's	  
there	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  our	  future	  too.	  And	  this	  is	  my	  starting	  point	  today:	  how	  we	  build	  on	  the	  
very	  best	  of	  our	  past,	  to	  create	  the	  strongest	  possible	  BBC	  for	  the	  years	  ahead.	  
	  
Reinventing	  the	  BBC	  for	  a	  new	  generation	  
The	  start	  of	  a	  new	  Charter	  is	  a	  critical	  moment.	  It’s	  the	  chance	  to	  set	  our	  sights	  high	  for	  the	  
next	  11	  years,	  to	  mobilise	  the	  whole	  of	  the	  BBC	  behind	  a	  really	  clear,	  really	  ambitious	  goal.	  
	  
So,	  this	  is	  my	  challenge:	  over	  the	  next	  few	  years,	  I	  want	  us	  to	  reinvent	  public	  service	  
broadcasting	  for	  a	  new	  generation.	  Now,	  let	  me	  say	  straight	  away:	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  
somehow	  forsaking	  our	  existing	  audiences	  -­‐	  that	  would	  be	  stupid.	  As	  I've	  said	  many	  times	  
before,	  we	  have	  to	  ride	  two	  horses:	  doing	  brilliant	  things	  on	  our	  existing	  channels	  and	  
services,	  but	  also	  innovating	  in	  the	  digital	  space.	  
	  
Our	  task	  therefore	  is	  to	  reinvent	  public	  service	  broadcasting	  so	  that	  it	  works	  for	  all	  
audiences,	  so	  that	  everyone	  gets	  value	  from	  the	  BBC.	  
	   182	  
Why	  is	  this	  so	  important?	  During	  the	  hard-­‐fought	  debates	  about	  the	  Charter,	  we	  learned	  
something	  that	  we	  should	  draw	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  comfort	  from.	  The	  public	  believe	  that	  our	  
mission	  is	  as	  relevant	  today	  as	  it	  has	  ever	  been.	  
	  
Audiences	  continue	  to	  value	  what	  we	  do	  -­‐	  in	  fact,	  they	  value	  it	  more	  than	  ever.	  And	  -­‐	  
Ofcom's	  research	  shows	  -­‐	  young	  people	  value	  public	  service	  broadcasting	  as	  much	  as	  all	  of	  us	  
-­‐	  a	  really	  crucial	  point	  to	  remember.	  
	  
But	  if	  young	  people	  value	  what	  we	  do,	  reaching	  them	  is	  a	  whole	  different	  matter.	  In	  fact,	  it's	  
one	  of	  the	  single	  biggest	  strategic	  issues	  we	  now	  face.	  Why?	  Well,	  first,	  because	  there's	  so	  
much	  competition	  for	  their	  time.	  
	  
Adults	  spend	  eight	  percent	  of	  their	  media	  time	  on	  social	  media	  and	  messaging.	  For	  16-­‐24	  
year-­‐olds,	  it’s	  25	  percent.	  Across	  the	  whole	  of	  the	  TV	  market,	  time	  spent	  with	  young	  
audiences	  has	  fallen	  by	  20	  to	  30	  percent.	  It’s	  the	  same	  story	  with	  radio.	  Increasingly,	  younger	  
audiences	  and	  older	  audiences	  are	  consuming	  media	  in	  different	  ways.	  So	  we	  have	  to	  
respond.	  
	  
I	  think	  the	  second	  big	  issue	  is	  that	  the	  media	  landscape	  has	  changed	  beyond	  recognition.	  It	  is	  
hugely	  more	  global	  and	  more	  competitive.	  We’re	  now	  in	  an	  environment	  where	  Amazon,	  
Netflix,	  and	  others	  are	  willing	  to	  invest	  huge	  amounts	  of	  money	  with	  no	  certain	  return	  in	  an	  
attempt	  to	  capture	  market	  share	  where	  Facebook	  is	  looking	  at	  commissioning	  its	  own	  TV	  
programmes,	  and	  Twitter	  is	  buying	  up	  sports	  rights	  and	  where	  moves	  such	  as	  the	  Fox-­‐Sky	  
merger	  are	  making	  the	  very	  biggest	  players	  even	  bigger.	  
	  
Real	  cause	  for	  confidence	  
	  
But	  despite	  these	  challenges	  -­‐	  and	  more	  -­‐	  I	  believe	  we	  should	  be	  confident	  about	  our	  future.	  
We	  may	  be	  financially	  small	  compared	  with	  some	  -­‐	  but	  our	  impact	  can	  be	  huge.	  We	  are	  still,	  
by	  far,	  the	  media	  provider	  that	  young	  audiences	  use	  the	  most,	  and	  with	  whom	  they	  spend	  
the	  most	  time.	  
	  
We	  are	  a	  powerful	  provider	  of	  programming	  and	  services	  to	  children	  -­‐	  CBeebies	  is	  the	  top	  
channel	  for	  the	  under-­‐sixes,	  CBBC	  for	  the	  over-­‐sixes…	  Bitesize	  is	  a	  necessity	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  
revision	  at	  GCSE	  time.	  For	  the	  16-­‐34	  age	  group,	  BBC	  One	  is	  still	  their	  top	  TV	  channel	  -­‐	  the	  one	  
the	  watch	  the	  most.	  Overall	  they	  spend	  11	  hours	  with	  the	  BBC	  each	  week	  -­‐	  nearly	  four	  times	  
more	  than	  they’re	  on	  Facebook.	  It’s	  also	  a	  major	  advantage	  that	  we	  have	  the	  stability	  of	  an	  
11-­‐year	  settlement,	  and	  are	  sure	  of	  our	  budget	  for	  the	  next	  five	  years.	  
	  
Now	  of	  course,	  we	  will	  have	  some	  hard	  choices	  to	  make	  to	  live	  within	  our	  means,	  I	  don’t	  
want	  to	  hide	  that	  fact	  from	  you.	  But	  at	  least	  we	  have	  certainty	  in	  an	  uncertain	  world.	  It’s	  
something	  most	  organisations	  would	  kill	  for	  -­‐	  so	  we	  need	  to	  make	  it	  count.	  But	  perhaps	  the	  
biggest	  cause	  for	  confidence	  is	  this:	  over	  the	  past	  year,	  we	  have	  proved	  yet	  again	  that	  when	  
you	  provide	  real	  quality,	  audiences	  -­‐	  young	  and	  old	  -­‐	  respond.	  
	  
That’s	  why	  51	  million	  people	  of	  all	  ages	  came	  to	  us	  for	  our	  sports	  coverage	  last	  summer.	  
Why,	  though	  we	  only	  have	  two	  percent	  of	  the	  total	  hours	  of	  sport	  broadcast,	  we	  have	  37	  
percent	  of	  the	  audience.	  
	  
And	  they	  don’t	  just	  come	  to	  us	  for	  big	  events.	  Our	  programmes	  have	  become	  big	  events	  -­‐	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whether	  that’s	  The	  Night	  Manager,	  Ed	  Balls	  on	  Strictly,	  or	  Sherlock	  at	  New	  Year.	  Planet	  Earth	  
II	  ended	  up	  topping	  the	  Sunday	  night	  ratings.	  More	  16-­‐34	  year-­‐olds	  watched	  it	  than	  watched	  
The	  X-­‐Factor	  on	  ITV.	  And,	  we've	  also	  learnt	  over	  the	  last	  year	  that	  when	  we	  innovate	  online,	  
we	  can	  have	  a	  similar	  impact.	  
	  
Our	  children’s	  apps	  have	  now	  been	  downloaded	  11	  million	  times,	  on	  YouTube,	  Radio	  1	  is	  the	  
biggest	  radio	  station	  in	  the	  world	  and	  BBC	  Three	  is	  setting	  new	  standards	  for	  short-­‐from	  
content.	  Their	  Amazing	  Humans	  video	  about	  Gabi	  Shull	  -­‐	  the	  dancer	  still	  doing	  ballet	  despite	  
losing	  her	  leg	  to	  cancer	  -­‐	  got	  78	  million	  views.	  We	  know	  that	  when	  we	  do	  things	  of	  quality,	  
audiences	  -­‐	  old	  and	  young	  -­‐	  come	  to	  the	  BBC.	  Traditional	  values,	  delivered	  in	  traditional	  -­‐	  but	  
also	  innovative,	  new	  ways.	  
	  
Three	  priorities	  for	  success	  
So,	  if	  our	  aim	  is	  to	  reinvent	  public	  service	  broadcasting	  for	  the	  next	  generation,	  I	  believe	  we	  
need	  to	  concentrate	  on	  three	  priorities:	  
	   	   Our	  creativity	  
	   	   Our	  culture	  
	   	   And	  our	  global	  ambition	  
	  
1.	  Our	  creativity	  
	  
First,	  our	  creativity…	  Or,	  to	  you	  and	  me,	  our	  programmes	  and	  services.	  
	  
I	  want	  the	  BBC	  during	  this	  Charter	  to	  be	  defined	  by	  boldness,	  originality,	  and	  risk	  taking.	  I	  
want	  us	  to	  have	  the	  courage	  of	  our	  convictions,	  to	  dare	  to	  do	  the	  things	  that	  others	  won’t.	  
To	  hear,	  again	  and	  again,	  “only	  the	  BBC	  would	  do	  that”.	  
	  
Not	  just	  doing	  what	  no-­‐one	  else	  does,	  but	  breaking	  new	  ground	  and	  leading	  the	  way.	  This	  is	  
something	  I	  care	  about	  passionately,	  and	  we	  must	  get	  right	  over	  the	  coming	  years	  because	  
it’s	  the	  true	  test	  of	  our	  creativity,	  and	  the	  true	  measure	  of	  our	  distinctiveness.	  Of	  course,	  we	  
are	  already	  on	  great	  form	  -­‐	  and	  many	  congratulations	  to	  The	  Night	  Manager	  team	  for	  their	  
well-­‐deserved	  gongs	  at	  the	  Golden	  Globes.	  
	  
But	  we	  all	  know	  we	  can	  never	  stand	  still	  -­‐	  we	  always	  need	  to	  generate	  new	  ideas,	  innovate	  
further,	  and	  take	  greater	  risks.	  This	  is	  what	  has	  to	  motivate	  us	  constantly	  in	  all	  our	  
traditionally	  delivered	  services	  but	  now	  we	  also	  need	  to	  look	  again	  to	  the	  online	  space,	  
where	  competition	  is	  highest,	  new	  audiences	  are	  most	  present,	  and	  where	  I	  believe	  we	  can	  
serve	  them	  in	  brilliant	  new	  ways.	  
	  
We	  need	  to	  reinvent	  iPlayer	  -­‐	  It	  was	  the	  biggest	  revolution	  of	  the	  last	  Charter.	  It’s	  been	  the	  
number	  one	  video-­‐on-­‐demand	  service	  in	  the	  UK,	  reaching	  more	  people	  than	  any	  other.	  
Now	  we	  need	  it	  to	  make	  the	  leap	  from	  a	  catch-­‐up	  service	  to	  a	  must-­‐visit	  destination	  in	  its	  
own	  right.	  Our	  goal,	  even	  in	  the	  face	  of	  rapid	  growth	  by	  our	  competitors,	  is	  for	  iPlayer	  to	  be	  
the	  number	  one	  online	  TV	  service	  in	  the	  UK.	  That	  will	  mean	  doubling	  our	  reach,	  and	  
quadrupling	  the	  time	  each	  person	  spends	  on	  it	  every	  week.	  And	  we	  want	  do	  it	  by	  2020.	  
That's	  tough,	  but	  I	  know	  we	  can	  do	  it.	  
	  
We	  need	  to	  do	  the	  same	  for	  audio	  -­‐	  or	  radio.	  Today	  we	  have	  the	  best	  speech	  and	  music	  radio	  
in	  the	  world.	  I	  think	  we	  can	  do	  so	  much	  more	  with	  our	  world-­‐class	  content.	  And,	  by	  the	  way,	  
win	  new	  global	  audiences.	  There	  is	  a	  challenge	  for	  the	  news	  teams	  too.	  Many	  of	  you	  have	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heard	  us	  speak	  about	  the	  distinction	  between	  ‘fast’	  and	  ‘slow’	  news	  services.	  
	  
We’re	  up	  there	  with	  the	  best	  in	  the	  world	  at	  telling	  people	  what’s	  happening	  right	  now,	  and	  
being	  where	  they	  come	  to	  find	  out	  what’s	  really	  going	  on.	  But	  I	  want	  us	  to	  do	  much	  more	  to	  
help	  our	  audiences	  understand	  what’s	  happening	  in	  the	  world	  today.	  And	  the	  thing	  that	  
brings	  all	  these	  challenges	  together	  is	  personalisation.	  This	  is	  a	  major	  priority.	  
	  
Data	  is	  creating	  a	  flight	  to	  quality.	  It	  means	  audiences	  can	  find	  the	  best	  of	  public	  service	  
broadcasting	  -­‐	  but	  only	  if	  they	  sign	  in.	  Each	  month,	  we	  now	  have	  around	  three	  million	  active	  
signed-­‐in	  users.	  I	  want	  to	  make	  that	  20	  million.	  And	  I	  want	  us	  to	  get	  there	  as	  quickly	  as	  
possible.	  More	  than	  anything	  else,	  this	  is	  what	  our	  future	  success	  will	  depend	  on.	  By	  finding	  
out	  more	  about	  our	  audiences	  and	  what	  they	  like,	  we	  can	  make	  better	  content,	  make	  it	  more	  
relevant,	  and	  bring	  it	  to	  them	  more	  effectively.	  The	  closer	  and	  more	  personal	  our	  
relationship	  with	  our	  audiences,	  the	  more	  I'm	  certain	  they	  will	  choose	  the	  BBC.	  And	  one	  
other	  point:	  I	  want	  us	  to	  examine	  what	  big	  technological	  changes	  -­‐	  such	  as	  voice	  recognition,	  
and	  virtual	  reality	  -­‐	  mean	  for	  us.	  How	  can	  we	  push	  boundaries,	  do	  new	  things,	  in	  the	  way	  
that	  we	  have	  done	  so	  well	  with	  new	  developments	  in	  the	  past.	  
	  
2.	  Our	  culture	  
My	  second	  major	  priority	  is	  our	  culture	  –	  making	  the	  BBC	  a	  great	  place	  to	  work.	  
Let	  me	  say	  first	  that,	  as	  I	  go	  around	  the	  country,	  I	  see	  lots	  of	  examples	  of	  where	  things	  are	  
going	  well	  and	  we	  have	  already	  made	  a	  start	  on	  simplifying	  the	  place:	  
	   Cutting	  overheads	  to	  just	  six	  percent	  -­‐	  better	  than	  most	  in	  the	  private	  sector	  
	   Reducing	  layers	  in	  many	  areas	  
	   Reducing	  divisions	  and	  boards	  
	   Halving	  the	  number	  of	  senior	  managers	  
	  
I	  know	  this	  has	  been	  very	  tough,	  and	  I	  really	  appreciate	  the	  way	  in	  which	  people	  have	  
responded.	  I	  also	  know	  that	  different	  parts	  of	  the	  organisation	  are	  moving	  at	  different	  
speeds,	  and	  we	  have	  plenty	  more	  to	  do.	  
	  
The	  priority	  has	  to	  be	  that	  we’re	  able	  work	  together	  across	  teams,	  and	  work	  fast.	  Because,	  
for	  me,	  the	  old	  way	  of	  doing	  things	  -­‐	  working	  in	  silos	  -­‐	  simply	  can’t	  succeed.	  Nor	  can	  the	  
traditional	  ways	  of	  delivering	  services	  -­‐	  big	  project	  plans,	  with	  budgets	  allocated	  five	  years	  
out.	  We’ve	  got	  to	  be	  much	  more	  entrepreneurial	  in	  our	  make-­‐up.	  What	  we	  did	  digitally	  last	  
summer	  for	  the	  Olympics	  shows	  where	  we	  need	  to	  be	  every	  day.	  For	  me,	  the	  biggest	  triumph	  
was	  how	  our	  technical	  and	  editorial	  teams	  came	  together	  to	  solve	  problems	  and	  innovate	  
with	  the	  full	  trust	  and	  support	  of	  management,	  refusing	  to	  let	  internal	  barriers	  get	  in	  their	  
way.	  Changing,	  responding,	  and	  adapting	  rapidly.	  
	  
We	  have	  to	  understand:	  the	  big	  beasts	  we	  are	  up	  against	  are	  already	  working	  in	  a	  very	  
different	  way.	  And	  we’re	  not	  only	  small	  by	  comparison	  -­‐	  but	  we	  can	  make	  ourselves	  smaller	  
still	  when	  we	  operate	  in	  silos.	  That’s	  why	  I	  attach	  such	  importance	  to	  making	  this	  a	  great	  
place	  to	  work.	  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  year,	  I	  want	  all	  of	  you	  to	  be	  able	  to	  say	  four	  things:	  
	   That	  we	  are	  making	  things	  simpler	  
	   That	  we	  value	  each	  other	  and	  celebrate	  success	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  Challenging	  ourselves	  and	  each	  other	  to	  be	  bolder,	  more	  imaginative,	  more	  creative	  
	   And	  that	  all	  of	  you	  feel	  your	  managers	  at	  all	  levels	  -­‐	  including	  myself	  -­‐	  are	  more	  visible	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  and	  accessible	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3.	  Our	  global	  ambition	  
My	  third	  priority	  is	  being	  much	  more	  ambitious	  for	  the	  BBC	  globally.	  Today,	  thanks	  to	  you,	  
we	  punch	  well	  above	  our	  weight	  worldwide.	  And,	  as	  one	  of	  the	  country’s	  most	  valuable	  
exports,	  we	  help	  the	  UK	  punch	  above	  its	  weight	  too.	  I	  believe	  that,	  right	  now	  in	  the	  post-­‐
Brexit	  world,	  the	  country	  needs	  us	  more	  than	  ever	  and	  we	  need	  to	  do	  more	  than	  ever	  for	  
Britain.	  That’s	  why,	  last	  autumn,	  I	  was	  so	  proud	  to	  be	  able	  to	  announce	  the	  historic	  
expansion	  of	  our	  World	  Service	  -­‐	  the	  biggest	  since	  the	  1940s.	  But	  beyond	  the	  World	  Service,	  I	  
believe	  there	  are	  two	  major	  factors	  that	  will	  be	  critical	  to	  our	  future	  global	  success.	  
	  
The	  first	  is	  BBC	  Studios	  -­‐	  and	  now	  we	  have	  the	  go-­‐ahead.	  I	  don’t	  need	  to	  tell	  you	  that	  this	  
represents	  a	  true	  revolution	  in	  the	  way	  we	  source	  and	  make	  our	  programmes.	  Yes,	  it	  means	  
a	  degree	  of	  risk,	  with	  the	  contesting	  of	  current	  programmes,	  but	  it	  is	  also	  an	  incredible	  
opportunity.	  And	  there’s	  one	  announcement	  we’ll	  be	  making	  very	  shortly	  that	  will	  highlight	  
just	  how	  great	  that	  opportunity	  is.	  
	  
In	  both	  radio	  and	  television,	  we	  need	  to	  own	  intellectual	  property	  rights	  for	  the	  future.	  I	  
don't	  want	  us	  ever	  to	  become	  a	  publisher-­‐broadcaster.	  I’m	  convinced	  that	  Studios	  is	  the	  only	  
way	  we	  will	  secure	  our	  future	  as	  one	  of	  the	  very	  best	  programme-­‐makers	  in	  the	  world.	  And,	  
by	  the	  way,	  the	  first	  episode	  of	  Let	  it	  Shine	  -­‐	  made	  by	  our	  in-­‐house	  teams	  -­‐	  showed	  just	  how	  
creatively	  brilliant	  and	  warm-­‐hearted	  we	  are.	  
	  
But	  I	  don’t	  want	  us	  just	  to	  be	  brilliant	  at	  making	  high-­‐quality,	  distinctive	  British	  programmes.	  
I	  want	  us	  to	  be	  truly	  brilliant	  at	  exporting	  them	  across	  the	  globe.	  That’s	  why	  we	  need	  BBC	  
Worldwide	  to	  thrive	  as	  a	  strategic	  partner	  for	  BBC	  Studios,	  making	  the	  very	  most	  of	  our	  
global	  reach.	  My	  challenge	  to	  Worldwide	  is	  to	  look	  again	  at	  how	  we	  best	  grow	  our	  business	  
to	  deliver	  more	  returns	  back	  to	  BBC	  public	  service	  -­‐	  to	  reinvest	  in	  yet	  more	  great	  British	  
programmes	  and	  services.	  
	  
Conclusion	  
There	  is	  so	  much	  more	  I	  could	  say	  about	  the	  future.	  And	  I	  will	  have	  more	  to	  say.	  Between	  
now	  and	  Easter,	  I	  will	  be	  in	  Scotland	  to	  talk	  about	  the	  Nations	  and	  Regions,	  and	  what	  more	  
we	  need	  to	  do	  to	  represent	  the	  whole	  country	  and	  reflect	  a	  changing	  Britain	  to	  itself.	  I	  will	  be	  
saying	  more	  about	  our	  ambitions	  for	  drama,	  about	  our	  plans	  to	  transform	  our	  services	  for	  
children	  and	  I	  will	  be	  talking	  about	  our	  ideas	  in	  education	  and	  the	  arts.	  
	  
By	  the	  time	  we	  reach	  our	  centenary	  year	  in	  2022,	  I	  want	  a	  BBC	  that	  is	  irresistible	  to	  all	  our	  
audiences.	  In	  a	  world	  of	  near-­‐limitless	  choice	  I	  want	  people	  to	  carry	  on	  choosing	  us.	  
	  
But	  above	  all	  by	  our	  centenary,	  I	  want	  us	  to	  have	  shown	  that	  public	  service	  broadcasting	  has	  
even	  more	  to	  offer	  the	  UK	  and	  the	  world	  in	  the	  next	  century.	  Even	  more	  than	  it	  has	  done	  in	  
its	  first	  hundred	  years.	  That	  excites	  me.	  And	  having	  spoken	  briefly	  yesterday	  to	  David	  
Clementi,	  the	  preferred	  candidate	  for	  chair,	  I	  know	  it	  excites	  him	  too.	  Reinventing	  the	  BBC	  
for	  a	  new	  generation	  is	  where	  I	  will	  be	  pouring	  all	  my	  energies.	  I	  want	  to	  ask	  each	  of	  you	  to	  
do	  the	  same.	  Seeing	  you	  all	  and	  talking	  to	  you	  all,	  around	  the	  country,	  I	  profoundly	  believe	  
that	  we	  can	  meet	  the	  challenge.	  
	  
My	  thanks	  to	  Joe	  Godwin	  and	  the	  team	  for	  hosting	  me	  this	  morning.	  And	  to	  all	  of	  you	  for	  
listening	  and	  for	  your	  support.	  
	  
Thank	  you.	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Appendix	  6:	  P1	  Digital	  Cinema:	  No	  Country	  for	  Old	  Entrepreneurs?	  	  




This	   paper	   reflects	   on	   current	   developments	   in	   the	   exhibition	   sector	   of	   the	   movie	  
industry.	   It	  will	  examine	  why	  the	  adoption	  of	  an	   innovation	   (digital	  cinema),	  capable	  of	  
revolutionising	   the	   movie	   industry,	   has	   stumbled	   in	   its	   attempts	   to	   cross	   Geoffrey	  
Moore’s	  ‘chasm’	  (Moore,	  1991)	  and	  will	  argue	  that	  despite	  numerous	  setbacks,	  d-­‐cinema	  
can	  now	  rightly	  be	  considered	  within	  Christensen’s	  framework	  of	  disruptive	  technologies.	  	  
The	   author	   will	   examine	   the	   strategies	   of	   exhibitors	   at	   the	   forefront	   of	   the	   adoption	  
process;	   describe	   some	   of	   the	   emerging	   business	  models	   being	   developed	   to	   facilitate	  
change;	  and	  analyse	  how	  two	  different	  territories	  (the	  international	  markets	  of	  the	  USA	  
and	  India)	  are	  realising	  the	  opportunities	  afforded	  by	  this	  technology.	  	  
Finally	  he	  will	  project	  the	  overall	  implications	  of	  the	  advent	  of	  d-­‐cinema	  for	  the	  future	  of	  
the	   global	   movie	   industry	   and	   how	   (private	   and	   public)	   entrepreneurs	   are	   already	  
changing	  the	  basis	  of	  competition	  in	  certain	  sectors	  to	  create	  new	  markets.	  
	  
Keywords:	  Retail	  entrepreneurism,	  standards,	  innovation,	  adoption	  policy	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Introduction	  
In	  1869	  Charles	  Darwin	  wrote,	  “Natural	  selection	  acts	  only	  by	  taking	  advantage	  of	  slight	  
successive	  variations;	  she	  can	  never	  take	  a	  great	  and	  sudden	  leap,	  but	  must	  advance	  by	  
short	  and	   sure,	   though	   slow	  steps."	   In	   that	   same	  year	   celluloid	  was	  developed	  by	   John	  
Wesley	  Hyatt;	   later	   to	  become	   the	  universal	   platform	   for	  delivering	   feature	   film	  across	  
the	  world.	   	   By	   1900	  Hollywood	  had	   emerged	   as	   the	   home	  of	   the	  US	   film	   industry	   and	  
soon	   after	   cemented	   the	   dominant	   position	   worldwide.	   Since	   then	   the	   major	   players	  
have	  arguably	  followed	  Darwin’s	  dictum	  to	  maintain	  a	  position	  of	  control	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  
the	  content	  and	  revenues.	  	  
However,	   the	   operating	   business	   practices	   which	   have	   successfully	   underpinned	   the	  
movie	   industry	   since	   the	   early	   part	   of	   the	   20th	   Century	   are	   coming	   under	   increasing	  
attack.	  Digital	   cinema	   -­‐	  aiming	   to	   replace	  celluloid	  –	  makes	  use	  of	  digital	   technology	   to	  
produce,	  distribute	  and	  project	  motion	  pictures.	  For	  digital	  prints	  to	  be	  created,	  a	  digital	  
master	   is	   needed.	   This	   is	   already	   available	   for	   movies	   that	   have	   been	   edited	   digitally	  
(figure	  1).	  Movies,	  which	  do	  not	  go	  through	  a	  digital	  editing	  process,	  need	  to	  be	  scanned	  
to	   create	   a	   digital	   master	   so	   that	   the	   digital	   prints	   can	   be	   made.	   The	   digital	   process	  
converts	  each	  frame	  of	  the	  film	  into	  a	  digital	  image,	  composed	  of	  an	  array	  of	  millions	  of	  
elements	   known	   as	   ‘pixels’	   (figure	   1a).	   Even	   today	   almost	   all	   movies	   create	   a	   digital	  
master	   as	   this	   is	   required	   for	   TV	   and	   DVD	  masters	   and	   this	   master	   can	   be	   utilised	   to	  
create	  digital	  prints.	  The	  final	  product	  can	  be	  distributed	  via	  hard	  drives,	  DVDs	  or	  satellite	  
and	  projected	  using	  a	  digital	  projector	  instead	  of	  a	  conventional	  film	  projector.	  	  
>>>>Take	  in	  figure	  1<<<<	  
Faced	  with	  this	  innovation	  and	  fully	  aware	  of	  how	  digital	  distribution	  impacted	  negatively	  
on	   the	   major	   record	   labels,	   the	   US	   studios	   find	   themselves	   challenged	   by	   a	   new	  
generation	   of	   entrepreneurs;	   armed	   with	   a	   combination	   of	   ever	   more	   affordable	  
filmmaking	   tools,	   widening	   access	   to	   broadband	   networks	   and	   mobile	   communication	  
devices	  operating	  on	  digital	  platforms.	  Such	  profound	  change	  in	  the	  way	  entertainment	  is	  
being	   consumed	   across	   the	   globe	   has	   created	   a	   potential	   ‘tipping	   point’	   in	   the	  movie	  
business.	  	  
Independence	  Day	  
In	  this	  first	  part	  the	  author	  considers	  that	  the	  basic	  assumptions	  around	  the	  way	  in	  which	  
audiences	   engage	   with	   movies	   need	   to	   be	   re-­‐examined	   in	   light	   of	   three	   contributory	  
factors.	   First,	   both	   cinema	   audiences	   and	  DVD	   sales	   have	   been	   in	   relative	   decline	   in	   a	  
number	   of	   key	   markets	   over	   the	   past	   four	   years	   (Waterman,	   2005).	   Although	   the	   UK	  
reported	  box	  office	  receipts	  of	  £904M	  in	  2007	  (8%	  increase	  on	  2006)	  this	  was	  driven	  by	  
the	   release	  of	   three	  Hollywood	   sequels	   –	  Harry	   Potter	  And	   The	  Order	  Of	   The	  Phoenix,	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Pirates	  Of	   The	  Caribbean:	  At	  World's	   End	   and	   Shrek	   The	   Third.	   These	   three	   ‘tent	   pole’	  
movies7	   generated	   between	   them	   over	   £252M	   or	   just	   under	   30%	   of	   total	   revenue.	  
However,	   total	   box-­‐office	   admissions	   in	   European	   Union	   countries,	   fell	   2.2%	   in	   2007	  
compared	  to	  2006,	  (European	  Audiovisual	  Observatory,	  2008).	  
Second,	  the	  creative	  and	  commercial	  barriers,	  which	  have	  kept	  cinema	  tied	  to	  the	  major	  
US	  studios,	  are	  under	  threat	  through	  technological	  developments	  in	  the	  way	  movies	  are	  
created,	   stored,	   distributed	   and	   exhibited.	   Replacing	   celluloid	   film	   with	   d-­‐cinema	  
technology	   will	   arguably	   provide	   enormous	   opportunities	   for	   the	   exhibitor	   market	  
(Elberse	  &	  Eliashberg,	  2003).	  
Finally,	  a	   recent	  phenomenon	  forces	  us	   to	  consider	   the	  possible	  collapse	  of	   the	  cinema	  
industry	  through	  the	  demise	  of	  the	  ‘release	  window’	  agreement	  between	  the	  studios	  and	  
the	   cinema	   operators.	   Here,	   first	   run	   movies	   are	   shown	   in	   the	   cinema	   for	   up	   to	   six	  
months	  before	  release	  in	  other	  formats.	  	  	  Hollywood	  itself	  broke	  away	  from	  its	  traditional	  
release	   strategies	   several	   years	   ago	  with	   the	   introduction	   of	   global,	   single	   day	   release	  
date	   for	   ‘tent	   pole’	  movies,	   including	   Lord	   of	   the	   Rings,	   The	  Matrix	   and	   Pirates	   of	   the	  
Caribbean,	  instead	  of	  sequential	  releases	  by	  country.	  In	  addition	  to	  reducing	  piracy,	   it	   is	  
argued	   that	   a	   single,	   global	   release	   date	   also	   maximises	   the	   marketing	   impact	   of	  
advertising	   spending	   for	   a	   film.	   This	   strategy	   not	   only	   helps	   to	   increase	   the	   opening	  
weekend	  box	  office	  but	  also	  prevents	  negative	  word	  of	  mouth	  affecting	  audiences.	  The	  
year	   2006	   set	   new	   standards	   for	   global	   single	   day	   release	   strategies	  with	   phenomenal	  
starting	   box	   offices	   for	   X-­‐Men	   and	   DaVinci	   Code,	   which	   were	   both	   savaged	   by	   critics	  
afterwards	  (Culkin	  and	  Morawetz,	  2007);	   in	  this	  scenario	  a	  lack	  of	  consumer	  insight	  had	  
little	   negative	   impact	   on	   the	   all	   important	   opening	   weekend	   at	   the	   box	   office.	   If	  
Hollywood	   studios	   take	   advantage	   of	   the	   interest	   derived	   from	   a	   successful	  marketing	  
campaign	  by	  releasing	  a	  film	  simultaneously	  across	  several	  territories,	  why	  not	  release	  a	  
film	   simultaneously	   across	   several	   platforms	   in	   one	   country	   to	   maximise	   marketing	  
spending	  for	  a	  smaller	  film?	  	  
A	  recent	  study	  by	  Gerbrandt	  (2006)	  found	  that	  thirty-­‐six	  percent	  of	  cinema	  audiences	  said	  
they	  would	   skip	   theatrical	   releases	   altogether	   and	   rent	   the	  movie	   on	   DVD	   instead	   if	   a	  
movie	   were	   released	   on	   both	   platforms	   simultaneously.	   The	   study	   also	   found	   that	  
because	   of	   their	   lack	   of	   commitment	   to	   the	   cinema	  movie	   experience,	   younger	  movie	  
consumers	   posed	   the	   biggest	   threat	   to	   the	   exhibition	   community	   and	   the	   greatest	  
opportunities	  for	  those	  engaged	  in	  alternative	  platforms.	  	  The	  problem	  for	  the	  studios,	  as	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  	  A	  tent	  pole	  movie	  is	  considered	  the	  studio's	  major	  release	  in	  any	  given	  season	  –	  usually	  summer	  –	  which	  
is	  accompanied	  by	  an	  enormously	  wide	  release.	  	  The	  theory	  is	  that	  the	  studio's	  other	  pictures	  will	  be	  "held	  
up"	   by	   this	   tent	   pole	   and	   provide	   a	   profitable	   summer	   season.	   It	   is	   increasingly	   the	   start	   of,	   or	   an	  
installment	  in,	  a	  franchise.	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they	   seek	   to	   retain	   control	  of	  product	  distribution	   -­‐	   and	  effectively	  profit	   -­‐	   is	   that	   they	  
face	  the	  same	  disruption	  as	  that	  of	   the	  music	   industry	  conglomerates	  when	  confronted	  
by	  the	  social	  entrepreneur,	  Shawn	  Fanning	  who	  founded	  Napster	  -­‐	  a	  decentralised,	  easily-­‐
distributed	  programme	  which	  allowed	  users	  to	  share	  music	  and	  other	  files	  directly	  from	  
peer-­‐to-­‐peer	   over	   the	   internet.	   So,	   the	   studios	   recognise	   the	   enormous	   cost	   savings	  
afforded	  by	  the	  adoption	  of	  d-­‐cinema	  but	  cannot	  ignore	  the	  damage	  caused	  in	  the	  early	  
part	  of	  the	  twenty-­‐first	  century	  to	  the	  intellectual	  copyright	  holders	  in	  another	  part	  of	  the	  
entertainment	  industry.	  We	  now	  move	  on	  to	  consider	  how	  that	  disruption	  is	  being	  played	  
out	   in	   the	  movie	  market	   before	   reviewing	   the	   research	  methodology	   employed	   in	   this	  
study.	  	  
Paths	  of	  Glory	  
This	  section	  places	  digital	  cinema	  in	  the	  context	  of	  localised	  technological	  change,	  which	  
draws	   together	   innovation,	   adoption	   and	   diffusion	   focusing	   the	   analysis	   on	   the	  
determinants	   of	   the	   adoption	   process	   (Rogers,	   2003).	   Here	   adoption	   is	   viewed	   as	   a	  
complementary	   component	   of	   a	   broader	   process	   of	   adjusting	   the	   technology	   when	  
unexpected	   events	   in	   the	   product	   and	   factor	   markets	   push	   firms	   towards	   a	   creative	  
reaction.	  An	  early	  observation	  of	  this	  phenomenon	  came	  from	  Zvi	  Griliches	  (1957)	  whose	  
research	  into	  hybrid	  corn	  found	  that	  the	  adoption	  of	  a	  new	  technology	  was	  not	  a	  single	  
event.	   Instead	   it	  was	   influenced	  by	  a	   series	  of	  developments	   that	  occurred	  at	  different	  
rates	   across	   geographical	   space.	   His	   work	   demonstrated	   the	   numerous	   individual	  
decisions	   and	   economic	   calculations	   that	   drove	   new	   hybrid	   corn	   technology	   forward.	  
Antonelli	   (2006a)	   has	   argued	   that	   this	   is	   important	   for	   European	   Economists	   who,	  
consider	   growth	   and	   change	   rather	   than	   equilibrium	   as	   the	   relevant	   object	   of	   analysis	  
and,	  hence,	  values	  historic	  time	  and	  philological	  investigation	  as	  basic	  tools	  to	  study	  the	  
dynamics	   of	   social	   events	   (p51).	   This	   is	   in	   sharp	   contrast	   to	   Friedman	   et	   al	   from	   the	  
Chicago	  School	  of	  Economics	  who	  would	  contest	  that	  the	  purposeful,	  rational	  behavior	  of	  
forward-­‐looking,	   profit-­‐seeking	   economic	   agents	   will	   inevitably	   override	   the	   effects	   of	  
events	   in	   the	   past	   and	   avoid	   ‘lack	   of	   foresight’	   situations	  which	   lead	   to	   outcomes	   that	  
offer	  lower	  payoffs	  than	  some	  hypothetical	  -­‐	  but	  unattainable	  -­‐	  alternative	  (Liebowitz	  and	  
Margolis,	  1995).	  	  
Anotelli’s	  argument	  draws	  heavily	  on	  the	  notion	  of	  path	  dependence	  elaborated	  by	  the	  
work	   of	   David	   (1985)	   and	   Arthur	   (1989).	   The	   general	   theory	   of	   which	   assumes,	   that,	  
buyers	  rarely	  have	  access	  to	  perfect	  information	  with	  which	  to	  make	  rational	  decisions.	  It	  
further	   purports	   that,	   current	   choices	   are	   influenced	   by	   earlier	   decisions	  which	   in	   turn	  
limit	   later	   choices,	   channeling	   the	   sequence	   of	   economic	   outcomes	   along	   one	   possible	  
path	   rather	   than	   another	   (Anotelli,	   2006a).	   In	   part,	   the	   difference	   between	   path-­‐
dependent	  and	  "path-­‐independent"	  processes	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  foresight	  
doesn't	   matter	   for	   path-­‐independent	   processes	   (Purfett,	   2008).	   Regardless	   of	   the	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journey,	  path-­‐independent	  processes	  will	  invariably	  lead	  to	  a	  set	  of	  predictable	  outcomes	  
-­‐	   those	   that	   lead	   to	   the	  most	   efficient	   and	  produce	  maximum	  payoffs.	  However,	   path-­‐
dependent	  processes	  have	  multiple	  potential	  outcomes,	  and	  the	  outcome	  selected	  is	  not	  
necessarily	  the	  one	  producing	  maximum	  payoffs.	  This	  contrast,	  to	  the	  results	  of	  standard	  
economic	   analysis	   is	   part	   of	   what	   makes	   path	   dependence	   interesting	   in	   this	   present	  
study	  as	  is	  discussed	  shortly.	  	  
In	   Arthur's	   (1989)	   basic	   analytical	   framework,	   "small	   events,"	   which	   he	   treated	   as	  
random,	   lead	   to	   early	   fluctuations	   in	   the	   market	   shares	   of	   competing	   techniques.	   As	  
Purfett	   (2008)	  goes	  on	  to	  argue,	  these	  fluctuations	  are	  magnified	  by	  positive	  feedbacks,	  
because	  techniques	  with	  larger	  market	  shares	  tend	  to	  be	  more	  valuable	  to	  new	  adopters.	  
As	   a	   result,	   one	   technique	   grows	   in	   market	   share	   until	   it	   is	   "locked	   in"	   as	   a	   de	   facto	  
standard.	  Within	  this	  context	  the	  role	  of	  private	  and	  public	  sector	  agents	  is	  interesting	  in	  
that	  they	  are	  both	  seeking	  to	  influence	  the	  adoption	  of	  competing	  technologies	  as	  a	  way	  
of	  developing	   local	  markets.	  And,	   in	  this	  respect	  they	  exhibit	  Schumpeterian	  tendencies	  
in	  that,	  ‘every	  social	  environment	  has	  its	  own	  ways	  of	  filling	  the	  entrepreneurial	  function’	  
(1949:70).	  Thereby	  supporting	  the	  notion	  that	  one	  outcome	  of	  a	  market	  disruption	  is	  that	  
it	   brings	   with	   it	   multiple	   and	   mutually	   exclusive	   solutions.	   This	   in	   turn	   leads	   to	   the	  
development	   of	   many	   different	   standards	   if	   no	   supplier	   can	   achieve	   early	   market	  
leadership,	  which	  can	  lead	  to	  ‘lock	  in’.	  Multi-­‐standards	  in	  digital	  cinema	  is	  not	  a	  desired	  
outcome	  for	  the	  studios	  that	  have	  made	  a	  significant	  investment	  over	  75	  years	  to	  ensure	  
a	  single	  standard	  (35mm	  film)	  operating	  globally	  (David,	  1987).	  	  
Whilst	  path	  dependence	  provides	  a	  framework	  upon	  which	  to	  base	  this	  study	  it	  requires	  a	  
dataset	   on	  which	   to	   test	   the	   hypothesis.	   D-­‐cinema	   technology	   is	   a	   new	   and	   unproven	  
product	   in	   a	   relatively	   stable	   market	   and	   has	   yet	   to	   cross	   Geoffrey	   Moore’s	   ‘chasm’	  
(1990)	  as	  is	  shown	  in	  figure	  2.	  
>>>>Take	  in	  figure	  2<<<<	  
Consequently,	   the	   author	   has	   turned	   to	   the	  work	   of	   Clayton	   Christensen	   (1997,	   2003)	  
who	  has	  written	  on	  the	  impact	  of	  disruptive	  technologies	  in	  seemingly	  stable	  markets;	  he	  
states	   disruptive	   technology	   is	   in	   essence,	   simpler,	   cheaper,	   and	   more	   reliable	   and	  
convenient	   than	  established	  technologies	   (Christensen,	  2003:192).	   	   In	   this	  context,	   low-­‐
end	   disruptions	   are	   similar	   to	   what	   Schumpeter	   referred	   to	   as	   ‘creative	   destruction’	  
(1942:82-­‐83)	   in	   so	  much	   that	   low-­‐end	   disruptions	   create	   a	   step-­‐change	   cost	   reduction	  
within	  an	  industry.	  However,	  this	  is	  achieved	  by	  entrant	  firms	  destroying	  the	  incumbents.	  
New-­‐market	  disruption,	  in	  contrast,	  entails	  a	  period	  of	  substantial	  creative	  creation	  -­‐	  new	  
consumption	  -­‐	  before	  the	  destruction	  of	  the	  old	  occurs	  (Christensen,	  2003:70).	  Based	  on	  
their	  ability	  to	  see	  opportunity	  from	  a	  fresh	  perspective,	  new	  entrants	  are	  able	  to	  develop	  
disruptive	   innovations	   that	   appeal	   to	   emerging	   market	   segments	   and	   to	   eventually	  
supersede	  prior	  industry	  leaders	  (Slater	  &	  Mohr,	  2006;	  Culkin	  &	  Smith,	  2000).	  In	  line	  with	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previous	   studies	   (Stoneman,	   2002;	   David,	   1985)	   the	   existence	   of	   two	   key	   drivers	   in	  
technological	  change	  -­‐	  bias	  and	  rivalry	  between	  competing	  technologies	  –	  are	  evident	  in	  
the	   digital	   cinema	   adoption	   process.	   Bias,	   in	   terms	   that	   adoption	   favours	   the	   large	  
American	  studios	  by	  reducing	  costs	  significantly.	  Rivalry,	  not	  only	  as	  it	  exists	  between	  old	  
and	   new	   technologies	   (celluloid	   vs.	   digital)	   but	   also	   in	   the	   attempted	   imposition	   of	   a	  
minimum	   operating	   standard	   for	   the	   new	   technology	   itself	   (1.3k	   [low	   end	   digital	  
projection]	  vs.	  2	  or	  4k	  (high	  end	  digital	  projection).	  	  
To	  provide	  some	  background	  on	   the	   technical	   issues	   involved	   in	  Digital	   cinema	  there	   is	  
basically	  one	  projection	  technology,	  several	  server	  solutions,	  but	  no	  one	  global	  standard.	  
All	   digital	   cinema	   projectors	   currently	   deployed	   are	   built	   using	   Texas	   Instruments’	   DLP	  
Cinema8	  which	  can	  display	  2,000	  horizontal	   lines	  of	  resolution	  (in	  a	  2,048	  x	  1,080	  chip),	  
compared	  to	  its	  m10	  and	  m15	  chips	  that	  had	  1,280	  x	  1,024	  resolution	  (roughly	  1.3K).	  In	  
July	  2005	  the	  DCI9	  published	   its	   final	  overall	  system	  requirements	  and	  specifications	  for	  
digital	   cinema,	   opting	   for	   a	   scalable	   solution	   from	   2K	   to	   4K	   (4,000	   x	   2,000);	   thereby	  
leaving	  the	  decision	  to	  which	  projector	  technology	  will	  be	  used	  in	  theatres	  to	  the	  market.	  
Whether	  or	  not	  Digital	  Cinema	  will	  provide	  new	  entrants	  with	  the	  opportunity	  to	  create	  a	  
‘new	   value	   network’	   in	   the	   movie	   industry	   will	   depend	   ultimately	   on	   their	   ability	   to	  
augment	  their	  skill	  set	  with	  the	  capabilities	  to	  serve	  mainstream	  customers	  as	  well.	  This	  
paper	  is	  part	  of	  a	  global	  study	  of	  digital	  cinema	  and	  in	  this	  next	  section	  the	  author	  briefly	  
describes	  the	  research	  methodology	  employed	  in	  this	  study.	  	  
The	  Third	  Man	  …..in	  the	  research	  methodology	  debate	  
This	  study	  embraces	  a	  mixed	  methods	  approach	  which	  provides	  the	  potential	  to	  reduce	  
some	  of	  the	  problems	  associated	  with	  singular	  methods	  especially	  in	  analyzing	  the	  early	  
(and	  current)	  stages	  of	  the	  technology	  adoption	  cycle.	  This	  pragmatic	  approach	  does	  not	  
sit	  well	  with	  purists	  who	  would	  argue	  “accommodation	  between	  paradigms	  is	  impossible	  
.	  .	  .”	  (Guba,	  1990:p81).	  However,	  embracing	  the	  strengths	  and	  weaknesses	  of	  quantitative	  
and	  qualitative	  research	  puts	  a	  researcher	  in	  a	  position	  to	  mix	  or	  combine	  strategies	  and	  
to	  use	  what	  Johnson	  and	  Turner	  (2003)	  call	  the	  fundamental	  principle	  of	  mixed	  research.	  
According	   to	   this	   principle,	   researchers	   should	   collect	   multiple	   data	   using	   different	  
strategies,	   approaches,	   and	   methods	   in	   such	   a	   way	   that	   the	   resulting	   mixture	   or	  
combination	   is	   likely	   to	   result	   in	   complementary	   strengths	   and	   no	   overlapping	  
weaknesses.	   In	   complex	   or	   emerging	   (international)	   markets	   mixed	   methods	   research	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	   	  TI’s	  projection	  technology	  gained	  widespread	  approval	  when	  it	  unveiled	  its	  so-­‐called	  2K	  chip	  (called	  the	  
m25	  by	  TI).	  
9	   The	  DCI	   (Digital	   Cinema	   Incentive)	  was	   formed	   in	   2002,	   a	   joint	   venture	   of	   the	   seven	  major	   Hollywood	  
studios	   (Disney,	   Fox,	   MGM,	   Paramount,	   Sony	   Pictures	   Entertainment,	   Universal	   and	   Warner	   Bros)	   it	  
effectively	  dwarfed	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  other	  institutions	  to	  establish	  guidelines	  for	  digital	  cinema	  into.	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frequently	  results	   in	  superior	  research	  compared	  to	  a	  single	  method	  approach	  (Johnson	  
and	  Onwuegbuzie,	  2004).	  A	  mixed	  method	  approach	  provides	  opportunities	  to	  react	  to,	  
reflect	  upon	  and	  incorporate	  emerging	  themes	  in	  a	  dynamic	  system,	  which	  requires	  the	  
researcher	   to	  embrace	  expansive	  and	  creative	   lines	  of	   inquiry.	  Research	   into	   the	  movie	  
industry	  is	  fraught	  with	  difficulties.	  First,	  there	  is	  the	  secretive	  nature	  of	  deal	  making	  at	  all	  
stages	  of	  the	  value	  network	  from	  script	  development,	  through	  green-­‐lighting	  a	  project	  to	  
sales	  and	  distribution	  across	  many	   territories	   (Daniels	  et	  al,	   1998);	  and	   finally	  audience	  
measurement;	   as	  a	   consequence	   there	   is	   little	  published	  data	  available	   to	  analyse.	   The	  
fact	  that	  this	  is	  part	  of	  a	  four-­‐country	  study	  poses	  a	  challenge	  in	  terms	  of	  interviewing	  key	  
players.	   This	   is	   further	   exasperated	   when	   there	   are	   both	   private	   and	   public	   players	  
engaged	  in	  the	  process.	  
One	  of	  the	  ways	  that	  the	  author	  and	  other	  colleagues	  working	   in	  this	  field	  (Hardy	  et	  al,	  
2007)	  has	  found	  to	  overcome	  part	  of	  this	  problem	  is	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  what	  Maskell	  et	  
al	   have	   referred	   to	   as	   temporary	   clustering	   (2006:997).	   This	   approach	   recognises	   that	  
movie	  business	  people	  and	  cinema	  professionals	  regularly	  meet	  at	  conventions,	  festivals	  
and	  conferences.	  Here,	  their	  latest	  and	  most	  advanced	  findings,	  inventions	  and	  products	  
are	  demonstrated	  and	  evaluated	  through	  a	  mix	  of	  exhibitions	  and	  seminars.	  The	  benefits	  
are	  clear	   if	  one	  makes	   the	  most	  use	  of	   the	  networking	  opportunities	   -­‐	   the	  existence	  of	  
local	   buzz	   of	   high	   quality	   and	   relevance	   leads	   to	   a	   more	   dynamic	   cluster	   (Bathelt,	  
2004:45),	  which	  for	  the	  researcher	  provides	  follow	  up	  interviewing	  opportunities.	  As	  such	  
the	  existence	  of	  temporary	  clustering	  in	  the	  movie	  industry	   is	  particularly	  well-­‐suited	  to	  
research	   into	   d-­‐cinema	   and	   the	   next	   section	   will	   provide	   a	   snap	   shot	   of	   the	   journey,	  
examining	  the	  emerging	  strategies	  amongst	  actors	  in	  response	  to	  this	  disruption	  focusing	  
on	  three	  territories,	  the	  UK,	  USA	  and	  India.	  	  
Around	  The	  World	  in	  80	  Days	  
The	   first	   commercial	   digital	   screening	   (Star	  Wars)	   took	   place	   in	  May	   1999;	   since	  when	  
there	   have	   been	   a	   number	   of	   false	   dawns	   for	   entrepreneurs.	   As	   with	   any	   technology	  
adoption	  process	  conversion	  has	  created	  unforeseen	  problems	  and	  opportunities.	  The	  US	  
movie	   studios	   have	   tried	   to	   control	   roll	   out	   through	   a	   ‘stick	   and	   stick’	   approach	   -­‐	   the	  
imposition	  of	  minimum	  standards	  by	  which	  to	  exhibit	  their	  product	  linked	  to	  a	  threat	  of	  
withholding	  digital	  product	  if	  the	  technology	  does	  not	  meet	  this	  standard.	  This	  attempt	  to	  
control	   the	   route	   through	   the	   adoption	   and	   diffusion	   stage	   has	   elicited	   interesting	  
responses	  (Culkin	  &	  Randle,	  2003).	  	  In	  some	  international	  markets	  the	  response	  has	  been	  
to	   ignore	   the	   standards	   issue	   altogether,	   which	   is	   understandable	   if	   you	   are	   not	  
dependent	  on	  Hollywood	  product	  (China	  and	  India).	  In	  other	  markets	  entrepreneurs	  have	  
sidestepped	   the	   issue	   altogether	   and	   found	   early	   success	   in	   developing	   a	   product	   not	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considered	   important	   and	   therefore	   not	   covered	  by	   the	   standards,	   3D	  or	   stereophonic	  
cinema	  (USA	  and	  UK),	  whose	  original	  golden	  era	  ran	  from	  1950	  to195310.	  	  
Whilst	  it	  still	  only	  accounts	  for	  less	  than	  5%	  of	  screens	  worldwide,	  the	  number	  of	  digital	  
screens	   is	   rising	  and	   stood	  at	  5,500	  as	  at	  December	  2007	   (table	  1)	  with	  North	  America	  
accounting	   for	   more	   than	   half	   of	   the	   total	   (Hancock,	   2007).	   In	   terms	   of	   screens,	   the	  
dominance	   of	   North	   America	   is	   even	   more	   marked	   because	   of	   a	   different	   pattern	   of	  
adoption.	   A	   number	   of	   exhibitors	   in	   the	   United	   States	   have	   opted	   to	   substantially	   or	  
completely	  convert	  their	  cinemas	  to	  digital	  projection,	  whereas	   in	  the	  rest	  of	   the	  world	  
most	  installations	  in	  the	  pilot	  phase	  covering	  one	  or	  perhaps	  two	  screens	  per	  complex.	  	  
>>>>Take	  in	  table	  1<<<<	  
As	  the	  major	  studios	  have	  been	  unable	  to	  enforcer	  a	  global	  standard	  we	  should	  not	  be	  
surprised	  to	  see	  that	  differences	  between	  adoption	  patterns	  across	  territories	  are	  taking	  
place,	   not	   only	   in	   line	   with	   the	   finding	   of	   Griliches	   (1957),	   but	   also	   with	   the	   primary	  
objectives	  of	  the	  adoption	  itself.	  In	  Japan	  we	  find	  that	  exhibitors	  seeking	  to	  differentiate	  
themselves	  from	  the	  competition	  are	  the	  main	  drivers	  of	  the	  adoption	  process;	  this	  is	  in	  
parallel	   with	   the	   country’s	   manufacturers	   desire	   to	   lead	   in	   the	   technology	   race11	   (e.g.	  
Sony	  and	  their	  development	  of	  4k	  projectors).	   	  A	  similar	  situation	  to	  this	  exists	   in	  South	  
Korea.	  	  
However,	   as	   Hancock	   (2007)	   claims,	   adoption	   in	   China	   is	   being	   driven	   by	   the	   Chinese	  
Government’s	   desire	   to	   bring	   cinema	   to	   a	  wider	   population	   than	   that	   of	   the	   big	   cities	  
where	  multiplexes	  are	  concentrated.	  Although	  some	  2K	  installations	  exist,	  digital	  cinema	  
using	  lower	  resolution	  projectors	  (1.3k)	  is	  more	  widespread,	  providing	  the	  opportunity	  to	  
leapfrog	   the	   need	   to	   modernise	   35mm	   cinemas	   at	   a	   relatively	   low	   cost.	   This	   follows	  
Christiansen’s	  work	  on	  disruptive	   technology	  where	  simpler,	   cheaper,	  new	  technologies	  
and	  more	  reliable	  and	  convenient	  than	  established	  technologies.	  As	  the	  Chinese	  state	  is	  
mostly	  concerned	  with	  reducing	  piracy	  and	  to	  limit	  the	  availability	  of	  Hollywood	  movies	  
DCI	  compliance	  is	  less	  of	  an	  issue	  than	  in	  other	  territories.	  	  
Case	  Study	  1:	  USA	  
As	  one	  might	  expect,	   the	  USA	  has	  taken	  the	  global	   lead	   in	  adopting	  digital	  cinema	  with	  
over	   4,000	   screens	   converted	   by	   the	   end	   of	   2007.	   Although	   a	   large	   territory	   North	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  Amongst	  other	  things,	  the	  decline	  in	  popularity	  for	  3-­‐D	  stemmed	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  two	  prints	  had	  to	  be	  
projected	  simultaneously	  and	  they	  had	  to	  remain	  exactly	  alike	  after	  repair	  or	  synchronization	  would	  be	  lost.	  
This	  is	  not	  an	  issue	  with	  d-­‐cinema.	  
11	   The	   growth	  of	   3D-­‐related	   technologies	   provides	   Japan’s	  manufacturers	  with	   an	   opportunity	   for	   future	  
innovations.	  Sony’s	  new	  4K	  3D	  projectors,	  which	  compete	  with	  what	  DLP	  offers,	  are	  currently	  being	  tested.	  
Their	  focus	  is	  on	  the	  development	  of	  competitive	  systems	  that	  only	  require	  a	  single	  projector.	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America	   is	   a	   very	   homogenous	   one,	   meaning	   that	   once	   an	   innovation	   is	   adopted	   and	  
business	  models	   emerge	   the	  move	   to	   diffusion	  where	   one	   technique	   grows	   in	  market	  
share	   until	   it	   is	   "locked	   in"	   as	   a	   de	   facto	   standard	   is	   arguably	   less	   difficult	   than	   in	   a	  
heterogeneous	   market	   (Scott,	   2005).	   Historically,	   there	   has	   been	   little	   public	   agency	  
intervention	   in	   distribution	   and	   exhibition	   sectors	   and	   as	   the	   home	   of	   Hollywood	  
exhibition	  has	  been	  forced	  to	  follow	  the	  product.	  	  
The	  larger	  exhibition	  chains	  (or	  circuits)	  are	  financing	  the	  change	  through	  a	  mix	  of	  subsidy	  
and	  the	  identification	  of	  new	  revenue	  streams.	  The	  subsidy,	  which	  is	  known	  as	  the	  Virtual	  
Print	   Fee	   (VPF)	  model	   is	   a	  means	   of	   financing	   the	   conversion	   of	   the	   industry	   to	   digital	  
cinema.	  A	  new	  player	  in	  the	  movie	  value	  chain,	  a	  third	  party12	  	  purchases	  the	  equipment,	  
and	   then	   recoups	   the	   cost	   of	   the	   equipment	   over	   time,	   through	   payments	   from	  
distributors	  (who	  pay	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  cost)	  and	  exhibitors.	  An	  example	  of	  how	  the	  VPF	  
model	  would	  work	  over	  the	  life	  of	  an	  agreement	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  table	  2.	  However,	  such	  a	  
scheme	  will	   only	  work	   for	   those	   exhibitors	  who	   are	   dependent	   on	   studio	   product.	   The	  
smaller	  exhibitors	  recognising	  the	  risk	  of	  being	  isolated	  created	  the	  Cinema	  Buying	  Group	  
(a	  semi-­‐autonomous	  programme	  of	  the	  National	  Association	  of	  Theatre	  Owners	  [NATO]),	  
which	  represents	  almost	  9,000	  smaller	  screens	  in	  the	  USA	  and	  Canada.	  The	  Group	  has	  yet	  
to	  announce	  how	  its	  model	  may	  differ	  from	  the	  VPF	  scheme.	  
>>>>Take	  in	  table	  2<<<<	  
A	  further	  development,	  announced	  in	  the	  spring	  of	  2007,	  which	  arguably	  sails	  close	  to	  the	  
‘anti-­‐trust	   law’	   wind,	   saw	   the	   formation	   of	   a	   venture	   called,	   the	   Digital	   Cinema	  
Distribution	  Coalition	  delivery	   system.	  This	  purports	   to	   represent	   the	   first	   collaboration	  
between	  studios	  and	  exhibitors	  to	  develop	  the	  most	  cost-­‐effective	  form	  of	  digital	  content	  
delivery	   through	   technologies	   such	   as	   satellite	   or	   digital	   terrestrial	   distribution.	   The	  
coalition	  claims	  that	  it	  would	  be	  open	  and	  available	  to	  any	  content	  provider,	  vendor	  and	  
exhibitor,	  including	  the	  owners,	  Warner	  Bros.	  Entertainment,	  Universal	  Pictures	  and	  DCIP,	  
which	   is	   owned	   by	   Regal	   Entertainment,	   AMC	   Entertainment	   and	   Cinemark	   USA	   and	  
represents	   14,000	   screens	   (Hancock,	   2007).	   As	   the	   DCIP	   venture	   –	   which	   is	   close	   to	  
announcing	   its	   deployment	   methodology	   shows	   -­‐	   the	   US	   exhibitor	   market	   is	   fully	  
recognising	   the	   potential	   benefits	   of	   digital,	   which	   is	   moving	   it	   closer	   to	   the	  
mainstreaming	  phase	  through	  a	  mix	  of	  studio	  product,	  alternative	  content	  and	  digital	  3D,	  
which	  saw	  close	  to	  1,100	  systems	  installed	  in	  the	  territory	  by	  end	  2007.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  A	  ruling	  handed	  down	  by	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  on	  May	  4,	  1948	  declared	  that	  the	  five	  major	  studios	  of	  the	  
day	   were	   guilty	   of	   violating	   antitrust	   laws	   through	   their	   subsidiaries	   or	   affiliates,	   owning	   or	   controlling	  
theatres.	  Therefore	  the	  studios	  would	  be	  in	  breach	  of	  the	  ruling	  if	  they	  were	  seen	  to	  be	  directly	  involved	  in	  
the	  process	  (Christopherson	  &	  Storper,	  1986).	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While	  digital	  cinema	  offers	  a	  brilliant	  picture	  quality	  (equal	  to	  first	  run	  35mm),	  excellent	  
repeatability,	   higher	   security	   and	   lower	   distribution	   costs,	   these	   factors	   do	   not	   excite	  
American	  audiences	  offering	  little	  visual	  differentiator	  from	  35mm	  film.	  The	  panacea	  for	  
declining	   cinema	   receipts	   and	   movie-­‐piracy-­‐hysteria	   could	   therefore	   be	   digital	  
stereoscopic	  (originally	  known	  as	  3D)	  cinema.	  Prominent	  supporters	  of	  3D	  digital	  cinema	  
are	   directors	   James	   Cameron,	   George	   Lucas	   and	   Robert	   Rodriguez.	   Cameron	   believes	  
that,	  in	  the	  near	  future,	  studios	  will	  release	  4-­‐5	  big	  tentpole	  pictures	  a	  year	  in	  3D,	  making	  
it	  the	  format	  for	  must-­‐see	  films	  that	  can	  only	  be	  experienced	  in	  a	  cinema.	  The	  first	  films	  
that	   will	   take	   full	   advantage	   of	   the	   new	   technology	   are	   3D	   animated	   films,	   which	   can	  
easily	   be	   adapted	   for	   3D	   projection	   –	   although	   a	   documentary	   of	   the	   pop	   group,	   U2	  
during	   the	   South	  American	   leg	  of	   the	  band's	   “Vertigo”	   tour	   is	   currently	  on	   release	  and	  
receiving	  excellent	  critical	  reviews.	  Paramount	  and	  has	  predicted	  that	  by	  2009	  there	  will	  
be	  enough	  digital	  3D	  content	  to	  keep	  at	  least	  one	  screen	  in	  a	  multiplex	  occupied	  full	  time	  
(Toumarkine,	  2007).	  	  
Paramount-­‐distributed	  Dreamworks	  Animation	  has	  also	  pledged	  that	  all	  of	   its	  animated	  
titles	  will	  be	  in	  digital	  3D	  as	  of	  the	  same	  year.	  From	  distributor	  and	  exhibitor	  perspectives,	  
there	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  strong	   financial	  case	   for	  digital	  3D	  cinema.	  For	  example,	  The	  Polar	  
Express,	   which	   was	   released	   in	   flate	   screen	   (2D)	   on	   3,500	   screens	   in	   the	   US	   in	   2004,	  
generated	  $121	  million	  during	  the	  holiday	  season.	  When	  the	  film	  was	  released	  in	  3D	  the	  
following	  year,	  it	  earned	  $40	  million	  on	  just	  68	  IMAX	  screens,	  greatly	  outperforming	  the	  
2D	   release.	   Analysis	   of	   box	   office	   data	   for	   Chicken	   Little,	   Monster	   House,	   Meet	   the	  
Robinsons	   and	   Beowulf	   has	   shown	   that	   digital	   3D	   screens	   generate	   on	   average	   three	  
times	   more	   revenue,	   driven	   by	   a	   2.4	   times	   higher	   attendance	   ratio	   per	   screen	   when	  
compared	  with	   2D	   screenings	   for	   the	   all	   important	   first	   weekend	   (see	   table	   3	  below).	  
Moreover,	   the	   introduction	   of	   a	   premium	  pricing	   strategy	   has	   opened	   up	   a	   new	  profit	  
share	   structure	   in	  which	  exhibitors	   share	   the	   resulting	   ‘surcharge’	   revenue	   from	  higher	  
ticket	  prices	  with	   the	  Studio,	  an	   incentive	   for	  both	   sides	  of	   the	   industry	  alike	   (Culkin	  &	  
Morawetz,	  2007).	  	  
>>>>Take	  in	  table	  2<<<<	  
Case	  Study	  2:	  The	  United	  Kingdom	  
Through	  direct	  government	   intervention	   the	  UK	  now	  has	   the	  second	   largest	  number	  of	  
digital	   screens	   after	   the	   United	   States.	   The	   UK	   Film	   Council	   (UKFC)	   -­‐	   part	   of	   the	  
Department	  for	  Culture,	  Music	  and	  Sport	  -­‐	  contracted	  Arts	  Alliance	  Media	  (AAM)	  to	  install	  
and	  operate	  its	  network	  of	  240	  digital	  screens.	  The	  Digital	  Screen	  Network	  (DSN)	  is	  a	  core	  
element	  of	  UKFC’s	   strategy	   to	  broaden	   the	   range	  of	   films	  available	   to	  audiences	  across	  
the	   UK	   and	   to	   support	   specialised	   films.	   The	   network	   is	   designed	   to	   operate	   in	  
conjunction	  with	  other	  UK	  Film	  Council	  distribution	  and	  exhibition	  initiatives,	  such	  as	  the	  
Print	  and	  Advertising	  Fund,	  for	  specialised	  films,	  and	  the	  Audience	  Development	  Scheme.	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The	  DSN	  was	   conceived	  as	  a	   ‘virtual	  network’	  of	  240	   screens,	   located	   in	  approximately	  
200	   cinemas	   across	   the	   UK.	   Screens	   are	   installed	   at	  multiplexes,	   independent	   cinemas	  
and	  single	  screen	  venues.	  AAM	  completed	  the	  first	  round	  of	  installations	  (50	  cinemas)	  in	  
February	  2006,	  with	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  screens	  installed	  by	  August	  2007.	  In	  return	  for	  the	  UK	  
Film	   Council’s	   financial	   contribution	   towards	   the	   equipment,	   network	   cinemas	   are	  
contractually	   obliged	   to	   devote	   a	   (self-­‐imposed)	   set	   percentage	   of	   playing	   time	   to	  
specialised	  programming	  (e.g.	  educational	  orientated	  content,	  archive	  material	  and	  short	  
films).	   Outside	   of	   these	   required	   slots,	   exhibitors	   can	   operate	   their	   digital	   projectors	  
independently,	   and	   the	   existing	   business	  model	   of	   film	   acquisition	   through	  distributors	  
will	   be	   the	   same	   (Culkin	   &	   Morawetz,	   2007).	   The	   DSN	   will	   arguably	   enable	   local	  
filmmakers	   to	   show	   their	   films	   on	   a	   regional	   basis	   within	   their	   own	   communities.	  
However,	   with	   only	   7%	   of	   its	   screens	   converted	   the	   UK	   still	   remains	   stuck	   in	  Moore’s	  
chasm	  and	  until	   an	  alternative	  or	  amended	  version	  of	   the	  VPF	  model	   is	   agreed	  –	  most	  
likely	  with	  Arts	  Alliance	  who	  recently	  signed	  up	  four	  studios	  to	  a	  European	  digital	  cinema	  
roll-­‐out	  –	  it	  is	  unlikely	  that	  the	  Government	  will	  offer	  any	  further	  subsidies	  to	  the	  market.	  
Case	  Study	  3:	  India	  
The	   Indian	  market	  for	  digital	  cinema	   is	  developing	  rapidly	  although	  they	  are	  going	  their	  
own	  way	  in	  terms	  of	  standards	  and	  systems	  being	  installed.	  The	  country	  is	  virtually	  self-­‐
sustaining	   in	   its	  content	  producing	  over	  1,000	  feature	  films	  a	  year.	  However,	  unlike	  the	  
USA,	   India	   is	  not	  one	  but	  many	  territories.	  Of	  the	  1000	  films	  produced	  only	  around	  250	  
are	  Hindi	  or	  Bollywood	  films,	  of	  which	  around	  30%	  is	  exported	  to	  North	  America	  and	  the	  
UK;	  Mumbai	  and	  the	  North	  Indian	  circuit	  account	  for	  rest	  of	  the	  Bollywood	  product.	  The	  
other	  750	  movies	  are	  shot	  in	  local	  languages,	  which	  can	  have	  a	  fanatical	  following	  in	  the	  
south	  (Tamil/Telugu)	  but	  rarely	  travel	  in	  India.	  
Before	   the	   advent	   of	   digital	   cinema	   only	   tier	   I	   cinema	   centres,	   located	   in	   large	  
metropolitan	  areas	  would	  receive	  first	  release	  prints.	  A	  typical	  Bollywood	  movie	  may	  be	  
released	  to	  150-­‐350	  cinemas,	   including	  overseas	  release.	  Tier	   II	  &	   III	  cinemas	   located	   in	  
outlying	  areas	   then	  wait	  5-­‐8	  weeks	   to	   receive	   the	  worn	  prints	   from	   the	  Tier	   I	   cinemas,	  
creating	  several	  problems.	  In	  line	  with	  many	  other	  territories	  marketing	  support	  tails	  off	  
after	  4	  weeks	  and	  with	  demand;	  this	  makes	  it	  difficult	  to	  make	  a	  return	  on	  investment.	  	  
In	  addition,	  presentation	  quality	  suffers	  when	  working	  with	  worn	  prints.	  The	  distributor	  
suffers,	  too,	  as	  the	  limited	  availability	  of	  the	  movie	  in	  the	  opening	  weeks	  encourages	  the	  
rampant	   sale	   of	   pirated	   copies.	   Thus,	   the	   current	   film	   distribution	   model	   in	   India	   has	  
created	   a	   downward	   business	   spiral	   for	   the	   owners	   of	   tier	   II	   &	   III	   cinemas.	   Electronic	  
movie	  distribution	  would	  benefit	  these	  cinemas,	  making	   it	  possible	  to	  participate	   in	  the	  
first	  week	  of	  movie	  release,	  increasing	  revenues	  not	  only	  at	  the	  door,	  but	  also	  in	  ancillary	  
operations	   such	  as	   concessions	  and	  parking.	   In	  a	  move	  not	  dissimilar	   to	   that	  of	   the	  UK	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Film	  Council,	  a	  number	  of	  companies	  are	  also	  acquiring	  and	  converting	  traditional	  single	  
screen	   venues	   to	   create	   digital	   screen	   networks	   with	   lower	   resolution	   1.3K	   or	   HD	  
projectors,	   ignoring	  the	  DCI	  2K/4K	  business	  model.	  This	  means	  that	  cinemas	  are	  able	  to	  
show	  getting	  hit	  films	  into	  cinemas	  faster	  at	  a	  better	  quality.	  
Increased	   investment	   in	   the	   Indian	   exhibition	   sector	   could	   also	   see	   the	   territory's	   box	  
office	   gross	   increase	   by	   30%	   in	   the	   next	   five	   years,	   linked	   to	   a	   strong	   economy,	   retail	  
boom	   and	   rising	   middle	   class	   disposable	   incomes	   in	   addition	   to	   expansions	   in	   the	  
downstream	   exhibition	   business	   should	   boost	   industry	   revenues.	   While	   multiplexes	   in	  
India	   currently	   account	   for	   only	   4%	   of	   the	   country's	   cinema	   screens,	   certain	   films	  
generate	  up	  to	  40%	  of	  their	  box-­‐office	  revenue	  from	  them	  due	  to	  higher	  ticket	  prices.	  Six	  
companies	   –	   Adlabs,	   PVR	   Cinemas,	   INOX	   Leisure,	   City	   Ventures,	   Shringar	   Cinemas	   and	  
Cinemax	   Cinemas	   –	   have	   plans	   to	   fund	   ambitious	   nationwide	   multiplex	   circuits	   and	  
between	  them,	  are	  set	  to	  open	  1,500	  screens	  (Grummitt,	  2007).	  
PVR	  is	  taking	  this	  a	  stage	  further	  with	  a	  recent	  announcement	  that	  it	  is	  making	  a	  strategic	  
foray	   into	   smaller	   towns	   through	   digital	   theatres	   under	   the	   "PVR	   Talkies"	   brand.	   The	  
company	  is	  investing	  Rs	  2	  billion	  to	  support	  this	  roll	  out.	  The	  first	  cinemas	  to	  benefit	  were	  
in	   Aurangabad	   and	   Latur	   each	   with	   three	   screens	   that	   were	   digital	   ready,	   where	  
computerised	  tickets	  are	  priced	  at	  Rs	  40	  and	  Rs	  60.	  The	  company	  aims	  to	  have	  200	  PVR	  
Talkies	  across	  13	  states	  and	  over	  70	  cities	  in	  the	  first	  phase.	  	  
According	  to	  PVR	  Cinemas	  chairman	  Ajay	  Bijli,	  "In	  1997,	  we	  enhanced	  the	  way	  India	  went	  
to	  the	  movies…..With	  PVR	  Talkies,	  the	  people's	  cinema	  has	  arrived.	  It	  is	  my	  fervent	  hope	  
that	  PVR	  Talkies	  will	  induce	  people	  to	  come	  back	  to	  the	  big	  screen	  and	  rediscover	  the	  true	  
magic	  of	  the	  movies."	  (Bijli,	  2006).	  Bijli	  went	  on	  to	  state	  “the	  digital	  theatres	  in	  the	  tier	  II	  
and	   tier	   III	   cities	   will	   work	   on	   the	   principle	   of	   digitised	   content	   being	   distributed	   to	  
theatres	  through	  satellite	  or	  fibre.	  They	  will	  be	  uploaded	  to	  a	  digital	  cinema	  server.	  Digital	  
projectors	  will	  be	  used	  for	  screening,	  enabling	  the	  entire	  system	  to	  have	  wide	  releases	  of	  a	  
movie	   across	   the	   country.”	   Driven	   by	   the	   need	   to	   reduce	   significantly	   the	   amount	   of	  
piracy	  -­‐	  which	  has	  been	  taking	  business	  away	  from	  the	  tier	   II	  and	  II	  class	  cinemas	  –	   it	   is	  
argued	   that	   nationwide	   screenings,	   will	   also	   increase	   the	   return	   on	   investment	   for	  
producers	  and	  distributors.	   It	   is	   interesting	   to	  note	   that	  PVR	  has	  also	  recently	  ventured	  
into	  the	  business	  of	  film	  distribution	  and	  set	  up	  PVR	  Pictures,	  a	  fully	  owned	  subsidiary	  of	  
PVR	  Ltd.	  PVR.	  	  
This	   initiative	   will	   potentially	   solidify	   PVR's	   exhibition	   growth	   whilst	   strengthening	   its	  
content	  creation	  space	  as	  a	  part	  of	  a	  backward	  integration	  strategy	  along	  the	  movie	  value	  
chain.	   To	   date,	   PVR	   Pictures	   has	   successfully	   released	   films	   produced	   by	   US-­‐based	  
production	  house	  Miramax	  such	  as	  Chicago.	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Conclusions	  
It	  was	  suggested	  at	  the	  outset	  that	  digital	  cinema	  has	  reached	  a	   ‘tipping	  point’	  and	  the	  
process	   is	   irreversible	   in	  several	  territories.	   It	  has	  been	  stated	  that	  those	  territories,	   led	  
by	   the	   USA,	   now	   have	   the	   momentum	   to	   carry	   other	   major	   territories	   through	   and	  
beyond	  Moore’s	  ‘chasm’	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  number	  of	  digital	  screens	  is	  rising,	  and	  
stood	  at	  around	  5,500	  as	  at	  December	  2007.	  	  However,	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  global	  exhibitor	  
industry	   has	   now	   not	   fully	   recognised	   a	   preferred	   single	   standard	   -­‐	   driven	   by	   the	   US	  
studios	  –	   suggests	  an	  adoption	  model	   that	  espouses	  a	  Schumpeterian	  view	   that,	   ‘every	  
social	  environment	  has	  its	  own	  ways	  of	  filling	  the	  entrepreneurial	  function’	  as	  opposed	  to	  
a	  path-­‐independent	  processes	   leading	  to	  a	  set	  of	  predictable	  outcomes	   (e.g.	  one	  global	  
standard).	  	  
Global	  standards	  may	  yet	  be	  set	  but	  that	  would	  require	  (large	  and	  largely	  self	  sufficient)	  
territories	  such	  as	  China	  and	  India	  decide	  that	  the	  DCI	  standard	  has	  benefits	  above	  and	  
beyond	   the	   technology	   they	   are	   currently	   employing	   –	  one	  which	   recognises	   the	   value	  
Christensen	   deemed	   important	   in	   the	   adoption	   process	   –	   simpler,	   cheaper,	   and	  more	  
reliable	  and	  convenient	  than	  established	  technologies.	  Unlike	  TV	  technology,	  it	  has	  been	  
argued	   that	   the	   market	   for	   d-­‐cinema	   is	   not	   large	   enough	   to	   support	   more	   than	   one	  
standard.	   Furthermore,	   multiple	   standards	   would	   require	   multiple	   inventories,	   and	   a	  
primary	   advantage	   of	   film	   –	   one	   standard,	   namely	   35	   mm	   –	   would	   be	   lost	   (Culkin	   &	  
Randle,	  2003a).	  Territories	  such	  as	  Europe	  which	  are	  trying	  to	  follow	  their	  own	  path	  run	  
the	   risk	   of	   being	   forced	   to	   change	   direction	   as	   their	   position	   becomes	   potentially	  
untenable	  without	  direct	  government	  involvement.	  	  
In	  certain	  territories	  a	  combination	  of	  the	  studios	  and	  exhibitors	  are	  funding	  the	  change	  
(Adner,	  2002).	  Therefore	  they	  are	  likely	  to	  have	  the	  final	  decision	  on	  any	  particular	  aspect	  
of	  d-­‐cinema	  and	  will	  determine	  standards	  locally	  as	  in	  the	  USA.	  It	  has	  been	  argued	  that	  it	  
would	  be	  uneconomic	  for	  others	  to	  establish	  alternatives.	  	  However,	  3D	  lies	  outside	  the	  
current	  standards	  and	  Sony,	  in	  particular,	  is	  focusing	  on	  the	  development	  of	  competitive	  
systems	  that	  only	  require	  a	  single	  projector	  for	  2D	  and	  3D.	  
One	  consequence	  of	  reduced	  distribution	  costs	  is	  a	  greater	  degree	  of	  flexibility	  providing	  
improved	  choice	  to	  the	  consumer,	  in	  terms	  of	  scheduling	  and	  content.	  It	  may	  also	  lead	  to	  
an	   increase	   in	   smaller	   local	   cinemas	   showing	   a	   greater	   variety	   of	   films	   to	   smaller	  
audiences.	  Entrepreneurs	  are	  already	  noting	  that	  such	  developments	  will	  create	  a	  need	  
for	  more	  sophisticated	  customer	  relationship	  management	  techniques,	  as	  well	  as	  better	  
marketing,	  in	  the	  cinema	  business.	  	  
The	   final	  word	  should	  perhaps	  be	   left	  with	  an	  entrepreneur	  operating	   in	  San	  Francisco,	  
not	   far	   from	   Hollywood.	   In	   a	   recent	   interview	   Gary	  Meyer,	   a	   co-­‐founder	   of	   Landmark	  
Theatres	   said.	   "I	   have	   hope	   that	   in	   a	   couple	   of	   years,	   when	   digital	   becomes	   more	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available....With	  film,	  there	  are	  $150	  shipping	  costs,	  and	  I	  have	  to	  pay	  a	  projectionist	  $16	  
an	   hour	   to	  work	   from	  noon	   to	   11.	   Digital	  would	   reduce	   the	   cost	   and	  make	   it	   feasible.	  	  
There	  are	  creative	  ways.	  Exhibitors	  can	  either	  go	  to	  bed	  angry	  or	  wake	  up	  and	  change...."	  
(LaSalle,	   2008).	   The	   change	   may	   just	   not	   be	   what	   the	   studios	   were	   hoping	   for	   or	  
expecting.	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Table	  1:	  D-­‐Cinema	  Screens	  by	  Region	  
Table	  1:	  D-­‐Cinema	  Screens	  by	  Region	  	  
	   	  
1999	   2000	   2001	   2002	   2003	   2004	   2005	   2006	   2007*	  
Europe	  	  
	  
0	   11	   8	   22	   30	   52	   229	   532	   747	  
North	  America	  	   0	   15	   23	   80	   82	   90	   332	   2014	   3536	  
Central	  and	  S	  
America	  	   0	   1	   2	   7	   10	   12	   13	   16	   20	  




0	   4	   8	   50	   66	   180	   272	   430	   561	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  World	  	  
	  
0	   31	   41	   159	   188	   335	   848	   2996	   4869	  
*	  Jan	  –	  June	  2007	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Source:	  ScreenDigest,	  2007	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  
Figure	  2:	  The	  Path	  to	  Mainstream	  Digital	  Cinema	  2007	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Table	  2	  Example	  of	  the	  Virtual	  Print	  Fee	  Model	  
	   Year	  1	   Year	  2	   Year	  3	   Year	  4	   Year	  5	   Year	  6	   Year	  7	   Year	  8	   Year	  9	  
System	  Cost*	   80,000	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	  
Financing	  cost	   5,836	   5,556	   5,006	   4,416	   3,739	   3,011	   2,229	   1,389	   485	  
Total	  Annual	  	  Cost	  	  	   85,836	   5,556	   5,006	   4,416	   3,739	   3,011	   2,229	   1,389	   485	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Average	  Turn	  rate	   3.25	   3.25	   3.25	   3.25	   3.25	   3.25	   3.25	   3.25	   3.25	  
Number	  of	  Pictures	   16	   16	   16	   16	   16	   16	   16	   16	   16	  
Utilisation	  Rate	  (%)	   80	   90	   90	   95	   95	   95	   95	   95	   95	  
VPF	  per	  booking	  ($)	   700	   700	   700	   700	   700	   700	   700	   700	   700	  
Total	  Distrib	  VPF	  revs	   8,960	   10,080	   10,008	   10,640	   10,640	   10,640	   10,640	   10,640	   10,640	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Exhib	  contribution	   1,600	   1,600	   1,600	   1,600	   1,600	   1,600	   1,600	   1,600	   1,600	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
No	  of	  alt	  cont	  bookings	   12	   12	   12	   12	   12	   12	   12	   12	   12	  
VPF	  for	  alt	  cont	  ($)	   100	   100	   100	   100	   100	   100	   100	   100	   100	  
Total	  VPF	  for	  alt	  cont	   1,200	   1,200	   1,200	   1,200	   1,200	   1,200	   1,200	   1,200	   1,200	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Total	  Revenue	   11,760	   12,880	   12,880	   13,440	   13,440	   13,440	   13,440	   13,440	   13,440	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Amount	  unrecouped	   74,076	   66,752	   58,878	   49,854	   40,153	   29,724	   18,514	   6,462	   -­‐6,493	  
*	  Does	  not	  include	  maintenance	  and	  installation	  
Average	  Turn	  Rate	  =	  Average	  time	  a	  movie	  stays	  on	  screen	  
Number	  of	  pictures	  per	  year	  =	  Films	  played	  on	  a	  screen	  per	  year	  
Utilization	  rate	  =	  Depends	  on	  number	  of	  distributors	  signed	  up	  to	  VPF	  system	  
Source: Screen Digest 
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Table	  3:	  Box	  Office	  per	  Screen	  results	  3D	  vs	  2D 
Title	   Digital	  3D	  
screens	  
2D	  ($)	   3D	  ($)	   X	  Revenue	  
Chicken	  Little	   	   86	   	   6,760	   	   24,419	   	   3.6	  
Monster	  House	   	   178	   	   4,798	   	   13,483	   	   2.8	  
Meet	  The	  
Robinsons	  
	   581	   	   4,713	   	   12,220	   	   2.6	  
Beowulf	   	   766	   	   3,882	   	   10,782	   	   2.8	  
Average	   	   403	   	   5,038	   	   15,226	   	   3.0	  
Source: Screen Digest 
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Abstract	  
While	  the	  process	  of	  distributing	  and	  exhibiting	  a	  film	  has	  changed	  a	  little	  over	  the	  past	  
century,	   Digital	   Cinema,	   the	   process	   of	   using	   digitally	   stored	   data	   instead	   of	   strips	   of	  
acetate,	  has	  arrived.	  With	  technology	  continuing	  to	  develop,	  it	  is	  expected	  that	  d-­‐cinema	  
will	  overtake	  the	  quality	  of	  conventional	  cinema	  within	  the	  next	  two	  years.	  	  
This	  paper	  considers	  how	  the	  film	  industry	  might	  affect	  the	  transition	  from	  film	  to	  digital	  
products.	   Rather	   than	   contributing	   to	   the	   continuing	   debate	   about	   the	   qualities	   of	   the	  
competing	  technologies	  or	  the	  creative	  merits	  or	  demerits	  of	  digital	  product,	  this	  paper	  
focuses	   on	   the	   search	   for	   new	  business	  models	   in	   an	   industry	  wedded	   to	   an	   analogue	  
process.	  	  
It	   considers	   the	   strategies	   of	   implications	   associated	   with	   change;	   and	   how	   different	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INTRODUCTION	  
Cinema	  can	  be	  considered	  as	  one	  of	  the	  success	  stories	  of	  the	  early	  21st	  century,	  with	  
more	  people	  currently	  going	  to	  see	  films	  at	  the	  cinema	  than	  at	  any	  time	  in	  the	  last	  30	  
years	  (Hubbard,	  2003).	  Turning	  cinemas	  into	  destination	  venues,	  improving	  the	  quality	  of	  
the	  movie-­‐going	  experience,	  and	  supporting	  the	  release	  of	  films	  with	  high	  marketing	  
budgets	  have	  revived	  the	  industry.	  	  
In	  the	  exhibition	  sector,	  Multiplex	  cinemas	  have	  revolutionised	  the	  pattern	  of	  cinema	  
visits.	  Offering	  easy	  car	  access	  for	  families	  and	  comfortable	  seating,	  multiplex	  cinemas	  are	  
a	  world	  away	  from	  the	  old-­‐fashioned,	  run-­‐down	  cinemas	  they	  superseded	  (Thomas	  and	  
Bromley,	  2000).	  
However,	  the	  distribution	  and	  exhibition	  of	  motion	  pictures	  are	  at	  a	  crossroads.	  Ever	  
since	  the	  medium	  was	  invented	  in	  the	  1890s	  (Huettig,	  1944)	  the	  ‘picture’	  has	  been	  
brought	  to	  the	  spectator	  in	  the	  form	  of	  photochemical	  images	  stored	  on	  strips	  of	  celluloid	  
film	  passed	  in	  intermittent	  motion	  through	  a	  projector.	  Now,	  with	  the	  advent	  of	  Digital	  
Cinema	  (that	  is	  using	  digitally	  stored	  data	  in	  place	  of	  film),	  new	  changes	  lie	  ahead	  for	  the	  
film	  industry.	  In	  the	  following	  section	  we	  will	  briefly	  explain	  the	  advantages	  of	  digital	  
cinema	  over	  film-­‐stock	  based	  cinema.	  
Time	  for	  Change	  
The	  traditional	  photochemical	  process	  of	  analogue	  movie	  making	  is	  capable	  of	  producing	  
images	  of	  great	  beauty	  and	  expressive	  power.	  However,	  the	  traditional	  viewer	  experience	  
is	  often	  diminished	  by	  the	  use	  of	  third	  generation	  (release)	  prints,	  manufactured	  on	  high-­‐
speed	  printing	  machines,	  and	  by	  the	  wear	  and	  tear	  of	  a	  mechanical	  exhibition	  process	  
with	  frequent	  scratching	  resulting	  in	  a	  dirty,	  faded,	  ultimately	  degraded	  presentation.	  
Furthermore,	  in	  a	  world	  ever	  more	  pre-­‐occupied	  with	  the	  impact	  of	  industry	  on	  the	  
environment,	  the	  continuing	  reliance	  on	  a	  technology	  (film	  manufacturing),	  which	  
involves	  environmental	  risks,	  is	  harder	  to	  justify	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  cleaner	  alternative.	  
In	  contrast	  to	  film	  the	  image	  quality	  of	  a	  digital	  cinema	  intermediate	  does	  not	  deteriorate	  
with	  each	  subsequent	  showing,	  its	  delivery	  is	  non-­‐physical	  and	  each	  copy	  a	  perfect	  clone	  
ensuring	  excellent	  image	  quality	  at	  every	  cinema.	  Because	  the	  movie	  is	  stored	  digitally,	  its	  
physical	  size	  is	  no	  longer	  an	  issue	  and	  once	  loaded	  into	  the	  server	  and	  the	  movie	  
calibrated,	  it	  does	  not	  require	  the	  attendance	  of	  the	  projectionist	  to	  do	  any	  more	  than	  
start	  the	  show.	  	  
A	  ‘digital	  print’	  can	  also	  contain	  multiple	  subtitled	  and	  dubbed	  language	  versions.	  	  
Furthermore,	  the	  potential	  savings	  on	  the	  (at	  least)	  $1	  billion	  spent	  annually	  on	  
manufacturing	  and	  shipping	  prints,	  should	  in	  theory	  provide	  a	  powerful	  impetus	  for	  
change	  (Culkin	  et	  al,	  2003).	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This	  paper	  considers	  how	  the	  transition	  from	  film	  to	  digital	  product	  is	  likely	  to	  affect	  the	  
global	  film	  industry.	  Rather	  than	  contributing	  further	  to	  the	  debate	  about	  the	  qualities	  of	  
competing	  technologies	  or	  the	  creative	  merits	  or	  demerits	  of	  digital	  product,	  this	  paper	  
will	  focus	  on	  the	  development	  of	  potential	  new	  business	  models	  in	  an	  industry	  wedded	  
for	  over	  one	  hundred	  years	  to	  an	  analogue	  process.	  The	  authors	  will	  examine	  the	  
strategies	  of	  the	  companies	  at	  the	  forefront	  of	  the	  technology;	  the	  financial	  implications	  
associated	  with	  change;	  and	  how	  different	  territories	  are	  adapting	  in	  order	  to	  
accommodate	  this	  transition.	  
D-­‐cinema	  –	  An	  idle	  revolution	  ?	  
Ever	  since	  1999,	  when	  George	  Lucas	  launched	  Star	  Wars	  –	  Phantom	  Menance	  on	  four	  
digital	  screens	  in	  America,	  prophets	  of	  digital	  cinema	  have	  proclaimed	  that	  it	  will	  change	  
the	  film	  industry	  forever.	  Six	  years	  later	  d-­‐cinema	  is	  still	  far	  away	  from	  wide	  
implementation.	  
Belton	  has	  even	  declared	  digital	  cinema	  to	  be	  a	  “false	  revolution”	  because	  it	  does	  not	  
transform	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  motion	  picture	  experience	  for	  the	  audience,	  stating	  that	  
“One	  obvious	  problem	  with	  digital	  cinema	  is	  that	  it	  has	  no	  novelty	  value,	  at	  least	  not	  for	  
film	  audiences”	  (Belton,	  2002).	  He	  argues	  that	  in	  a	  marketplace	  in	  which	  the	  word	  
“digital”	  sells	  consumer	  products,	  “it	  is	  digital	  sound	  (and	  not	  digital	  projection)	  that	  
marks	  for	  consumers	  the	  entry	  of	  motion	  pictures	  into	  the	  digital	  era”.	  	  
His	  arguments	  can	  not	  be	  easily	  dismissed	  especially	  when	  considering	  the	  explicit	  goal	  
of	  digital	  projector	  manufacturers	  to	  produce	  an	  image	  quality	  that	  equals	  that	  of	  
traditional	  film	  prints.	  Slater	  has	  compared	  the	  cinema	  exhibition	  chain	  of	  traditional	  film	  
and	  electronic/digital	  cinema.	  When	  looking	  for	  an	  answer	  to	  the	  question	  what	  problem	  
electronic/digital	  cinema	  is	  trying	  to	  solve,	  he	  could	  not	  find	  “one	  single	  good	  technical	  
or	  operational	  reason	  why	  the	  whole	  system	  should	  be	  replaced”	  (Slater	  2002:43),	  with	  
film	  being	  high	  quality,	  flexible	  and	  most	  important	  future	  proof.	  	  
Still	  key	  players	  in	  the	  industry	  seem	  to	  be	  determined	  to	  make	  digital	  cinema	  happen,	  
such	  as	  John	  Filthian,	  president	  of	  the	  National	  Association	  of	  Theater	  Owners	  (NATO)	  in	  
America,	  who	  has	  said	  that	  “digital	  cinema	  will	  be	  the	  biggest	  transition	  technology	  in	  
the	  history	  of	  the	  movie	  industry”	  (Baird,	  2004).	  
The	  dilemma	  
However,	  with	  just	  over	  120.000	  screens	  worldwide,	  the	  cinema	  market	  has	  been	  
deemed	  too	  small	  to	  support	  any	  major	  technological	  innovation	  by	  itself	  (Screen	  Digest,	  
2003).	  This	  means	  that	  no	  manufacturer	  is	  currently	  in	  the	  position	  to	  produce	  a	  digital	  
projector	  at	  such	  a	  competitive	  price,	  that	  exhibitors	  could	  afford	  to	  pay	  for	  the	  switching	  
costs	  themselves.	  Consequently	  the	  matter	  of	  financing	  the	  conversion	  to	  d-­‐cinema	  has	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been	  passed	  on	  to	  distributors,	  who	  are	  claimed	  to	  benefit	  the	  most	  from	  digital	  cinema	  
by	  saving	  on	  print	  costs.	  	  
The	  problem	  is	  further	  intensified,	  when	  more	  than	  one	  company	  for	  d-­‐cinema	  
equipment	  tries	  to	  serve	  the	  market,	  and	  more	  than	  one	  standard	  exists.	  For	  distributors	  
however,	  it	  does	  only	  make	  sense	  to	  fund	  digital	  cinema	  conversion,	  if	  a	  single	  standard	  
exists	  (similar	  to	  the	  35mm	  standard)	  otherwise	  the	  cost	  savings	  of	  digital	  are	  offset	  by	  
producing	  several	  masters	  for	  different	  standards.	  
Thus	  the	  need	  arises	  for	  a	  clearly	  specified	  standard	  –	  an	  issue	  that	  took	  the	  participating	  
players	  more	  than	  six	  years	  to	  resolve.	  These	  players	  can	  be	  categorized	  into	  three	  basic	  
groups:	  equipment	  manufacturers,	  institutional	  players	  and	  distributors.	  In	  the	  following	  
the	  major	  players	  and	  their	  stakes	  in	  digital	  cinema	  will	  be	  introduced	  briefly	  while	  
reflecting	  on	  their	  role	  in	  the	  search	  for	  a	  single	  standard.	  	  
Setting	  a	  standard,	  shaping	  the	  market	  
The	  earliest	  attempts	  to	  gain	  a	  dominant	  market	  position	  and	  to	  set	  standards	  have	  been	  
made	  by	  the	  main	  competitors	  in	  digital	  projector	  manufacturing,	  Texas	  Instruments	  (DLP	  
Cinema),	  Sony	  (GLV)	  and	  JVC	  (D-­‐ILA).	  	  
While	  JVC’s	  position	  in	  the	  market	  has	  been	  marginalized,	  Texas	  Instruments	  has	  licensed	  
its	  DLP	  Cinema	  technology	  to	  projector	  manufacturers	  such	  as	  Barco,	  Christie	  Digital	  and	  
DPI/NEC	  and	  has	  by	  doing	  so	  gained	  an	  early	  advantage	  for	  its	  standard	  over	  Sony.	  It	  soon	  
became	  evident	  however,	  that	  a	  working	  business	  model	  for	  d-­‐cinema	  has	  to	  include	  not	  
just	  a	  projector,	  but	  must	  consist	  of	  a	  bundle	  with	  digital	  distribution	  and	  server	  
hardware.	  The	  main	  competitors	  in	  this	  area	  are	  companies	  such	  as	  QuVis,	  GDC,	  XDC	  	  and	  
AccessIT.	  	  
As	  technology	  companies	  are	  clearly	  wedded	  to	  their	  own	  solutions,	  pointing	  out	  flaws	  in	  
competing	  technologies	  while	  downplaying	  the	  shortcomings	  of	  their	  own,	  institutional	  
players	  stepped	  in	  to	  help	  specify	  a	  single	  standard	  and	  support	  the	  development	  of	  
digital	  cinema.	  In	  the	  USA	  the	  institution	  in	  charge	  is	  a	  special	  commission	  (DC-­‐28)	  of	  the	  
SMPTE	  (Society	  of	  Motion	  Picture	  and	  Television	  Engineers)	  in	  Europe	  it	  is	  the	  EDCF	  
(European	  Digital	  Cinema	  Forum)	  in	  Japan	  the	  DCCJ	  NPO	  (Digital	  Cinema	  Consortium	  of	  
Japan)	  and	  in	  China	  the	  SARFT	  (State	  Administration	  of	  Radio,	  Film,	  and	  Television).	  The	  
power	  of	  these	  institutions	  has	  however	  been	  limited,	  as	  they	  tend	  to	  avoid	  taking	  sides	  
and	  promote	  all	  solutions	  equally.	  
In	  2002	  the	  DCI	  (Digital	  Cinema	  Incentive)	  was	  formed,	  a	  joint	  venture	  of	  the	  seven	  major	  
Hollywood	  studios	  (Disney,	  Fox,	  MGM,	  Paramount,	  Sony	  Pictures	  Entertainment,	  
Universal	  and	  Warner	  Bros)	  that	  has	  dwarfed	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  other	  institutions	  to	  
establish	  guidelines	  for	  digital	  cinema	  into	  insignificance.	  Although	  it	  still	  is	  the	  SMPTE	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that	  ratifies	  technical	  standards	  for	  cinema	  and	  television	  in	  America,	  even	  Peter	  Symes,	  
vice	  president	  engineering	  at	  SMPTE	  has	  to	  admit	  that	  “the	  DCI	  represents	  a	  significant	  
party	  of	  interest”	  and	  it	  was	  very	  unlikely	  that	  the	  SMPTE	  could	  reach	  consensus	  on	  
something	  if	  the	  DCI	  was	  in	  favour	  of	  something	  else	  (Crabtree,	  2004).	  	  
In	  July	  2005	  the	  DCI	  has	  published	  its	  final	  overall	  system	  requirements	  and	  specifications	  
for	  digital	  cinema.	  In	  their	  “guidelines”	  they	  have	  opted	  for	  a	  scalable	  solution	  from	  2K	  to	  
4K	  and	  have	  therefore	  left	  the	  decision	  which	  projector	  technology	  will	  be	  used	  in	  
theatres	  to	  the	  market.	  	  
They	  have	  however	  selected	  JPG2000	  as	  the	  image	  coding	  system	  to	  be	  used	  in	  the	  
delivery	  of	  digital	  motion	  pictures.	  This	  decision	  is	  very	  likely	  to	  eliminate	  competing	  
systems,	  such	  as	  various	  MPEG	  standards	  or	  newcomer	  eTreppid	  from	  the	  market	  and	  
forces	  all	  major	  manufacturers	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  standard	  (Crabtree,	  2004).	  
DCI	  specification	  have	  consequently	  been	  branded	  to	  be	  synonymous	  with	  the	  term	  
“digital	  cinema”,	  as	  Tim	  Partridge,	  senior	  vice	  president	  and	  general	  manager	  of	  the	  
professional	  division	  for	  Dolby	  Laboratories	  has	  explained:	  “I	  think	  we	  [Dolby	  
Laboratories]	  use	  the	  terms	  in	  what	  has	  become	  the	  standard	  way.	  D-­‐cinema	  to	  us	  means	  
DCI	  standard	  equipment,	  E-­‐cinema	  is	  everything	  below	  that”	  (DCR,	  2005b).	  
The	  question	  arises,	  why	  the	  “digital	  cinema	  revolution”	  still	  has	  not	  fully	  begun,	  when	  
the	  dominating	  market	  forces	  (The	  Hollywood	  studios)	  can	  so	  easily	  safeguard	  their	  
interests.	  One	  might	  argue	  that	  all	  they	  have	  to	  do,	  to	  continue	  their	  international	  market	  
supremacy,	  is	  to	  replicate	  the	  existing	  power	  structure	  and	  apply	  it	  to	  the	  digital	  cinema	  
market.	  What	  does	  stop	  them?	  Can	  the	  hesitancy	  of	  the	  Majors	  to	  move	  along	  with	  d-­‐
cinema	  quickly	  be	  interpreted	  as	  an	  indication	  of	  concern	  about	  the	  impact	  the	  digital	  
transition	  will	  have	  on	  the	  industry?	  	  
DIGITAL	  CINEMA	  –	  A	  DISRUPTIVE	  TECHNOLOGY?	  
„Digital	  cinema	  […]	  is	  perhaps	  the	  most	  significant	  challenge	  to	  the	  cinema	  industry	  since	  
the	  introduction	  of	  sound	  on	  film.	  As	  with	  any	  new	  technology,	  there	  are	  those	  who	  want	  
to	  do	  it	  fast,	  and	  those	  who	  want	  to	  do	  it	  right.	  As	  we	  move	  down	  this	  path,	  let's	  not	  
forget	  the	  lesson	  learned	  with	  the	  introduction	  of	  digital	  audio	  for	  film	  in	  the	  '90s.	  Cinema	  
Digital	  Sound,	  a	  division	  of	  Optical	  Radiation	  Corporation,	  was	  the	  first	  to	  put	  digital	  
audio	  on	  35mm	  film.	  Very,	  very	  few	  remember	  CDS,	  who	  closed	  their	  doors	  long	  ago.	  
Such	  are	  the	  rewards	  for	  being	  first.“	  	  (MKPE	  Consulting	  LLC,	  2005)	  
As	  the	  above	  statement	  shows,	  there	  are	  considerable	  risks	  attached	  with	  moving	  into	  a	  
market	  too	  fast.	  Indeed	  some	  of	  the	  companies	  who	  tried	  to	  find	  an	  early	  foothold	  in	  d-­‐
cinema	  have	  already	  closed	  their	  business	  in	  this	  field	  (most	  notably	  Boeing).	  However	  as	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the	  literature	  on	  “disruptive	  innovation”	  and	  “disruptive	  technology”	  has	  pointed	  out,	  
one	  of	  the	  biggest	  risks	  for	  incumbents	  in	  any	  market	  is	  to	  move	  too	  slowly.	  
Disruptive	  innovation	  and	  disruptive	  technology	  are	  emerging	  and	  increasingly	  prominent	  
business	  terms	  describing	  a	  revolutionary	  change	  in	  an	  industry	  (Thomond	  et	  al,	  2003).	  
The	  term	  disruptive	  technology	  was	  first	  marked	  by	  Christensen	  (1997)	  to	  describe	  a	  
technological	  discontinuity	  that	  causes	  the	  failure	  of	  incumbents	  in	  a	  market.	  Danneels	  
(2004)	  defines	  disruptive	  technology	  as	  a	  technology	  that	  changes	  the	  bases	  of	  
competition	  by	  changing	  the	  performance	  metrics	  along	  which	  firms	  compete.	  Customers	  
seeking	  certain	  benefits	  determine	  which	  attributes	  they	  value	  in	  a	  product,	  with	  
different	  customer	  groups	  valuing	  different	  attributes.	  New	  products	  based	  on	  a	  
disruptive	  technology	  have	  different	  attribute	  sets	  than	  existing	  products.	  They	  tend	  to	  
have	  initially	  a	  lower	  level	  of	  performance	  on	  dimensions	  relevant	  to	  mainstream	  market	  
segments	  but	  have	  higher	  performance	  on	  dimensions	  valued	  by	  remote	  or	  emerging	  
market	  segments.	  Christensen	  has	  characterized	  disruptive	  technologies	  as	  typically	  
“simpler,	  cheaper,	  and	  more	  reliable	  and	  convenient	  than	  established	  technologies	  
(2000:192).”	  	  
When	  the	  disruption	  has	  established	  itself	  in	  an	  underserved	  customer	  segment,	  major	  
players	  may	  be	  displaced	  as	  disrupter’s	  develop	  new	  wealth	  opportunities.	  The	  
consequences	  of	  not	  securing	  disruptive	  innovations	  can	  be	  “far	  more	  devastating	  than	  
simply	  lost	  opportunities	  or	  lost	  market	  share”	  (Thomond	  et	  al,	  2003:6).	  	  	  
Following	  these	  definitions	  d-­‐cinema	  can	  easily	  be	  identified	  as	  a	  disruptive	  technology.	  
In	  the	  following	  sections	  we	  will	  map	  out	  current	  important	  issues	  stopping	  incumbents	  
from	  embracing	  the	  technology	  and	  exploiting	  its	  full	  potential.	  We	  will	  show	  how	  d-­‐
cinema	  changes	  the	  basis	  of	  competition	  in	  the	  industry	  and	  helps	  new	  markets	  to	  
emerge.	  We	  will	  also	  show	  how	  incumbents	  can	  slow	  down	  the	  development	  to	  their	  
advantage,	  and	  in	  doing	  so	  deliberately	  risk	  losing	  niche	  markets.	  	  
Single	  standard	  vs	  Consumer	  Market	  
One	  of	  the	  prerequisites	  for	  a	  wide	  roll	  out	  of	  digital	  cinema	  has	  been	  the	  readiness	  of	  
tested	  equipment.	  There	  is	  a	  broad	  consent	  among	  industry	  experts	  that	  the	  problems	  of	  
digital	  projectors	  with	  image	  quality	  have	  now	  been	  solved.	  However	  the	  availability	  of	  
technology	  that	  meets	  the	  requirements	  has	  not	  propelled	  the	  number	  of	  installed	  digital	  
cinema	  projectors	  tremendously.	  Walt	  Ordway,	  chief	  technology	  officer	  for	  the	  DCI,	  does	  
not	  see	  a	  wide	  implementation	  of	  digital	  cinema	  before	  at	  least	  four	  to	  six	  years,	  although	  
an	  initial	  roll	  out	  could	  take	  place	  “in	  the	  next	  year	  or	  so”.	  Ordway	  notes	  that	  one	  
problem	  with	  the	  systems	  that	  are	  currently	  fielded	  is	  their	  lack	  of	  security	  constraints	  
and	  a	  common	  standard	  (DCR,	  2005a).	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On	  an	  exhibitor’s	  wish	  list	  for	  regulators	  of	  digital	  cinema,	  a	  common	  global	  standard	  
would	  rank	  among	  the	  top	  objectives.	  There	  are	  two	  rivalling	  technologies	  in	  the	  
projector	  market,	  namely	  Texas	  Instrument’s	  2K	  (DLP)	  standard,	  and	  Sony’s	  4K	  (GLV)	  
standard.	  	  Texas	  instruments	  has	  invested	  an	  “unspeakably	  large	  amount	  of	  money”	  
(ScreenDigest,	  2003:30)	  into	  its	  DLP	  technology,	  revealing	  the	  exact	  amount	  not	  even	  to	  
its	  shareholders,	  and	  currently	  controls	  the	  market.	  Sony	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  keeps	  
announcing	  its	  4K	  projector	  and	  plays	  on	  the	  preference	  of	  studios	  for	  a	  4K	  solution.	  
Despite	  Sony’s	  de	  facto	  zero	  market	  share,	  the	  DCI	  (in	  which	  Sony	  is	  a	  member)	  has	  
endorsed	  both	  2K	  and	  4K	  standards	  when	  choosing	  the	  JPEG	  2000	  codec	  for	  studio	  d-­‐
cinema	  release	  masters.	  
Although	  the	  revenues	  from	  the	  high	  end	  digital	  cinema	  market	  can	  be	  substantial,	  the	  
real	  market	  to	  be	  won	  is	  the	  home	  cinema	  market.	  For	  both	  companies	  the	  market	  for	  d-­‐
cinema	  is	  therefore	  a	  kind	  of	  branding	  exercise	  for	  reaping	  rewards	  in	  the	  consumer	  
electronics	  (CE)	  market.	  The	  underlying	  logic	  (e.g.	  for	  Texas	  Instruments)	  is	  the	  following:	  
“Cinema	  audiences	  will	  see	  the	  DLP	  logo	  before	  the	  start	  of	  every	  film	  in	  a	  digital	  cinema	  
and	  come	  to	  associate	  it	  with	  the	  highest	  quality	  of	  picture	  viewing.	  They	  will	  then	  seek	  it	  
out	  or	  opt	  for	  it	  in	  their	  local	  CE	  market.”	  (ScreenDigest,	  2003).	  	  
The	  situation	  is	  similar	  to	  the	  introduction	  of	  digital	  sound	  into	  cinemas,	  which	  was	  also	  
seen	  as	  a	  preliminary	  battle	  “for	  the	  potentially	  much	  more	  lucrative	  market	  for	  digital	  
sound	  in	  the	  home”	  (Belton	  2002:	  101).	  During	  the	  1990s	  three	  different	  companies	  tried	  
to	  establish	  their	  proprietary	  technology	  as	  a	  cinema	  standard,	  namely	  DTS	  
(Universal/MCA),	  SDDS	  (Sony)	  and	  Dolby	  digital	  (Dolby	  Laboratories).	  Since	  each	  standard	  
was	  able	  to	  capture	  a	  sufficient	  market	  share,	  multi-­‐standards	  in	  cinema	  sound	  continue	  
to	  exist.	  	  
Multi-­‐standards	  in	  d-­‐cinema	  are	  certainly	  not	  a	  desired	  outcome	  for	  film	  distributors	  as	  
well	  as	  exhibitors.	  Still,	  as	  long	  as	  d-­‐cinema	  is	  only	  considered	  as	  a	  prefacing	  market	  for	  
the	  companies	  who	  actually	  develop	  the	  technologies	  in	  use,	  standards	  will	  be	  an	  issue.	  
A	  market	  with	  network	  effects	  
One	  of	  the	  reasons	  why	  a	  common	  standard	  is	  so	  desirable	  is	  that	  the	  market	  for	  digital	  
cinema	  exhibits	  positive	  consumption	  and	  production	  externalities.	  Positive	  consumption	  
(network)	  externalities	  exist,	  when	  the	  value	  of	  a	  unit	  of	  the	  good	  increases	  with	  the	  
expected	  number	  of	  units	  sold	  (Economides,	  1995).	  	  
If	  both	  Texas	  Instruments	  (2K)	  and	  Sony	  (4K)	  establish	  their	  incompatible	  projectors	  in	  the	  
market,	  the	  market	  is	  split	  into	  two	  different	  networks,	  one	  for	  2K	  projectors	  and	  one	  for	  
4K	  projectors.	  Each	  of	  these	  networks	  consists	  of	  sellers	  (the	  Hollywood	  studios	  +	  
independent	  content	  producers)	  and	  buyers	  (exhibitors).	  If	  an	  exhibitor	  installs	  a	  2K	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projector	  he	  joins	  the	  2K	  network,	  and	  the	  utility	  of	  this	  projector	  increases	  with	  each	  
other	  exhibitor	  to	  join	  this	  network	  because	  the	  increasing	  size	  of	  the	  (2K)	  market,	  
increases	  the	  expected	  utility	  of	  all	  participants	  as	  they	  have	  more	  partners	  to	  trade	  with.	  
This	  is	  especially	  true	  for	  the	  Hollywood	  studios,	  as	  for	  them	  the	  utility	  of	  the	  market	  is	  at	  
a	  maximum,	  when	  there	  is	  only	  one	  standard	  (either	  2K	  or	  4K)	  and	  they	  can	  trade	  with	  all	  
the	  exhibitors	  without	  incurring	  any	  additional	  costs.	  
Charles	  Swartz,	  CEO	  of	  the	  USC	  Entertainment	  Technology	  Center,	  has	  stressed	  the	  
importance	  of	  a	  single,	  global,	  interoperable	  standard	  for	  d-­‐cinema	  by	  referring	  to	  35mm	  
which	  had	  all	  these	  characteristics;	  	  the	  single	  standard	  ultimately	  enabled	  film	  to	  
become	  a	  “medium	  of	  tremendous	  power”	  (Crabtree,	  2003).	  A	  situation	  with	  a	  double	  
standard	  would	  therefore	  be	  not	  a	  progress	  but	  a	  step	  backward	  for	  the	  industry.	  
Waiting	  for	  Sony	  	  
As	  a	  vertical	  integrated	  corporation	  Sony	  faces	  competition	  on	  each	  stage	  of	  the	  value	  
chain,	  with	  contradicting	  objectives	  adding	  to	  the	  complexity.	  	  
Being	  a	  member	  of	  the	  DCI,	  Sony,	  the	  studio,	  has	  been	  able	  to	  secure	  that	  the	  DCI	  agreed	  
on	  scalable	  format	  standards	  from	  2K	  to	  4K,	  and	  has	  thereby	  strengthened	  the	  position	  of	  
Sony,	  the	  projector	  manufacturer.	  On	  the	  other	  side	  however,	  it	  has	  also	  agreed	  to	  accept	  
rival	  technology	  as	  a	  standard.	  
There	  is	  a	  strong	  and	  compelling	  argument	  that	  says	  that	  since	  the	  studios	  are	  the	  real	  
beneficiaries	  of	  digital	  cinema	  (through	  print	  savings)	  they	  should	  also	  fund	  the	  projector	  
installation	  (Baird,	  2004).	  One	  possible	  way	  to	  realize	  this	  funding	  sees	  the	  majors	  setting	  
up	  an	  independent	  financing	  entity	  that	  allows	  cinema	  owners	  to	  decide	  on	  their	  own	  on	  
how	  to	  use	  the	  funds	  to	  upgrade	  their	  cinemas	  along	  DCI	  standards	  (Kilday,	  2004).	  
If	  this	  happens,	  Sony	  will	  find	  itself	  in	  the	  contradictory	  situation,	  where	  as	  a	  member	  of	  
the	  DCI	  it	  will	  have	  to	  (directly	  or	  indirectly)	  subsidize	  its	  competitors	  in	  equipment	  
manufacturing.	  
As	  an	  equipment	  manufacturer	  Sony	  competes	  against	  Texas	  Instruments	  and	  its	  
licensees	  Christie	  Digital,	  Barco	  and	  NEC.	  It	  has	  to	  do	  so	  because	  it	  wants	  to	  protect	  its	  
market	  prospects	  in	  consumer	  electronics,	  where	  it	  again	  competes	  against	  TI	  licensees,	  
eg.	  Samsung,	  Sanyo	  or	  Marantz.	  
On	  each	  stage	  of	  the	  value	  chain	  Sony	  has	  more	  to	  lose	  than	  its	  competitors	  (the	  
subsequent	  market)	  but	  it	  is	  also	  the	  only	  player	  that	  can	  exacerbate	  power	  at	  a	  higher	  
level	  by	  participating	  in	  the	  DCI.	  Although	  Sony	  has	  not	  even	  proved	  yet	  that	  its	  4K	  
projector	  is	  more	  than	  a	  functioning	  prototype,	  it	  is	  therefore	  still	  a	  market	  force	  one	  has	  
to	  take	  into	  account.	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Sony’s	  strategy	  clearly	  is	  to	  play	  on	  time	  and	  by	  cleverly	  doing	  so,	  it	  has	  managed	  to	  stay	  
in	  a	  race	  that	  otherwise	  would	  have	  been	  long	  over.	  Through	  repeatedly	  announcing	  its	  
4K	  projector	  it	  has	  raised	  industry	  uncertainty	  and	  stopped	  investments.	  As	  Travis	  Reid,	  
president	  of	  the	  cinema	  chain	  Loews	  Cineplex	  said	  “the	  fact	  that	  (a	  4K	  projector)	  exists	  is	  
making	  everyone	  stop	  to	  think”,	  and	  admitted	  that	  if	  there	  was	  no	  deployment	  (of	  4K),	  
then	  2K	  would	  have	  been	  the	  initial	  rollout.	  	  
An	  exhibitor	  quoted	  in	  Hollywood	  Reporter	  said	  that:	  “They	  [Sony]	  are	  clearly	  trying	  to	  
slow	  down	  the	  forward	  momentum	  of	  2K	  being	  adopted	  and	  rolled	  out.	  It	  will	  be	  
interesting	  to	  see	  how	  they’ve	  come	  along	  to	  being	  a	  real	  live	  projector;	  there	  are	  a	  lot	  of	  
studios	  saying,	  ‘If	  this	  is	  close,	  then	  let’s	  wait.’	  TI	  [Texas	  Instruments]	  can’t	  be	  happy	  
about	  it.”	  (Sperling,	  2004)	  
Doug	  Darrow,	  project	  manager	  for	  digital	  cinema	  at	  TI	  challenges	  Sony	  with	  the	  strong	  
argument	  that	  it	  has	  not	  demonstrated	  that	  4K	  projectors	  actually	  work	  in	  theatres	  for	  a	  
few	  years	  in	  contrast	  to	  TI.	  However	  this	  argument	  could	  backfire.	  If	  there	  is	  no	  pressing	  
economic	  need	  (and	  there	  is	  none)	  to	  switch	  to	  digital	  projection	  immediately,	  then	  
exhibitors	  and	  studios	  might	  well	  postpone	  their	  investment	  decisions	  and	  wait	  to	  see	  if	  
Sony’s	  4K	  projector	  can	  deliver.	  
Texas	  Instruments	  has	  expressed	  little	  interest	  in	  the	  race	  to	  4K	  and	  focuses	  on	  the	  
commercialisation	  of	  2K,	  with	  “the	  biggest	  challenge	  not	  lying	  in	  resolution	  but	  in	  costs”	  
(Kaufman,	  2004).	  
A	  complex	  transition	  	  
For	  John	  Fithian,	  president	  of	  the	  National	  Association	  of	  Theatre	  Owners	  (NATO)	  “it	  is	  
fairly	  clear	  that	  studios	  will	  fund	  the	  transition,”	  since	  “they	  will	  save	  a	  tremendous	  
amount	  of	  money	  from	  the	  conversion	  (Baird,	  2004).	  
The	  modus	  operandi	  of	  this	  transition	  is	  far	  away	  from	  being	  “fairly	  clear”,	  though.	  The	  
rollout	  plan	  that	  determines	  which	  cinemas	  will	  get	  converted	  first	  must	  be	  consensual	  
negotiated	  with	  all	  interest	  parties.	  Should	  the	  transition	  start	  only	  in	  North	  America	  or	  
internationally,	  by	  state,	  by	  exhibitor,	  by	  market	  or	  where	  low	  technology	  and	  
penetration	  allow	  for	  fast	  entry?	  (Fuchs,	  2004b)	  	  
The	  Board	  of	  directors	  of	  the	  NATO	  (2004)	  has	  formulated	  a	  resolution	  of	  requirements	  
that	  need	  to	  be	  fulfilled	  for	  the	  transition	  to	  be	  a	  success.	  A	  key	  point	  for	  them	  is	  that	  
interoperable,	  reliable	  equipment	  is	  in	  place	  (both	  NATO	  and	  DCI	  have	  pledged	  for	  a	  beta	  
testing	  phase)	  that	  at	  least	  equals	  the	  image	  quality	  of	  35mm.	  The	  equipment	  must	  
further	  be	  easy	  to	  upgrade	  at	  reasonable	  cost,	  as	  technology	  advances,	  must	  be	  built	  
around	  clearly	  defined	  standards	  and	  has	  to	  be	  produced	  by	  competing	  multiple	  vendors.	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For	  exhibitors	  a	  desirable	  financing	  plan	  for	  the	  transition	  has	  to	  ensure	  that	  all	  movie	  
complexes	  and	  auditoriums,	  regardless	  of	  size	  or	  geographic	  location	  can	  participate	  
within	  reasonable	  time,	  studios	  are	  committed	  to	  provide	  digital	  content,	  and	  exhibitors	  
can	  independently	  select	  the	  equipment,	  and	  own	  it	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  financing	  period.	  
Furthermore	  they	  ask	  for	  a	  “no	  dark	  screen”	  policy,	  meaning	  that	  films	  play	  in	  a	  non-­‐
repudiate	  manner	  unless	  the	  exhibitor	  attempts	  to	  play	  the	  film	  in	  a	  completely	  different	  
venue	  and	  that	  they	  can	  decide	  on	  their	  own	  about	  schedules,	  advertisements,	  trailers	  
and	  other	  content	  (NATO,	  2004).	  
From	  a	  studio	  point	  of	  view,	  subsidising	  the	  full	  cost	  of	  the	  equipment	  without	  any	  
obligations	  to	  exhibitors	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  a	  very	  healthy	  economic	  proposition.	  A	  
solution	  that	  does	  not	  contain	  any	  obligations	  to	  exhibitors	  to	  show	  content	  is	  a	  de	  facto	  
cross-­‐subsidisation	  for	  independent	  filmmakers,	  as	  they	  will	  benefit	  from	  the	  installation	  
without	  contributing	  to	  the	  costs.	  	  The	  question	  of	  ownership	  therefore	  rests	  a	  crucial	  
point	  in	  the	  transition	  to	  d-­‐cinema.	  The	  immense	  undertaking	  to	  convert	  thousands	  of	  
screens	  in	  America	  and	  internationally	  is	  not	  an	  “everyday”	  logistic	  and	  organizational	  
challenge.	  To	  resolve	  the	  major	  issues	  will	  take	  time.	  For	  the	  moment	  this	  will	  delay	  the	  
“d-­‐cinema	  revolution”	  further,	  as	  exhibitors	  have	  little	  incentive	  to	  enter	  the	  market	  on	  
their	  own	  before	  the	  studios	  have	  come	  to	  a	  decision.	  	  
THE	  NEW	  DIGITAL	  DEAL	  
The	  paralysis	  that	  results	  from	  the	  funding	  problem	  has	  left	  the	  market	  for	  the	  moment	  
to	  third	  party	  players.	  A	  first	  wave	  of	  third	  party	  players	  proposed	  to	  pay	  the	  upfront	  
costs	  for	  digital	  projectors	  in	  return	  for	  a	  fee	  (per	  print,	  per-­‐screening,	  per-­‐ticket	  or	  an	  
annual	  contract)	  and	  promised	  to	  ensure	  that	  there	  is	  no	  shift	  in	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  
between	  distributors	  and	  exhibitors	  (ScreenDigest,	  2003).	  The	  success	  of	  these	  
companies	  (with	  some	  exemptions	  such	  as	  Kodak)	  has	  been	  very	  modest	  so	  far.	  In	  2003	  
Boeing	  Digital	  Cinema	  closed	  its	  d-­‐cinema	  business	  that	  was	  once	  projected	  to	  bring	  $	  1	  
billion	  a	  year	  in	  revenue	  (Gates,	  2003).	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  Technicolor	  has	  scaled	  down	  its	  
ambitions	  and	  based	  on	  latest	  reports,	  Elsacom	  is	  still	  in	  the	  “testing	  phase”.	  
A	  new	  wave	  of	  investment	  into	  d-­‐cinema	  comes	  from	  state	  initiatives	  and	  independent	  
film	  distributors.	  By	  targeting	  niche	  markets	  these	  players	  fragment	  the	  market	  and	  can	  
then	  gradually	  expand	  their	  business	  into	  the	  mainstream.	  These	  dynamics	  are	  reflected	  
in	  Christensen’s	  (1997)	  disruptive	  technology	  framework.	  He	  argues	  that	  incumbents	  are	  
resource	  dependent	  (Pfeffer	  and	  Salancik,	  1978)	  on	  their	  most	  demanding	  customers	  and	  
focus	  their	  investment	  towards	  innovations	  that	  are	  valued	  by	  their	  mainstream	  
customers.	  In	  contrast	  to	  this,	  new	  entrants	  are	  not	  constraint	  by	  and	  can	  not	  rely	  on	  an	  
existing	  customer	  base,	  thus	  they	  are	  “forced	  to	  identify	  consumers	  who	  value	  the	  new	  
features	  offered	  by	  the	  new	  technology	  and	  support	  its	  further	  development”	  (Adner,	  
2002).	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In	  this	  regard,	  it	  seems	  as	  if	  the	  first	  wave	  of	  new	  entrants	  into	  d-­‐cinema	  failed	  to	  
correctly	  identify	  these	  “new	  customers”.	  Most	  of	  these	  ventures	  were	  aimed	  right	  from	  
the	  beginning	  at	  the	  mainstream	  market,	  ignoring	  the	  importance	  to	  segment	  the	  market	  
that	  has	  been	  strongly	  underlined	  by	  Moore	  (1991).	  This	  is	  in	  stark	  contrast	  to	  the	  new	  
wave	  of	  entrants,	  who	  are	  very	  focused	  on	  niche	  markets,	  namely	  the	  distribution	  of	  
independent	  content.	  	  
It	  is	  remarkable	  in	  this	  context	  that	  major	  new	  initiatives	  (e.g.	  the	  UK	  Film	  Councils	  Screen	  
Network)	  are	  state	  driven.	  So	  far	  government	  support	  for	  the	  film	  industry	  was	  mainly	  
aimed	  at	  subsidising	  film	  production,	  often	  resulting	  in	  the	  so	  produced	  films	  not	  finding	  
exhibition	  and	  reaching	  only	  a	  very	  limited	  audience.	  The	  idea	  to	  provide	  distribution	  and	  
exhibition	  for	  this	  content	  through	  installing	  digital	  screens	  is	  a	  strong	  shift	  away	  from	  the	  
traditional	  production	  oriented	  subsidy	  logic	  to	  a	  more	  market	  oriented	  one.	  It	  directly	  
addresses	  a	  market	  failure	  in	  exhibition	  that	  provides	  only	  very	  limited	  “screen	  space”	  to	  
“art-­‐house”	  films.	  	  
In	  the	  following	  section	  some	  of	  these	  initiatives	  shall	  be	  introduced:	  
The	  UK	  –	  The	  beta	  tester	  for	  the	  world	  
Despite	  Screen	  Digest’s	  predictions	  in	  2002	  (in	  a	  report	  commissioned	  by	  the	  British	  
department	  for	  Culture,	  Media	  and	  Sport)	  that	  “no	  country	  is	  expected	  to	  ‘go	  it	  alone’”	  
this	  is	  exactly	  what	  has	  happened,	  with	  Britain	  leading	  the	  digital	  front.	  In	  February	  2005	  
the	  UK	  Film	  Council	  announced	  that	  it	  has	  chosen	  the	  Arts	  Alliance	  Digital	  Cinema	  (AADC)	  
to	  install	  and	  run	  the	  world’s	  first	  digital	  screen	  network.	  In	  a	  contract	  worth	  around	  
£11.5	  million	  AADC	  will	  provide	  a	  network	  of	  up	  to	  250	  screens	  throughout	  the	  UK,	  with	  
each	  cinema	  guaranteeing	  to	  show	  a	  minimum	  number	  of	  specialised	  (arthouse/foreign	  
language)	  films	  a	  week	  in	  return	  for	  the	  equipment.	  The	  UK	  Film	  Councils	  strategy	  is	  to	  
improve	  access	  to	  specialised	  films	  especially	  in	  areas	  outside	  metropolitan	  areas	  and	  to	  
broaden	  the	  range	  of	  films	  available	  to	  audiences	  throughout	  the	  UK	  (UK	  Film	  Council,	  
2005).	  	  
By	  choosing	  a	  combination	  of	  Christie	  Digital	  System	  and	  NEC	  (supported	  by	  Digital	  
Projection	  Ltd)	  2K	  DLP	  Cinema	  Projectors,	  and	  QuVIS	  supply	  servers,	  the	  UK	  also	  
influences	  the	  whole	  market,	  as	  investment	  decisions	  by	  other	  parties	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  
directed	  towards	  equipment	  that	  already	  has	  a	  “track	  record”.	  One	  might	  argue	  that	  the	  
UK	  is	  an	  independent	  beta	  tester	  for	  digital	  cinema.	  
DocuZone	  	  
Another	  intiative	  is	  the	  European	  DocuZone	  (EDZ)	  which	  plans	  to	  transform	  180	  
independent	  cinemas	  in	  nine	  European	  countries	  into	  digital	  cinemas.	  EDZ	  will	  use	  a	  
range	  of	  Panasonic	  projectors	  with	  up	  to	  1.4K	  resolution.	  According	  to	  Kees	  Ryninks,	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managing	  director	  of	  EDZ,	  the	  typical	  EDZ	  screen	  is	  up	  to	  250	  seats	  and	  the	  audience	  will	  
have	  the	  same	  viewing	  experience	  with	  a	  mid-­‐range	  1.35K	  projector	  as	  a	  2K	  projector	  in	  a	  
mainstream	  multiplex	  cinema	  with	  600-­‐800	  seats.	  The	  savings	  through	  digital	  distribution	  
for	  a	  smaller	  documentary	  projects	  can	  be	  quite	  substantial,	  as	  the	  average	  costs	  for	  just	  
three	  celluloid	  prints	  varies	  between	  €60,000	  to	  €70,000.	  Ryninks	  further	  states	  that	  
“with	  over	  180	  cinemas	  in	  a	  single	  network”	  EDZ	  is	  “already	  gaining	  such	  substantial	  
economies	  of	  scale	  in	  distribution”	  that	  they	  can	  now	  offer	  “a	  new	  way	  for	  small	  
specialised	  European	  films	  to	  hit	  the	  big	  screen	  and	  reach	  a	  new	  audience.“	  The	  cinemas	  
will	  also	  cooperate	  on	  joint	  audience	  research,	  marketing	  and	  publicity	  to	  reduce	  costs.	  
Further	  to	  that	  films	  will	  be	  able	  to	  open	  simultaneously	  across	  all	  EDZ	  cinemas	  as	  a	  pan-­‐
European	  premier	  with	  a	  satellite-­‐linked	  Q&A	  with	  the	  director,	  taking	  advantage	  of	  
interest	  when	  film	  reviews	  are	  published	  (EDZ,	  2004).	  This	  appears	  like	  the	  “dream	  come	  
true”	  for	  European	  independent	  cinema,	  since	  ironically	  up	  till	  now,	  only	  the	  American	  
majors	  had	  the	  distribution	  structure	  to	  release	  feature	  films	  simultaneously	  in	  Europe.	  
Besides	  economic	  ratio	  EDZs	  choice	  for	  a	  1.35k	  projector	  also	  demonstrates	  that	  it	  is	  not	  
technology	  that	  will	  attract	  audiences	  but	  its	  content.	  As	  Ryninks	  states:	  “although	  there	  
are	  debates	  raging	  over	  the	  technical	  merits	  of	  d-­‐cinema	  over	  e-­‐cinema,	  we	  like	  to	  call	  
our	  solution	  c-­‐cinema	  -­‐	  it	  is	  about	  content,	  culture	  and	  communities.”	  	  
China	  
The	  government	  of	  China	  has	  mandated	  the	  China-­‐wide	  conversion	  of	  cinemas	  to	  digital	  
projection	  to	  be	  completed	  by	  the	  year	  2015.	  According	  to	  Fung	  Sien,	  chairman	  of	  the	  
Chinese	  entertainment	  company	  Spacecom	  Inc.	  this	  could	  mean	  the	  conversion	  of	  up	  to	  
100,000	  new	  screens	  (the	  worldwide	  screen	  count	  is	  approx	  120,000).	  The	  government	  
has	  granted	  Spacecom	  Inc.	  the	  exclusive	  licence	  rights	  for	  all	  media	  entertainment	  
transmission	  to	  digital	  cinemas	  in	  China	  for	  30	  years	  (Spacecom	  Inc,	  2005).	  China’s	  plan	  is	  
to	  overtake	  the	  USA	  in	  the	  number	  of	  installed	  digital	  cinema	  sites	  in	  the	  next	  few	  years.	  
According	  to	  Bill	  Nemtin,	  a	  consultant	  for	  the	  Canadian	  National	  Film	  Board,	  one	  of	  the	  
reasons	  China	  is	  facilitating	  digital	  cinema	  installations	  to	  such	  an	  extent	  is	  as	  a	  means	  to	  
control	  the	  cost	  of	  importing	  films	  into	  China.	  The	  China	  Film	  Corporation	  is	  the	  exclusive	  
importer	  of	  foreign	  films	  into	  mainland	  China.	  Its	  strategy	  is	  to	  introduce	  foreign	  films	  at	  
first	  into	  digital	  cinemas,	  thus	  saving	  the	  costs	  of	  35mm	  prints	  and	  if	  they	  are	  a	  "hit",	  then	  
and	  only	  then,	  35mm	  prints	  to	  serve	  the	  35mm	  cinemas	  are	  imported	  (Nemtin,	  2003).	  
The	  emerging	  Chinese	  market	  has	  a	  potential	  box	  office	  that	  could	  exceed	  western	  
territories	  by	  far.	  	  	  
Brazil	  
In	  Brazil	  Rain	  Networks	  has	  developed	  a	  low-­‐cost	  distribution	  system,	  with	  built-­‐in	  anti-­‐
piracy	  measures	  that	  supplies	  over	  100	  cinemas.	  Using	  a	  self	  developed	  compression	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software	  based	  on	  the	  MPEG-­‐4	  standard,	  films	  are	  beamed	  by	  satellite	  from	  Rain's	  central	  
computer	  in	  Sao	  Paulo	  to	  cinemas	  in	  the	  hinterland	  that	  are	  inaccessible	  by	  road.	  Again	  
the	  beneficiaries	  are	  independent	  distributors	  and	  low-­‐budget	  filmmakers	  who	  otherwise	  
would	  be	  unable	  to	  afford	  a	  celluloid	  master	  and	  who	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  be	  victims	  of	  
piracy.	  (Downie,	  2004)	  
A	  strong	  argument	  for	  d-­‐cinema,	  which	  is	  reflected	  in	  the	  case	  studies	  above,	  has	  been	  
that	  it	  helps	  independent	  filmmakers	  to	  overcome	  the	  market	  entry	  barrier	  to	  
distribution.	  On	  this	  ground	  state	  intervention	  has	  been	  justified.	  One	  has	  to	  
acknowledge	  though,	  that	  d-­‐cinema	  does	  not	  help	  to	  overcome	  the	  even	  bigger	  barrier	  of	  
consumer	  habits	  and	  tastes.	  The	  American	  film	  industry	  has	  shaped	  audience	  tastes	  for	  
generations	  resulting	  in	  a	  market	  share	  of	  up	  to	  over	  90%	  in	  western	  countries.	  Although	  
this	  domination	  might	  be	  a	  portrait	  of	  distorted	  consumer	  preferences,	  resulting	  from	  
restricted	  consumer	  choice	  offered	  in	  local	  cinemas,	  the	  majority	  of	  mainstream	  audience	  
taste	  is	  unlikely	  to	  change	  overnight.	  It	  will	  take	  more	  than	  access	  to	  the	  market	  to	  re-­‐win	  
significant	  audience	  shares	  for	  independent	  (European)	  cinema.	  Nevertheless	  higher	  
exposure	  to	  content	  is	  an	  essential	  first	  step	  to	  alter	  cinema	  goer’s	  habits	  in	  the	  long	  run.	  
IMPLICATIONS	  FOR	  THE	  CURRENT	  STRUCTURE	  OF	  THE	  FILM	  INDUSTRY	  
As	  the	  above	  examples	  clearly	  show,	  digital	  cinema	  not	  only	  allows	  smaller	  competitors	  
to	  carve	  out	  viable	  market	  niches	  but	  can	  bring	  completely	  new	  markets	  into	  existence.	  
Remote	  areas	  whose	  access	  to	  audiovisual	  content	  has	  been	  limited	  so	  far	  will	  now	  be	  as	  
easily	  reached	  as	  regions	  with	  developed	  infrastructures.	  Both	  developments	  will	  
increase	  competition:	  Firstly	  through	  players	  who	  fragment	  the	  market	  and	  then	  try	  to	  
expand	  their	  strongholds	  into	  the	  mainstream	  market,	  and	  secondly	  through	  companies	  
who	  operate	  from	  new	  strong	  domestic	  markets.	  
Without	  additional	  costs	  in	  supplying	  additional	  “prints”	  for	  screens,	  economies	  of	  scale	  
that	  have	  shielded	  Hollywood	  studios	  from	  low	  budget	  competitors	  for	  nearly	  a	  century	  
are	  eradicated.	  Consequently	  the	  release	  of	  a	  film	  will	  become	  “less	  of	  a	  financial	  decision	  
and	  more	  of	  a	  marketing	  decision”	  (TI,	  2003).	  If	  this	  will	  truly	  give	  independents	  leverage	  
remains	  to	  seen.	  The	  majors	  themselves	  have	  hardly	  ever	  regarded	  printing	  costs	  as	  an	  
obstacle	  to	  distribution.	  With	  “ultrawide	  releases”	  (3000+	  prints)	  on	  the	  rise	  (Screen	  
Digest	  2003),	  digital	  cinema	  opens	  the	  door	  to	  an	  ever	  higher	  pervasiveness	  of	  Hollywood	  
product.	  	  
The	  studios	  have	  recently	  shortened	  the	  time	  lags	  between	  release	  dates	  in	  international	  
markets	  and	  global	  simultaneous	  film	  starts	  have	  become	  a	  trend	  (e.g.	  The	  Matrix	  II,	  III,	  
Star	  Wars,	  Harry	  Potter,	  Lord	  of	  The	  Rings,	  Narnia).	  One	  reason	  for	  this	  might	  be	  that	  the	  
Internet	  has	  facilitated	  the	  development	  of	  a	  global	  film	  audience	  with	  increasingly	  
convergent	  tastes.	  This	  audience	  readily	  turns	  to	  pirated	  copies	  of	  films	  if	  time	  lags	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between	  national	  releases	  are	  too	  long.	  The	  combination	  of	  digital	  cinema	  and	  global	  
simultaneous	  film	  starts	  is	  likely	  to	  propel	  this	  trend	  further	  with	  studios	  staging	  and	  
marketing	  their	  productions	  as	  global	  events	  for	  a	  global	  box	  office.	  	  
Furthermore,	  the	  recent,	  unexpected	  success	  of	  Alexander	  (directed	  by	  Oliver	  Stone,	  
2004)	  in	  international	  markets,	  compared	  with	  its	  weak	  performance	  in	  America,	  has	  led	  
to	  a	  rethinking	  of	  traditional	  release	  strategies.	  It	  might	  e.g.	  become	  reasonable	  to	  open	  a	  
film	  first	  in	  international	  markets	  and	  treat	  the	  US	  only	  as	  a	  secondary	  market.	  Moritz	  
Borman,	  head	  of	  Intermedia,	  the	  sales	  and	  production	  house	  that	  put	  Alexander	  
together,	  has	  noted.	  	  “For	  the	  first	  time	  in	  50	  years,	  the	  US	  is	  not	  really	  in	  step,	  culturally	  
and	  politically,	  with	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world”	  (Schilling	  et	  al.,	  2005).	  On	  this	  score	  digital	  
cinema	  could	  widen	  the	  spectrum	  of	  alternative	  release	  strategies	  significantly.	  
Another	  advantage	  studios	  will	  take	  along	  into	  the	  era	  of	  digital	  cinema	  will	  be	  their	  
business	  model	  of	  a	  portfolio	  approach	  to	  film	  production	  and	  distribution.	  The	  strategy	  
to	  spread	  risk	  onto	  a	  slate	  of	  films	  is	  even	  more	  effective	  with	  digital	  cinema:	  if	  a	  film	  is	  a	  
success,	  studios	  can	  immediately	  supply	  additional	  screens	  at	  virtually	  no	  costs,	  if	  a	  film	  is	  
a	  failure,	  it	  can	  be	  withdrawn	  without	  bearing	  the	  sunk	  costs	  of	  film	  prints.	  	  
In	  this	  context	  d-­‐cinema	  appears	  to	  be	  less	  a	  disruptive	  but	  rather	  a	  sustaining	  technology	  
for	  the	  Majors.	  Sustaining	  technologies	  are	  consistent	  with	  a	  firm’s	  business	  model	  
(Christensen	  and	  Raynor,	  2003)	  and	  improve	  the	  performance	  of	  established	  products	  
through	  the	  “current	  technology	  product	  paradigm”	  (Kostoff	  et	  al.,	  2004).	  D-­‐cinema	  bears	  
both	  the	  characteristics	  of	  a	  sustaining	  and	  a	  disruptive	  technology,	  making	  it	  difficult	  to	  
recognize	  the	  distinction.	  It	  is	  exactly	  this	  failure	  to	  address	  technological	  innovations	  
appropriately	  that	  according	  to	  Christensen	  causes	  successful	  incumbents	  to	  stumble	  or	  
even	  disappear	  from	  the	  market.	  	  
Historically,	  the	  film	  industry	  has	  already	  mastered	  a	  number	  of	  disruptive	  technologies	  
(e.g.	  television,	  video	  recorder),	  despite	  its	  traditional	  reluctance	  to	  embrace	  new	  
technologies.	  Its	  nostrum	  on	  how	  to	  deal	  with	  new	  technologies	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  combined	  
strategy	  of	  vertical	  disintegration	  and	  diversification,	  which	  has	  led	  to	  an	  oligopolistic	  
industry	  structure.	  	  	  During	  the	  1990s	  the	  Majors	  have	  diversified	  themselves	  into	  the	  
independent	  market	  by	  setting	  up	  or	  buying	  independent	  distributors,	  a	  trend	  that	  is	  
likely	  to	  be	  intensified	  by	  digital	  cinema.	  Thus	  if	  entrepreneurial	  firms	  take	  advantage	  of	  
the	  disruptive	  technology	  d-­‐cinema	  and	  “redefine	  current	  markets”	  (Kostoff	  et	  al.,	  2004)	  
the	  majors	  might	  simply	  counter	  them	  through	  acquisition	  and	  integration	  into	  their	  
corporate	  structure.	  	  
As	  local	  independent	  distributors	  develop	  an	  expertise	  how	  to	  successfully	  handle	  
“difficult”	  films	  in	  their	  markets,	  the	  majors	  might	  also	  begin	  to	  disintegrate	  further	  and	  
try	  to	  outsource	  some	  of	  their	  distribution	  to	  these	  companies	  in	  the	  same	  way,	  they	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have	  outsourced	  production	  through	  flexible	  specialization	  (see	  Christopherson	  and	  
Storper,	  1986,	  1989).	  As	  the	  importance	  of	  a	  physical	  distribution	  structure	  diminishes	  
their	  means	  to	  keep	  control	  over	  the	  industry	  would	  then	  be	  through	  controlling	  
intellectual	  property	  rights	  as	  well	  as	  keeping	  a	  strong	  stake	  in	  development,	  packaging	  
and	  financing	  and	  providing	  expertise	  in	  film	  production,	  marketing	  and	  distribution	  to	  
contractors.	  	  
Diagram	  3:	  Money	  Flows	  in	  the	  film	  industry/	  The	  Hold	  up	  problem	  of	  D-­‐cinema	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  New	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The	  Hold	  up	  problem	  
Diagram	  3	  shows	  a	  simplified	  model	  of	  money	  flows	  in	  the	  traditional	  film	  industry	  value	  
chain	  and	  in	  a	  system	  of	  d-­‐cinema	  (a	  comprehensive	  discussion	  on	  profit	  calculation	  and	  
accounting	  practices	  in	  the	  Hollywood	  studio	  system	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Daniels	  et	  al.,	  1998).	  
In	  the	  current	  system,	  box	  office	  receipts	  are	  first	  split	  between	  exhibitors	  and	  
distributors.	  Exhibitors	  are	  the	  first	  to	  deduct	  their	  expenses,	  the	  value	  they	  appropriate	  
is	  E.	  Distributors	  then	  deduct	  their	  distribution	  fee,	  which	  is	  intended	  to	  cover	  their	  
overhead	  costs	  (offices,	  corporate	  expenses,	  distribution	  efforts)	  and	  the	  distribution	  
expenses	  (Prints	  and	  Advertising).	  The	  distribution	  fee	  varies	  according	  to	  geographic	  area	  
and	  market	  between	  25%	  and	  up	  to	  50%	  of	  the	  revenue.	  The	  value	  the	  distributors	  
appropriate	  is	  D.	  The	  remainder,	  P,	  is	  allocated	  to	  the	  producers	  of	  the	  film.	  	  
After	  the	  transition	  to	  a	  system	  of	  d-­‐cinema,	  cost	  savings	  arise:	  distribution	  expenses	  are	  
reduced	  through	  cutting	  print	  costs,	  distribution	  fees	  are	  lower	  through	  reduced	  studio	  
overhead.	  It	  will	  be	  interesting	  to	  see	  if	  studios	  can	  appropriate	  the	  added	  value	  they	  
have	  created	  through	  cost	  savings	  for	  themselves	  or	  if	  they	  will	  have	  to	  share	  it	  with	  the	  
other	  parties.	  If	  studios	  pay	  for	  the	  transition	  costs,	  they	  are	  likely	  to	  demand	  the	  added	  
value	  on	  the	  ground	  that	  they	  have	  paid	  for	  it	  (scenario	  1	  in	  the	  diagram).	  However,	  if	  a	  
new	  distributor	  enters	  the	  game	  at	  this	  stage	  (“Maverick	  distributor”),	  he	  would	  be	  able	  
to	  offer	  both	  exhibitors	  and	  producers	  a	  better	  deal	  than	  the	  existing	  studios	  (scenario	  2),	  
since	  he	  can	  pass	  on	  the	  cost	  savings	  to	  them	  without	  having	  paid	  for	  them.	  In	  this	  
scenario,	  studios	  will	  eventually	  have	  to	  pass	  on	  cost	  savings	  to	  producers	  as	  well,	  if	  they	  
do	  not	  want	  to	  continuously	  lose	  potential	  box	  office	  hits	  to	  maverick	  distributors.	  The	  
prospect	  of	  being	  held	  up	  by	  other	  parties	  in	  the	  value	  chain	  in	  the	  long	  run	  is	  therefore	  
another	  factor	  that	  severely	  decreases	  the	  studios	  financial	  incentive	  to	  pay	  the	  transition	  
costs	  for	  digital	  cinema.	  
Companies	  like	  Hollywood	  Software	  already	  offer	  independent	  film	  distributors	  and	  
producers	  to	  outsource	  the	  distribution	  of	  entire	  release	  slates	  or	  individual	  films	  to	  their	  
company.	  Hollywood	  software	  is	  a	  major	  player	  that	  provides	  information	  systems	  to	  the	  
industry	  (including	  the	  majors)	  that	  automatically	  create	  sales	  charts,	  track	  film	  bookings,	  
print	  shipment	  orders	  and	  credit	  payments	  (Hollywood	  Software,	  2005).	  The	  company	  is	  a	  
subsidiary	  of	  one	  of	  the	  largest	  server	  and	  digital	  cinema	  platform	  manufacturers	  in	  the	  
market,	  AccessIT	  (Access	  Integrated	  Technologies).	  AccessIT	  has	  bought	  and	  re-­‐
commissioned	  all	  28	  installed	  digital-­‐cinema	  systems	  from	  Boeing	  Digital	  Cinema	  in	  2004,	  
placing	  itself	  in	  the	  “centre	  of	  the	  the	  digital	  revolution”	  (Fuchs,	  2004a).	  Their	  most	  
recent	  development	  is	  the	  “Theatre	  Command	  Console”	  which	  supports	  multiple	  brands	  
and	  models	  of	  digital-­‐cinema	  projectors	  and	  is	  operated	  through	  an	  easy	  to	  use	  graphic	  
interface.	  The	  president	  and	  COO	  of	  the	  company,	  Dave	  Gajda	  has	  said:	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  “The	  idea	  is	  to	  have	  fingertip	  access	  to	  and	  control	  of	  all	  critical	  d-­‐cinema	  operations,	  
including	  print-­‐movements	  and	  pre-­‐show	  content	  such	  as	  advertising	  and	  trailers.	  
Whether	  on-­‐site	  by	  the	  manager	  or	  directed	  remotely	  from	  the	  central	  home	  office,	  
…,	  operators	  can	  easily	  employ	  a	  single	  user	  interface	  to	  simplify	  training	  and	  flexibly	  
integrate	  multiple	  technology	  solutions	  into	  a	  unified	  system.”(Fuchs,	  2004a)	  
This	  gives	  rise	  to	  a	  tangible	  set	  of	  questions	  about	  training	  needs	  of	  staff	  and	  the	  
transition	  to	  digital	  cinema.	  
Training	  costs	  –	  What	  training?	  
Although	  a	  network	  of	  high	  bandwidth	  fibre	  optic	  links	  to	  cinemas	  could	  be	  envisaged,	  
transmission	  of	  content	  via	  hard	  disk,	  and	  in	  a	  few	  years	  via	  satellite	  is	  the	  financially	  
more	  realistic	  scenario	  for	  digital	  cinemas.	  Slater	  (2002:14)	  has	  predicted	  that	  “the	  new	  
projection	  equipment	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  internally	  more	  complex	  than	  the	  relatively	  simple	  
electro-­‐mechanical	  projectors	  that	  operators	  have	  been	  used	  to,	  so	  it	  will	  need	  to	  be	  
reliable	  and	  simple	  to	  operate	  by	  existing	  staff.”	  The	  equipment	  will	  use	  built-­‐in	  
diagnostic	  software	  and	  straightforward	  test	  routines.	  As	  a	  consequence	  d-­‐cinema	  
projectors	  will	  be	  far	  easier	  to	  remote	  control	  when	  connected	  via	  a	  cinema	  management	  
system	  that	  both	  controls	  their	  inputs	  and	  outputs.	  AccessIT’s	  “Theatre	  Command	  
Console”	  is	  therefore	  a	  predecessor	  to	  an	  era	  where	  it	  will	  be	  possible	  to	  look	  after	  
hundreds	  of	  screens	  in	  the	  country	  from	  a	  single	  control	  room	  (a	  situation	  already	  come	  
true	  for	  UK	  broadcasting	  (Slater,	  2004:15)).	  
The	  simplicity	  of	  a	  graphical	  interface	  and	  remote	  control	  dismisses	  concerns	  from	  
exhibitors	  that	  new	  digital	  projectors	  will	  require	  advanced	  technical	  knowledge	  
(McQuire,	  2004)	  but	  could	  mean	  bleak	  prospects	  for	  some	  projector	  staff.	  	  
Flexibility,	  DRMS	  and	  Piracy	  
Today	  theatres	  often	  violate	  the	  strict	  letter	  of	  their	  rights	  agreements	  with	  distributors	  
by	  e.g.	  switching	  prints	  from	  a	  larger	  venue	  to	  a	  smaller	  one	  (DCR,	  2005a).	  Up	  until	  now	  
the	  studios	  have	  overlooked	  this	  practice,	  because	  they	  are	  profiting	  from	  this	  flexibility	  
as	  well.	  	  In	  the	  digital	  world,	  many	  aspects	  of	  the	  contractual	  agreements	  between	  
distributors	  and	  exhibitors	  will	  be	  incorporated	  into	  digital	  rights	  management	  systems	  
(DRMS).	  DRMS	  control	  the	  access	  and	  usage	  of	  digital	  content	  and	  assure	  its	  authenticity	  
and	  integrity.	  Through	  watermarking	  and	  encryption	  techniques	  DRMS	  make	  is	  easier	  to	  
protect	  intellectual	  property	  (Fetscherin	  and	  Schmid,	  2003).	  Dean	  Devlin,	  special	  effects	  
expert	  (Godzilla,	  Independence	  Day),	  has	  commented	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  piracy	  and	  digital	  
cinema:	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“[…]	  I	  think	  when	  you	  start	  talking	  about	  digital	  format	  some	  people	  get	  frightened	  […]	  
But	  the	  reality	  is,	  with	  watermarking	  technologies,	  with	  things	  that	  can	  be	  included	  into	  
the	  digital	  projection,	  we	  actually	  have	  a	  chance	  of	  being	  more	  vigilant	  in	  our	  abilities	  to	  
track	  down	  where	  the	  thieves	  are	  working	  […]	  The	  print	  won’t	  be	  on	  several	  screens	  at	  
the	  same	  time	  without	  us	  knowing	  about	  it.	  We’ll	  know	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  print	  
everywhere.	  […]	  we’ll	  be	  able	  to	  track	  down	  crime	  in	  a	  way	  we’ve	  never	  been	  able	  to	  do	  it	  
before”	  (DLP,	  2005)	  
However	  if	  encryption	  technologies	  are	  too	  tight	  and	  systems	  are	  too	  rigid,	  significant	  
business	  changes	  will	  be	  required	  in	  the	  industry	  (DCR,	  2005).	  The	  development	  of	  a	  DRM	  
system	  for	  digital	  cinema	  is	  therefore	  very	  complex,	  as	  interoperability	  with	  other	  
systems	  and	  a	  high	  flexibility	  to	  re-­‐allocate	  theatre	  assets	  to	  changing	  demands,	  are	  
essential.	  	  	  
Alternative	  Content	  and	  Advertising	  
One	  of	  the	  key	  advantages	  of	  d-­‐cinema	  is	  the	  possibility	  of	  theatre	  owners	  to	  use	  the	  
projectors	  to	  show	  alternative	  content	  and	  advertisement.	  These	  two	  streams	  of	  
revenues	  were	  predicted	  to	  be	  a	  major	  incentive	  for	  exhibitors	  to	  switch	  to	  digital	  
technology.	  However,	  developments	  so	  far	  have	  painted	  a	  different	  picture.	  Patrick	  von	  
Sychowski	  has	  called	  advertising	  the	  “Trojan	  Horse”	  and	  the	  “digital	  underdog	  that’s	  
ahead”	  (Fuchs,	  2004b).	  Instead	  of	  “waiting	  for	  the	  movies”	  (and	  expensive	  high	  end	  
projectors),	  theatre	  owners	  have	  made	  the	  transition	  to	  digital	  with	  low	  end	  projectors	  to	  
cater	  advertisers.	  Advertising	  projectors	  outnumber	  digital	  cinema	  projectors	  already	  by	  
more	  than	  30	  to	  one.	  As	  Sychowski	  has	  argued,	  exhibitors	  have	  found	  a	  low	  cost	  entry	  to	  
reaping	  the	  ancillary	  benefits	  of	  d-­‐cinema,	  and	  their	  gains	  from	  upgrading	  to	  high	  cost	  
projectors	  are	  very	  low	  (Fuchs,	  2004b).	  A	  good	  example	  for	  this	  trend	  is	  the	  network	  
Regal	  Cine	  Media	  that	  centrally	  controls	  over	  20.000	  devices	  and	  runs	  over	  800.000	  ads	  a	  
day.	  	  
The	  broadcasting	  of	  sport	  events	  has	  been	  cited	  as	  one	  of	  the	  primary	  possibilities	  of	  
alternative	  content.	  Still,	  as	  McQuire	  has	  pointed	  out,	  one	  does	  not	  need	  an	  expensive,	  
digital	  projector	  to	  show	  sport,	  because	  it	  is	  not	  a	  filmic	  experience,	  but	  television	  
(McQuire,	  2004).	  In	  addition,	  exhibitors	  did	  not	  make	  entirely	  positive	  experiences	  with	  
alternative	  content	  so	  far.	  In	  Belgium,	  Kinepolis	  abandoned	  plans	  of	  ever	  showing	  soccer	  
games	  in	  its	  cinemas	  again	  after	  fans	  rioted	  and	  tore	  up	  the	  seats	  in	  the	  auditorium	  
following	  their	  team’s	  loss	  in	  the	  game	  shown,	  and	  in	  Sweden	  a	  Mike	  Tyson	  PPV	  boxing	  
match	  shown	  in	  a	  cinema	  ended	  in	  a	  knock	  out	  in	  less	  than	  a	  minute,	  much	  to	  the	  anger	  
of	  the	  paying	  audience	  (Screendigest,	  2002).	  
From	  the	  perspective	  of	  filmmakers,	  studios	  and	  distributors	  it	  is	  important	  that	  
alternative	  content	  is	  only	  shown	  in	  theatres	  during	  “off	  time”	  (usually	  during	  the	  day).	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Otherwise	  alternative	  content	  brings	  additional	  competition	  to	  screens	  that	  already	  face	  
an	  oversupply	  of	  films,	  taking	  away	  business	  from	  all	  players	  in	  the	  industry.	  Still	  in	  its	  
infancy,	  interactive	  cinema	  could	  be	  one	  opportunity	  for	  exhibitors	  to	  fill	  their	  theatres	  
during	  the	  “off	  time”.	  Lev	  Manovich	  (2001)	  has	  suggested	  that	  the	  “dominant	  tone	  of	  the	  
discourse	  of	  digital	  cinema	  lies	  in	  the	  possibility	  of	  an	  interactive	  narrative”,	  where	  users	  
can	  choose	  the	  course	  of	  the	  film.	  Geoff	  Lowe,	  managing	  director	  of	  Filmserve,	  a	  British	  
digital	  film	  content	  and	  technology	  company,	  believes	  that	  interactivity	  will	  be	  one	  key	  to	  
a	  developing	  and	  engaging	  new	  cinema	  in	  the	  future.	  Filmserve	  has	  developed	  an	  
interactive	  platform	  that	  enables	  users	  of	  mobile	  phones,	  pdas	  and	  laptops	  to	  interact	  
with	  on-­‐screen	  content	  (UK	  Film	  Council).	  
Innovations	  in	  this	  field	  are	  especially	  attractive	  to	  multiplex	  cinemas	  that	  are	  close	  to	  
malls.	  Malls	  and	  cinemas	  benefit	  from	  synergies	  in	  real	  estate	  when	  shoppers	  use	  the	  
same	  parking	  space	  by	  day	  as	  movie	  goers	  by	  night	  (Husak,	  2004).	  Interactive	  cinemas	  
could	  be	  a	  major	  attraction	  of	  malls	  by	  day,	  where	  kids	  could	  be	  entertained	  while	  their	  
parents	  are	  shopping.	  
Other	  usage	  of	  digital	  cinemas	  during	  “off	  time”	  includes	  servicing	  for	  distance	  learning	  
institutes,	  broadcasting	  important	  nationwide	  events	  or	  serving	  enterprises	  as	  
communication	  tools.	  
CONCLUSION	  
In	  this	  paper	  we	  have	  tried	  to	  situate	  current	  developments	  in	  digital	  cinema	  within	  
Christensen’s	  framework	  of	  disruptive	  technologies.	  We	  have	  focused	  the	  attention	  on	  
what	  we	  see	  as	  the	  major	  players	  in	  digital	  cinema,	  namely	  the	  major	  Hollywood	  studios	  
and	  have	  tried	  to	  map	  the	  implications	  of	  d-­‐cinema	  on	  the	  relationships	  within	  the	  film	  
industry	  value	  chain.	  It	  was	  shown	  that	  the	  market	  for	  d-­‐cinema	  exhibits	  network	  
externalities	  and	  that	  therefore	  a	  common	  standard	  is	  desirable.	  The	  discussion	  on	  
standards	  also	  revealed	  the	  conflicting	  interests	  a	  diversified	  and	  vertical	  integrated	  
corporation	  such	  as	  Sony	  faces,	  as	  the	  competition	  in	  d-­‐cinema	  becomes	  a	  “preliminary	  
battle”	  for	  the	  consumer	  electronics	  market.	  As	  a	  major	  incumbent,	  Sony	  is	  able	  to	  delay	  
the	  progress	  of	  the	  whole	  transition	  to	  digital	  cinema	  for	  its	  own	  benefit,	  a	  strategy	  worth	  
examining	  more	  closely.	  	  
We	  have	  also	  briefly	  outlined	  some	  of	  the	  complexities	  linked	  to	  organise	  a	  satisfying	  
transition	  to	  digital	  cinema	  for	  all	  parties.	  The	  emergence	  of	  new	  markets	  and	  new	  
entrants	  into	  the	  d-­‐cinema	  market	  was	  examined	  in	  respect	  to	  the	  implications	  for	  major	  
players	  in	  the	  industry.	  Although	  d-­‐cinema	  was	  found	  to	  benefit	  independent	  players	  that	  
can	  carve	  out	  market	  niches,	  it	  was	  also	  shown	  that	  the	  majors	  have	  a	  strong	  leverage	  to	  
exploit	  the	  technology	  to	  their	  advantage.	  However,	  the	  combination	  of	  a	  change	  in	  the	  
terms	  of	  competition	  and	  a	  potential	  hold	  up	  problem,	  are	  likely	  to	  lead	  to	  a	  further	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diversification	  and	  possibly	  a	  further	  disintegration	  of	  major	  distributors.	  In	  addition	  we	  
have	  discussed	  important	  issues	  associated	  with	  d-­‐cinema,	  such	  as	  alternative	  content,	  
training	  and	  digital	  rights	  management.	  	  
Further	  research	  is	  needed	  to	  explore	  strategies	  of	  new	  entrants	  and	  incumbents	  in	  this	  
market,	  survey	  successful	  and	  unsuccessful	  business	  models	  and	  discuss	  how	  the	  
research	  on	  digital	  cinema	  can	  contribute	  to,	  and	  be	  enriched	  by	  literature	  on	  strategic	  
management	  and	  disruptive	  technologies.	  Interesting	  research	  questions	  are	  related	  to	  
the	  performance	  of	  third	  party	  initiatives	  such	  as	  the	  UK	  Film	  Council’s	  Screen	  Network;	  
the	  complexity	  of	  organising	  a	  transition	  to	  d-­‐cinema	  for	  the	  mainstream	  market;	  and	  the	  
role	  of	  diversified,	  vertically	  integrated	  corporations	  in	  the	  process	  of	  setting	  standards	  
for	  d-­‐cinema,	  branding	  for	  subsequent	  markets	  and	  market	  fragmentation.	  	  
In	  conclusion	  it	  shall	  be	  mentioned	  that	  d-­‐cinema	  has	  not	  solved	  the	  problem	  of	  long	  
term	  digital	  storage	  yet.	  As	  Phil	  Feiner,	  CEO	  of	  the	  renowned	  optical	  service	  company	  
Pacific	  Title	  Digital,	  has	  remarked:	  “It’s	  not	  archival”	  (Parisi,	  2004).	  Digital	  intermediates	  
are	  stored	  on	  magnetic	  tapes,	  that	  have	  an	  archival	  life	  of	  30	  years	  at	  best.	  In	  contrast,	  a	  
three-­‐strip	  black-­‐an-­‐white	  masters,	  the	  current	  archival	  standard,	  lasts	  as	  long	  as	  1,500	  
years.	  This	  means	  that	  even	  if	  a	  film	  is	  shot,	  edited,	  distributed	  and	  projected	  digitally,	  in	  
the	  end	  it	  has	  to	  be	  transferred	  to	  film.	  
Therefore,	  in	  the	  uncertain	  future	  of	  digital	  cinema,	  at	  least	  one	  thing	  is	  for	  sure:	  Even	  if	  
the	  “d-­‐cinema	  fairy”	  converts	  all	  the	  screens	  in	  the	  world	  overnight	  to	  digital,	  traditional	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Abstract	  
The	   distribution	   and	   exhibition	   of	   motion	   pictures	   are	   at	   a	   crossroads.	   Ever	   since	   the	  
medium	  was	  invented	  in	  the	  1890s	  the	  ‘picture’	  has	  been	  brought	  to	  the	  spectator	  in	  the	  
form	   of	   photochemical	   images	   stored	   on	   strips	   of	   celluloid	   film	   passed	   in	   intermittent	  
motion	  through	  a	  projector.	  	  
Now,	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  21st	  century,	  an	  entirely	  new	  method	  has	  emerged,	  using	  
digitally	  stored	  data	  in	  place	  of	  film	  and	  barely	  needing	  any	  physical	  support	  other	  than	  a	  
computerised	  file.	  This	  opens	  an	  intriguing	  portfolio	  of	  revenue-­‐generating	  opportunities	  
for	  the	  movie	  exhibitor.	  	  
This	  chapter	  will	  give	  an	  overview	  of	  current	  developments	  in	  digital	  cinema	  (d-­‐cinema).	  
It	   will	   examine	   potential	   new	   business	  models	   in	   an	   industry	  wedded	   to	   the	   analogue	  
process.	   The	   authors	   will	   consider	   the	   strategies	   of	   companies	   at	   the	   forefront	   of	   the	  
technology;	  implications	  associated	  with	  the	  change;	  and	  how	  different	  territories	  might	  
adapt	  in	  order	  to	  accommodate	  this	  transition.	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INTRODUCTION	  
In	  this	  chapter	  we	  will	  consider	  how	  the	  transition	  from	  film	  to	  digital	  product	  is	  likely	  to	  
affect	  an	  industry	  that	  has	  been	  wedded	  to	  an	  analogue	  process	  for	  more	  than	  100	  years.	  
Rather	  than	  contributing	  further	  to	  the	  debate	  about	  the	  qualities	  of	  competing	  
technologies	  or	  the	  creative	  merits	  or	  demerits	  of	  digital	  product,	  this	  chapter	  will	  focus	  
on	  the	  development	  of	  potentially	  new	  business	  models	  in	  the	  global	  film	  industry.	  The	  
authors	  will	  examine	  the	  strategies	  of	  the	  companies	  at	  the	  forefront	  of	  the	  technology;	  
the	  financial	  implications	  associated	  with	  change;	  and	  how	  different	  territories	  are	  
adapting	  in	  order	  to	  accommodate	  this	  transition.	  
What	  revolution?	  
Ever	  since	  1999,	  when	  George	  Lucas	  launched	  Star	  Wars:	  Phantom	  Menance	  on	  four	  
digital	  screens	  in	  America,	  prophets	  of	  d-­‐cinema	  (that	  is	  using	  digitally	  stored	  data	  in	  
place	  of	  film)	  have	  proclaimed	  that	  it	  will	  change	  the	  film	  industry	  forever.	  Six	  years	  later	  
d-­‐cinema	  is	  still	  far	  away	  from	  wide	  implementation.	  Belton	  (2002)	  has	  even	  declared	  d-­‐
cinema	  to	  be	  a	  “false	  revolution”	  because	  it	  does	  not	  transform	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  motion	  
picture	  experience	  for	  the	  audience,	  stating	  that	  “One	  obvious	  problem	  with	  digital	  
cinema	  is	  that	  it	  has	  no	  novelty	  value,	  at	  least	  not	  for	  film	  audiences.”	  He	  argues	  that	  in	  a	  
marketplace	  in	  which	  the	  word	  “digital”	  sells	  consumer	  products,	  “it	  is	  digital	  sound	  (and	  
not	  digital	  projection)	  that	  marks	  for	  consumers	  the	  entry	  of	  motion	  pictures	  into	  the	  
digital	  era.”	  
His	  arguments	  cannot	  be	  easily	  dismissed	  especially	  when	  considering	  the	  explicit	  goal	  of	  
digital	  projector	  manufacturers	  to	  produce	  an	  image	  quality	  that	  equals	  that	  of	  traditional	  
film	  prints.	  Slater	  (2002)	  has	  compared	  the	  cinema	  exhibition	  chain	  of	  traditional	  film	  and	  
electronic/d-­‐cinema.	  When	  looking	  for	  an	  answer	  to	  the	  question	  what	  problem	  
electronic/d-­‐cinema	  is	  trying	  to	  solve,	  he	  could	  not	  find	  “one	  single	  good	  technical	  or	  
operational	  reason	  why	  the	  whole	  system	  should	  be	  replaced”	  (p.	  43),	  with	  film	  being	  
high	  quality,	  flexible,	  and	  most	  important	  future	  proof.	  Still	  key	  players	  in	  the	  industry	  
seem	  to	  be	  determined	  to	  make	  d-­‐cinema	  happen,	  such	  as	  John	  Filthian,	  president	  of	  the	  
National	  Association	  of	  Theater	  Owners	  (NATO)	  in	  America,	  who	  has	  said	  that	  “digital	  
cinema	  will	  be	  the	  biggest	  transition	  technology	  in	  the	  history	  of	  the	  movie	  industry”	  
(Baird,	  2004).	  
Catch-­‐22	  
However,	  with	  just	  over	  120,000	  screens	  worldwide,	  the	  cinema	  market	  has	  been	  
deemed	  too	  small	  to	  support	  any	  major	  technological	  innovation	  by	  itself	  (Screen	  Digest,	  
2003).	  This	  means	  that	  no	  manufacturer	  is	  currently	  in	  the	  position	  to	  produce	  a	  digital	  
projector	  at	  such	  a	  competitive	  price,	  that	  exhibitors	  could	  afford	  to	  pay	  for	  the	  switching	  
costs	  themselves.	  Consequently,	  the	  matter	  of	  financing	  the	  conversion	  to	  d-­‐cinema	  has	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been	  passed	  on	  to	  distributors,	  who	  are	  claimed	  to	  benefit	  the	  most	  from	  d-­‐cinema	  by	  
saving	  on	  print	  costs.	  The	  problem	  is	  further	  intensified,	  when	  more	  than	  one	  company	  
for	  d-­‐cinema	  equipment	  tries	  to	  serve	  the	  market,	  and	  more	  than	  one	  standard	  exists.	  
For	  distributors	  however,	  it	  does	  only	  make	  sense	  to	  fund	  d-­‐cinema	  conversion,	  if	  a	  single	  
standard	  exists	  (similar	  to	  the	  35mm	  standard),	  otherwise	  the	  cost	  savings	  of	  digital	  are	  
offset	  by	  producing	  several	  masters	  for	  different	  standards.	  Thus	  the	  need	  arises	  for	  a	  
clearly	  specified	  standard—an	  issue	  that	  took	  the	  participating	  players	  more	  than	  6	  years	  
to	  resolve.	  These	  players	  can	  be	  categorized	  into	  three	  basic	  groups:	  equipment	  
manufacturers,	  institutional	  players,	  and	  distributors.	  In	  the	  following	  section	  the	  major	  
players	  and	  their	  stakes	  in	  d-­‐cinema	  will	  be	  introduced	  briefly	  while	  reflecting	  on	  their	  
role	  in	  the	  search	  for	  a	  single	  standard.	  
STANDARDISING	  TASTES	  
The	  earliest	  attempts	  to	  gain	  a	  dominant	  market	  position	  and	  to	  set	  standards	  have	  been	  
made	  by	  the	  main	  competitors	  in	  digital	  projector	  manufacturing,	  Texas	  Instruments	  (TI)	  
(DLP	  Cinema),	  Sony	  (GLV),	  and	  JVC	  (D-­‐ILA).	  While	  JVC’s	  position	  in	  the	  market	  has	  been	  
marginalised,	  TI	  has	  licensed	  its	  DLP	  Cinema	  technology	  to	  projector	  manufacturers	  such	  
as	  Barco,	  Christie	  Digital,	  and	  DPI/NEC	  and	  has	  by	  doing	  so	  gained	  an	  early	  advantage	  for	  
its	  standard	  over	  Sony.	  It	  soon	  became	  evident	  however,	  that	  a	  working	  business	  model	  
for	  d-­‐cinema	  has	  to	  include	  not	  just	  a	  projector,	  but	  must	  consist	  of	  a	  bundle	  with	  digital	  
distribution	  and	  server	  hardware.	  The	  main	  competitors	  in	  this	  area	  are	  companies	  such	  
as	  QuVis,	  GDC,	  XDC,	  and	  AccessIT.	  As	  technology	  companies	  are	  clearly	  wedded	  to	  their	  
own	  solutions,	  pointing	  out	  flaws	  in	  competing	  technologies	  while	  downplaying	  the	  
shortcomings	  of	  their	  own,	  institutional	  players	  stepped	  in	  to	  help	  specify	  a	  single	  
standard	  and	  support	  the	  development	  of	  d-­‐cinema.	  
In	  the	  U.S.	  the	  institution	  in	  charge	  is	  a	  special	  commission	  (DC-­‐28)	  of	  the	  Society	  of	  
Motion	  Picture	  and	  Television	  Engineers	  (SMPTE),	  in	  Europe	  it	  is	  the	  European	  Digital	  
Cinema	  Forum	  (EDCF),	  in	  Japan	  the	  Digital	  Cinema	  Consortium	  of	  Japan	  (DCCJ	  NPO),	  and	  
in	  China	  the	  State	  Administration	  of	  Radio,	  Film,	  and	  Television	  (SARFT).	  The	  power	  of	  
these	  institutions	  has	  however	  been	  limited,	  as	  they	  tend	  to	  avoid	  taking	  sides	  and	  
promote	  all	  solutions	  equally.	  In	  2002	  the	  Digital	  Cinema	  Incentive	  (DCI)	  was	  formed,	  a	  
joint	  venture	  of	  the	  seven	  major	  Hollywood	  studios	  (Disney,	  Fox,	  MGM,	  Paramount,	  Sony	  
Pictures	  Entertainment,	  Universal,	  and	  Warner	  Bros.)	  that	  has	  dwarfed	  the	  importance	  of	  
the	  other	  institutions	  to	  establish	  guidelines	  for	  d-­‐cinema	  into	  insignificance.	  Although	  it	  
still	  is	  the	  SMPTE	  that	  ratifies	  technical	  standards	  for	  cinema	  and	  television	  in	  America,	  
even	  Peter	  Symes,	  vice	  president	  engineering	  at	  SMPTE	  has	  to	  admit	  that	  “the	  DCI	  
represents	  a	  significant	  party	  of	  interest”	  and	  it	  was	  very	  unlikely	  that	  the	  SMPTE	  could	  
reach	  consensus	  on	  something	  if	  the	  DCI	  was	  in	  favour	  of	  something	  else	  (Crabtree,	  
2004).	  
	   232	  
In	  July	  2005	  the	  DCI	  had	  published	  its	  final	  overall	  system	  requirements	  and	  specifications	  
for	  d-­‐cinema.	  In	  their	  guidelines	  they	  have	  opted	  for	  a	  scalable	  solution	  from	  2K	  to	  4K	  and	  
have	  therefore	  left	  the	  decision	  which	  projector	  technology	  will	  be	  used	  in	  theatres	  to	  the	  
market.	  They	  have	  however	  selected	  JPG2000	  as	  the	  image	  coding	  system	  to	  be	  used	  in	  
the	  delivery	  of	  digital	  motion	  pictures.	  This	  decision	  is	  very	  likely	  to	  eliminate	  competing	  
systems,	  such	  as	  various	  MPEG	  standards	  or	  newcomer	  eTreppid	  from	  the	  market	  and	  
forces	  all	  major	  manufacturers	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  standard	  (Crabtree,	  2004).	  DCI	  
specifications	  have	  consequently	  been	  branded	  to	  be	  synonymous	  with	  the	  term	  d-­‐
cinema,	  as	  Tim	  Partridge,	  senior	  vice	  president	  and	  general	  manager	  of	  the	  professional	  
division	  for	  Dolby	  Laboratories	  has	  explained:	  “I	  think	  we	  [Dolby	  Laboratories]	  use	  the	  
terms	  in	  what	  has	  become	  the	  standard	  way.	  D-­‐cinema	  to	  us	  means	  DCI	  standard	  
equipment,	  E-­‐cinema	  is	  everything	  below	  that”	  (DCR,	  2005b).	  
The	  question	  arises,	  why	  the	  d-­‐cinema	  revolution	  still	  has	  not	  fully	  begun,	  when	  the	  
dominating	  market	  forces	  (the	  Hollywood	  studios)	  can	  so	  easily	  safeguard	  their	  interests.	  
One	  might	  argue	  that	  all	  they	  have	  to	  do,	  to	  continue	  their	  international	  market	  
supremacy,	  is	  to	  replicate	  the	  existing	  power	  structure	  and	  apply	  it	  to	  the	  d-­‐cinema	  
market.	  What	  does	  stop	  them?	  Can	  the	  hesitancy	  of	  the	  “majors”	  to	  move	  along	  with	  
dcinema	  quickly	  be	  interpreted	  as	  an	  indication	  of	  concern	  about	  the	  impact	  the	  digital	  
transition	  will	  have	  on	  the	  industry?	  
CREATING	  DISRUPTION?	  
Digital	  cinema	  […]	  is	  perhaps	  the	  most	  significant	  challenge	  to	  the	  cinema	  industry	  since	  
the	  introduction	  of	  sound	  on	  film.	  As	  with	  any	  new	  technology,	  there	  are	  those	  who	  want	  
to	  do	  it	  fast,	  and	  those	  who	  want	  to	  do	  it	  right.	  As	  we	  move	  down	  this	  path,	  let’s	  not	  
forget	  the	  lesson	  learned	  with	  the	  introduction	  of	  digital	  audio	  for	  film	  in	  the	  ’90s.	  Cinema	  
Digital	  Sound,	  a	  division	  of	  Optical	  Radiation	  Corporation,	  was	  the	  first	  to	  put	  digital	  audio	  
on	  35mm	  film.	  Very,	  very	  few	  remember	  CDS,	  who	  closed	  their	  doors	  long	  ago.	  Such	  are	  
the	  rewards	  for	  being	  first.	  (MKPE	  Consulting	  LLC,	  2005)	  
As	  the	  previous	  statement	  shows,	  there	  are	  considerable	  risks	  attached	  with	  moving	  into	  
a	  market	  too	  fast.	  Indeed	  some	  of	  the	  companies	  who	  tried	  to	  find	  an	  early	  foothold	  in	  d-­‐
cinema	  have	  already	  closed	  their	  business	  in	  this	  field	  (most	  notably	  Boeing).	  However	  as	  
the	  literature	  on	  disruptive	  innovation	  and	  disruptive	  technology	  has	  pointed	  out,	  one	  of	  
the	  biggest	  risks	  for	  incumbents	  in	  any	  market	  is	  to	  move	  too	  slowly.	  
Disruptive	  innovation	  and	  disruptive	  technology	  are	  emerging	  and	  increasingly	  prominent	  
business	  terms	  describing	  a	  revolutionary	  change	  in	  an	  industry	  (Thomond	  et	  al.,	  2003).	  
The	  term	  disruptive	  technology	  was	  first	  marked	  by	  Christensen	  (1997)	  to	  describe	  a	  
technological	  discontinuity	  that	  causes	  the	  failure	  of	  incumbents	  in	  a	  market.	  Danneels	  
(2004)	  defines	  disruptive	  technology	  as	  a	  technology	  that	  changes	  the	  bases	  of	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competition	  by	  changing	  the	  performance	  metrics	  along	  which	  firms	  compete.	  Customers	  
seeking	  certain	  benefits	  determine	  which	  attributes	  they	  value	  in	  a	  product,	  with	  
different	  customer	  groups	  valuing	  different	  attributes.	  New	  products	  based	  on	  a	  
disruptive	  technology	  have	  different	  attribute	  sets	  than	  existing	  products.	  They	  tend	  to	  
have	  initially	  a	  lower	  level	  of	  performance	  on	  dimensions	  relevant	  to	  mainstream	  market	  
segments	  but	  have	  higher	  performance	  on	  dimensions	  valued	  by	  remote	  or	  emerging	  
market	  segments.	  Christensen	  (2000)	  has	  characterized	  disruptive	  technologies	  as	  
typically	  “simpler,	  cheaper,	  and	  more	  reliable	  and	  convenient	  than	  established	  
technologies”	  (p.	  192).	  
When	  the	  disruption	  has	  established	  itself	  in	  an	  underserved	  customer	  segment,	  major	  
players	  may	  be	  displaced	  as	  disrupter’s	  develop	  new	  wealth	  opportunities.	  The	  
consequences	  of	  not	  securing	  disruptive	  innovations	  can	  be	  “far	  more	  devastating	  than	  
simply	  lost	  opportunities	  or	  lost	  market	  share”	  (Thomond	  et	  al.,	  2003,	  p.	  6).	  Following	  
these	  definitions	  d-­‐cinema	  can	  easily	  be	  identified	  as	  a	  disruptive	  technology.	  In	  the	  
following	  sections	  we	  will	  map	  out	  current	  important	  issues	  stopping	  incumbents	  from	  
embracing	  the	  technology	  and	  exploiting	  its	  full	  potential.	  We	  will	  show	  how	  d-­‐cinema	  
changes	  the	  basis	  of	  competition	  in	  the	  industry	  and	  helps	  new	  markets	  to	  emerge.	  We	  
will	  also	  show	  how	  incumbents	  can	  slow	  down	  the	  development	  to	  their	  advantage,	  and	  
in	  doing	  so	  deliberately	  risk	  losing	  niche	  markets.	  	  
Single	  Standard	  vs.	  Consumer	  Market	  
One	  of	  the	  prerequisites	  for	  a	  wide	  roll	  out	  of	  d-­‐cinema	  has	  been	  the	  readiness	  of	  tested	  
equipment.	  There	  is	  a	  broad	  consent	  among	  industry	  experts	  that	  the	  problems	  of	  digital	  
projectors	  with	  image	  quality	  have	  now	  been	  solved.	  However	  the	  availability	  of	  
technology	  that	  meets	  the	  requirements	  has	  not	  propelled	  the	  number	  of	  installed	  d-­‐
cinema	  projectors	  tremendously.	  Walt	  Ordway,	  chief	  technology	  officer	  for	  the	  DCI,	  does	  
not	  see	  a	  wide	  implementation	  of	  d-­‐cinema	  for	  at	  least	  4-­‐6	  years,	  although	  an	  initial	  roll	  
out	  could	  take	  place	  “in	  the	  next	  year	  or	  so.”	  Ordway	  notes	  that	  one	  problem	  with	  the	  
systems	  that	  are	  currently	  fielded	  is	  their	  lack	  of	  security	  constraints	  and	  a	  common	  
standard	  (DCR,	  2005a).	  
On	  an	  exhibitor’s	  wish	  list	  for	  regulators	  of	  d-­‐cinema,	  a	  common	  global	  standard	  would	  
rank	  among	  the	  top	  objectives.1	  There	  are	  two	  rivalling	  technologies	  in	  the	  projector	  
market,	  namely	  TIs	  2K	  (DLP)	  standard,	  and	  Sony’s	  4K	  (GLV)	  standard.2	  TI	  has	  invested	  an	  
“unspeakably	  large	  amount	  of	  money”	  (Screen	  Digest,	  2003,	  p.	  30)	  into	  its	  DLP	  
technology,	  revealing	  the	  exact	  amount	  not	  even	  to	  its	  shareholders,	  and	  currently	  
controls	  the	  market.	  Sony	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  keeps	  announcing	  its	  4K	  projector	  and	  plays	  
on	  the	  preference	  of	  studios	  for	  a	  4K	  solution.	  Despite	  Sony’s	  de	  facto,	  zero-­‐market	  
share,	  the	  DCI	  (in	  which	  Sony	  is	  a	  member)	  has	  endorsed	  both	  2K	  and	  4K	  standards	  when	  
choosing	  the	  JPEG	  2000	  codec	  for	  studio	  d-­‐cinema	  release	  masters.	  Although	  the	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revenues	  from	  the	  high-­‐end	  d-­‐cinema	  market	  can	  be	  substantial,	  the	  real	  market	  to	  be	  
won	  is	  the	  home	  cinema	  market.	  For	  both	  companies	  the	  market	  for	  d-­‐cinema	  is	  
therefore	  a	  kind	  of	  branding	  exercise	  for	  reaping	  rewards	  in	  the	  consumer	  electronics	  
(CE)	  market.	  The	  underlying	  logic	  (e.g.,	  for	  TI)	  is	  the	  following:	  
Cinema	  audiences	  will	  see	  the	  DLP	  logo	  before	  the	  start	  of	  every	  film	  in	  a	  d-­‐cinema	  and	  
come	  to	  associate	  it	  with	  the	  highest	  quality	  of	  picture	  viewing.	  They	  will	  then	  seek	  it	  out	  
or	  of	  opt	  for	  it	  in	  their	  local	  CE	  market.	  (Screen	  Digest,	  2003)	  
The	  situation	  is	  similar	  to	  the	  introduction	  of	  digital	  sound	  into	  cinemas,	  which	  was	  also	  
seen	  as	  a	  preliminary	  battle	  “for	  the	  potentially	  much	  more	  lucrative	  market	  for	  digital	  
sound	  in	  the	  home”	  (Belton,	  2002,	  p.	  101).	  During	  the	  1990s	  three	  different	  companies	  
tried	  to	  establish	  their	  proprietary	  technology	  as	  a	  cinema	  standard,	  namely	  DTS	  
(Universal/MCA),	  SDDS	  (Sony),	  and	  Dolby	  digital	  (Dolby	  Laboratories).	  Since	  each	  
standard	  was	  able	  to	  capture	  a	  sufficient	  market	  share,	  multi-­‐standards	  in	  cinema	  sound	  
continue	  to	  exist.	  
Multi-­‐standards	  in	  d-­‐cinema	  are	  certainly	  not	  a	  desired	  outcome	  for	  film	  distributors	  as	  
well	  as	  exhibitors.	  Still,	  as	  long	  as	  d-­‐cinema	  is	  only	  considered	  as	  a	  prefacing	  market	  for	  
the	  companies	  who	  actually	  develop	  the	  technologies	  in	  use,	  standards	  will	  be	  an	  issue.	  
Network	  markets	  
One	  of	  the	  reasons	  why	  a	  common	  standard	  is	  so	  desirable	  is	  that	  the	  market	  for	  d-­‐
cinema	  exhibits	  positive	  consumption	  and	  production	  externalities.	  Positive	  consumption	  
(network)	  externalities	  exist,	  when	  the	  value	  of	  a	  unit	  of	  the	  good	  increases	  with	  the	  
expected	  number	  of	  units	  sold	  (Economides,	  1996).	  If	  both	  TI	  (2K)	  and	  Sony	  (4K)	  establish	  
their	  incompatible	  projectors	  in	  the	  market,	  the	  market	  is	  split	  into	  two	  different	  
networks,	  one	  for	  2K	  projectors	  and	  one	  for	  4K	  projectors.	  Each	  of	  these	  networks	  
consists	  of	  sellers	  (the	  Hollywood	  studios	  plus	  independent	  content	  producers)	  and	  
buyers	  (exhibitors).	  If	  an	  exhibitor	  installs	  a	  2K	  projector	  he	  joins	  the	  2K	  network,	  and	  the	  
utility	  of	  this	  projector	  increases	  with	  every	  exhibitor	  who	  joins	  this	  network	  because	  the	  
increasing	  size	  of	  the	  (2K)	  market	  increases	  the	  expected	  utility	  of	  all	  participants	  as	  they	  
have	  more	  partners	  to	  trade	  with.	  This	  is	  especially	  true	  for	  the	  Hollywood	  studios,	  as	  for	  
them	  the	  utility	  of	  the	  market	  is	  at	  a	  maximum,	  when	  there	  is	  only	  one	  standard	  (either	  
2K	  or	  4K)	  and	  they	  can	  trade	  with	  all	  the	  exhibitors	  without	  incurring	  any	  additional	  costs.	  
Charles	  Swartz,	  CEO	  of	  the	  USC	  Entertainment	  Technology	  Center,	  has	  stressed	  the	  
importance	  of	  a	  single,	  global,	  interoperable	  standard	  for	  d-­‐cinema	  by	  referring	  to	  35mm,	  
which	  had	  all	  these	  characteristics;	  the	  single	  standard	  ultimately	  enabled	  film	  to	  become	  
a	  “medium	  of	  tremendous	  power”	  (Crabtree,	  2003).	  A	  situation	  with	  a	  double	  standard	  
would	  therefore	  not	  be	  progress	  but	  a	  step	  backward	  for	  the	  industry.	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Sony	  arrives,	  soon	  
As	  a	  vertical	  integrated	  corporation	  Sony	  faces	  competition	  on	  each	  stage	  of	  the	  value	  
chain,	  with	  contradicting	  objectives	  adding	  to	  the	  complexity.	  Being	  a	  member	  of	  the	  DCI,	  
Sony,	  the	  studio,	  has	  been	  able	  to	  secure	  that	  the	  DCI	  agreed	  on	  scalable	  format	  
standards	  from	  2K	  to	  4K,	  and	  has	  thereby	  strengthened	  the	  position	  of	  Sony,	  the	  
projector	  manufacturer.	  On	  the	  other	  side	  however,	  it	  has	  also	  agreed	  to	  accept	  rival	  
technology	  as	  a	  standard.	  There	  is	  a	  strong	  and	  compelling	  argument	  that	  says	  that	  since	  
the	  studios	  are	  the	  real	  beneficiaries	  of	  d-­‐cinema	  (through	  print	  savings)	  they	  should	  also	  
fund	  the	  projector	  installation	  (Baird,	  2004).	  
One	  possible	  way	  to	  realize	  this	  funding	  sees	  the	  majors	  setting	  up	  an	  independent	  
financing	  entity	  that	  allows	  cinema	  owners	  to	  decide	  on	  their	  own	  on	  how	  to	  use	  the	  
funds	  to	  upgrade	  their	  cinemas	  along	  DCI	  standards	  (Kilday,	  2004).	  If	  this	  happens,	  Sony	  
will	  find	  itself	  in	  the	  contradictory	  situation,	  where	  as	  a	  member	  of	  the	  DCI	  it	  will	  have	  to	  
(directly	  or	  indirectly)	  subsidize	  its	  competitors	  in	  equipment	  manufacturing.	  As	  an	  
equipment	  manufacturer	  Sony	  competes	  against	  TI	  and	  its	  licensees	  Christie	  Digital,	  
Barco,	  and	  NEC.	  It	  has	  to	  do	  so	  because	  it	  wants	  to	  protect	  its	  market	  prospects	  in	  
consumer	  electronics,	  where	  it	  again	  competes	  against	  TI	  licensees,	  for	  example,	  
Samsung,	  Sanyo,	  or	  Marantz.	  
On	  each	  stage	  of	  the	  value	  chain	  Sony	  has	  more	  to	  lose	  than	  its	  competitors	  (the	  
subsequent	  market)	  but	  it	  is	  also	  the	  only	  player	  that	  can	  exacerbate	  power	  at	  a	  higher	  
level	  by	  participating	  in	  the	  DCI.	  Although	  Sony	  has	  not	  even	  proved	  yet	  that	  its	  4K	  
projector	  is	  more	  than	  a	  functioning	  prototype,	  it	  is	  therefore	  still	  a	  market	  force	  one	  has	  
to	  take	  into	  account.	  Sony’s	  strategy	  clearly	  is	  to	  play	  on	  time,	  and	  by	  cleverly	  doing	  so,	  it	  
has	  managed	  to	  stay	  in	  a	  race	  that	  otherwise	  would	  have	  been	  long	  over.	  Through	  
repeatedly	  announcing	  its	  4K	  projector	  it	  has	  raised	  industry	  uncertainty	  and	  stopped	  
investments.	  As	  Travis	  Reid,	  president	  of	  the	  cinema	  chain	  Loews	  Cineplex	  said:	  
...	  the	  fact	  that	  (a	  4K	  projector)	  exists	  is	  making	  everyone	  stop	  to	  think,	  and	  admitted	  that	  
if	  there	  was	  no	  deployment	  (of	  4K),	  then	  2K	  would	  have	  been	  the	  initial	  rollout.	  (Sperling,	  
2004)	  
An	  exhibitor	  quoted	  in	  Hollywood	  Reporter	  said	  that:	  
They	  [Sony]	  are	  clearly	  trying	  to	  slow	  down	  the	  forward	  momentum	  of	  2K	  being	  adopted	  
and	  rolled	  out.	  It	  will	  be	  interesting	  to	  see	  how	  they’ve	  come	  along	  to	  being	  a	  real	  live	  
projector;	  there	  are	  a	  lot	  of	  studios	  saying,	  “If	  this	  is	  close,	  then	  let’s	  wait.”	  TI	  [Texas	  
Instruments]	  can’t	  be	  happy	  about	  it.	  (Sperling,	  2004)	  
Doug	  Darrow,	  Project	  Manager	  for	  d-­‐cinema	  at	  TI	  challenges	  Sony	  with	  the	  strong	  
argument	  that	  it	  has	  not	  demonstrated	  that	  4K	  projectors	  will	  actually	  work	  in	  theatres	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for	  a	  few	  years,	  in	  contrast	  to	  TI.	  However,	  this	  argument	  could	  backfire.	  If	  there	  is	  no	  
pressing	  economic	  need	  (and	  there	  is	  none)	  to	  switch	  to	  digital	  projection	  immediately,	  
then	  exhibitors	  and	  studios	  might	  well	  postpone	  their	  investment	  decisions	  and	  wait	  to	  
see	  if	  Sony’s	  4K	  projector	  can	  deliver.	  TI	  has	  expressed	  little	  interest	  in	  the	  race	  to	  4K	  and	  
focuses	  on	  the	  commercialisation	  of	  2K,	  with	  “the	  biggest	  challenge	  not	  lying	  in	  
resolution	  but	  in	  costs”	  (Kaufman,	  2004).	  
A	  transition	  in	  waiting	  
John	  Fithian,	  president	  of	  the	  National	  Association	  of	  Theatre	  Owners	  (NATO),	  states	  “it	  is	  
fairly	  clear	  that	  studios	  will	  fund	  the	  transition,”	  since	  “they	  will	  save	  a	  tremendous	  
amount	  of	  money	  from	  the	  conversion”	  (Baird,	  2004).	  The	  modus	  operandi	  of	  this	  
transition	  is	  far	  away	  from	  being	  “fairly	  clear,”	  though.	  The	  rollout	  plan	  that	  determines	  
which	  cinemas	  will	  get	  converted	  first	  must	  be	  consensually	  negotiated	  with	  all	  interest	  
parties.	  Should	  the	  transition	  start	  only	  in	  North	  America	  or	  internationally,	  by	  state,	  by	  
exhibitor,	  by	  market,	  or	  where	  low	  technology	  and	  penetration	  allow	  for	  fast	  entry?	  
(Fuchs,	  2004b).	  The	  Board	  of	  directors	  of	  the	  NATO	  (2004)	  has	  formulated	  a	  resolution	  of	  
requirements	  that	  need	  to	  be	  fulfilled	  for	  the	  transition	  to	  be	  a	  success.	  A	  key	  point	  for	  
them	  is	  that	  interoperable,	  reliable	  equipment	  is	  in	  place	  (both	  NATO	  and	  DCI	  have	  
pledged	  for	  a	  beta	  testing	  phase)	  that	  at	  least	  equals	  the	  image	  quality	  of	  35mm.	  The	  
equipment	  must	  further	  be	  easy	  to	  upgrade	  at	  reasonable	  cost,	  as	  technology	  advances;	  
must	  be	  built	  around	  clearly	  defined	  standards;	  and	  has	  to	  be	  produced	  by	  competing	  
multiple	  vendors.	  
For	  exhibitors	  a	  desirable	  financing	  plan	  for	  the	  transition	  has	  to	  ensure	  that	  all	  movie	  
complexes	  and	  auditoriums,	  regardless	  of	  size	  or	  geographic	  location	  can	  participate	  
within	  reasonable	  time,	  studios	  are	  committed	  to	  provide	  digital	  content,	  and	  exhibitors	  
can	  independently	  select	  the	  equipment,	  and	  own	  it	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  financing	  period.	  
Furthermore	  they	  ask	  for	  a	  “no	  dark	  screen”	  policy,	  meaning	  that	  films	  play	  in	  a	  
nonrepudiate	  manner	  unless	  the	  exhibitor	  attempts	  to	  play	  the	  film	  in	  a	  completely	  
different	  venue	  and	  that	  they	  can	  decide	  on	  their	  own	  about	  schedules,	  advertisements,	  
trailers,	  and	  other	  content	  (NATO,	  2004,	  p.	  3).	  
From	  a	  studio	  point	  of	  view,	  subsidising	  the	  full	  cost	  of	  the	  equipment	  without	  any	  
obligations	  to	  exhibitors	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  a	  very	  healthy	  economic	  proposition.	  A	  
solution	  that	  does	  not	  contain	  any	  obligations	  to	  exhibitors	  to	  show	  content	  is	  a	  de	  facto	  
cross-­‐subsidisation	  for	  independent	  filmmakers,	  as	  they	  will	  benefit	  from	  the	  installation	  
without	  contributing	  to	  the	  costs.	  	  In	  the	  question	  of	  ownership	  therefore	  rests	  a	  crucial	  
point	  in	  the	  transition	  to	  d-­‐cinema.	  The	  immense	  undertaking	  to	  convert	  thousands	  of	  
screens	  in	  America	  and	  internationally	  is	  not	  an	  “everyday”	  logistic	  and	  organisational	  
challenge.	  To	  resolve	  the	  major	  issues	  it	  will	  take	  time.	  For	  the	  moment	  this	  will	  delay	  the	  
d-­‐cinema	  revolution	  further,	  as	  exhibitors	  have	  little	  incentive	  to	  enter	  the	  market	  on	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their	  own	  before	  the	  studios	  have	  come	  to	  a	  decision.	  
THE	  NEW	  DIGITAL	  DEAL	  
The	  paralysis	  that	  results	  from	  the	  funding	  problem	  has	  left	  the	  market	  for	  the	  moment	  
to	  third-­‐party	  players.	  A	  first	  wave	  of	  third-­‐party	  players	  proposed	  to	  pay	  the	  upfront	  
costs	  for	  digital	  projectors	  in	  return	  for	  a	  fee	  (per-­‐print,	  per-­‐screening,	  per-­‐ticket,	  or	  an	  
annual	  contract)	  and	  promised	  to	  ensure	  that	  there	  is	  no	  shift	  in	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  
between	  distributors	  and	  exhibitors	  (Screen	  Digest,	  2003).	  The	  success	  of	  these	  
companies	  (with	  some	  exemptions	  such	  as	  Kodak)	  has	  been	  very	  modest	  so	  far.	  In	  2003	  
Boeing	  Digital	  Cinema	  closed	  its	  d-­‐cinema	  business	  that	  was	  once	  projected	  to	  bring	  $1	  
billion	  a	  year	  in	  revenue	  (Gates,	  2003).	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  Technicolor	  has	  scaled	  down	  its	  
ambitions	  and	  based	  on	  latest	  reports,	  Elsacom	  is	  still	  in	  the	  testing	  phase.	  
A	  new	  wave	  of	  investment	  into	  d-­‐cinema	  comes	  from	  state	  initiatives	  and	  independent	  
film	  distributors.	  By	  targeting	  niche	  markets	  these	  players	  fragment	  the	  market	  and	  can	  
then	  gradually	  expand	  their	  business	  into	  the	  mainstream.	  	  These	  dynamics	  are	  reflected	  
in	  Christensen’s	  (1997)	  disruptive	  technology	  framework.	  He	  argues	  that	  incumbents	  are	  
resource	  dependent	  (Pfeffer	  &	  Salancik,	  1978)	  on	  their	  most	  demanding	  customers	  and	  
focus	  their	  investment	  towards	  innovations	  that	  are	  valued	  by	  their	  mainstream	  
customers.	  In	  contrast	  to	  this,	  new	  entrants	  are	  not	  constraint	  by	  and	  can	  not	  rely	  on	  an	  
existing	  customer	  base,	  thus	  they	  are	  “forced	  to	  identify	  consumers	  who	  value	  the	  new	  
features	  offered	  by	  the	  new	  technology	  and	  support	  its	  further	  development”	  (Adner,	  
2002).	  
In	  this	  regard,	  it	  seems	  as	  if	  the	  first	  wave	  of	  new	  entrants	  into	  d-­‐cinema	  failed	  to	  
correctly	  identify	  these	  “new	  customers.”	  Most	  of	  these	  ventures	  were	  aimed	  right	  from	  
the	  beginning	  at	  the	  mainstream	  market,	  ignoring	  the	  importance	  to	  segment	  the	  market	  
that	  has	  been	  strongly	  underlined	  by	  Moore	  (1991).	  This	  is	  in	  stark	  contrast	  to	  the	  new	  
wave	  of	  entrants,	  who	  are	  very	  focused	  on	  niche	  markets,	  namely	  the	  distribution	  of	  
independent	  content.	  It	  is	  remarkable	  in	  this	  context	  that	  major	  new	  initiatives	  (e.g.,	  the	  
UK	  Film	  Councils	  Screen	  Network)	  are	  state	  driven.	  So	  far	  government	  support	  for	  the	  
film	  industry	  was	  mainly	  aimed	  at	  subsidising	  film	  production,	  often	  resulting	  in	  the	  so-­‐
produced	  films	  not	  finding	  exhibition	  and	  reaching	  only	  a	  very	  limited	  audience.	  The	  idea	  
to	  provide	  distribution	  and	  exhibition	  for	  this	  content	  through	  installing	  digital	  screens	  is	  
a	  strong	  shift	  away	  from	  the	  traditional	  production-­‐oriented	  subsidy	  logic	  to	  a	  more	  
market	  oriented	  one.	  It	  directly	  addresses	  a	  market	  failure	  in	  exhibition	  that	  provides	  
only	  very	  limited	  “screen	  space”	  to	  “art-­‐house”	  films.	  
While	  d-­‐cinema	  might	  potentially	  help	  independent	  filmmakers	  to	  overcome	  the	  market	  
barriers	  to	  distribution,	  this	  does	  not	  necessarily	  mean	  that	  the	  even	  bigger	  barriers	  of	  
consumer	  habits	  and	  tastes	  can	  be	  overcome	  as	  well.	  The	  American	  film	  industry	  has	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shaped	  audience	  tastes	  for	  generations	  resulting	  in	  a	  market	  share	  of	  up	  to	  over	  90%	  in	  
Western	  countries.	  Although	  this	  domination	  might	  be	  a	  portrait	  of	  distorted	  consumer	  
preferences,	  resulting	  from	  restricted	  consumer	  choice	  offered	  in	  local	  cinemas,	  the	  
majority	  of	  mainstream	  audience	  taste	  is	  unlikely	  to	  change	  overnight.	  It	  will	  take	  more	  
than	  access	  to	  the	  market	  to	  re-­‐win	  significant	  audience	  shares	  for	  independent	  
(European)	  cinema.	  Nevertheless	  higher	  exposure	  to	  content	  is	  an	  essential	  first	  step	  to	  
alter	  cinema	  goer’s	  habits	  in	  the	  long	  run.	  
What	  Next	  For	  The	  Structure	  Of	  The	  Film	  Industry?	  
As	  the	  aforementioned	  examples	  clearly	  show,	  d-­‐cinema	  not	  only	  allows	  smaller	  
competitors	  to	  carve	  out	  viable	  market	  niches	  but	  can	  bring	  completely	  new	  markets	  into	  
existence.	  Remote	  areas	  whose	  access	  to	  audiovisual	  content	  that	  has	  been	  limited	  so	  far	  
will	  now	  be	  as	  easily	  reached	  as	  regions	  with	  developed	  infrastructures.	  Both	  
developments	  will	  increase	  competition:	  Firstly	  through	  players	  who	  fragment	  the	  market	  
and	  then	  try	  to	  expand	  their	  strongholds	  into	  the	  mainstream	  market,	  and	  secondly	  
through	  companies	  who	  operate	  from	  new	  strong	  domestic	  markets.	  Without	  additional	  
costs	  in	  supplying	  additional	  “prints”	  for	  screens,	  economies	  of	  scale	  that	  have	  shielded	  
Hollywood	  studios	  from	  low-­‐budget	  competitors	  for	  nearly	  a	  century	  are	  eradicated.	  
Consequently,	  the	  release	  of	  a	  film	  will	  become	  “less	  of	  a	  financial	  decision	  and	  more	  of	  a	  
marketing	  decision”	  (TI,	  2003).	  If	  this	  will	  truly	  give	  independents	  leverage	  remains	  to	  
seen.	  The	  majors	  themselves	  have	  hardly	  ever	  regarded	  printing	  costs	  as	  an	  obstacle	  to	  
distribution.	  With	  “ultrawide	  releases”	  (3000+	  prints)	  on	  the	  rise	  (Screen	  Digest,	  2003),	  d-­‐
cinema	  opens	  the	  door	  to	  an	  ever	  higher	  pervasiveness	  of	  Hollywood	  product.	  
The	  studios	  have	  recently	  shortened	  the	  time	  lags	  between	  release	  dates	  in	  international	  
markets	  and	  global,	  simultaneous,	  film	  starts	  have	  become	  a	  trend	  (e.g.,	  The	  Matrix	  II,	  III,	  
Star	  Wars,	  Harry	  Potter,	  Lord	  of	  The	  Rings).	  One	  reason	  for	  this	  might	  be	  that	  the	  Internet	  
has	  facilitated	  the	  development	  of	  a	  global	  film	  audience	  with	  increasingly	  convergent	  
tastes.	  This	  audience	  readily	  turns	  to	  pirated	  copies	  of	  films	  if	  time	  lags	  between	  national	  
releases	  are	  too	  long.	  The	  combination	  of	  d-­‐cinema	  and	  global	  simultaneous	  film	  starts	  is	  
likely	  to	  propel	  this	  trend	  further	  with	  studios	  staging	  and	  marketing	  their	  productions	  as	  
global	  events	  for	  a	  global	  box	  office.	  
Another	  advantage	  studios	  will	  take	  along	  into	  the	  era	  of	  d-­‐cinema	  will	  be	  their	  business	  
model	  of	  a	  portfolio	  approach	  to	  film	  production	  and	  distribution.	  The	  strategy	  to	  spread	  
risk	  onto	  a	  slate	  of	  films	  is	  even	  more	  effective	  with	  d-­‐cinema:	  If	  a	  film	  is	  a	  success,	  
studios	  can	  immediately	  supply	  additional	  screens	  at	  virtually	  no	  cost,	  if	  a	  film	  is	  a	  failure,	  
it	  can	  be	  withdrawn	  without	  bearing	  the	  sunk	  costs	  of	  film	  prints.	  In	  this	  context	  d-­‐cinema	  
appears	  to	  be	  less	  a	  disruptive	  but	  rather	  a	  sustaining	  technology	  for	  the	  majors.	  
Sustaining	  technologies	  are	  consistent	  with	  a	  firm’s	  business	  model	  (Christensen	  &	  
Raynor,	  2003)	  and	  improve	  the	  performance	  of	  established	  products	  through	  the	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“current	  technology	  product	  paradigm”	  (Kostoff,	  Boylan,	  &	  Simons,	  2004).	  D-­‐cinema	  
bears	  both	  the	  characteristics	  of	  a	  sustaining	  and	  a	  disruptive	  technology,	  making	  it	  
difficult	  to	  recognize	  the	  distinction.	  It	  is	  exactly	  this	  failure	  to	  address	  technological	  
innovations	  appropriately	  that	  according	  to	  Christensen	  causes	  successful	  incumbents	  to	  
stumble	  or	  even	  disappear	  from	  the	  market.	  
Historically,	  the	  film	  industry	  has	  already	  mastered	  a	  number	  of	  disruptive	  technologies	  
(e.g.,	  television,	  video	  recorder),	  despite	  its	  traditional	  reluctance	  to	  embrace	  new	  
technologies.	  Its	  nostrum	  on	  how	  to	  deal	  with	  new	  technologies	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  combined	  
strategy	  of	  vertical	  disintegration	  and	  diversification,	  which	  has	  led	  to	  an	  oligopolistic	  
industry	  structure.	  During	  the	  1990s	  the	  major	  studios	  diversified	  themselves	  into	  the	  
independent	  market	  by	  setting	  up	  or	  buying	  independent	  distributors	  (New	  Line	  Cinema,	  
Miramax,	  Fox	  Searchlight,	  etc.),	  a	  trend	  that	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  intensified	  by	  d-­‐cinema.	  Thus,	  if	  
entrepreneurial	  firms	  take	  advantage	  of	  the	  disruptive	  technology	  d-­‐cinema	  and	  
“redefine	  current	  markets”	  (Kostoff	  et	  al.,	  2004)	  the	  majors	  might	  simply	  counter	  them	  
through	  acquisition	  and	  integration	  into	  their	  corporate	  structure.	  
As	  local	  independent	  distributors	  develop	  an	  expertise	  on	  how	  to	  successfully	  handle	  
“difficult”	  films	  in	  their	  markets,	  the	  majors	  might	  also	  begin	  to	  disintegrate	  further	  and	  
try	  to	  outsource	  some	  of	  their	  distribution	  to	  these	  companies	  in	  the	  same	  way	  that	  they	  
have	  outsourced	  production	  through	  flexible	  specialization	  (see	  Christopherson	  &	  
Storper,	  1986,	  1989).	  As	  the	  importance	  of	  a	  physical	  distribution	  structure	  diminishes	  
their	  means	  to	  keep	  control	  over	  the	  industry	  would	  then	  be	  through	  controlling	  
intellectual	  property	  rights	  as	  well	  as	  keeping	  a	  strong	  stake	  in	  development,	  packaging,	  
and	  financing	  and	  providing	  expertise	  in	  film	  production,	  marketing	  and	  distribution	  to	  
contractors.	  
Why	  The	  Hold	  Up?	  
Figure	  1	  shows	  a	  simplified	  model	  of	  money	  flows	  in	  the	  traditional	  film	  industry	  value	  
chain	  and	  in	  a	  system	  of	  d-­‐cinema	  (a	  comprehensive	  discussion	  on	  profit	  calculation	  and	  
accounting	  practices	  in	  the	  Hollywood	  studio	  system	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Daniels,	  Leedy,	  &	  
Sills,	  1998).	  In	  the	  current	  system,	  box	  office	  receipts	  are	  first	  split	  between	  exhibitors	  
and	  distributors.	  Exhibitors	  are	  the	  first	  to	  deduct	  their	  expenses,	  the	  value	  they	  
appropriate	  is	  E.	  Distributors	  then	  deduct	  their	  distribution	  fee,	  which	  is	  intended	  to	  
cover	  their	  overhead	  costs	  (offices,	  corporate	  expenses,	  distribution	  efforts)	  and	  the	  
distribution	  expenses	  (prints	  and	  advertising).	  The	  distribution	  fee	  varies	  according	  to	  
geographic	  area	  and	  market	  between	  25%	  and	  up	  to	  50%	  of	  the	  revenue.	  The	  value	  the	  
distributors	  appropriate	  is	  D.	  The	  remainder,	  P,	  is	  allocated	  to	  the	  producers	  of	  the	  film.	  
After	  the	  transition	  to	  a	  system	  of	  d-­‐cinema,	  cost	  savings	  arise:	  distribution	  expenses	  are	  
reduced	  through	  cutting	  print	  costs,	  distribution	  fees	  are	  lowered	  through	  reduced	  studio	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overhead.	  It	  will	  be	  interesting	  to	  see	  if	  studios	  can	  appropriate	  the	  added	  value	  they	  
have	  created	  through	  cost	  savings	  for	  themselves	  or	  if	  they	  will	  have	  to	  share	  it	  with	  the	  
other	  parties.	  If	  studios	  pay	  for	  the	  transition	  costs,	  they	  are	  likely	  to	  demand	  the	  added	  
value	  on	  the	  ground	  that	  they	  have	  paid	  for	  it	  (scenario	  1	  in	  Figure	  1).	  However,	  if	  a	  new	  
distributor	  enters	  the	  game	  at	  this	  stage	  (“Maverick	  distributor”),	  he/she	  would	  be	  able	  
to	  offer	  both	  exhibitors	  and	  producers	  a	  better	  deal	  than	  the	  existing	  studios	  (scenario	  2,	  
Figure	  1),	  since	  the	  distributor	  can	  pass	  on	  the	  cost	  savings	  to	  them	  without	  having	  paid	  
for	  them.	  In	  this	  scenario,	  studios	  will	  eventually	  have	  to	  pass	  on	  cost	  savings	  to	  
producers	  as	  well,	  if	  they	  do	  not	  want	  to	  continuously	  lose	  potential	  box	  office	  hits	  to	  
maverick	  distributors.	  The	  prospect	  of	  being	  held	  up	  by	  other	  parties	  in	  the	  value	  chain	  in	  
the	  long	  run	  is	  therefore	  another	  factor	  that	  severely	  decreases	  the	  studios	  financial	  
incentive	  to	  pay	  the	  transition	  costs	  for	  d-­‐cinema.	  
Companies	  like	  Hollywood	  Software	  already	  offer	  independent	  film	  distributors	  and	  
producers	  to	  outsource	  the	  distribution	  of	  entire	  release	  slates	  or	  individual	  films	  to	  their	  
company.	  Hollywood	  Software	  is	  a	  major	  player	  that	  provides	  information	  systems	  to	  the	  
industry	  (including	  the	  majors)	  that	  automatically	  create	  sales	  charts,	  track	  film	  bookings,	  
print	  shipment	  orders,	  and	  credit	  payments	  (Hollywood	  Software,	  2005).	  The	  company	  is	  
a	  subsidiary	  of	  one	  of	  the	  largest	  server	  and	  d-­‐cinema	  platform	  manufacturers	  in	  the	  
market,	  Access	  Integrated	  Technologies	  (Access	  IT).	  AccessIT	  has	  bought	  and	  
recommissioned	  all	  28	  installed	  d-­‐cinema	  systems	  from	  Boeing	  Digital	  Cinema	  in	  2004,	  
placing	  itself	  in	  the	  “centre	  of	  the	  digital	  revolution”	  (Fuchs,	  2004a).	  Their	  most	  recent	  
development	  is	  the	  Theatre	  Command	  Console	  which	  supports	  multiple	  brands	  and	  
models	  of	  d-­‐cinema	  projectors	  and	  is	  operated	  through	  an	  easy-­‐to-­‐use	  graphic	  interface.	  
The	  president	  and	  COO	  of	  the	  company,	  Dave	  Gajda	  has	  said:	  
The	  idea	  is	  to	  have	  fingertip	  access	  to	  and	  control	  of	  all	  critical	  d-­‐cinema	  
operations,	  including	  print-­‐movements	  and	  pre-­‐show	  content	  such	  as	  advertising	  and	  
trailers.	  Whether	  on-­‐site	  by	  the	  manager	  or	  directed	  remotely	  from	  the	  central	  home	  
office,	  …,	  operators	  can	  easily	  employ	  a	  single	  user	  interface	  to	  simplify	  training	  and	  
flexibly	  integrate	  multiple	  technology	  solutions	  into	  a	  unified	  system.	  (Fuchs,	  2004a)	  
>>>>>>>>	  Take	  in	  Figure	  1<<<<<<<<<<	  
This	  gives	  rise	  to	  a	  tangible	  set	  of	  questions	  about	  training	  needs	  of	  staff	  and	  the	  
transition	  to	  d	  -­‐cinema.	  Slater	  (2002)	  has	  predicted	  that	  the	  new	  projection	  equipment	  
will	  use	  built-­‐in	  diagnostic	  software	  and	  straightforward	  test	  routines.	  As	  a	  consequence	  
d-­‐cinema	  projectors	  will	  be	  far	  easier	  to	  remotely	  control	  when	  connected	  via	  a	  cinema	  
management	  system	  that	  both	  controls	  their	  inputs	  and	  outputs.	  AccessIT’s	  Theatre	  
Command	  Console	  is	  therefore	  a	  predecessor	  to	  an	  era	  where	  it	  will	  be	  possible	  to	  look	  
after	  hundreds	  of	  screens	  in	  the	  country	  from	  a	  single	  control	  room	  (a	  situation	  that	  
already	  has	  come	  true	  for	  (UK	  broadcasting	  [Slater,	  2004]).	  The	  simplicity	  of	  a	  graphical	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interface	  and	  remote	  control	  dismisses	  concerns	  from	  exhibitors	  that	  new	  digital	  
projectors	  will	  require	  advanced	  technical	  knowledge	  (McQuire,	  2004)	  but	  could	  mean	  
bleak	  prospects	  for	  some	  projector	  staff.	  
CONCLUSION	  
In	  this	  chapter	  we	  have	  tried	  to	  situate	  current	  developments	  in	  d-­‐cinema	  within	  
Christensen’s	  framework	  of	  disruptive	  technologies.	  We	  have	  focused	  the	  attention	  on	  
what	  we	  see	  as	  the	  major	  players	  in	  d-­‐cinema,	  namely	  the	  major	  Hollywood	  studios	  and	  
have	  tried	  to	  map	  the	  implications	  of	  d-­‐cinema	  on	  the	  relationships	  within	  the	  film	  
industry	  value	  chain.	  It	  was	  shown	  that	  the	  market	  for	  d-­‐cinema	  exhibits	  network	  
externalities	  and	  that	  therefore	  a	  common	  standard	  is	  desirable.	  The	  discussion	  on	  
standards	  also	  revealed	  the	  conflicting	  interests	  a	  diversified	  and	  vertical	  integrated	  
corporation	  such	  as	  Sony	  faces,	  as	  the	  competition	  in	  d-­‐cinema	  becomes	  a	  “preliminary	  
battle”	  for	  the	  CE	  market.	  As	  a	  major	  incumbent,	  Sony	  is	  able	  to	  delay	  the	  progress	  of	  the	  
whole	  transition	  to	  d-­‐cinema	  for	  its	  own	  benefit,	  a	  strategy	  worth	  examining	  more	  
closely.	  We	  have	  also	  briefly	  outlined	  some	  of	  the	  complexities	  linked	  to	  organising	  a	  
satisfying	  transition	  to	  d-­‐cinema	  for	  all	  parties.	  	  
The	  emergence	  of	  new	  markets	  and	  new	  entrants	  into	  the	  d-­‐cinema	  market	  was	  
examined	  in	  respect	  to	  the	  implications	  for	  major	  players	  in	  the	  industry.	  Although	  d-­‐
cinema	  was	  found	  to	  benefit	  independent	  players	  that	  can	  carve	  out	  market	  niches,	  it	  
was	  also	  shown	  that	  the	  majors	  have	  a	  strong	  leverage	  to	  exploit	  the	  technology	  to	  their	  
advantage.	  However,	  the	  combination	  of	  a	  change	  in	  the	  terms	  of	  competition	  and	  a	  
potential	  hold	  up	  problem,	  are	  likely	  to	  lead	  to	  a	  further	  diversification	  and	  possibly	  a	  
further	  disintegration	  of	  major	  distributors.	  In	  addition	  we	  have	  discussed	  important	  
issues	  associated	  with	  d-­‐cinema,	  such	  as	  alternative	  content,	  training,	  and	  digital	  rights	  
management.	  Further	  research	  is	  needed	  to	  explore	  strategies	  of	  new	  entrants	  and	  
incumbents	  in	  this	  market,	  survey	  successful	  and	  unsuccessful	  business	  models,	  and	  
discuss	  how	  the	  research	  on	  d-­‐cinema	  can	  contribute	  to	  and	  be	  enriched	  by	  literature	  on	  
strategic	  management	  and	  disruptive	  technologies.	  Interesting	  research	  questions	  are	  
related	  to	  the	  performance	  of	  third	  party	  initiatives	  such	  as	  the	  UK	  Film	  Council’s	  Screen	  
Network	  (2005);	  the	  complexity	  of	  organising	  a	  transition	  to	  dcinema	  for	  the	  mainstream	  
market;	  and	  the	  role	  of	  diversified,	  vertically	  integrated	  corporations	  in	  the	  process	  of	  




	   242	  
REFERENCES	  
Adner,	  R.	  (2002).	  When	  are	  technologies	  disruptive?	  A	  demand-­‐based	  view	  of	  the	  emergence	  of	  
competition.	  Strategic	  Management	  Journal,	  23,	  667-­‐688.	  
Baird,	  K.	  (2004,	  April	  22).	  The	  age	  of	  digital	  movies	  is	  coming	  (or	  so	  it	  seems).	  Las	  Vegas:	  Sun	  
Herald.	  
BBC	  News.	  (2005,	  March	  20).	  Irish	  cinema	  ‘set	  to	  go	  digital’.	  Retrieved	  March	  23,	  2005,	  from	  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-­‐/2/hi/uk_news/northern_ireland/4365875.stm	  
Belton,	  J.	  (2002).	  Digital	  cinema:	  A	  false	  revolution.	  October,	  100(1),	  98-­‐114.	  
Christensen,	  C.	  M.	  (1997).	  The	  innovator’s	  dilemma.	  Harvard	  Business	  School	  Press.	  
Christensen,	  C.	  M.,	  &	  Raynor,	  M.	  E.	  (2003).	  The	  innovator’s	  solution.	  Creating	  and	  sustaining	  
successful	  growth.	  Boston:	  Harvard	  Business	  School	  Press.	  
Christopherson,	  S.,	  &	  Storper,	  M.	  (1986).	  The	  city	  as	  studio	  –	  The	  world	  as	  backlot:	  The	  impact	  of	  
vertical	  disintegration	  on	  the	  location	  of	  the	  motion	  picture	  industry.	  Environment	  and	  Planning.	  
D:	  Society	  and	  Space,	  4,	  305-­‐320.	  
Christopherson,	  S.,	  &	  Storper,	  M.	  (1989).	  The	  effects	  of	  flexible	  specialization	  on	  industrial	  politics	  
and	  the	  labor	  market:	  The	  motion	  picture	  industry.	  Industrial	  and	  Labor	  Relations	  Review,	  42(3),	  
331-­‐347.	  
Crabtree,	  S.	  (2003,	  August	  27).	  Single,	  global	  standard	  eyed	  for	  digital	  cinema.	  The	  Hollywood	  
Reporter.	  
Crabtree,	  S.	  (2004,	  June	  21).	  Studios	  pick	  digital	  system.	  The	  Hollywood	  Reporter.	  
Culkin,	  N.,	  &	  Randle,	  K.	  R.	  (2003,	  Winter).	  Digital	  cinema:	  Opportunities	  and	  challenges.	  
Convergence:	  The	  Journal	  of	  Research	  into	  New	  Media	  Technologies,	  9(4).	  
Culkin,	  N.,	  &	  Randle,	  K.	  R.	  (2003,	  August	  25).	  Stelios	  v	  America,	  the	  latest	  big	  screen	  bout.	  The	  
Guardian,	  p.	  19.	  
Daneels,	  E.	  (2004).	  Disruptive	  technology	  reconsidered:	  A	  critique	  and	  research	  agenda.	  Product	  
Development	  &	  Management	  Association,	  21,	  246-­‐258.	  
Daniels,	  B.,	  Leedy,	  D.,	  &	  Sills,	  S.	  (1998).	  Movie	  money:	  Understanding	  Hollywood’s	  (creative)	  
accounting	  practices.	  Los	  Angeles:	  Silman-­‐James	  Press.	  
Department	  for	  Culture,	  Media	  and	  Sport	  (DCMS).	  (2002).	  The	  implications	  of	  digital	  technology	  
for	  the	  film	  industry.	  London:	  TSO.	  
Digital	  Cinema	  Report	  (DCR).	  (2005a).	  The	  big	  picture.	  Retrieved	  March	  14,	  2005,	  from	  www.	  
digitalcinemareport.com/thebigpicture_53.html	  
Digital	  Cinema	  Report	  (DCR).	  (2005b).	  A	  conversation	  with	  Tim	  Partridge.	  Retrieved	  March	  14,	  
2005,	  from	  www.digitalcinemareport.com/qatimpartridge.html	  
Economides,	  N.	  (1996,	  October).	  The	  economics	  of	  networks.	  International	  Journal	  of	  Industrial	  
Organization,	  14(6),	  673-­‐699.	  
	   243	  
Fuchs,	  A.	  (2004a,	  September).	  Gaining	  access:	  Former	  Boeing	  digital	  sites	  re-­‐lit	  &	  linked	  by	  
satellite.	  Film	  Journal	  International.	  Retrieved	  March	  25,	  2005,	  from	  
http://www.filmjournal.com/filmjournal/search/article_display.	  jsp?vnu_content_id=1000729613	  
Fuchs,	  A.	  (2004b).	  The	  Hollywood	  Titanic.	  ETA	  Conference	  Asks:	  Is	  D-­‐Cinema	  the	  Iceberg.	  Film	  
Journal	  International.	  Retrieved	  March	  25,	  2005,	  from	  
http://www.filmjournal.com/filmjournal/search/article_display.	  jsp?vnu_content_id=1000729613	  
Gates,	  D.	  (2003,	  December	  2).	  Condit	  steered	  Boeing	  to	  be	  No.	  2.	  Seattle	  Times.	  Retrieved	  March	  
23,	  2005,	  from	  http://seattletimes.nwsource.com	  
Giardina,	  C.	  (2004).	  Independent	  thinking.	  The	  Hollywood	  Reporter	  (Ed.).	  White	  Paper:	  Digital	  
Intermediates,	  p.	  14.	  	  
Hollywood	  Software.	  (2005).	  Indiedirect.	  Retrieved	  March	  14,	  2005,	  from	  
http://www.ukfilmcouncil.org.uk/news/?p=D4A15778059152EF9EkRn2455D6C&skip	  
Hubbard,	  P.	  (2002).	  Screen	  shifting:	  Consumption,‘riskless	  risks’	  and	  the	  changing	  geographies	  of	  
cinema.	  Environment	  and	  Planning	  A,	  34,	  1239-­‐1258.	  
Huettig,	  M.	  D.	  (1944).	  Economic	  control	  of	  the	  motion	  picture	  industry.	  MPhil	  dissertation,	  
University	  of	  Pennsylvania,	  Philadelphia.	  
Husak,	  W.	  (2004)	  Economic	  and	  other	  considerations	  for	  digital	  cinema.	  Image	  Communication,	  
19,	  921-­‐936.	  
Kaufman,	  D.	  (2004).	  DI	  facilities	  adopt	  2K	  Projectors.	  The	  Hollywood	  Reporter	  (Ed.).	  White	  Paper:	  
Digital	  Intermediates,	  pp	  10-­‐11.	  Retrieved	  March14,	  2005,	  from	  
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/threast/pdfs/di_	  whitepaper.pdf	  
Kilday,	  G.	  (2004,	  March	  25).	  Studios	  shifting	  d-­‐cinema	  stance:	  Hint	  at	  subsidizing	  transition.	  The	  
Hollywood	  Reporter.	  
Kostoff	  ,	  R.N.,	  Boylan	  R.,	  Simons,	  G.R.	  (2004).	  Disruptive	  technology	  roadmaps.	  Technological	  
Forecasting	  &	  Social	  Change,	  71,	  141-­‐159.	  
Litman,	  B.	  R.	  (1998).	  The	  motion	  picture	  mega	  industry.	  Needham	  Heights,	  MA:	  Allyn	  and	  Bacon.	  	  
McQuire,	  S.	  (2004,	  February).	  Slow	  train	  coming?	  The	  Transition	  to	  digital	  distribution	  and	  
exhibition	  in	  cinema.	  Media	  International	  Australia	  incorporating	  Culture	  and	  Policy,	  p.	  110.	  
MKPE	  Consulting.	  (2005).	  Humble	  thoughts.	  Retrieved	  March	  14,	  2005,	  from	  
http://mkpe.com/digital_cinema/index.php	  
Moore,	  G.	  (1991).	  Crossing	  the	  chasm.	  New	  York:	  Harper	  Business	  Press.	  
(NATO)	  National	  Association	  of	  theatre	  owners	  (2004,	  November	  18).	  Digital	  Resolution.	  
Retrieved	  March	  14,	  2005,	  from	  http://www.natoonline.org/DigitalResolution%2011-­‐18-­‐04.pdf	  
Parisi,	  P.	  (2004).	  Aged	  to	  perfection.	  The	  Hollywood	  Reporter	  (Ed.).	  White	  Paper:	  Digital	  
Intermediates,	  p.	  15.	  Retrieved	  March	  14,	  2005,	  from	  
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/threast/pdfs/di_whitepaper.pdf	  
Pfeffer,	  J.,	  &	  Salancik,	  G.	  R.	  (1978).	  The	  external	  control	  of	  organizations:	  A	  resource	  dependence	  
	   244	  
perspective.	  New	  York:	  Harper	  &	  Row.	  
Schilling,	  M.	  et	  al.	  (2005,	  January	  21).	  Conquering	  Alexander.	  Screen	  Int.,	  p.	  4,	  6.	  
Scott,	  A.	  J.	  (2002).	  A	  new	  map	  of	  Hollywood:	  The	  production	  and	  distribution	  of	  American	  motion	  
pictures.	  Regional	  Studies,	  36(9),	  957-­‐975.	  
Scott,	  J.	  (2005).	  On	  Hollywood.	  The	  place,	  the	  industry.	  Princeton	  University	  Press.	  
Screen	  Digest.	  (2003).	  Report	  on	  the	  implications	  of	  digital	  technology	  for	  the	  film	  industry.	  
London:	  Screen	  Digest.	  
Slater,	  J.	  (2002,	  August).	  Electronic	  cinema—A	  business	  as	  much	  as	  a	  technology.	  Ingenia,	  13,	  41-­‐
46.	  
Sony.	  (2005,	  March	  15).	  Digital	  cinema	  gets	  to	  billing	  with	  Sony,	  Landmark	  Theatres	  Alliance.	  
Retrieved	  March	  23,	  2005,	  from	  http://news.sel.sony.com/pressrelease/5701	  
Sperling,	  N.	  (2004,	  October	  22).	  Double	  standards.	  The	  Hollywood	  Reporter.	  Retrieved	  March	  25,	  
2005,	  from	  
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr/film/feature_display.jsp?vnu_content_id=1000682865	  
Texas	  Instruments	  (TI).	  (2003,	  June	  9).	  Interview	  with	  Director	  Bryan	  Singer.	  Retrieved	  March	  21,	  
2005,	  from	  
http://www.dlp.com/dlp_cinema/dlp_cinema_feature_article_brian_singer_interview.asp	  
Texas	  Instruments	  (TI).	  (2005,	  March	  15).	  George	  Lucas	  and	  James	  Cameron	  to	  highlight	  digital	  
cinema	  and	  3D	  movies	  at	  ShoWest	  2005.	  Retrieved	  March	  23,	  2005,	  from	  	  
http://www.dlp.com/about_dlp/about_dlp_	  press_release.asp?id=1232	  
Thomond,	  P.,	  &	  Lettice,	  F.	  (2002).	  Understanding	  and	  enabling	  disruptive	  innovation.	  Doctoral	  
paper.	  International	  Ecotechnology	  Research	  Centre.	  
UK	  Film	  Council.	  (2005,	  February	  26).	  UK	  film	  council	  selects	  arts	  alliance	  digital	  cinema	  to	  
manage	  world’s	  first	  large	  scale	  digital	  screen	  network.	  Press	  Release.	  London	  
Von	  Sychowski,	  P.	  (2003).	  Digital	  cinema	  business	  models:	  The	  global	  outlook.	  London:	  Screen	  
Digest.	  
	   	  
	   245	  
Appendix	  9:	  P4	  Getting	  in	  and	  getting	  on	  in	  Hollywood:	  Freelance	  careers	  in	  
an	  uncertain	  industry.  
In	   Smith,	   C.	   and	   McKinlay,	   A.	   (eds.)	  Creative	   Labour	   and	   the	   Labour	   Process.	  
London:	  Palgrave.	  (with	  Randle:	  52	  citations)	  
	  
Abstract	  	  
This	  chapter	  explores	  issues	  in	  film	  industry	  related	  employment	  in	  the	  US,	  reporting	  on	  a	  
study	  carried	  out	  between	  June	  1999	  and	  March	  2002	  around	  the	  themes	  of	  ‘getting	  in,	  
staying	   in	   and	   getting	   on’	   in	   the	   Hollywood	   (Los	   Angeles)	   visual	  media	   industries.	   The	  
study	   set	   out	   to	   explore	   the	   experience	   of	   freelance	  workers	  within	   a	   sector	   changing	  
rapidly	  at	  both	  a	  global	  and	  local	  level	  (Wasko,	  1994)	  and	  is	  part	  of	  a	  wider	  comparative	  
project	  concerned	  with	  similar	  issues	  in	  the	  UK.”	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1. Introduction	  
This	   chapter	   explores	   issues	   in	   film	   industry	   related	   employment	   in	   the	   US,	  
reporting	  on	  a	  study	  carried	  out	  between	  June	  1999	  and	  March	  2002	  around	  the	  themes	  
of	   ‘getting	   in,	   staying	   in	   and	   getting	   on’	   in	   the	   Hollywood	   (Los	   Angeles)	   visual	   media	  
industries.	   The	   study	   set	   out	   to	   explore	   the	   experience	   of	   freelance	   workers	   within	   a	  
sector	   changing	   rapidly	   at	   both	   a	   global	   and	   local	   level	   (Wasko	   1994)	   and	   is	   part	   of	   a	  
wider	  comparative	  project	  concerned	  with	  similar	  issues	  in	  the	  UK.	  	  
The	  study	  reported	  here	  has	  grown	  out	  of	  earlier	  work	  concerned	  with	  the	  nature	  
of	   employment	   and	   management	   in	   the	   UK	   film	   industry	   (Blair	   2001,	   Blair,	   Grey	   and	  
Randle	   2001),	   with	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   US	   and	   UK	   industries	   (Culkin	   and	  
Kerrigan	  1999,	   Blair	   and	  Rainnie	   2000,	   Kerrigan	  2000)	   and	  with	   a	   comparison	  between	  
the	  industries	  in	  the	  two	  countries	  (Blair,	  Culkin	  and	  Randle	  2003).	  	  
With	   a	   primary	   interest	   in	   film-­‐related	   employment	   in	   the	   UK,	   the	   location	  
decisions	  of	  US	  majors	  are	  of	   considerable	   importance.	  While	   some	  US	   film	  production	  
does	   take	   place	   in	   the	   UK;	   Canada,	   Australia	   and	   Mexico	   have	   also	   been	   seen	   as	  
benefiting	   from	   ‘runaway’	   or	   ‘offshore’	   production	   –	   the	   tendency	   for	   film-­‐making	  
traditionally	   carried	   out	   in	   Los	   Angeles	   to	   take	   place	   in	   other	   locations1.	   Runaway	  
production	  was	  a	  major	   issue	  for	  our	   interviewees	  and	  was	  felt	  by	  them	  to	  be	  affecting	  
the	  ability	  of	  Los	  Angeles	  based	  film	  workers	  to	  find	  work,	  but	   it	  was	  also	  the	  case	  that	  
other	  events	  outside	  of	  their	  control	  such	  as	  technological	  change,	  strikes	  (or	  threatened	  
strikes)	   in	   sub-­‐sectors	   of	   the	   industry,	   or	   the	   cataclysmic	   events	   of	   9/11	   could	   have	  
serious	   effects	   on	   the	   availability	   of	   work.	   	   Against	   this	   background	   of	   uncertainty	  
individual	   freelancers	   had	   adopted	   a	   range	   of	   strategies	   for	   finding	   work	   and	   making	  
careers.	  Networking	  was	  a	  key	  strategy	  for	  all	  of	  our	  interviewees	  and	  the	  importance	  of	  
contacts	   is	   revealed	  as	  paramount.	   	  When	  work	   is	   scarce	   the	  quality	  of	   these	  networks	  
may	  determine	  whether	  a	  freelance	  career	  continues	  or	  ends.	  
We	  begin	  with	  an	  account	  of	   the	   importance	  of	   the	  entertainment	   industries	   to	  
southern	   California,	   and	   film	   and	   television	   more	   specifically	   to	   Los	   Angeles	   and	   then	  
consider	  some	  of	  the	  sources	  of	  uncertainty	  in	  those	  industries.	  Next	  we	  provide	  a	  brief	  
note	  on	  the	  background	  to	  employment	  relations	  in	  film	  and	  television.	  This	   is	  followed	  
by	   a	   description	   of	   the	   method	   the	   research	   team	   adopted	   in	   order	   to	   identify	   and	  
contact	   freelance	   film	   industry	  workers	   in	   LA.	  A	  major	   section	   reports	   findings	   on	  how	  
freelance	  workers	  experienced	  and	  were	  responding	  to	  change	   in	   the	   industry	  over	   the	  
period	  of	  the	  study	  before	  we	  finally	  draw	  some	  conclusions.	  
2.	  The	  Hollywood	  Film	  Industry	  
	  The	   entertainment	   industry	   is	   crucial	   to	   the	   economy	   of	   southern	   California,	  
growing	  by	  more	  than	  a	  third	  in	  the	  last	  decade	  of	  the	  20th	  century	  (EEI,	  2004)	  while	  film	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Essentially	  there	  are	  two	  forms	  of	  runaway	  production	  –	  ‘creative’,	  which	  departs	  because	  the	  story	  takes	  
place	  in	  a	  setting	  that	  cannot	  be	  duplicated	  at	  home	  and	  ‘economic’	  -­‐	  in	  which	  the	  prime	  consideration	  is	  a	  
lowering	  of	  production	  costs.	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and	  television	  production	  in	  Los	  Angeles	  County	  alone	  accounts	  for	  more	  than	  a	  quarter	  
of	   the	   total	   employed	   in	   entertainment	   (California	   LMI,	   2005).	   	   When	   the	   multiplier	  
effects2	  of	  payrolls	   and	  employment	  are	   taken	   into	  account,	   the	   film	   industry	  probably	  
contributes	  more	  than	  US$25	  billion	  in	  payroll	  and	  nearly	  295,000	  jobs	  to	  the	  Los	  Angeles	  
economy.	  	  With	  employment	  in	  aircraft,	  missiles	  and	  spacecraft	  falling	  (EDD,	  2005)	  these	  
industries	  are	  arguably	  now	  the	  dominant	  employers	  in	  LA.	  
	   Film	   production	   is	   labour	   intensive,	   with	   up	   to	   85	   per	   cent	   of	   the	   cost	   of	  
production	  attributable	  to	  labour	  costs.	  This	  can	  be	  divided	  into	  above	  the	  line	  or	  ‘talent’	  
(40	   per	   cent),	   below	   the	   line	   or	   ‘crew’	   (33	   per	   cent)	   and	   postproduction	   (12	   per	   cent)	  
costs	  (KPMG	  Peat	  Marwick	  1988)3.	  Film	  production	  costs	  almost	  doubled	  in	  the	  decade	  to	  
2003.	  However,	  the	  total	  cost	  of	  delivering	  a	  film	  to	  the	  consumer,	  with	  marketing	  costs	  
nearly	  tripling	  over	  the	  same	  period,	  has	  increased	  even	  more	  dramatically.	  
Entertainment	  industry	  statistics	  showing	  the	  number	  of	  days	  of	  location	  shooting	  
in	   L.A.	   County	   reveal	   a	   shift	   away	   from	   film	   and	   towards	   television	   production	   (EIDC,	  
2005a;	  EIDC,	  2005b;	  EIDC,	  2005c).	  	  With	  the	  total	  number	  of	  production	  days	  rising	  by	  60	  
per	  cent,	  a	  55	  per	  cent	  decline	   in	   film	  production	  between	  1997	  and	  2003	   is	  disguised.	  
Television	   production,	   at	   the	   same	   time,	   has	   almost	   tripled,	   absorbing	   unemployed	  
feature	  film	  workers	  and	  largely	  propelling	  the	  industry.	  	  
	   The	   entertainment	   industries	   in	   the	   US	   are	   characterised	   by	   a	   set	   of	   unusual	  
features	  (Gray	  and	  Seeber	  1996).	  Of	  particular	  importance	  in	  the	  context	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  
the	  fact	  that	  they	  have	  an	  exceptionally	  high	  level	  of	  unemployment	  and	  are	  dominated	  
by	   casual	   employment	   on	   a	   project-­‐by-­‐project	   basis.	   One	   Californian	   study	   (EEI,	   2004)	  
found	  that	  the	  “jobs-­‐to-­‐workers”	  ratio,	  which	  indicates	  the	  number	  of	   jobs	  available	  for	  
each	  worker,	  ranged	  from	  a	  low	  of	  0.67	  in	  1993	  to	  a	  high	  of	  0.79	  in	  1997,	  where	  a	  ratio	  of	  
less	  than	  1	  suggests	  that	  more	  than	  one	  worker	  is	  available	  for	  every	  job.	  This	  indicates	  
that	  almost	  half	  of	  all	  entertainment	  workers	  relied	  on	  non-­‐entertainment	  jobs	  for	  their	  
primary	   income.	   	   The	   same	   study	   also	   found	   that	   in	   2002	   entertainment	   workers	   in	  
production	   had	   an	   average	   of	   2.3	   employers	   and	   workers	   in	   production	   services	   2.6,	  
compared	   with	   1.7	   for	   workers	   who	   earned	   their	   primary	   income	   elsewhere.	   This	  
underlines	   the	   highly	   uncertain	   and	   competitive	   environment	   in	   which	   entertainment	  
workers	  operate.	  	  
3.	  Sources	  of	  uncertainty	  in	  the	  audio	  visual	  media	  industries	  
There	   is	   general	   agreement	   that	   during	   the	   20th	   Century	   technological	   changes4	  	  
have	   comprised	   the	   single	   most	   important	   influence	   on	   employment	   and	   industrial	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  A	  number	  of	  economic	  multipliers	  (a	  measure	  of	  the	  total	  economic	  impact	  of	  a	  particular	   industry)	  has	  
been	  used	  for	  the	  film	  industry.	  It	  has	  been	  assumed	  to	  be	  between	  1.6	  (British	  Columbia	  Film	  Commission,	  
2001),	   2.12	   (Virginia	   Film	   Office,	   1999)	   and	   to	   be	   3.1	   for	   wages	   and	   3.6	   for	   goods	   and	   services	   by	   the	  
Monitor	  Company	  (DGA/SAG	  1999).	  	  
3	  These	  are	  average	  percentages.	  With	  some	  films	  featuring	  star	  actors	  or	  directors	  talent	  costs	  may	  well	  
exceed	   40	   per	   cent,	   while	   on	   a	   high	   concept	   special	   effects	   film	   (e.g.	   Star	   Wars)	   the	   costs	   for	  
postproduction	  and	  “crew”	  will	  make	  up	  the	  biggest	  part	  of	  the	  budget.	  	  
4	  for	  example;	  cable	  TV,	  satellite	  technology,	  miniaturisation	  of	  equipment,	  home	  video	  and	  pay-­‐per-­‐view	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relations	  in	  the	  electronic	  entertainment	  and	  media	  industries	  (Brown,	  1996).	   	  We	  have	  
considered	  the	  impact	  of	  this	  ‘disruptive	  technology’	  elsewhere;	  at	  a	  global	  level	  (Randle	  
and	   Culkin	   2003,	   Culkin,	  Morawetz	   and	   Randle	   2006);	   a	   UK	   national	   level	   (Randle	   and	  
Culkin	  2004);	  and	  at	  a	  UK	  regional	  level	  (Randle	  and	  Morawetz	  2005).	  Digitisation	  has	  no	  
doubt	  aided,	  and	  will	  continue	  to	  aid	  the	  rise	  of	  regional	  film	  production	  centres	  in	  North	  
America	  and	  around	  the	  world	  forming	  a	  (qualified)	  challenge	  the	  Los	  Angeles	  film	  cluster	  
(Lukinbeal,	  2004;	  Scott	  2005).	  	  
If	  Hollywood	  has	  historically	  been	  the	  first	  choice	  for	  the	  majority	  of	  US	  producers	  
to	  make	  their	  movies,	  many	  other	  countries	  now	  offer	  aggressive	  competition	  seeking	  to	  
attract	   US	   investment	   through	   a	   combination	   of	   tax	   breaks,	   active	   promotion	   of	   the	  
country	   as	   a	   production	   location	   by	   government	   agencies,	   lower	   labour	   costs,	   reduced	  
union	  influence	  and	  the	  weakness	  of	  their	  local	  currencies	  against	  the	  US	  dollar.	  	  
	   By	   far	   the	   most	   successful	   country	   following	   this	   strategy	   has	   been	   Canada5.	  
Several	  US	   industry	   reports	  have	  been	  published,	   claiming	  very	   significant	   job	   losses	   to	  
Canada	   (CTPFA	   2004,	   FTAC	   2004,	   DGA/SAG	   1999,	   CEIDR	   2002)	   as	   a	   result	   of	   runaway	  
production.	   However,	   these	   suggestions	   are	   not	   undisputed	   as	   a	   report	   (Neil	   Craig	  
Associates,	  2004)	  produced	  for	  the	  Canadian	  Film	  and	  Television	  Production	  Association	  
demonstrates.	  Canada	  has	  been	  mimicked	  in	  its	  approach	  to	  targeting	  US	  production	  by	  a	  
string	   of	   nations	   spanning	   Europe	   to	   Australasia	   and	   South	   Africa.	   	   As	   the	   Hollywood	  
Majors	  are	  spending	  more	  money	  on	  fewer	  films	  (Variety,	  Sep.	  5,	  2004)	  this	  translates	  to	  
more	  competition	  by	  locations	  for	  projects,	  hence	  the	  targeting	  of	  capital	  by	  competing	  
nations	   has	   become	   more	   aggressive.	   These	   nations	   may,	   however,	   find	   themselves	  
engaged	   in	   a	   ‘race	   to	   the	   bottom’	   as	   they	   are	   forced	   into	   continually	   increasing	   their	  
financial	  incentives	  in	  order	  not	  to	  lose	  production	  to	  other	  locations.	  	  
Moving	  production	  out	  of	  the	  country,	  however,	   is	  not	  without	  its	  drawbacks,	  as	  
one	  director	  notes:	  	  
	  “Depth	  is	  a	  big	  problem	  even	  in	  Toronto.	  Let's	  say	  you	  only	  bring	  the	  stars,	  
so	  you	  need	  a	  supporting	  actress	  in	  her	  late	  30s	  -­‐	  but	  anyone	  who's	  got	  the	  
goods	  has	  already	  gravitated	  to	  L.A.	  It's	  even	  more	  of	  a	  problem	  in	  a	  place	  
like	   Halifax	   because	   then	   it's	   as	   if	   you're	   casting	   community	   theater.”	  	  
(Variety	  Sept	  5	  2004)	  
Locations	  outside	  of	  LA	  may	  thus	  lack	  the	  critical	  mass	  of	  talent	  which	  means	  that	  
their	  financial	  attractiveness	  is	  moderated	  by	  the	  absence	  of	  appropriately	  qualified	  and	  
skilled	  actors	  or	  crew	  members.	  	  A	  critical	  question	  for	  the	  Los	  Angeles	  industry	  is	  to	  what	  
extent	  can	  other	  countries	  	  replicate	  the	  dense	  network	  of	  workers	  that	  a	  location	  such	  as	  
LA	   offers?	  When	   production	   and	   post-­‐production	   tasks	   are	  multiple	   but	   disintegrated,	  
and	   assembled	   through	   dense	   networks	   of	   subcontractor	   relationships,	   then	   locations	  
that	   possess	   such	   dense	   networks	   are	   necessarily	   limited,	   and	   cost	   alone	   for	   discreet	  
functions,	   such	  as	  post-­‐production	  work,	  may	  not	  offer	   the	  competitive	   features	  of	   the	  
Hollywood	  cluster.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  for	  a	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  the	  Vancouver	  film	  industry	  see	  Coe,	  2000	  and	  Coe,	  2001	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   One	   argument	   sees	   the	   future	   of	   the	   Hollywood	   industry	   as	   comprising	  mainly	  
non-­‐production	   jobs,	   with	   Los	   Angeles	   remaining	   as	   a	   centre	   for	   the	   industry’s	  
dealmaking,	   financing	   and	   advertising	   (Variety,	   Sept	   2	   2003).	   The	   pronouncements	   of	  
Askoy	  and	  Robins	  (1992)	  and	  Hozic	  (2001)	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  Hollywood	  is	  now	  effectively	  
‘footloose’,	  are	  however,	  challenged	  by	  Scott	  (2005:56)	  who	  argues	  that	  these	  are	  “both	  
exaggerated	  and	  premature”.	  To	  put	  the	  impact	  into	  context	  Scott	  maintains;	  
	  “So	  far,	  runaway	  production	  has	  not	  seriously	  undermined	  the	  vitality	  of	  the	  
Hollywood	  film	  industry,	  and	  it	  may	  never	  become	  life-­‐threatening,	  at	  least	  in	  
the	  more	  creative	  segments	  of	  the	  industry”	  (2005:55)	  
Scott’s	  comments	  suggest	  that	  the	  degree	  of	  embededness	  of	  the	  Los	  Angeles	  industry	  is	  
high	  and	   the	   long	   term	   impact	  of	  producers	   location	  decisions	  will	  be	  mediated	  by	   the	  
fact	   that	   there	   are	   few	  places	   in	   the	  world	  where	   a	   critical	  mass	   of	   talent	   is	   so	   tightly	  
clustered.	  However,	  he	  is	  also	  suggesting	  that	  for	  below	  the	  line	  workers	  the	  future	  may	  
not	  be	  quite	  so	  assured.	  
This	   brief	   review	   of	   the	   context	   in	   which	   freelance	   workers	   in	   the	   Hollywood	  
industry	  operate	  suggests	  that	  there	  are	  a	  variety	  of	  factors	  impacting	  upon	  the	  ability	  to	  
find	  work	  in	  Los	  Angeles.	   	  The	  number	  of	  movies	  being	  made,	  the	  impact	  of	  new	  digital	  
technologies	  and	  the	  location	  decisions	  of	  the	  major	  studios	  are	  crucial	  in	  the	  medium	  to	  
long	  term	  and	  as	  later	  sections	  will	  demonstrate,	  less	  predictable	  events	  can	  have	  sudden	  
and	  dramatic	  effects	  on	  the	  opportunity	  to	  work.	  	  Against	  this	  background	  workers	  have	  
varying	  degrees	  of	  attractiveness	  to	  employers,	  some	  are	  more	  highly	  skilled	  than	  others	  
and/or	  have	  worked	  for	  them	  previously	  and	  are	  thus	  a	  known	  quantity.	  Finally,	  we	  will	  
suggest,	  some	  workers	  have	  more	  developed	  networks	  of	  contacts	  than	  others	  and	  in	  an	  
environment	   of	   declining	   work	   opportunities	   this	   may	   prove	   crucial	   to	   survival	   in	   the	  
industry.	  
4.	  Employment	  Relations	  in	  the	  US	  Media	  Industries	  
The	  US	  entertainment	   industry	  as	  a	  whole	   is	  highly	  unionised,	  although	  patterns	  
of	  unionisation	  are	  changing	  as	  above	  the	  line	  unions	  have	  been	  growing	  while	  below	  the	  
line	  membership	  has	  fallen.	   	  This	   latter	  tendency	  is	  accounted	  for	  by	  both	  technological	  
change	   and	   moves	   towards	   non-­‐union	   production	   in	   some	   sectors	   (Gray	   and	   Seeber	  
1996).	  Christopherson	  (1996)	  has	  described	  the	  current	  organisation	  of	  production	  in	  the	  
motion	  picture	  industry	  as	  more	  integrated	  in	  terms	  of	  distribution	  and	  production	  than	  
at	   any	   time	   since	   the	   studio	   system	  dominated	  US	   film	  making	   in	   the	  1930s.	  However,	  
this	   growing	   integation	   has	   been	   achieved	   through	   a	   flexible	   subcontracted	   network	  
system	   (“virtual	   integration”)	   which	   developed	   during	   the	   1970s,	   rather	   than	   by	   re-­‐
adopting	  an	  in-­‐house	  form	  of	  production.	   In	  taking	  this	  approach	  major	  distributors	  use	  
contract	  and	  investment	  to	  integrate	  the	  various	  functions	  involved	  in	  the	  production	  of	  
entertainment	   products,	   rather	   than	   ownership	   and	   employment	   of	   personnel.	   The	  
resulting	  structural	  workforce	  flexibility,	  it	  has	  been	  claimed,	  has	  significantly	  contributed	  
to	  the	  success	  of	  the	  entertainment	  industry	  in	  California	  (EEI,	  2004).	  In	  an	  industry	  that	  
continues	  to	  experience	  cyclical	  trends,	  project	  based	  (un)employment	  has	  become	  a	  fact	  
of	  life	  for	  the	  entertainment	  workforce.	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  This	  system,	  while	  offering	  some	  economic	  advantages	  for	  employers,	  has	  not	  been	  
without	   its	  drawbacks	   for	   them	  and	  as	   the	  new	  structures	  developed	  during	   the	  1970s	  
negative	   implications	   became	   apparent	   in	   the	   form	   of	   a	   loss	   of	   control	   over	   the	  
maintenance	  of	  a	  skilled	  labour	  force.	  Furthermore,	  the	  unions	  were	  strengthened	  when	  
they	  stepped	  in	  to	  fulfill	  roles	  previously	  played	  by	  the	  employer	  and	  to	  negotiate	  around	  
issues	  far	  wider	  than	  simple	  rates	  for	  the	  job.	  They	  were	  involved	  in	  the	  development	  of	  a	  
roster	  system	  which	  had	  the	  twin	  functions	  of	  maintaining	  lines	  of	  seniority	  and	  certifying	  
skill	   and	   experience,	   the	   creation	   and	   operation	   of	   a	   health	   and	   pension	   scheme	   (The	  
Motion	   Picture	   Health	   and	   Welfare	   Fund)	   into	   which	   employers	   paid	   on	   the	   basis	   of	  
employee	   on	   a	   union	   contract,	   and	   a	   ‘royalty’	   scheme	   connected	   to	   the	   outputs	   of	  
production	  (Christopherson	  1996).	  
During	   the	   1950s	   the	   roster	   system6	  was	   supported	   by	   the	  major	   studios,	   as	   it	  
served	   as	   a	   certification	   and	   screening	   device	   for	   labour	   while	   allowing	   them	   to	   shed	  
overhead.	   The	   system	   allowed	   craft	   unions	   to	   control	   labour	   supply	   and	   maintain	  
seniority	   rights.	   	   However,	   the	   ‘vertical	   disintegration’	   which	   characterised	   the	   period	  
following	   the	  decline	  of	   the	  vertically	   integrated	   studio	  period	  of	   the	  1930s	  and	  1940s,	  
meant	   that	   skills	   had	   to	   be	   acquired	   over	   an	   extended	   period	   of	   intermittent	   project	  
work,	  rather	  than	  through	  continuous	  employment	   in	  a	  studio.	  While	  craft	  unions	  were	  
able	   to	   control	   the	   supply	   of	   labour	   through	   this	   process,	   those	   undertaking	  
apprenticeships	  were	  subject	  to	  greater	  hardship	  and	  eventually	  the	  frustration	  of	  those	  
seeking	   to	  enter	   the	   industry,	   employer	  objections	   to	  union	   control	  over	   labour	   supply	  
and	  new	  production	  technologies	  led	  to	  the	  development	  of	  initial	  training	  programmes	  
which	   have	   become	   the	   preserve	   of	   the	   film	   and	   television	   schools	   (Christopherson	  
1996).	  
	   As	   a	   result	   of	   these	   changes	   in	   the	   ways	   skills	   were	   acquired,	   over	   time	   the	  
heterogeneity	   of	   the	   workforce	   increased	   and	   the	   culture	   of	   production	   within	   the	  
industry	   began	   to	   change.	   During	   the	   1990s	   and	   related	   to	   these	   changes	   the	   unions	  
began	  to	  lose	  members	  as	  non-­‐union	  films	  were	  made,	  production	  fled	  to	  other	  parts	  of	  
the	  world	  and	   concessions	  were	  made	   to	  what	  were	   seen	  as	  wealthy	  and	  even	  greedy	  
studios	  (Wasko	  1995)	  
While	  union	  membership	   is	   still	   seen	  as	   a	   goal	   for	  many	  entrants,	   bringing	  as	   it	  
does	  health	  and	  social	  security	  benefits	  and	  signalling	  a	  degree	  of	  experience	  across	  the	  
industry,	  the	  extent	  of	  change	  in	  the	  industry	  [see	  Christopherson	  1996	  for	  a	  full	  account]	  
has	  meant	  declining	   control	  and	   influence	   for	   the	  unions.	   	  With	  employers	   increasingly	  
offering	   only	   ‘flexible	   working’	   [fixed	   term,	   freelance	   contracts]	   and	   unions	   unable	   to	  
wield	   their	   former,	   quite	   significant	   power	   in	   placing	   film	   workers	   in	   employment,	  
freelance	  workers	  are	   increasingly	  having	  to	  rely	  on	  developing	  their	  own	  strategies	   for	  
acquiring	  skills,	  finding	  work	  and	  making	  careers	  in	  the	  industry.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Under	  the	  system	  the	  studios	  and	  independent	  producers	  sign	  contracts	  with	  the	  unions	  whose	  members	  
are	  on	   rosters	  based	  on	   the	  amount	  of	   seniority	   they	  have	  acquired	  across	   the	   industry	  as	  a	  whole.	  This	  
serves	  as	  a	  certification	  and	  screening	  device.	  Employers	  looking	  for	  labour	  would	  consequently	  approach	  
the	  union	  who	  would	  seek	  to	  ensure	  that	  available	  work	  was	  spread	  evenly	  amongst	  its	  members.	  Thus	  the	  
union	  was	  afforded	  a	  degree	  of	  control	  over	  who	  worked	  on	  what	  production.	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5.	  Research	  Method	  
The	   recruitment	   of	   participants	   for	   any	   longitudinal	   survey	   is	   problematic,	   with	  
design	  issues	  such	  as	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  representative	  sample	  identified	  as	  a	  key	  problem	  
(McDonald	  and	  King,	  1996).	  Nevertheless,	  while	  more	  complex	  to	  design	  than	  their	  cross-­‐
sectional	  counterparts,	  they	  still	  need	  to	  strive	  to	  construct	  a	  sample	  that	  can	  reflect	  the	  
population	  it	  seeks	  to	  represent.	  However,	  when	  we	  are	  faced	  with	  a	  population,	  which	  is	  
difficult	  to	  accurately	  define	  and	  access,	  our	  view	  on	  what	  value	  we	  should	  place	  on	  the	  
pursuit	  of	  representativeness	  needs	  reassessing.	  	  	  
We	  decided	  to	  employ	  a	  panel	  study,	  a	  form	  of	  a	  longitudinal	  study	  involving	  a	  set	  
of	  base	  measures	   followed	  by	  a	   succession	  of	   follow-­‐up	   interviews	   (Oppenheim,	  1992).	  
For	  this	  study	  the	  base	  measures	  included;	  educational	  and	  family	  background,	  routes	  of	  
entry,	  work	  patterns	  to	  date	  and	  union	  membership	  status.	  Freelance	  workers	  represent	  
a	  particularly	  disparate	  group,	  giving	  rise	  to	  difficulties	  in	  identifying	  suitable	  subjects	  and	  
gaining	  their	  cooperation.	  Participants	  were	  contacted	  via	  email,	  based	  on	  a	  searchable	  
database	  (http//www.crewnet.com).	  Since	  email	  penetration	  in	  the	  US	  was	  high	  in	  1999,	  
especially	   in	   California	   and	   in	   the	   media	   industries	   in	   general,	   we	   suggest	   that	   this	  
represents	  both	   an	   innovative	   and	  effective	  method	   for	   collecting	  data	   relevant	   to	  our	  
subject	   group.	   The	   degree	   of	   accessibility	   we	   encountered	   may	   well	   be	   linked	   to	   the	  
position	   of	   freelance	   workers	   in	   the	   labour	   market.	   It	   was	   our	   experience	   that	   film	  
workers	   invariably	  had	  several	  email	  accounts,	  a	  pager,	  mobile	  and	   landline	  telephones	  
and	   a	   fax	   number.	   Contact	   information	  was	  made	   readily	   available	   on	   Crewnet,	  which	  
appears	  to	  us	  related	  to	  the	  need	  for	  workers	  operating	  within	  the	  freelance	  industry	  to	  
be	  easily	  contactable	  at	  all	  times.	  
The	  existence	  of	  the	  database	  is	   itself	  an	  indicator	  of	  the	  pressure	  on	  individuals	  
to	   raise	   their	   personal	   profiles.	   The	   résumé's	  held	  on	   the	  database	   gave	  names,	   postal	  
and	   email	   addresses,	   fax	   and	   pager	   numbers	   as	   well	   as	   brief	   details	   of	  
educational/training	  background	  and	  recent	  productions	  that	  the	   individual	  had	  worked	  
on.	  	  
Several	   occupations	   key	   to	   the	   production	   phase	   were	   targeted	   and,	   randomly	  
selected,	  individuals	  in	  the	  LA	  area	  were	  contacted,	  via	  email,	  and	  invited	  to	  take	  part	  in	  
the	  study.	  This	  approach	  secured	  a	  good	  response,	  with	  25	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  180	  contacted	  
agreeing	   to	   take	   part	   in	   the	   interview	  programme.	   The	   next	   step	   involved	   plotting	   the	  
addresses	  of	  those	  who	  had	  indicated	  willingness	  to	  take	  part	  in	  the	  study	  on	  a	  detailed	  
street	  map	  of	  Los	  Angeles.	  By	  far	  the	  majority	  were	  based	  in	  the	  West	  Los	  Angeles	  area	  
and	  most	  of	  these	  in	  the	  West	  Hollywood	  district.	  In	  the	  event	  it	  was	  possible	  on	  the	  first	  
visit	  to	  arrange	  in	  depth,	  semi-­‐structured	  interviews	  with	  twenty	  three	  individuals	  in	  both	  
above	  and	  below	   the	   line	  occupations	   as	  well	   as	   a	  number	  of	   representatives	  of	   IATSE	  
(International	  Association	  of	  Theatre	  and	  Screen	  Employees)	  affiliated	  unions.	  
Although	   the	   research	   team	  offered	   to	   travel	   to	  meet	   the	   film	  workers	  on	   their	  
own	  ground,	  all	  but	  one	  were	  prepared	  to	  come	  to	  us.	  This	  prompts	  the	  question	  of	  why	  
freelance	  workers	  were	  willing	   to	   travel	  at	   their	  expense	  and	   in	   their	  own	  time	  to	   take	  
part	  in	  an	  academic	  study.	  The	  issue	  was	  raised	  with	  several	  of	  the	  interviewees	  and	  drew	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two	  broad	  responses.	  The	  first	  was	  related	  to	  a	  desire	  to	  ‘pay	  one’s	  dues’	  –	  a	  recognition	  
that	  a	  willingness	   to	  give	   something	  back	   to	  others	   involved	   in	   industry	   related	  activity	  
was	  to	  the	  mutual	  benefit	  of	  all.	  The	  second	  response	  was	  concerned	  with	  the	  potential	  
benefits	  that	  might	  accrue	  from	  the	  encounter	  in	  terms	  of	  contacts	  or	  information.	  	  Both	  
responses	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   a	   comment	   on	   the	   nature	   of	   freelance	   work	   in	   the	   US	   film	  
industry	   as	   a	   highly	   relational	   activity,	   which	   is	   further	   borne	   out	   by	   the	   empirical	  
material	  examined	  in	  later	  sections	  of	  the	  chapter.	  
This	  methodology	  may	  also	  raise	  further	  questions	  concerning	  bias	  in	  the	  sample	  
of	  interviewees.	  For	  example	  are	  individuals	  who	  choose	  to	  put	  their	  resumes	  on	  Crewnet	  
likely	   to	   represent	  a	   less	   successful	   group	  who	  need	   to	   take	  every	  opportunity	   to	   raise	  
their	   profile?	   Furthermore,	   are	   those	   with	   the	   time	   and	   inclination	   to	   travel	   to	   meet	  
academic	  researchers	  likely	  to	  represent	  a	  group	  at	  a	  stage	  where	  every	  tenuous	  contact	  
needs	  to	  be	  explored	  in	  case	  it	  constitutes	  an	  opportunity?	  If	  so,	  it	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  
findings	   which	   appeared	   to	   demonstrate	   difficulties	   in	   obtaining	   work	   might	   be	   more	  
closely	  related	  to	  the	  marginality	  of	  the	  subject,	  rather	  than,	  for	  example,	  the	  economic	  
environment.	  
In	  the	  event	  the	  profile	  of	  respondents,	  while	  not	  including	  any	  Oscar	  nominees,	  
did	  include	  people	  with	  over	  30	  years	  of	  experience	  and	  some	  who	  had	  earned	  six	  figure	  
salaries	   over	   a	   relatively	   lengthy	   period.	   The	   inclusion	   of	   the	   resumes,	   on	   Crewnet,	   of	  
established	   and	   successful	   freelancers,	   was	   an	   early	   indication	   of	   the	   need	   for	   film	  
workers	   to	  make	  use	  of	  every	  available	  opportunity	   for	  self-­‐marketing.	  However	   few,	   if	  
any,	   respondents	   were	   able	   to	   report	   any	   tangible	   benefit	   from	   the	   presence	   of	   their	  
resume	  on	   the	  database	  and	  none	  had	  directly	  gained	  paid	  employment	   from	   it.	  While	  
we	   cannot	   claim	   this	   to	   be	   any	   more	   than	   speculation,	   we	   believe	   that	   given	   the	  
networked	  nature	  of	  employment-­‐seeking	   in	   the	   industry	   such	  open	  and	  non-­‐relational	  
forms	  of	  information	  are	  of	  limited	  value	  in	  finding	  employment.	  
A	   further	   arguable	   shortcoming	   of	   the	   study	   in	   its	   first	   phase	   was	   the	   relative	  
shortage	   of	   respondents	   representing	   craft	   occupations	   especially	   those	   in	   the	   lighting	  
and	   camera	  departments	   (grip,	   gaffer,	   best	   boy,	   clapper	   loader,	   focus	   puller).	   As	   these	  
are	  members	  of	  the	  larger	  departments	  within	  a	  production	  crew	  their	  absence	  may	  have	  
proven	   significant.	   Firstly,	   it	  may	   be	   that	   camera	   crew	   tend	   to	   gain	   jobs	   as	   a	   coherent	  
team	  and	  form	  what	  Blair	  (2001)	  refers	  to	  as	  a	  ‘semi-­‐permanent	  group’.	  Secondly,	  a	  lack	  
of	  response	  from	  these	  occupations	  might	  indicate	  that	  they	  are	  less	  affected	  by	  variable	  
demand,	  are	  more	  consistently	  in	  work	  and	  consequently	  are	  less	  available	  for	  interview.	  
We	  were	   subsequently	  able	   to	   remedy	   this	  by	  using	  a	   ‘snowballing’	   technique	  –	  asking	  
interviewees	  to	  arrange	  for	  us	  to	  meet	  their	  own	  contacts	  in	  these	  occupations.	  
While	   the	   argument	   put	   forward	   in	   this	   chapter	   is	   qualified	   by	   the	   forgoing	  
account,	  we	  nevertheless	  maintain	  that	  the	  study	  provides	  us	  with	  a	  valuable	  picture	  of	  
the	   current	   issues	  associated	  with	  entering	  and	   finding	   continued	  employment	   in	  what	  
has	  become	  a	  largely	  freelance	  industry.	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6.	  Employee	  Strategies	  in	  a	  Climate	  of	  Uncertainty	  
In	  this	  section	  we	  explore	  some	  of	  the	  circumstances	  surrounding	  entry	   into	  the	  
industry,	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  freelance	  employees	  are	  expected	  to	  work,	  and	  the	  
strategies	  they	  use	  to	  find	  work	  and	  to	  develop	  careers	  in	  film	  and	  television.	  	  Getting	  in	  
to	   the	   industry	   can	   take	   place	   through	   one	   of	   several	   routes.	   	   Full-­‐time	   positions	   are	  
generally	   restricted	   to	   specialised	   suppliers	   and	   services	   directly	   related	   to	   production	  
such	  as	  laboratories,	  locations	  services,	  prop	  and	  wardrobe	  houses	  and	  film	  stock	  houses.	  
In	   the	   Hollywood	   industry,	   however,	   virtually	   all	   positions	   in	   film	   production	   itself	   are	  
now	   freelance.	   One	   author	   advising	   newcomers	   on	   getting	   into	   the	   film	   industry,	   lists	  
amongst	   the	   advantages	   of	   freelance	  work	   ‘the	   opportunities	   to	   choose	   your	   own	   job’	  
and	   ‘to	  work	  when	   you	  want	   to’.	   In	   short	   he	   continues	   ‘being	   a	   freelancer	   gives	   you	  a	  
level	  of	  freedom	  that	  you	  can’t	  have	  when	  you’re	  committed	  to	  a	  full-­‐time	  job’	  (McHugh	  
1999:	  8).	  Evidence	  from	  the	  freelance	  workers	  interviewed	  as	  part	  of	  this	  study	  suggests	  
that,	  in	  practice,	  such	  freedom	  is	  largely	  negated	  by	  the	  difficulties	  experienced	  in	  finding	  
work.	  
A	  text	  aimed	  at	  those	  aspiring	  to	  enter	  the	  US	  entertainment	  business	  emphasises	  
that	  while	  an	  element	  of	  luck	  and	  access	  to	  a	  mentor	  may	  be	  important,	  ‘networking’	  is	  
central	   to	   achieving	   a	   successful	   career	   (Tepper	   1999).	   	   This	   appears	   to	   be	   widely	  
acknowledged	  both	  within	  the	  industry	  and	  amongst	  academic	  observers	  of	  the	  industry.	  
Our	   interview	  subjects	  acknowledged	   the	  centrality	  of	   their	  networks	   to	   their	  ability	   to	  
find	  work;	  
…if	   I’m	  looking	  for	  work	  there’s	  five	  people	  I	  call	  and	  if	  those	  people	  don’t	  know	  
someone	  who	  knows	  something,	  then	  I’m	  in	  trouble…	  (Matt,	  	  First	  AD)	  
A	   wide	   range	   of	   personal	   networking	   strategies	   were	   reported.	   	   Examples,	  
however,	  include;	  always	  having	  resumes	  at	  hand	  and	  keeping	  them	  up	  to	  date,	  or	  ringing	  
up	  contacts	  from	  the	  set	  when	  in	  work,	  rather	  than	  waiting	  to	  be	  out	  of	  work.	  This	  latter	  
strategy	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   a	   way	   of,	   demonstrating	   one’s	   desirability	   as	   an	   employee,	  
indicating	  usefulness	  as	  a	  contact	  who	  may	  have	  ‘inside’	  information	  and	  avoiding	  being	  
seen	  as	  over	  instrumental	  (‘[s]he	  only	  rings	  when	  [s]he	  wants	  something’).	  
The	   importance	   of	   networking	   is	   such	   that	   it	   cannot	   be	   abstracted	   from	   the	  
production	  task	  and	  maintaining	  one's	  network	  and	  seeking	  work	  becomes	  a	  central	  part	  
of	  the	  job.	  The	  following	  respondent	  felt	  it	  was	  the	  job;	  
…finding	  and	  negotiating	  work	  is	  the	  hardest	  part.	  Doing	  the	  work	  is	  the	  
fun.	  Finding	  the	  work	  is	  the	  job.	  	  (Margery,	  script	  supervisor)	  
Despite	   intensifying	   competition	   for	   jobs	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	   changing	  production	  
environment,	   there	   was	   some	   evidence	   from	   the	   study	   of	   increased	   collaboration	  
between	   individuals	   in	   seeking	   and	   securing	   work.	   For	   example	   in	   the	   case	   of	   script	  
supervisors,	  who	   tend	   to	  work	   individually,	   there	   being	   normally	   only	   one	   attached	   to	  
each	  production,	  union	  meetings	  were	  seen	  as	  an	  important	  opportunity	  for	  networking	  
and	  information	  exchange.	  One	  script	  supervisor	  described	  how	  she	  shared	  a	  subscription	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to	  one	  of	  the	  job	  information	  services	  available	  with	  two	  other	  young	  women	  in	  the	  same	  
occupation,	  although	  they	  could	  be	  in	  competition	  for	  the	  same	  vacancies.	  	  
6.i	   Working	  for	  free	  
Those	   taking	   part	   in	   the	   study	  worked	   in	   a	   range	   of	   different	  media	   industries;	  
independent	   and	   feature	   film,	   commercials,	   music	   video	   and	   television.	   The	   routes	  
interviewees	  had	   taken	   into	   the	  business	  were	  equally	  diverse	   and	  are	  not	   explored	   in	  
detail	   in	   this	   chapter	  however,	  no-­‐one	  had	   simply	   fallen	  or	  drifted	   into	   the	  business.	  A	  
strong	  motivation	   to	  make	  a	  career	   in	   the	  entertainment	   industry	  appears	   to	  be	  a	  pre-­‐
condition	  and	  is	  essential	  in	  order	  to	  overcome	  the	  high	  barriers	  to	  entry.	  	  
An	  unusual	  feature	  of	  the	  entertainment	  industry	  is	  that	  individuals	  are	  frequently	  
expected	  to	  work	  without	  payment	  in	  the	  early	  stages	  of	  their	  careers	  (although	  this	  can	  
also	  be	  a	  feature	  of	  ‘getting	  on’	  and	  changing	  roles	  further	  into	  a	  career.	  We	  return	  to	  this	  
in	  a	  later	  section).	  Many	  of	  our	  panel	  reported	  having	  spent	  some	  time	  working	  for	  free	  
or	   for	   ‘deferred	  payment’	   (a	   share	  of	   the	  profits	   if	   the	   film	  makes	  money).	  Additionally	  
whole	   crews	   are	   often	   ‘hired’	   for	   free	   on,	   for	   example,	   low-­‐budget	   independent	  
productions.	   	  While	   such	  a	   crew	   is	   likely	   to	   consist	   largely	  of	   aspirant	  entrants	   it	   is	   the	  
case	  that	  more	  experienced	  crew	  members	  might	  from	  time	  to	  time	  agree	  to	  work	  in	  this	  
way.	   	   This	   might	   happen	   if,	   for	   example,	   they	   are	   not	   currently	   in	   work	   and	   the	  
production	  represents	  an	  opportunity	  to	  network	  with	  new	  talent	  or	  if	  they	  want	  to	  move	  
on	   to	   a	   new	   role	   and	   a	   director	   is	  willing	   to	   allow	   them	   to	   operate,	   for	   example,	   as	   a	  
Director	   of	   Photography	   rather	   than	   Camera	  Operator.	   From	   time	   to	   time	  working	   for	  
free	  might	   constitute	   a	   favour	   for	   a	   friend	   or	   contact	   working	   on	   a	   low	   or	   no	   budget	  
production.	  	  A	  Director	  of	  Photography	  on	  music	  videos	  describes	  a	  dilemma:	  
…one	  director	  I’ve	  worked	  with,	  he	  financed	  his	  own	  little	  DV	  film…	  I	  don’t	  
know	  how	  it	  turned	  out.	  I	  was	  supposed	  to	  shoot	  it	  for	  him,	  but	  at	  the	  last	  
minute	   I	   got	   a	   couple	  of	   jobs	   in	   a	   row.	   So	   it	  was	   like	   ‘sorry’.	   But	   it	  was	  
going	  to	  be	  a	  kind	  of	  freebie	  for	  him.	  I	  can’t	  do	  that	  if	  I	  get	  a	  job.	  You	  help	  
out	  as	  much	  as	  you	  can,	  but	  if	  you	  get	  paying	  jobs	  that’s	  kind	  of	  a	  little	  bit	  
more	  important.	  So	  I	  had	  to	  pull	  away	  from	  him…	  and	  I	  haven’t	  talked	  to	  
him	  since.	  What	  do	  you	  do?...	  (William,	  DOP)	  
However,	   those	   in	   work	   were	   conscious	   of	   the	   growing	   pool	   of	   aspirant	   film	  
workers	  seeking	  entry	  into	  the	  industry,	  many	  coming	  through	  the	  film	  school	  route,	  who	  
were	   prepared	   to	   work	   long	   hours	   for	   free	   or	   for	   ‘copy	   and	   credit’7.	   A	   young	   script	  
supervisor	  felt	  that	  there	  were	  many	  unscrupulous	  producers	  who	  were	  prepared	  to	  take	  
advantage	  of	  this	  situation:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  This	  refers	  to	  the	  practice	  of	  providing	  individuals	  who	  have	  worked	  on	  a	  production	  with	  a	  video	  copy	  of	  
the	  product,	  and	  of	  formally	  acknowledging	  their	  contribution.	  Credits	  are	  an	  important	  legal	  requirement	  
in	   establishing	   entitlement	   to	   a	   share	   of	   any	   profits	   that	  might	   be	  made	   by	   the	   film	  where	   there	   is	   an	  
agreement	  for	  deferred	  payment.	  They	  are	  similarly	  required	  in	  order	  to	  be	  entitled	  to	  ‘residuals’	  (residual	  
or	  supplemental	  payments)	  –	  income	  generated	  when	  a	  work	  is	  reissued	  in	  another	  medium	  (eg	  35mm	  film	  
to	  video	  or	  to	  television)	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…I’ve	  only	  been	  here	   for	  about	   six	  months	  and	   I’ve	  only	  worked	  on	  one	  
feature…	  The	  work	  is	  free	  and	  that’s	  just	  the	  way	  it	  is,	  if	  you	  don’t	  have	  a	  
lot	  of	  experience,	  you	  have	  to	  work	  for	  free	  a	  lot.	  And	  I’ve	  attached	  myself	  
to	  a	  bunch	  of	  different	  projects	  that	  never	  came	  to	  fruition	  and	  it’s	  just	  a	  
lot	   of	   talk,	   a	   lot	   of	   producers	   just	   lying,	   basically	   it’s	   just	   flat	   out	   lying,	  
saying	   ‘oh,	  we’re	  going	   to	  get	   this	  movie	   rolling	   in	   about	  a	  month	  here,	  
we’ll	  keep	  in	  touch	  with	  you,	  you	  know,	  ….………….	  It’s	  all	  free	  work,	  and	  I	  
can	  only	  work	   for	   free	  so	  much,	  yes,	   so	   it’s	  hard	   in	   the	  very	  beginning…	  	  
(Andre,	  script	  supervisor)	  
Internships	  are	  quite	  a	   common	  entry	   route	   to	   the	   industry,	   generally	   through	  
one	   of	   the	   film	   schools,	   and	   take	   the	   form	   of	   a	   short	   unpaid	   apprenticeship.	   	   The	  
purpose	  is	  to	  gain	  practical	  film	  making	  skills.	  	  There	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  general	  recognition	  
that	  skills	  are	  learned	  ‘on	  the	  job’	  and	  that	  the	  formal	  training	  of	  a	  film	  school	  education	  
does	  not	  equip	  graduates	  to	  work	  in	  the	  industry.	  
Others	  had	  begun	  by	  working,	  again	  often	  voluntarily	  for	  film-­‐related	  businesses	  
such	  as	  the	  camera	  rental	  houses	  as	  a	  way	  of	  learning	  about	  the	  equipment	  and	  making	  
contacts	  in	  the	  production	  sector	  itself;	  
…what	   I	   did	  was	   I	  went	   to	   all	   the	   rental	   houses	   here	   in	   Hollywood	   and	  
volunteered	  my	   time,	  which	   is	   the	   great	   secret	   by	   the	  way…	   for	   people	  
who	  want	  to	  get	  into	  the	  film	  business	  …	  and	  I	  was	  lucky,	  I	  hooked	  up	  with	  
some	  very	  nice	  people	  who	  I	  still	  know	  over	  at	  the	  rental	  house…	  	  (Robin	  
Camera	  Operator	  )	  
It	  would	  be	  difficult	  to	  provide	  concrete	  evidence	  that	  working	  for	  free	  is	  on	  the	  
increase	   specifically	   as	   a	   result	   of	   pressures	   on	   the	   industry	   through,	   for	   example,	  
runaway	  production.	  It	  is	  probably	  true	  to	  say	  that	  the	  advent	  of	  working	  without	  pay	  is	  
closely	   related	   to	   structural	   changes	   in	   the	   industry	   that	   came	  about	  as	   a	   result	  of	   the	  
‘virtual	   integration’	  of	   the	  1970s.	   	  As	  apprenticeship	  schemes	  sponsored	  by	   the	  studios	  
declined	  and	  film	  schools	  became	  the	  key	  source	  of	  training,	  gaining	  practical	  experience	  
became	   an	   individual	   responsibility.	   Combined	   with	   this	   the	   development	   of	   the	   low	  
budget	  independent	  production	  may	  provide	  opportunities	  to	  work	  for	  free.	  Having	  said	  
this,	  where	  work	  is	  scarce	  for	  whatever	  reason,	  freelancers	  may	  be	  prompted	  to	  work	  for	  
free	  as	  a	  networking	  strategy:	  
	   …you	  do	  it	  for	  free	  just	  to	  meet	  people,	  which	  is	  what	  a	  lot	  of	  people	  do,	  
and	  I’ve	  actually…	  I’ve	  thought	  about	  it	  when	  it	  gets	  lean,	  you	  know,	  its	  
like,	  well	  maybe	  I	  should,	  just	  to	  get	  on	  the	  set	  and	  see	  people	  and	  make	  
some	  new	  connections…	  (Tudor)	  
6.ii.	   Family	  support	  
In	  many	   cases,	   those	  we	   spoke	   to	   indicated	   that	   sporadic	   work	   in	   the	   industry	  
would	  be	  supplemented,	  or	  even	  sponsored	  by,	  other	  forms	  of	  part-­‐time	  work	  either	   in	  
parallel	   or	   between	   unpaid	   jobs.	   In	   practice	   it	   seems	   unlikely	   that	   any	   form	   of	   regular	  
part-­‐time	   work	   would	   be	   possible	   while	   working	   in	   the	   industry	   given	   the	   long	   and	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irregular	  hours	  worked	  by	  crews	  in	  production.	  For	  the	  majority	  of	  those	  taking	  on	  casual	  
employment	  outside	  of	   the	   industry	   this	  was	   likely	   to	  consist	  of	  bar	  or	   restaurant	  work	  
which	  could	  be	  dropped	  quickly,	  and	  where	  another	  job	  was	  relatively	  easy	  to	  find	  later	  
once	  the	  production	  was	  over.	  
Several	   of	   our	   sample,	   however,	   had	   access	   to	   family	   support,	   suggesting	   that	  
individuals	   from	   wealthier	   backgrounds	   might	   be	   better	   able	   to	   sustain	   themselves	  
through	  periods	  of	  unpaid	  or	  very	  low	  paid	  work;	  
…I	  have	  also	  been	  very	   lucky	   to	  have	  a	  mother	  and	   father	   that	  helped	  
support	  a	  career	   in	  the	  film	  business.	  And	  I	  do	  have	  friends	  that	  are	   in	  
the	   same	   boat.	   And	   its	   one	   of	   the	   things	   that	   unfortunately	   is	   really	  
necessary…	  some	  way	  to	  finance	  the	  time	  that	  you	  have	  here…because	  
you’re	   either	   going	   to	   be	   working	   for	   free	   to	   get	   experience,	   or	   your	  
going	  to	  be	  working	  for	  some	  pay,	  some	  free…	  or	  you’re	  going	  to…	  the	  
bottom	  line	  is…	  going	  to	  drop	  out…	  
The	   following	   interviewee	  was	   fortunate	   to	   be	   able	   to	   supplement	   his	   earned	   income	  
from	  film	  work	  with	  unearned	  income	  from	  investments;	  
…I’m	   gonna	   give	   it	   five	   to	   ten	   years…	   it’s	   called	   paying	  my	   dues…	   and	  
coming	   from	   a	   business	   family,	   I	   never	   like	   having	   all	   my	   eggs	   in	   one	  
basket.	  I’ve	  invested	  a	  lot	  in	  the	  stock	  market.	  I’ve	  done	  things	  so	  I	  have	  a	  
certain	  little	  income	  …	  (Keith,	  Director	  of	  Photography	  )	  
In	   some	  cases	   support	   from	  the	   family	  might	   involve	  direct	  handouts,	   though	   in	  others	  
access	  to	  other	  forms	  of	  paid	  work	  might	  be	  critical.	  In	  one	  case	  a	  young	  script	  supervisor,	  
who	   claimed	   she	   had	   rejected	   financial	   support	   from	   her	   family,	   talked	   of	   having	  
supported	  herself	  with	  a	  part-­‐time	  job.	  	  When	  questioned	  about	  how	  she	  accommodated	  
this	  work	  with	  the	  varying	  demands	  of	   film	  work	  she	  explained	  that	  her	   job	  was	  with	  a	  
relatives	  company	  who	  accepted	  that	   if	  script	  supervision	  work	  had	  become	  available	   it	  
would	  take	  priority.	  	  	  
An	   Independent	   Film	   Director	   at	   an	   early	   stage	   in	   his	   career,	   who	   was	   heavily	  
involved	   in	   producing	   ‘ethical’	   commercials,	   was	   able	   to	   gain	   financial	   backing	   for	   his	  
current	  project	  partly	  as	  a	  result	  of	  having	  family	  contacts	  outside	  of	  the	  film	  industry:	  
…	  to	  be	  honest	  with	  you…	  I’m	  starting	  this	  one	  up	  because	  I	  have	  some	  
investors	  in	  Beverley	  Hills	  and	  in	  New	  York	  that	  are	  going	  to	  help	  me	  out	  
….…my	   dad’s,	   sort	   of,	   business	   associates	   …	   (Chris,	   Independent	   Film	  
Director	  )	  
	   There	   seems	   little	   doubt	   that	   parental	   influence	   has	   always	   been	   an	   important	  
factor	   in	   entering	   film	   careers,	   perhaps	   most	   obviously	   in	   the	   number	   of	   actors	   and	  
actresses	   who	   have	   mothers	   and/or	   fathers	   in	   the	   same	   occupation.	   	   The	   precise	  
dynamics	  of	  this	  process	  are	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  chapter	  but	  we	  can	  speculate	  that	  
this	   is	   likely	   to	   consist	  of	   some	  combination	  of	   the	  availability	  of	   role	  models,	   of	  being	  
brought	   up	  within	   a	   network	   of	   parental	   contacts	   and	   a	  movie	  making	   culture	   and	   of	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location.	   That	   this	   extends	   beyond	   the	   above	   the	   line	   occupations	   is	   indicated	   by	   the	  
comment	  of	  an	  expatriate	  British	  camera	  operator	  who	  referred	  to	  the	  ‘three	  generation	  
camera	   dynasties’	   that	   existed	   in	   LA.	   	   Perhaps	   what	   is	   changing	   is	   the	   importance	   of	  
direct	   parental	   support	   to	   bolster	   aspiring	   entrants	   through	   the	   lean	   times	   early	   in	   a	  
career.	   	   If	   a	   previous	   generation	   of	   entrants	   were	   disadvantaged	   by	   a	   lack	   of	   family	  
background	  in	  the	  industry	  to	  help	  ease	  them	  into	  a	  job	  with	  a	  studio,	  the	  new	  generation	  
have	  the	  double	  disadvantage	  that	  even	   if	  an	  opportunity	  to	  work	  on	  a	  movie	  presents	  
itself	   they	  may	  not	   have	   the	   financial	   support	   to	   carry	   them	   through	   the	   early	   days	   of	  
working	  for	  free.	  
6.iii	   ‘Getting	  on’	  in	  the	  industry	  
Even	   those	  who	  had	  got	   into	   the	   industry	  and	  begun	   to	  make	  a	   living,	   receiving	  
paychecks	  on	  a	  fairly	  regular	  basis,	  may	  be	  forced	  back	  into	  working	  for	  free	  in	  order	  to	  
‘get	  on’,	  that	  is,	  to	  move	  up	  to	  a	  higher	  level	  occupation.	  An	  aspirant	  Director	  comments;	  
…	   I’ve	  been	   [working]	   ‘union’	  as	  an	  actor	   for	  a	   long	   time,	  but	   I’m	   	  kinda	  
starting	  all	  over	  again	  as	  a	  Director,	  where	  I’m	  working	  for	  credits,	  and	  I’m	  
working	   for	   free	   practically.	   I’ve	   only	   been	   paid	   on	   a	   couple	   of	   jobs	  
recently…	   and	   in	   a	   production	   role…	   (Tony,	   Actor/Second	   Assistant	  
Director)	  
	   Once	   again	   the	   pattern	   seems	   to	   be	   that	   in	   order	   to	   acquire	   a	   reputation	   as	   a	  
trustworthy	  crew	  member	  in	  a	  new	  role,	  skills	  have	  to	  be	  acquired	  on	  the	  job	  by	  working	  
for	  a	  low	  rate	  or	  for	  free.	  This	  might	  require	  the	  individual	  to	  go	  back	  to	  working	  in	  low	  
budget/independent	   movies	   where	   in	   addition	   to	   gaining	   experience	   he/she	   can	   also	  
make	   a	   new	   range	  of	   contacts	   and	   join	   new	  networks.	   This	   suggests	   that	   on	   the	  more	  
speculative	   	   projects,	  where	   the	   financial	   risk	   is	   greater	  we	  might	   expect	   to	   find	  more	  
labour	  working	  for	  free.	  A	  camera	  assistant	  explained	  it:	  
…	  I	  moved	  up	  from	  Second	  Assistant	  to	  First	  Assistant,	  it’s	  the	  same	  thing	  
so	  what	  you	  end	  up	  doing	  is	  going	  back	  down	  to	  the	  bottom	  of	  the	  budget	  
range	   and	   you	  work	  with	   people…	   and	   you	   try	   to	   find	   people	  who	   you	  
think	  are	  moving	  up	  themselves…	  (Robin,	  Camera	  Operator)	  
The	  problem	  for	  those	  wishing	  to	  make	  a	  career	  move	  from	  say,	  clapper	  loader	  or	  focus	  
puller	   to	   camera	   operator,	   is	   that	   within	   the	   networks	   an	   individual	   will	   be	   known	   by	  
his/her	   current	   role	  and	  work	  will	   come	   forward	  on	   that	  basis.	  Avoiding	  being	   ‘pigeon-­‐
holed’	   therefore	  means	  having	   to	   refuse	  work	   in	   that	  area	  and	  going	   through	  what	   the	  
following	  respondent	  referred	  to	  as	  a	  ‘starvation	  period’;	  
…you’re	   working	   as	   an	   electrician	   or	   best	   boy	   electric,	   in	   lighting,	   	   and	  
people	  are	  starting	  to	  like	  you	  and	  you’re	  making	  money,	  but	  you	  wanna	  
be	  a	  DP,	  so	  still	  you’re	  shooting	  this	  project	  on	  the	  side,	  and	  the	  problem	  
is,	   the	   more	   you	   work	   as	   an	   electrician	   or	   best	   boy,	   electric,	   or	   Gaffer	  
that’s	   what	   anybody	   who	   meets	   you	   is	   gonna	   remember	   you	   as,	   that	  
position,	  so	  after	  a	  while	  you	  have	  to	  say.’you	  know	  what,	   I	  wanna	  be	  a	  
DP’,	   so	   then	   you	   make	   that	   leap,	   I’m	   only	   doing	   DP,	   so	   there’s	   this	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starvation	  period,	  you	  know,	  where	  you’re	  shooting	  things	  and	  not	  getting	  
paid,	  but	   you	  wanna	   just	  be	  a	  DP,	   and	   if	   you	   can	   last	   that	   some	  people	  
think	   of	   you	   as	   the	   DP…	   so	   you	   get	   to	   the	   point	   where	   you’re	   making	  
money	  doing	  it,	  that’s	  when	  you’ve	  made	  it.	  I	  happen	  to	  be	  in	  a	  starvation	  
period…	  (Keith,	  	  Director	  of	  Photography)	  
The	   implication	   of	   a	   ‘starvation	   period’	   is	   that	   in	   the	   industry	   there	   is	   a	   degree	   of	  
separation	  between	  jobs	  and	  that	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  career	  of	  continuous	  steps	  between	  inter-­‐
related	  activities,	  as	  might	  be	  characterised	  by	  the	  internal	   labour	  markets	  of	  corporate	  
institutions,	  does	  not	  fit.	  There	  are	  clear	  breaks	  between	  jobs	  which	  require	  aspirants	  to	  
go	   back	   to	   square	   one	   and	   acquire	   training,	   experience	   and	   contacts	   often	   by	  working	  
once	  more	   for	   free.	   At	   the	   same	   time	   there	   is	   an	   understanding	   by	   respondents	   that	  
learning	   for	   new	   jobs	   is	   nevertheless	   reasonably	   structured,	   and	   that	   this	   represents	   a	  
temporary	  period	  of	  job	  transition.	  
7.	  Experiencing	  Uncertainty	  	  
7.1	  	   The	  impact	  of	  runaway	  production	  
In	  the	  past,	  as	  production	  moved	  to	  other	  states	  within	  the	  US,	  Los	  Angeles	  based	  
workers	  could	  travel	  from	  project	  to	  project.	  However,	  under	  Canadian	  Immigration	  and	  
union	   rules	   the	  only	   foreign	  occupations	  allowed	   to	  work	   in	   the	   country	  are	  above	   the	  
line;	  directors,	  producers	  and	  stars.	  	  Consequently,	  above	  the	  line	  occupations	  have	  been	  
employed	   to	  manage	   Canadian,	   below	   the	   line,	   crew	   during	   the	   principal	   photography	  
(filming)	   stage.	   A	   young	   Independent	   Film	   Director	   referred	   to	   a	   meeting	   with	  
representatives	  from	  a	  Canadian	  Film	  Commission;	  
…	   they	  were	   like,	   slick,	   they	  were	   like	   serving	   everyone	   coffee,	   and	   you	  
know,	   I	   expected	   a	   foot	   rub	   or	   something,	   that’s	   how	  much	   they	  were	  
kissing	  your	  ass.	  It	  was	  great…	  but	  what	  they’re	  doing	  is	  they	  come	  down	  
here	  and	  they	  tell,	  like,	  independent	  producers	  like	  myself,	  they	  say	  ‘hey,	  
if	   you	   bring	   your	   film	   up	   here	   we’re	   going	   to	   give	   you	   tax	   breaks,	   you	  
know,	   they	   offering	   me	   free	   location	   and	   a	   tax	   break…	   and	   they	   were	  
going	  to	  match	  funds	  for	  my	  film….	  (Sean,	  Independent	  Film	  Director)	  
Interviewees	  were	  asked	  what	  proportion	  of	  the	  previous	  year	  they	  had	  spent	  in	  
work,	   was	   it	   for	   example	   50	   per	   cent	   in	   work	   50	   per	   cent	   looking	   for	   work?	   	   A	   line	  
producer	  felt	  that	  this	  was	  an	  over	  estimate;	  
…it’s	  more	   than	   that,	   it’s	   probably	   60:40	  or	  maybe	  even	  65:35	   looking	  
for	  work	  more	  than	  working,	  it	  really	  is…	  (Todd,	  Line	  Producer	  [13]	  )	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While	   the	   above	   ratio	   seems	   fairly	   typical,	   a	   number	   of	   (below	   the	   line)	  
interviewees	  stated	  that	  they	  and	  their	  peer	  group	  worked	   less	  during	  this	  year	  than	   in	  
previous	  years.	  	  In	  the	  2002	  interview	  round,	  Adam,	  a	  sound	  recordist	  stated	  that	  in	  the	  
20	   months	   since	   his	   last	   interview	   out	   of	   around	   600	   possible	   working	   days	   he	   had	  
worked	  on	  ‘…probably	  100	  of	  them..’.	  
This	   supports	   the	   contention	   (LA	   Weekly	   13.4.99)	   that	   it	   is	   ‘working	   class	  
Hollywood’	  (the	  film	  crews	  and	  support	  services	  such	  as	  equipment	  rental	  and	  catering)	  
that	  is	  being	  hit	  disproportionately	  by	  reductions	  in	  employment	  opportunities.	  A	  camera	  
operator	  commented:	  
…Definitely	  the	  big	  thing	  that	  you’ve	  seen…	  I’ve	  seen	  it	  in	  the	  last	  couple	  
of	   years…	   is	   this	   huge	   and	   increasing	   divide	   between	   the	   fortunes	   of	  
people	  who	  are	  in	  the	  executive	  part	  of	  this	  industry	  and	  people	  who	  are	  
in	  production.	  	  When	  I	  first	  got	  to	  this	  town	  this	  was	  basically	  where	  the	  
executive	   and	  management	   side	   of	   the	   business	  was,	   and	   this	  was	   also	  
the	  centre	  of	  production…	  and	  that	  is	  shifting.	  I	  mean,	  there	  is	  pain	  at	  all	  
levels,	  but	  the	  real	  pain	  is	  on	  the	  production	  end…	  
And	   a	   young	   first	   Assistant	   Director	   was	   having	   second	   thoughts	   about	   staying	   in	   the	  
business:	  
…I’m	   recently	   thinking	  about…	   ‘do	   I	  wanna	   live	  my	   life	   like	   this?’	   as	   I’ve	  
watched	  the	  industry	  decline	  over	  the	  last	  three	  years…	  everyone	  I	  know	  
is	  making	  less	  money	  now	  than	  they	  were	  two	  years	  ago,	  everyone	  I	  know	  
is	  having	  trouble	  finding	  good	  work,	  everyone	  I	  know	  is	  complaining	  that	  
the	  jobs	  have	  gone	  to	  Canada…	  	  	  (Matt,	  First	  AD)	  
A	   Director	   of	   Photography	   with	   nearly	   forty	   years	   experience	   in	   the	   industry,	  
interviewed	  as	  the	  start	  of	  this	  study	  in	  2000,	  commented	  that	  the	  shift	  to	  Canada	  was:	  
…	   terrible,	   it’s	   absolutely	   devastating,	   it	   has	   completely	   removed	   the	  
possibility	  for	  me	  to	  work	  in	  American	  pictures	  for	  the	  last	  year	  and	  a	  half	  
or	   thereabouts……………….it’s	   so	   horribly	   impacted	   now	   that	   the	   really	  
good	   guys	   and	   women	   that	   do	   what	   I	   do,	   they’re	   out	   on	   the	   street	  
looking,	   having	   a	   hard	   time	   getting	   jobs……………it’s	   because	   of	   this	  
migration	  to	  Canada	  and	  other	  foreign	  places	  so….	  and	  it’s	  built	  up	  a	  lot	  of	  
resentment	   to	   widen	   the	   gap	   between	   producers	   and	   below	   the	   line…	  	  
(Peter,	  DOP	  )	  
The	   final	   sentence	   is	  a	   suggestion	   that	   the	  beneficiaries	  of	   runaway	  production	  are	   the	  
production	  companies	  and	  a	  layer	  of	  the	  ‘above	  the	  line’	  creatives.	  	  The	  evidence	  here	  is	  
from	  a	  well-­‐established	  head	  of	  camera	  department	  with	  many	  years	  experience	  and	  a	  
successful	  career	  behind	  him,	  who	  seems	  to	  be	  suggesting	  that	  the	  migration	  of	  work	  is	  
something	  that	  had	  begun	  to	  impact	  on	  him	  over	  the	  previous	  eighteen	  months.	  	  
	   A	  Wardrobe	  Supervisor	  with	  32	  years	   in	  the	   industry	  had	  been	  very	  vocal	   in	  her	  
opposition	   to	   runaway	   production	   during	   a	   first	   interview	   in	   2000	   and	   was	   actively	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involved	  in	  the	  IATSE	  campaign	  to	  promote	  ‘countervailing	  tariffs’	  for	  US	  producers	  taking	  
production	  out	  of	  the	  country.	  She	  felt	  the	  migration	  of	  work	  had	  a	  major	  impact	  on	  jobs	  
in	  her	  trade:	  
…My	   union	   used	   to	   top	   out	   at	   1,000	   people,	   now	   its	   1800	   people,	  
probably	  of	  that	  1800	  800	  do	  what	  I	  do,	  so	  there	  have	  to	  be	  800	  jobs	  for	  
us,	  and	  there	  aren’t…and	  there	  probably	  never	  will	  be	  again,	  because	  of	  
this	  runaway…	  
Asked	  for	  her	  assessment	  of	  	  runaway	  production	  two	  years	  on	  she	  replied:	  
…I	  notice	  it	  more	  now,	  but	  it	  doesn’t	  affect	  me	  as	  much.	  It	  happens…	  so	  
the	   anger	   that	   was	   coming	   out	   a	   couple	   of	   years	   ago	   has	   died	   down	  
quite	  a	  bit	  …	  
She	  continued,	  talking	  about	  runaway	  production	  to	  Australia	  and	  New	  Zealand;	  
…	  they	  have	  enough	  crafts	  people	  in	  New	  Zealand	  and	  Australia	  to	  do	  2	  
or	  3	  huge	  pictures	  a	  year,	  but	   they	  can’t	  support	  an	  entire	   industry,	  a	  
national	  industry	  and	  that’s	  what	  they’re	  finding	  in	  Canada…	  
and	  went	  on	  to	  say	  that	  that	  when	  production	  reports	  come	  out	  they	  often	  showed	  TV	  
pilot	   shows	  being	  produced	   in	  Canadian	   cities	  but	   that	  many	   subsequently	   returned	   to	  
LA;	  
…Talking	  to	  producers	  who	  go	  up	  there	  all	   the	  time,	  they	  are	  doing	  an	  
extra	   day	   of	   production	   because	   unless	   you	   get	   one	   of	   the	   to	   three	  
crews	   in	   Vancouver	   or	   Toronto,	   maybe	   five	   in	   Toronto,	   they’re	   still	  
grabbing	   high	   school	   kids	   for	   the	   bottom	   of	   those	   crews.	   There’s	   so	  
much	  production	  they	  don’t	  have	  the	  trained	  people	  …	  
There	   were	   frequent	   comments	   on	   the	   availability	   of	   appropriately	   experienced	   and	  
qualified	   crew	   in	   Canada	   and	   others	   which	   suggested	   that	   the	   impact	   of	   an	   influx	   of	  
production	  into	  the	  country	  had	  been	  to	  make	  crew	  there	  unwilling	  to	  tolerate	  the	  terms	  
and	  conditions	  accepted	  as	  normal	  by	  the	  Hollywood	  crews.	  	  
7.ii	  	   Strikes	  and	  9/11	  
	   Despite	   concerns	   about	   runaway	   production,	   it	   was	   clear	   that	   this	  was	   not	   the	  
only	  environmental	  factor	  affecting	  the	  ability	  of	  our	  panel	  to	  find	  work.	  Robin,	  a	  camera	  
operator	  who	  was	  trying	  to	  break	  into	  a	  Director	  of	  Photography	  role,	  speaking	  in	  March	  
2002	  talked	  about	  his	  previous	  year’s	  work:	  
	   …I	   started	   getting	   some	   really	   good	   jobs	   as	   an	   operator	   (camera	  
operator).	  Most	  of	  last	  year,	  2001	  was	  really	  taken	  up	  with	  that.	  I	  ended	  
up,	   let’s	   see,	   I	   did	  B	   camera	  on	  Planet	  of	   the	  Apes	  and	   then	   I	   did	   some	  
stuff	   that	  was	  actually	  assisting,	  but	   I	  did	  another	  big	   chunk	  on	  Training	  
Day……….	  Most	  of	   last	   year,	   in	   fact	  all	   of	   last	   year	  was	  operating……that	  
took	  me	   through	   	   I	   guess	   about	   to	   the	   end	   of	   summer	   2001	   and	   then	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everything	   closed	   down	   and	   I’ve	   been	   out	   of	   work	   for	   about	   seven	  
months	  now…	  	  (Robin,	  Camera	  Operator)	  
What	  do	  you	  think	  caused	  the	  drop	  off?	  
Two	  things……	  I	  worked	  virtually	  solidly,	  as	  did	  everybody	  else	  in	  this	  town	  
for	   six	   months	   between	   the	   beginning	   of	   2001	   and	   June,	   because	  
everybody	   was	   rushing	   everything	   they	   could	   find	   into	   production	  
because…	  they	  were	  worried	  about	  the	  SAG	  strike……	  we	  all	  knew	  there	  
was	  going	  to	  be	  a	  fall-­‐off	  after	  that…and	  there	  was,	  basically	  it	  stopped…	  
nothing	   new	   was	   being	   green	   lit…	   they	   had	   actually	   co-­‐ordinated	  
everything,	  so	  that	  everything	  was	  wrapped	  before	  June.	  
He	  continued;	  
…then	   9/11	   happened,	   and	   everybody	   went	   into	   this	   collective	   frenzy	  
about	   “oh	  my	  God,	   is	   the	  public	   going	   to	   accept	  what	  we’ve	  put	  out,	   is	  
everybody	   going	   to	   reject	  buying	  movies	  or	   are	  people	   going	   to	   require	  
completely	  different	  kinds	  of	  movies,	  and	  there	  was	  this	  kind	  of…	  you	  had	  
to	  be	  here…	  total	  collective	  angst….	  
These	  patterns	  were	  confirmed	  by	  other	  panel	  members.	  	  The	  SAG	  (Screen	  Actors	  Guild)	  
commercial	   strike8	  had	  caused	  a	  drop	  off	   in	  work	   for	  many	  with	  no	   involvement	   in	   the	  
making	  of	  commercials	  whatsoever.	  	  There	  was	  a	  belief	  that	  as	  commercial	  work	  dried	  up	  
the	   most	   experienced	   and	   most	   well	   connected	   found	   work	   in	   other	   sectors	   and	   the	  
shake	  down	  effect	  pushed	  the	  less	  experienced	  and	  less	  well	  connected	  to	  the	  margins	  of	  
the	  industry.	  	  This	  worked	  in	  the	  opposite	  direction	  as	  the	  threat	  of	  an	  across	  the	  board	  
SAG	  and	  WG	  (Writers	  Guild)	  strike	  loomed	  towards	  the	  summer	  of	  2001.	  Studios	  strove	  
to	   get	   as	  much	   production	   ‘in	   the	   can’	   as	   possible	   before	   the	   onset	   of	   the	   strike.	   This	  
opened	   up	   opportunities	   for	   crew	   to	  work	  more	   or	   less	   continuously	   and	   for	   some	   to	  
break	  into	  the	  higher	  roles	  they	  aspired	  to.	  	  	  
However,	   the	  events	  of	  September	  11	  2001	  were	   to	  have	   the	  effect	  of	  virtually	   closing	  
down	   the	   industry.	   Several	   reasons	   have	   been	   put	   forward	   as	   to	   why	   this	   happened;	  
studios	  became	  anxious	  about	   the	  sensitivity	  of	  audiences	   to	   the	  messages	  and	   images	  
contained	   in	   their	   output;	   both	   restrictions	   on	   flying	   and	   a	   fear	   of	   flying	   constrained	  
business	  activity	  and	   investors	  became	  more	  cautious	  about	  committing	  capital	   to	  high	  
risk	  projects.	  Virtually	  all	  of	  our	  panel	  of	  interviewees	  commented	  on	  the	  impact	  of	  9/11,	  
from	   increased	  security	  on	   the	   lots	  where	   they	  worked	  which	  slowed	  down	  production	  
activity,	  to	  the	  absence	  of	  opportunities	  for	  employment.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  A	  strike	  by	  members	  of	  the	  Screen	  Actors	  Guild	  working	  in	  advertisements	  over	  residuals	  (royalties).	  	  This	  
was	   seen	   as	   a	   key	   issue	   in	   determining	   compensation	   in	   the	   sector.	   A	   central	   part	   of	   the	   case	   for	   SAG	  
members	  is	  that	  the	  more	  frequently	  an	  advertisement	  is	  shown	  or	  the	  more	  widely	  [for	  example	  when	  it	  
moves	   to	   another	   technology	   platform]	   the	   greater	   the	   degree	   of	   ‘typecasting’	   of	   the	   actor.	   	   This	  might	  
mean	   that	   the	   association	   of	   the	   actor	  with	   a	   particular	   product	   cannot	   be	   overcome	   so	   easily	   and	   the	  
degree	  of	  exposure	  makes	  it	  more	  difficult	  for	  him/her	  to	  find	  follow	  on	  work.	  
	   262	  
7.	  Conclusions	  
This	   chapter	   has	   demonstrated	   the	   importance	   for	   the	   freelance	   entertainment	  
worker	  of	  creating,	  maintaining	  and	  extending	  a	  network	  of	  contacts	  in	  order	  to	  maximise	  
the	  opportunities	   to	  work.	   	  This	   is	   to	  a	  greater	  extent	   (though	  notwithstanding	  the	  fact	  
that	   some	   are	   born	   into	   networks)	  within	   her/his	   control.	   Furthermore,	  we	   have	   seen	  
that	   a	   range	  of	   factors	   outside	  of	   the	   control	   of	   the	   individual	   freelance	  worker	   in	   the	  
entertainment	  industries	  can	  have	  a	  very	  significant	  impact	  on	  his/her	  ability	  to	  find	  work	  
at	  any	  given	  time.	  	  	  
In	  Los	  Angeles	  a	  number	  of	  factors	  are	  combining	  to	   impact	  upon	  the	  nature	  of,	  
and	  prospects	  for,	  work	  in	  the	  US	  (West	  Coast)	  industry.	  While	  technological	  changes	  are	  
having	  some	   impact	  on	  the	  way	  the	   industry	   is	  structured,	  and	  may	  prove	  significant	   in	  
the	   longer	   term,	   of	   more	   immediate	   significance	   is	   the	   tendency	   for	   production	   to	  
‘runaway’	   from	   the	   US	   to	   locations	  where	   state	   incentives,	   lack	   of	   union	   organisation,	  
lower	   wage	   rates	   and	   weaker	   local	   currencies	   are	   having	   the	   effect	   of	   cutting	   costs,	  
sometimes	  considerably.	  	  
There	   is	   considerable	   debate	   about	   the	   precise	   extent	   to	   which	   runaway	  
production	  is	   impacting	  on	  jobs	   in	  Hollywood	  and	  whether	  this	  represents	  a	  permanent	  
and	   critical	   movement.	   Both	   the	   literature	   and	   interviewees	   refer	   to	   productions,	   for	  
example	  TV	  series,	  which	  have	  runaway	  only	  to	  return	  for	  a	  variety	  of	  reasons,	  not	  least	  
because	   of	   a	   shortage	   of	   sufficiently	   experienced	   and	   talented	   labour.	   Nevertheless	  
runaway	   production	   has	   clearly	   been	   felt	   by	   our	   interviewees	   to	   be	   in	   large	   part	  
responsible	  for	  what	  they	  currently	  see	  as	  a	  tightening	  of	  the	  jobs	  market.	  Consequently,	  
while	  Scott’s	   (2005)	  prediction	   that	   runaway	  production	  may	  never	   threaten	   the	   life	  of	  
creative	   above-­‐the-­‐line	   Hollywood	   may	   hold	   out,	   its	   impact	   on	   increasing	   the	   work	  
uncertainty	  of	  below-­‐the-­‐line	  ‘working	  class	  Hollywood’	  seems	  less	  questionable.	  
Respondents	   in	   this	   study	   were,	   then,	   highly	   aware	   of	   the	   continuing	   local	  
problem	  of	  runaway	  production	  and	  the	  impact	  of	  changing	  technologies	  but	  also	  raised	  
the	   more	   immediate	   impact	   of	   strikes	   (or	   even	   anticipated	   strikes),	   or	   unanticipated	  	  
events	   such	   as	   9/11	   on	   the	   jobs	   market	   within	   the	   sector.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   the	   newer	  
entrants	  to	  the	  industry	  there	  is	  little	  direct	  previous	  experience	  with	  which	  to	  compare	  
their	   current	   experiences.	   ‘Getting	   in’	   remained	   a	   matter	   of,	   perseverance,	   active	  
networking,	  family	  background	  and	  support	  and	  last	  but	  probably	  not	  least,	  luck.	  	  	  
Established	   freelance	   film	   employees,	   however,	   were	   experiencing	   difficulty	   in	  
maintaining	  previous	  levels	  of	  employment	  and	  were	  able	  to	  broadly	  quantify	  the	  decline	  
in	  paid	  work.	   	   In	  terms	  of	  ‘getting	  on’	   in	  the	  industry,	  previously	  established	  freelancers	  
reported	   that	   making	   career	   advances,	   in	   effect,	   meant	   going	   through	   a	   ‘starvation	  
period’	  during	  which	  they	  may	  be	  obliged	  to	  work	  for	  free,	  or	  for	  ‘copy	  and	  credit’	  once	  
more,	  often	   in	  the	   independent	  or	   low	  budget	  sector,	  before	  building	  up	  a	  resume	  and	  
profile	  which	  would	  allow	  access	   to	  the	  better	  paid,	  generally	  unionised,	  work	  with	  the	  
majors	   on	   feature	   productions.	   This	   repeated	   process	   which	   may	   be	   experienced	   as	  
stressful	  and	  uncomfortable	  by	  freelancers	  and	  which	  will	  have	  a	  formative	  influence	  on	  
the	   quality	   and	   character	   of	   their	   non-­‐work	   lives	   may	   nevertheless	   present	   itself	   as	   a	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rational	   strategy	   for	   employers	   in	   a	   project	   based	   industry	   characterised	   by	   a	   large	  
surplus	  army	  of	  willing	  labour.	  
The	   long	   run	   effect	   of	   vertical	   disintegration	   of	   the	   film	   business	   and	   its	  
replacement	  by	  a	  virtually	   integrated	   industry	  has	  been	  to	   intensify	   insecurity	   for	  those	  
employed	  on	  a	  freelance	  basis	  and	  this	  has	  a	  major	  impact	  on	  the	  way	  that	  employment	  
is	   experienced	   and	   the	   ways	   that	   lives	   are	   lived.	   As	   Baines	   (1999:21,	   paraphrasing	  
Mariussen	  and	  Wheelock	  1997)	  points	  out:	  	  
	  “…when	   large	  corporations	  have	  delegated	  risk	   further	  down	  the	   line,	  
to	  subcontractors,	  to	  smaller	  firms,	  to	  a	  more	  flexible	  workforce,	  and	  to	  
the	  self-­‐employed,	  the	  overall	  result	  has	  been	  to	  transfer	  a	  business	  risk	  
onto	  the	  household.”	  
The	  reality	  of	  freelance	  work	  is	  demonstrated	  by	  our	  panel.	  Leisure	  becomes	  work	  
as	   ‘seeing	   friends’	  means	   looking	   for	   job	  opportunities;	   the	   family	  becomes	  a	  source	  of	  
continuing	   financial	   support,	   well	   beyond	   the	   years	   of	   higher	   education,	   as	   periods	  
outside	   of	   paid	   employment	   mean	   falling	   back	   on	   parents;	   children	   become	   an	  
unsupportable	  burden	  as	  periods	  in	  work	  mean	  long	  hours,	  and	  periods	  outside	  of	  work	  
mean	   living	  on	  reduced	  streams	  of	   income;	  training	  to	  acquire	  the	  skills	  to	  work	  and	  to	  
move	  on	  in	  a	  rapidly	  changing	  industry	  becomes	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  individual,	  to	  be	  
gained	  more	  formally	  during	  periods	  out	  of	  work	  or	  on	  the	  job	  by	  working	  for	  free	  on	  low	  
or	  no-­‐budget	  productions.	  
Freelance	  working	  in	  the	  US	  entertainment	  industries	  provides	  a	  graphic	  picture	  of	  
the	   insecurity	   and	   uncertainty	   of	   project	   based	   employment	   in	   the	   creative	   industries.	  	  
Nevertheless,	  this	  is	  a	  ‘structured	  uncertainty’	  where	  these	  features	  of	  the	  industries	  are	  
well	  known,	  understood	  and	  to	  a	  great	  extent	  accepted	  as	  a	   fact	  of	  occupational	   life.	   If	  
jobs	   in	   the	   creative	   industries	   are	   seen	   as	   replacing	   more	   traditional	   industries	   and	  
freelance	   working	   replaces	   more	   permanent	   modes	   of	   employment,	   then	   increasing	  
numbers	  of	  workers	  may	  well	   find	  themselves	  shouldering	  the	  burden	  of	  delegated	  risk	  
against	  such	  a	  background	  of	  structured	  uncertainty.	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Appendix	  10:	  P5	  Facing	  the	  digital	  future:	  Digital	  Technology	  and	  the	  Film	  
Industry.	  	  
Industry	   report	   commissioned	   by	   the	   East	   of	   England	   Development	   Agency.	   (with	  
Morawetz:	  7	  citations)	  
	  
As	  indicated	  in	  the	  Table	  of	  Contents,	  this	  Report	  is	  held	  in	  a	  separate	  document,	  with	  the	  
title,	  “P5	  Facing	  the	  digital	  future:	  Digital	  Technology	  and	  the	  Film	  Industry	  2007.”	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Appendix	   11:	   P6	   An	   Emotional	   Business:	   A	   Guide	   to	   Understanding	   the	  
Motivations	  of	  Small	  Business	  Decision	  Makers’.	  	  




This	  paper	  argues	  that	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  UK	  Government,	  operating	  through	  various	  
departments	   and	  quangos,	   approaches	  policy	   implementation	  designed	   to	   improve	   the	  
effectiveness	   of	   the	   small	   business	   sector,	   is	   based	   on	   a	   flawed	   understanding	   of	   how	  
small	   businesses	   actually	   operate.	   	   This	   naïve,	   over-­‐simplistic	   understanding	   of	   the	  
motivation	   of	   those	   in	   the	   small	   business	   sector	   means	   that	   many	   government	  
interventions	   that	   are	   made,	   are	   blunt	   instruments	   destined	   to	   fail,	   given	   the	   limited	  
understanding	  shown	  of	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  small	  business	  market.	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Introduction	  
This	  paper	  is	  in	  four	  parts.	  First	  we	  discuss	  the	  basis	  for	  government	  definitions	  of	  the	  small	  firm	  
and	  its	  market.	  We	  then	  move	  to	  argue	  that	  much	  UK	  government	  intervention	  (especially	  at	  the	  
information	  provision	  level),	  designed	  to	  help	  improve	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  small	  firm	  sector,	  
is	   based	   on	   a	   flawed	   understanding	   of	   how	   small	   firms	   actually	   operate.	   We	   then	   move	   to	  
describing	  how	  this	  naive,	  over-­‐simplistic	  understanding	  of	   the	  motivation	  of	   those	   in	   the	  small	  
firm	  sector	  means	  that	  many	  interventions	  are	  inevitably	  blunt	  instruments	  destined	  to	  fail,	  given	  
the	   limited	   understanding	   shown	   of	   the	   complexity	   of	   the	   small	   firm	   market	   (Bennett	   and	  
Robson,	  1998;	  Keeble,	  1994;	  May	  and	  McHugh,	  1991;	  North	  and	  Smallbone,	  1995;	  Storey,	  1994).	  
Finally,	  we	   offer	   recommendations	   for	   improving	   the	   interventionist	   process,	   based	   on	   leading	  
edge	  qualitative	  research	  (Martin	  and	  Turner,1986).	  
Two	  key	  pointers	  are	  embedded	  within	  the	  various	  parts	  of	  this	  paper.	  These	  are	  based	  on	  
findings	   from	   two	   recent	   studies	   among	   small	   firms;	   a	   series	   of	   large-­‐scale	   qualitative	   studies	  
undertaken	  for	  a	  blue	  chip	  company	  and	  a	  mixed	  study	  on	  the	  Business	  Link	  network.	  First,	   the	  
authors	  will	  demonstrate	  the	  way	  in	  which	  leading	  edge	  qualitative	  research	  is	  able	  to	  burst	  the	  
myth	  that	  small	  businesses	  are	  simply	  scaled	  down	  versions	  of	  large	  enterprises.	  Second,	  we	  will	  
indicate	   how	   such	   research	   is	   able	   to	   capture	   the	   emotion,	   ambiguity	   and	   complexity	   that	  
characterises	  this	  market	  (Stacey,	  1995;	  1996;	  Aram	  and	  Noble,	  1998;	  Dexter	  and	  Smith,	  1991)	  -­‐	  
features	   which	   quantitative	   approaches	   alone	   (and	   any	   intervention	   based	   on	   their	   findings)	  
struggle	  to	  accommodate.	  
These	   observations	   will	   be	   helpful	   to	   those	   -­‐	   both	   in	   commercial	   organisations	   and	  
government	  departments	  and	  quangos	  -­‐	  interested	  in	  making	  effective	  interventions	  in	  the	  small	  
firm	  market	  (Payne	  and	  Skelcher,	  1997;	  Stanworth	  and	  Stanworth,	  1990).	  
Defining	  the	  small	  firm	  market	  	  	  
In	   1970	   the	   government	   of	   the	   day	   formed	   the	   Bolton	   Committee,	   with	   the	   objective	   of	  
examining	  the	  role	  of	  the	  small	  firm	  in	  the	  UK	  economy.	  This	  committee	  was	  established	  despite	  a	  
generally	   held	   view	   that,	   as	   a	   contributory	   factor,	   the	   small	   firm	   was	   of	   little	   significance	   in	  
determining	   the	   nation's	   standing	   on	   the	   world	   economy	   (GLC,	   1983;	   O'Farrall,	   1988;	   Rainnie,	  
1991).	  While	   the	  committee	  did	  not	  suggest	   that	   the	  small	   firm	  was	  otherwise,	   the	   findings	  did	  
raise	  the	  question,	  “what	  then	  is	  the	  role	  of	  the	  small	  firm?”	  
On	   a	   wider	   scale,	   through	   analyzing	   international	   trends	   in	   small	   firm	   activity	   Bolton	  
established	  one	  fact	  in	  particular.	  The	  rate	  of	  market	  share	  (in	  terms	  of	  economic	  activity)	  of	  the	  
small	  firm	  was	  in	  steeper	  and	  faster	  decline	  in	  the	  UK	  than	  in	  other	  developed	  economies:	  
We	  believe	  that	  the	  health	  of	  the	  economy	  requires	  the	  birth	  of	  new	  enterprises	  in	  substantial	  
numbers	   and	   the	  growth	  of	   some	   to	  a	   position	   from	  which	   they	  are	   able	   to	   challenge	  and	  
supplant	  the	  existing	  leaders	  of	  industry.	  We	  fear	  that	  an	  economy	  totally	  dominated	  by	  large	  
firms	  could	  not	  for	  long	  avoid	  ossification	  and	  decay	  .	  .	  .	  This	  ``seedbed”	  function,	  therefore,	  
appears	   to	   be	   a	   vital	   contribution	   of	   the	   small	   firms	   sector	   to	   the	   long-­‐run	   health	   of	   the	  
economy.	   We	   cannot	   assume	   that	   the	   ordinary	   working	   of	   market	   forces	   will	   necessarily	  
preserve	  a	  small	  firm	  sector	  large	  enough	  to	  perform	  this	  function	  in	  the	  future.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (Bolton,	  1971)	  
Ever	   since	   Bolton's	   findings	   were	   reported	   political	   parties,	   academics,	   trade	   bodies	   and	  
lobbyists	  have	  argued	  over	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  sector.	  However,	  social	  scientists	  (in	  particular)	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have	   tended	   to	   concentrate	   on	   the	   macroeconomic	   side	   of	   the	   argument.	   For	   example,	   the	  
impact	  of	  the	  small	  firm	  on	  employment	  levels	  (Storey	  et	  al.,	  1987;	  North	  and	  Smallbone,	  1995),	  
VAT	   receipts	   (Chittenden	   et	   al.,	   1996;	   Deverouz,	   1991;	   Sandford	   et	   al.,	   1989),	   GDP	   and	   export	  
levels	  (Kaufmann,	  1995;	  Storey,	  1982)	  which	   in	  turn	  are	  often	  linked	  directly	  to	  a	  specific	  public	  
policy	   targeted	   at	   the	   small	   firm	  market.	   However,	   recent	   evidence	   (Hill	   and	  McGowan,	   1999)	  
does	  suggest	   that	  small	   firms	  and	  entrepreneurship	  do	  play	  a	  major	   role	   in	   the	  world	  economy	  
(Timmons,	  1994)	  and	  that	  they	  do	  constitute	  the	  bulk	  of	  enterprises	  in	  all	  economies	  in	  the	  world	  
(Storey,	  1994).	  
But,	  what	  do	  we	  actually	  mean	  when	  we	  refer	  to	  the	  small	  firm	  market?	  
Defining	  the	  small	  firm	  
There	  is	  no	  single	  definition	  of	  a	  small	  firm,	  due	  to	  the	  wide	  diversity	  of	  businesses.	  Perhaps	  the	  
best	  description	  of	  a	  small	  firm	  remains	  that	  used	  by	  Bolton,	  which	  suggested	  that,	  a	  small	  firm	  is	  
an	  independent	  business,	  managed	  by	  its	  owner	  or	  part	  owners	  and	  having	  a	  small	  market	  share.	  
In	   turn,	   the	  Bolton	  Report	   adopted	   a	  number	  of	   different	   statistical	   definitions,	   intimating	   that	  
size	  was	  relevant	  to	  sector.	  For	  example,	  a	  firm	  of	  a	  given	  size	  could	  be	  small	   in	  relation	  to	  one	  
sector	  where	  the	  market	  is	  large	  and	  there	  are	  many	  competitors.	  Alternatively,	  a	  firm	  of	  similar	  
proportions	   could	   be	   considered	   large	   in	   another	   sector	   with	   fewer	   (generally	   smaller	   firms)	  
players.	  	  
In	   government	   the	   norm	   has	   been	   to	   measure	   size	   according	   to	   numbers	   of	   fulltime	  
employees	  or	  their	  equivalent.	  Section	  249	  of	  the	  Companies	  Act	  of	  1985	  states	  that	  a	  company	  is	  
“small”	  if	  it	  satisfies	  at	  least	  two	  of	  the	  criteria	  outlined	  in	  Table	  I.	  
For	  statistical	  purposes,	  the	  Department	  of	  Trade	  and	  Industry	  (DTI)	  usually	  works	  with	  the	  
following	  definitions:	  
.	  micro	  firm:	  0-­‐9	  employees;	  
.	  small	  firm:	  0-­‐49	  employees	  (includes	  micro);	  
.	  medium	  firm:	  50-­‐249	  employees;	  
.	  large	  firm:	  over	  250	  employees.	  
However,	   in	  practice,	  DTI	  products	  and	   services	   targeted	  at	   the	   sector	  adopt	  a	  plethora	  of	  
working	  definitions	  depending	  on	  their	  own	  particular	  aims	  and	  objectives	  (Culkin,	  1998).	  It	  is	  not	  
difficult	  to	  see	  the	  potential	  ambiguity	  in	  which	  government	  both	  defines	  and	  measures	  the	  small	  
firm.	  
Nor	  can	  the	  UK	  ignore	  the	  European	  dimension.	  In	  February	  1996,	  the	  European	  Commission	  
adopted	  a	  communication	  setting	  out	  a	  single	  definition	  for	  the	  SME	  (Table	   II).	  The	  Commission	  
sought	   to	  apply	   this	  across	  all	   community	  programmes	  and	  proposals.	   The	  communication	  also	  
included	  a	  (non-­‐binding)	  recommendation	  to	  Member	  States,	  the	  European	  Investment	  Bank	  and	  
the	   European	   Investment	   Fund	   encouraging	   them	   to	   adopt	   the	   same	   definitions	   for	   their	  
programmes.	   The	   communication	   allowed	  members	   to	   use	   lower	   threshold	   figures,	   if	   they	   so	  
wished.	   However,	   existing	   SME	   definitions	   in	   community	   programmes	   were	   allowed	   until	   31	  
December	  1997,	  after	  when	  the	  single	  definition	  came	  into	  force.	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The	  small	  firms	  in	  this	  research	  
The	  results	  are	  based	  on	  findings	  from	  two	  recent	  studies	  among	  small	  firms:	  
(1)	  a	  series	  of	  large-­‐scale	  qualitative	  studies	  undertaken	  for	  a	  blue	  chip	  company;	  	  
(2)	  a	  mixed	  study	  on	  the	  government	  sponsored	  services.	  
The	   research	   for	   a	   major	   UK	   telecommunications	   plc	   included	   the	   running	   of	   eight	   focus	  
groups	   with	   the	   owners	   of	   small	   firms	   right	   across	   the	   country,	   the	   target	   audience	   was	  
segmented	  in	  terms	  of	  turnover	  (starting	  at	  c.	  £50,000	  and	  rising	  to	  over	  £1	  million).	  The	  mixed	  
study	   involved	   users	   and	   non-­‐users	   of	   government	   business	   services	   in	   Government	   Office	  
Eastern	   Region	   (GOER).	   Two	   focus	   groups	   were	   run	   (one	   composed	   of	   eight	   owner/managers	  
with	   no	   experience	   of	   government-­‐sponsored	   services,	   and	   an	   identical	   group	  with	   direct	   (and	  
recent)	  experience	  of	  government	  sponsored	  services);	  this	  was	  followed	  by	  a	  telephone	  survey	  
of	   over	   250	   owner/managers.	   Interviews	   were	   spread	   over	   a	   three-­‐month	   period	   and	   the	  
structured	  interview	  lasted	  on	  average	  15	  minutes.	  
Small	  firms:	  some	  myths	  and	  realities	  
We	  now	  move	  on	   to	  discuss	   the	  way	   in	  which	  many	  UK	  government	   interventions,	  designed	   to	  
improve	   the	  effectiveness	  of	   the	   small	   firm	   sector,	   is	   based	  on	   a	   flawed	  understanding	  of	   how	  
small	   firms	  actually	  operate	   and	  what	  motivates	   them	   to	   act	   in	   the	  way	   that	   they	  do.	   Figure	  1	  
shows	   some	   of	   the	   range	   of	   services	   offered	   by	   government,	   we	   categorise	   these	   services	   as	  
either	   shallow	   or	   deep	   (targeted	   solely	   at	   an	   individual	   or	   intrafirm)	   and	   short	   and	   long	   (over	  
time).	  
It	   is	   interesting	   to	  note	   that	  while	   the	  TCS	  programme	  was	   first	   introduced	   in	  1973,	   it	   has	  
taken	  until	   the	   publication	  of	   the	   government's	  white	   paper	   (DTI,	   1998)	   on	   competitiveness	   to	  
recognise	  that	  this	  deep	  intervention	  is	  extremely	  successful.	  A	  two-­‐year	  partnership	  between	  a	  
graduate,	  a	  university	  and	  a	  small	  firm,	  in	  part	  subsidized	  by	  the	  DTI	  (among	  others)	   is	  probably	  
the	  sharpest	  instrument	  in	  the	  interventionist	  toolkit	  and	  is	  set	  to	  double	  in	  size	  under	  this	  new	  
administration.	   Unfortunately,	   the	   Trade	   and	   Industry	   Minister	   accredited	   with	   this	   foresight	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resigned	  within	  weeks	  of	  the	  paper's	  publication.	  
	  
As	  we	  go	  down	  the	  scale	  of	  size,	  the	  number	  of	  businesses	  rises	  rapidly	  (DTI,	  1997).	  However,	  
subtle	   complications	   in	   the	   small	   business	   sector	   make	   life	   even	   harder	   for	   the	   budding	  
interventionist.	   Specifically,	   small	   businesses	   simply	   do	   not	   behave	   in	   the	   same	   way	   as	   larger	  
organisations.	   Larger	   organisations	   are	   inherently	   more	   complex	   in	   their	   structure,	   their	  
organisation	   and	   the	   level	   of	   departmentalisation	   and	   specialization	   within	   the	   company.	   This	  
leads	  to,	  on	  the	  surface,	   increasingly	  complex	  decision-­‐making	  criteria.	  However,	  although	  small	  
firms	   may	   be	   regarded	   in	   one	   very	   valid	   sense	   as	   relatively	   ``simple”	   units	   in	   terms	   of	   their	  
attitude,	  behaviour	  and	  decision-­‐making,	  they	  have	  complexities	  of	  their	  own.	  	  
Classic	   business-­‐to-­‐business	   understanding	   claims	   that	   in	   any	   particular	   organization	   there	  
will	  be	  a	  range	  of	  individuals	  involved	  in	  a	  purchase	  decision	  (Hague,	  1993).	  These	  can	  range	  from	  
``key	  influencers”,	  to	  ``gate	  keepers”	  of	  information,	  to	  ``purchasing	  specialists”,	  and	  so	  on,	  up	  to	  
a	  final	  decisionmaker	  who	  will	  sign	  off	  a	  purchase.	  But	  equally,	  this	  varies	  widely	  by	  the	  size	  of	  the	  
organisation	  under	   consideration.	  While	  a	   typical	   corporate	   customer	  may	  very	  well	   operate	   in	  
this	  mode,	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  small	  business	  decision-­‐making	  unit	  is	  essentially	  the	  owner/manager,	  
and	   it	   is	   this	   owner/	   manager	   position	   that	   raises	   several	   layers	   of	   complexity	   for	   the	  
interventionist.	   As	   a	   business	   grows,	   typically	   the	   first	   step	   will	   be	   for	   other	   directors	   of	   the	  
business	   to	   become	   involved	   in	   decision-­‐making.	   This	   may	   then	   lead,	   with	   increasing	   size,	   to	  
tactical	  relationships	  being	  undertaken	  at	  departmental	  level.	  Specialist	  managers	  then	  come	  into	  
play	  as	   the	  business	  evolves	   through	  a	  sufficient	   level	  of	  size	  and	  complexity,	  as	  can	  be	  seen	   in	  
Figure	  2.	  
In	   this	   way	   one	  may	   think	   it	   would	   be	   reasonable	   to	   make	   two	   basic	   assumptions	   about	  
smaller	   businesses.	   First,	   they	   are	   relatively	   simple	   in	   structure.	   Second,	   very	   few	   individuals	   -­‐	  
usually	   -­‐	   are	   involved	   in	   decision-­‐making.	   Third,	   their	   needs,	   technically	   speaking,	   are	   more	  
straightforward	  than	  those	  of	  a	  larger	  business.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  small	  firm	  can	  be	  treated	  as	  a	  neat	  
rational	  economic	  unit	   (Swartz	  and	  Boaden,	  1997).	  Therefore,	  the	  market	  ought	  to	  be	  relatively	  
simple	  to	  research	  and	  straightforward	  to	  market	  to	  (in	  terms	  of	  intervention	  processes).	  In	  fact,	  
the	  reverse	  is	  true.	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Larger	   businesses	   may,	   indeed,	   have	   more	   complex	   decision-­‐making	   units	   with	   diverse	  
personnel	   involved,	   various	   influences	   on	   purchase	   decisions,	   and	   so	   on.	   But	   it	   is	   true	   that	   in	  
larger	  businesses,	  decision	  making	  is	  taken	  in	  a	  structured,	  hierarchical	  way	  around	  defined	  roles	  
for	   those	   involved	   in	   the	   decision.	   Thus,	   although	   the	   structure	   of	   the	   organisation	   and	   its	  
decision-­‐making	   units	   may	   be	   complex,	   attitudes	   and	   behaviour	   will	   often	   tend	   to	   be	   more	  
``rational”.	  So	  although	  many	   individuals	  may	  be	   involved	   in	  a	  particular	  decision,	   the	  way	  they	  
process	  information	  (Betts-­‐Grey	  and	  Edwards,	  1997),	  build	  attitudes,	  and	  take	  decisions	  could	  be	  
arguably,	  in	  itself,	  more	  straightforward	  (Brown,	  1996;	  Andrews	  and	  Smith,	  1996).	  
Smaller	   businesses	   -­‐	   although	   they	   have	   simple	   structure	   -­‐	   often	   exhibit	   highly	   complex	  
attitudes	   and	   behaviours.	   First,	   of	   course,	   there	   is	   an	   alarming	   variety	   of	   small	   firms	   who	   are	  
particularly	  difficult	   to	   categorise.	   Second,	   they	  will	  often	  be	   “personality	  driven”	   in	  a	  way	   that	  
larger	  organisations	  are	  not.	  In	  other	  words,	  understanding	  the	  context,	  attitudes	  and	  behaviour	  
of	   the	   individual	   small	   businessperson	   becomes	   equally	   as	   important	   as	   understanding	   their	  
business.	   For	   example,	   one	   respondent	   in	   research	   (a	   group	   discussion	   among	   small	   firm	  
owner/managers)	  asked	  the	  question:	  
I	  work	  long	  hours,	  day	  in	  day	  out,	  in	  what	  this	  government	  thinks	  is	  a	  ``not	  cool”	  industry	  but	  I	  
supply	  a	  couple	  of	  blue	  chip	  companies	  who	  don't	  have	  many	  other	  places	  to	  go	  .	  .	  .	  so	  who's	  
the	  important	  one	  in	  this	  relationship	  and	  when	  will	  they	  [the	  DTI]	  recognise	  my	  value	  in	  all	  of	  
this?	  
Three	  further	  quotes	  from	  the	  group	  discussions	  reveal	  the	  anxiety	  felt	  by	  many	  in	  this	  position:	  
If	  the	  DTI	  really	  understood	  what	  the	  world	  was	  really	  like	  they	  wouldn't	  send	  me	  a	  bunch	  of	  
failed	  consultants	  to	  advise	  me	  on	  how	  to	  run	  my	  life.	  
They	  [the	  DTI]	  think	  all	  we	  have	  to	  do	  is	  turn	  up	  to	  a	  seminar,	  fill	  in	  an	  application	  form	  for	  a	  
such	  and	  such	  award	  and	  we'll	  be	  world	  class	  companies	  .	  .	  .	  as	  if	  .	  .	  .	  
I	  was	  on	  the	  verge	  of	  a	  major	  breakthrough	  with	  a	  new	  line	  when	  the	  bank	  put	  the	  squeeze	  
on	   .	   .	   .	  had	   I	  been	  Glaxo	   I	  bet	  they	  wouldn't	  have	  thought	  there	  was	  a	  problem	  .	   .	   .	   the	  DTI	  
were	  also	  nowhere	  to	  be	  seen	  
	  This	   represents	  a	  particularly	  awkward	  barrier	   to	  overcome	   in	   terms	  of	  generating	  a	  bond	  
and	   a	   relationship	   between	   government	   (and	   large	   companies)	   and	   small	   firm	   customers.	  
Without	   an	   appreciation	   for	   the	  personality	   involved,	   the	   intervention	  process	  with	   its	   rational	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pursuit	  of	  all	  things	  ``world	  class”	  will	  remain	  in	  exile	  in	  the	  small	  firm	  community.	  To	  understand	  
the	   small	   firm,	   government	   interventions	   must	   place	   significantly	   more	   emphasis	   on	  
understanding	  the	  context,	  and	  the	  individual	  person	  who	  is	  the	  decision	  maker.	  
Contextualising	  the	  small	  firm	  operation:	  happy	  families	  
This	   simplistic	  understanding	  of	   the	  motivation	  and	   complexity	  of	   those	   living	   in	   the	   small	   firm	  
sector	  leaves	  government	  intervention	  in	  danger	  of	  remaining	  the	  blunt	  instrument,	  destined	  to	  a	  
life	   on	   the	  bookshelf	   rather	   than	   a	   force	   in	   the	  boardroom.	   In	  understanding	   small	   businesses,	  
interventionists	  therefore	  need	  to	  first	  take	  into	  account	  some	  key	  contextual	  issues.	  
The	  first	  is	  about	  ownership.	  Unlike	  decision	  makers	  in	  many	  larger	  organisations,	  our	  small	  
firm	   decision	   makers	   often,	   if	   not	   usually,	   are	   owner/managers	   and,	   as	   has	   been	   seen,	   the	  
business	   is	   inextricably	   tied	   up	   with	   their	   life	   and	   identity.	   Thus,	   while	   managers	   in	   large	  
organisations	  have	  responsibilities,	  small	  businessmen	  literally	  own	  any	  decisions	  that	  they	  take.	  
My	  youngest	  son	  thinks	  we	  should	  be	  going	  onto	  the	  World	  Wide	  Web	   .	   .	   .	  every	  night	   this	  
week	  it's	  been	  ``when	  are	  you	  going	  to	  get	  on	  the	  'net,	  dad?”	  
	  The	  second	  contextual	   issue	   is	  the	  fact	  that	   in	  a	  small	   firm	  there	   is	   frequently	  no	  place	  for	  
specialists.	  Certainly	  small	  firms	  may	  take	  advice	  and	  soundings	  from	  outside	  their	  organisation,	  
but	   it	   is	   rare	   that	   they	   have	   the	   resource	   or	   the	   expertise	   to	   take	   complex	   technical	   decisions	  
through	   a	   specialist	   channel	   (Darby,	   1997).	   The	   small	   firm	   owner/manager	   will,	   unlike	   his	  
counterpart	   in	   a	   larger	   organisation,	   need	   to	   be	   taking	   decisions	   about	   banking,	   technology,	  
communications,	   credit	   facilities,	  office	  equipment,	  whether	   to	  buy	  a	  new	   radio	   for	   the	   factory	  
floor,	   to	   the	   kind	   of	   stationery	   to	   order	   (Brooksbank,	   1996).	   Recruitment	   alone	   is	   a	   major	  
headache	  for	  many	  small	  firm	  owners	  as	  our	  research	  uncovered:	  
I	  lose	  sleep	  over	  getting	  wrong	  again	  .	  .	  .	  I	  promised	  people	  in	  the	  office	  I'd	  get	  someone	  in	  to	  
help	  .	  .	  .	  within	  six	  weeks	  they	  had	  caused	  so	  much	  unrest	  I	  had	  to	  let	  them	  go	  .	  .	  .	  I'm	  getting	  
in	  a	  Feng-­‐Shui	  expert	  next	  week	  to	  try	  and	  help	  create	  some	  harmony	   in	   the	  office	   .	   .	   .	  you	  
can't	  realise	  the	  effect	  this	  has	  on	  me	  .	  .	  .	  
The	  next	  contextual	  issue	  is	  that	  small	  firms	  -­‐	  through	  the	  intensity	  of	  their	  involvement	  with	  
the	  business	  -­‐	  as	  identified	  in	  our	  two	  research	  projects,	  regularly	  fall	  back	  on	  the	  argument	  that	  
they	  are	  unlike	  any	  other	  company.	  This	  idiosyncratic	  view	  of	  the	  world	  means	  that	  they	  are	  often	  
unable	  to	  deal	  with	  broader	  concepts	  that	  might	  affect	  ``all	  small	  firms”,	  i.e.	  they	  tend	  to	  fall	  back	  
on	   specific	   examples	   from	   their	   own	   experience	   (Crant,	   1996;	   Nielsen,	   1997	   and	   Wright	   and	  
Ashill,	   1998).	   Thus,	   small	   firms	   often	   exhibit	   what	   we	   call	   the	   ``Alamo	   syndrome”,	   an	   intrinsic	  
suspicion	   of	   all	   large	   ``monolithic”	   suppliers;	   these	   firms	   are	   fighting	   in	   a	   hostile	   world	   where	  
everybody	  is	  against	  them.	  Thus	  we	  might	  characterise	  the	  spectrum	  as	  shown	  in	  Figure	  3:	  at	  the	  
large	  end,	  complex	  DMUs	  inhabited	  by	  the	  ``men	  in	  black';	  at	  the	  small	  end,	  the	  mass	  market	  of	  
personally	  driven	  “Xfilers”.	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As	  one	  of	  our	  respondents	  (only	  half	  tongue-­‐in-­‐cheek)	  suggested:	  
Just	  because	  I'm	  paranoid	  doesn't	  mean	  that	  they're	  not	  out	  to	  get	  me!	  
	  We	  suggest	  this	  means	  that	  understanding	  small	  businesses	  is	  very	  rarely	  a	  straightforward	  
task;	  from	  the	  small	  firm	  perspective,	  how	  can	  a	  very	  large	  organization	  (like	  a	  high	  street	  bank	  or	  
a	  government	  department)	  really	  understand	  what	  it	  is	  like	  to	  run	  a	  small	  business?	  
How	  can	  they	  [the	  DTI]	  possibly	  understand	  my	  needs?	  
However,	   although	   they	   often	   describe	   themselves	   as	   operating	   on	   their	   own	   in	   a	   “cruel	  
world”,	   small	   firms,	   as	   we	   confirmed,	   have	   an	   extensive	   support	   and	   information	   network	  
(Bennett	  and	  Robson,	  1998;	  Dibb,	  1997),	  which	  may	  include:	  
• Professionals,	  such	  as	  accountants,	  solicitors,	  financial	  advisers,	  and	  so	  on.	  
• Their	  peer	  group,	  other	  small	  businesses	  operating	  in	  the	  area.	  
• Their	  suppliers,	  whether	  large	  or	  small.	  
• Their	  staff	  	  (in	  cases	  where	  they	  have	  staff).	  
• Their	  customers.	  
• Interestingly,	   their	   competitors	   	   (a	   surprising	   amount	   of	   dialogue	   goes	   on	   between	   small	  
businesses	  that	  are	  actually	  in	  competition	  with	  one	  another	  in	  a	  particular	  area).	  
• Contacts	  from	  their	  personal	  life:	  friends,	  relatives,	  acquaintances,	  and	  so	  on.	  
It	   is	  encouraging	  to	  note	  that	  support	   for	   these	  general	   insights	  exists	   from	  other	  European	  
countries	   -­‐	   for	   example	   Nielsen	   (1997),	   in	   an	   unpublished	   presentation	   at	   a	   recent	   seminar,	  
reviewed	  the	  Danish	  Technology	  Institute's	  experience	  of	  work	  in	  this	  area,	  saying:	  
SMEs	   need	   the	   same	   level	   of	   knowledge	   and	   technology	   as	   large	   corporations,	   but	   their	  
capacity	   to	   receive	  and	  adapt	   is	  weak	   .	   .	   .	   they	  perceive	   themselves	  as	   lone	  wolfs	  but	   learn	  
best	  with	  other	  companies.	  
Interestingly,	  a	  recent	  ESRC	  sponsored	  survey	  of	  SMEs	  revealed	  that	  38	  per	  cent	  had	  sought	  
business	   advice	   from	  business	   friends	   /	   relations.	   This	   compared	   to	   27	  per	   cent	   seeking	   advice	  
from	   Business	   Links	   and	   23	   per	   cent	   talking	   to	   Chambers	   of	   Commerce	   (Bennett	   and	   Robson,	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1998).	  All	  of	   these	  contextual	   influences	   (friends	  and	  families)	  will	  play	  a	  supporting	  role	  where	  
complex	  decisions	  need	  to	  be	  taken.	  Tony	  Blair	   is	  a	  well	  known	  advocate	  of	  e-­‐commerce	  but	  no	  
doubt	  it	  will	  be	  the	  children	  of	  owner/	  managers	  who	  push	  their	  parents	  into	  the	  Net.	  
The	  business/personal	  overlap	  
For	   the	   small	   businessperson,	  work	   subsists	   at	   the	   boundary	   between	   their	   business	   and	   their	  
personal	  life	  (see	  Figure	  4).	  All	  money	  in	  the	  business	  belongs	  to	  them,	  and	  they	  control,	  in	  many	  
cases,	  a	  steady	  income.	  Their	  income	  is	  inextricably	  related	  to	  the	  ebbs	  and	  flows	  of	  business.	  In	  
many	  cases,	  they	  will	  identify	  with,	  and	  be	  identified	  with,	  their	  business	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  not	  true	  
in	  a	   larger	  organisation.	  Equally	   important,	  and	  set	  against	   this	  backdrop,	  we	  must	  be	  aware	  of	  
the	  boundaries	  between	  what	  constitutes	  their	  job	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  their	  lives.	  
	  
Small	   firms	   (and	   as	   a	   consequence	   the	   owners	   own	   personality)	   suffer	   from	   a	   range	   of	  
conflicting	   pressures,	   which	   although	   to	   some	   extent	   also	   affect	   decision	   makers	   in	   larger	  
organisations,	  impact	  significantly	  less	  strongly	  in	  understanding	  buyer	  behavior	  (Culkin	  and	  Cox,	  
1997;	  Simons	  and	  Davila,	  1998).	  The	  pressures	   that	  exist	   in	   the	  world	  of	   small	   firms	  mean	  they	  
have	   to	  be	   flexible;	   to	  meet	  customer	  demands	   they	  often	  do	  not	  differentiate	  between	  “work	  
time”	  and	  “personal	  time”.	  In	  many	  cases,	  they	  feel	  they	  have	  to	  be	  available	  to	  their	  customers	  
at	  all	   times.	  Of	  course,	   in	  many	  cases,	   they	  do	  not	  have	  others	  to	  delegate	  to,	  and	  do	  not	  have	  
back-­‐up	  to	  the	  main	  people	  involved	  in	  the	  business	  (Li,	  1997).	  
Letting	   off	   steam	   in	   the	   office	   was	   good	   therapy	   when	   I	   worked	   for	   Company	   A	   (a	   large	  
multinational),	  but	  it’s	  just	  not	  an	  option	  these	  days.	  
But	   at	   the	   same	   time,	   it	   is	   true	   that	   -­‐	   emotionally	   -­‐	   many	   small	   businesses	   would	   like	   to	  
separate	  the	  world	  of	  work	  and	  the	  world	  of	  leisure.	  Like	  everybody	  else,	  they	  have	  families;	  like	  
everybody	  else	  they	  are	  looking	  for	  a	  balance.	  They	  can	  feel	  trapped	  by	  their	  business,	  not	  always	  
finding	  it	  a	  joy.	  
Understanding	  the	  immediate	  family	  ties	  
While	  acknowledging	  that	  various	  approaches	  can	  be	  taken	  to	  segment	  the	  small	  firm	  market,	  it	  is	  
the	  authors'	  view	  that	  there	  exists	  a	  number	  of	  value-­‐based	  segments	  which	  are	  almost	  universal	  
in	  their	  application	  to	  this	  market;	  segments	  that	  policy	  makers	  interested	  in	  opening	  a	  dialogue	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with	  the	  small	  firm	  sector	  would	  do	  well	  to	  acknowledge:	  
• The	  undisputed	  head	  of	   the	  household	  Difficult,	   self-­‐important,	  often	  aggressive	   individuals.	  
These	   small	   businesses	   really	   see	   themselves	   battling	   against	   the	   odds.	   It	   is	   the	   Alamo	  
syndrome	  writ	   large.	   They	   usually	   have	   an	   exaggerated	   view	   of	   their	   own	   capabilities	   in	   a	  
business	  sense.	  Most	  of	  them	  seem	  to	  be	  labouring	  under	  the	  illusion	  that	  they	  are	  running	  
ICI.	  They	  are	  often	  easily	  irritated	  by	  what	  they	  perceive	  as	  the	  failure	  of	  large	  suppliers,	  and	  
indeed	  customers,	  to	  recognise	  their	  abilities,	  visit	  them,	  give	  them	  their	  due,	  etc.	  
• Married	  under	  sufferance.	  The	  second	  type	  tends	  to	  dwell	  exclusively	  on	  the	  hardships	  rather	  
than	   the	  motivations	   and	   joys	   of	   business	   life.	   They	   are	   highly	   introspective	   types	  with	   an	  
inward	   focus.	  When	  you	  ask	   them	  for	   their	  priorities,	  no	  matter	  what	   the	  subject,	   they	  are	  
mainly	  concerned	  with	  reducing	  costs,	  avoiding	  risks,	  and	  defending	  an	  entrenched	  position.	  
They	   are	   not	   outwardly	   oriented.	   They	   have	   a	   very	   limited	   appetite	   for	   new	   marketing	  
opportunities	   and	   change	   generally.	   If	   the	   business	   is	   struggling,	   it	   will	   tend	   to	   be	   due	   to	  
factors	  that	  they	  perceive	  to	  be	  beyond	  their	  control.	  
• DIY	  husbands.	  	  What	  we	  call	  the	  DIYers	  are,	  in	  fact,	  extremely	  expert	  in	  the	  nuts	  and	  bolts,	  the	  
practicalities	  of	  their	  core	  skills	  -­‐	  the	  “doing”	  part	  of	  the	  business.	  But	  they	  do	  tend	  to	  have	  
very	   limited	   business	   and	   financial	   skills.	   They	   are	   often	   rather	   unworldly	   and	   get	   by	   on	  
instinct	  and	  luck.	  They	  often	  do	  not	  see	  themselves	  really	  as	  businessmen	  or	  entrepreneurs,	  
and	  they	  will	  tend	  to	  lack	  confidence	  in	  business	  matters.	  
• Enlightened	   partners.	   	   By	   contrast,	  what	  we	   call	   the	   enlightened	  partners	  will	   take	   a	  much	  
more	  progressive,	  outward	  position	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  their	  business.	  Usually	  they	  are	  entrepreneurial	  
types	   who	   are	   keen	   to	   market	   and	   develop	   their	   business,	   expand	   into	   new	   areas,	   find	  
different	  USPs	   for	   their	   customers,	   and	   so	   on.	  We	  usually	   find	   that	   they	   are	   relatively	  well	  
educated	   and	   often,	   interestingly,	   have	   previously	   been	   senior	   employees	   in	   larger	  
organisations.	  	  
Typically,	  the	  DIYers	  and	  the	  married	  under	  sufferance	  types	  highlighted	  in	  our	  research	  came	  
to	  business	  for	  one	  of	  the	  following	  reasons:	  
• Family	  tradition.	  
• Could	  not	  think	  of	  anything	  else	  to	  do.	  
	  
The	  enlightened	  partner,	  by	  contrast,	  was	  highly	  motivated	  and	  skilled	  at	  business	  in	  general,	  
as	  well	  as	  their	  core	  craft:	  
• Married	  with	  a	  roving	  eye.	  	  Many	  small	  businessmen	  claim	  to	  work	  all	  hours	  that	  God	  sends.	  
However,	  the	  lifestyler	  is	  quite	  different.	  His	  emphasis	  is	  simply	  to	  do	  enough	  work	  to	  pay	  for	  
the	  lifestyle	  that	  he	  wants	  and	  then	  stop.	  So	  in	  contrast	  with	  many,	  being	  a	  businessman	  does	  
not	  necessarily	  define	  this	  person's	   identity.	   It	   is	  merely	  a	  tool	  to	  generate	  an	  income	  and	  a	  
lifestyle.	  In	  reality,	  this	  means	  that	  although	  they	  may	  pay	  lip	  service	  to	  competitive	  pressures	  
and	  the	  stresses	  of	  running	  a	  small	  business,	  they	  will	  tend	  to	  avoid	  challenges	  until	  this	  has	  a	  
direct	  effect	  on	  their	  ability	  to	  live	  in	  the	  way	  that	  they	  want	  to	  live.	  
Understanding	   the	   psychographics	   and	   motivations	   of	   the	   small	   firm	   owner/manager	  
therefore	  becomes	  crucial;	  especially	   in	   the	  case	  of	   the	  policy	  maker	  who	   is	   responsible	   for	   the	  
investment	   of	   not	   inconsiderate	   amounts	   of	   public	   funds	   in	   an	   effort	   to	   improve	   the	  
competitiveness	  of	  firms	  operating	  in	  this	  sector.	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Establishing	  the	  framework	  for	  helpful	  interventions	  in	  the	  small	  firm	  community	  
In	   our	   experience,	   therefore,	   in	   attempting	   to	  open	   a	   dialogue	  with	   the	   small	   firm	  market	   one	  
should	   take	   a	   dual	   approach	   (Culkin	   et	   al.,	   1999).	   Thinking	   purely	   of	   the	   business	   side	   of	   that	  
overlap,	  any	  interventionist	  (public	  or	  private	  sector)	  will	  always	  need	  to	  understand	  what	  is	  the	  
nature	  of	  the	  business	  in	  the	  usual	  (rational)	  sense	  (de	  Ruyter,	  1996;	  Denis	  et	  al.,	  1997;	  Zaltman,	  
1997)	  (see	  Figure	  5):	  
	  
• Its	  turnover?	  
• How	  many	  employees	  does	  it	  have?	  
• What	  technology	  is	  in	  place	  and	  what	  are	  the	  plans	  for	  technology?	  
• What	   kind	  of	   customer	  base	  does	   it	   have	   -­‐	   is	   it	   a	   high	   street	   business	  with	  many	   transient	  
customers,	  or	  does	  it	  rely	  on	  a	  few	  large,	  regular	  customers?	  
• Is	  it	  growing	  or	  shrinking?	  
But	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  there	  needs	  to	  be	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  personal	  perspective	  of	  the	  
small	  businessman	  (Steyaert,	  1997),	   it	   is	  often	  their	  business	  after	  all.	   Issues	  that	  can	  affect	  the	  
way	   that	   the	   small	   firm	   takes	   decisions	   -­‐	   particularly	   with	   regard	   to	   communications	   and	  
marketing	  -­‐	  include:	  
• Age.	  
• Gender.	  
• Their	  level	  of	  educational	  attainment.	  
• Their	  previous	  employment	  -­‐	  were	  they	  involved	  with	  a	  large	  company	  and	  decided	  to	  set	  up	  
on	  their	  own,	  or	  have	  they	  always	  been	  self-­‐employed?	  
• Their	   general	   attitudes	   -­‐	   small	   businessman	   are	   notoriously	   cautious	   but	   clearly	   some	   are	  
more	  at	  the	  early	  innovator	  end	  of	  the	  spectrum	  than	  others.	  
• Their	  business	  philosophy	  -­‐	  inward	  or	  outward	  focused?	  
• How	  do	  they	  manage	  their	  time,	  particularly	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  overlap	  and	  space	  between	  work	  
and	  play?	  
Overlaid	  on	  this,	  we	  often	  find	  broad	  themes	  about	  the	  vision	  and	  culture	  of	  the	  business.	  The	  
first	  relates	  to	  the	  kind	  of	  management	  style	  that	   is	   in	  place	  within	  the	  company	  -­‐	  which,	  as	  we	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have	  demonstrated,	  can	  range	  from	  the	  rational	  to	  the	  emotional.	  Second,	  what	  are	  the	  goals	  for	  
the	  firm?	  It	   is	  possible	  to	  classify	  some	  of	  the	  issues	  discussed	  above	  into	  a	  range	  of	  categories.	  
There	  are	  those	   issues	  that	  a	  customer	  will	   tell	  us	  are	   important	   in	  an	  overt	   (rational)	  way,	  and	  
then	  there	  are	  those	  issues	  which	  seem	  to	  have	  a	  greater	  or	  lesser	  impact	  on	  their	  overall	  warmth	  
towards	  a	  particular	  supplier	  (covert,	  or	  sub-­‐rational	   issues).	  This	  may	  not	  be	  expressed	  in	  quite	  
the	  same	  way.	  So	  we	  have	  developed	  a	  view	  of	  issues	  that	  revolves	  around	  plotting	  key	  attributes	  
of	  a	  supplier	  along	  the	  overt	  and	  covert	  importance	  dimensions.	  Key	  loyalty	  issues	  will	  include:	  
• understanding	  my	  business;	  
• supporting	  my	  business;	  
• continuity	  of	  contact;	  
• flexibility;	  
• the	  way	  that	  problems	  are	  handled;	  
• accessibility.	  
Cost	   and	   price	   often	   straddle	   the	   boundary	   between	   a	   hygiene	   issue	   (the	   “there	   or	  
thereabouts	  is	  good	  enough”	  opinion)	  and	  a	  loyalty	  issue	  (this	  can	  make	  the	  difference	  between	  
engaging	  with	  the	  intervention	  process	  or	  not).	  
Hygiene	  issues	  
Those	  issues	  on	  which	  an	  organisation	  is	  expected	  to	  deliver	  but	  where	  no	  extra	  warmth	  is	  gained	  
for	  particular	  excellence	  -­‐	  including:	  
• Delivery	  issues.	  
• Reliability.	  
• Speed	  of	  response.	  
• Approach	  to	  invoicing	  and	  payment.	  
• The	  resources	  behind	  the	  supplier	  (government	  department	  or	  high	  street	  bank).	  
Lower	  priority	  issues	  
Not	   generally	   considered	  not	   to	  be	   important	   in	   the	  decision	  making	  process,	   they	  will	   include	  
tangibles	   such	   as	   office	   premises,	   office	   environment,	   certain	   types	   of	   written	   communication	  
and	   presentation,	   and	   so	   on.	   However,	   they	   can	   have	   an	   important	   background	   or	   contextual	  
effect	   on	   attitude,	   and	   thus	   decisions	   that	   are	   taken	   (Gilmore	   and	   Carson,	   1996;	   Carson	   and	  
Coviello,	  1996).	  Of	  course,	  different	  segments	  will	  generate	  a	  different	  map	  of	  priorities.	  
How	  the	  intervention	  process	  can	  be	  improved	  
The	  small	  firm	  market	  is	  constantly	  bombarded	  with	  different	  sources	  of	  information	  and	  advice	  
provision.	   We	   believe	   that	   there	   still	   remains	   a	   large	   question	   mark	   over	   whether	   those	  
responsible	   for	  synthesizing	  and	  presenting	  business	  support	  packages	  at	  government	   level	  and	  
providing	  this	  information	  service	  actually	  help	  the	  small	  firm	  (DTI,	  1996;	  Mercer,	  1996).	  	  
It	   is	  worth	   noting	   that	  many	   Business	   Links	   have	   installed	   sophisticated	   client	   information	  
systems,	   which	   hold	   a	   wealth	   of	   data	   at	   individual	   small	   firm	   level;	   how	   well	   they	   use	   this	  
intelligence	  must	  remain	  open	  to	  question.	  
Why	  do	  they	  keep	  sending	  me	  this	  expensive	  drivel?	  It's	  very	  professionally	  produced	  [details	  
of	   the	  Business	  Link's	  seminar	  programme]	  but	   it	   still	  heads	   for	   the	  bin	  with	   the	  rest	  of	   the	  
junk	  we	  get	  from	  the	  DTI.	  
	   280	  
There	  needs	  to	  be	  people	  below	  (and	  incidentally,	  at	  the	  level	  of)	  the	  policy	  maker	  who	  can	  
assemble	   the	   ``jigsaw”	   of	   available	   information	   into	   a	   sensible,	   meaningful	   picture.	   A	   Select	  
Committee	  report	  (1999)	  has	  recently	  suggested	  a	  major	  overhaul	  of	  the	  way	  in	  which	  Office	  for	  
National	  Statistics	  (ONS)	  markets	  information,	  the	  implication	  being	  that	  ONS	  was	  not	  delivering	  a	  
quality	  service	  or	  adequately	  exploiting	   the	  data	   that	   it	  managed.	  There	  are,	  of	  course,	  pockets	  
who	  remain	   in	  the	  ``we	  know	  best”	  strait-­‐jacket.	  Nevertheless,	  over	  the	  past	  five	  years,	  there	   is	  
evidence	   of	   considerable	   progress.	   Although	   somewhat	   piecemeal,	   there	   are	   support	   service	  
providers	   who	   do	   operate	   in	   a	  more	   eclectic	   way	   than	   in	   the	   past;	   drawings	   on,	   and	  weaving	  
together,	  evidence	  from	  the	  UK	  and	  overseas	  (Stacey,	  1996;	  de	  Koning	  et	  al.,	  1992),	   in	  order	  to	  
design	  sensitive	  and	  long	  lasting	  intervention	  packages.	  	  
I	  was	  very	  skeptical	  at	  first	  but	  on	  my	  second	  visit	  I	  started	  to	  understand	  what	  they	  [Business	  
Link]	  were	  all	  about	  .	  .	  .	  I	  now	  call	  them	  whenever	  I	  need	  them.	  
Such	  enlightened	  interventionists	  have	  realised	  that,	   in	  essence,	  all	  support	   is	  qualitative	  in	  
the	   sense	   that	   they	   need	   to	   be	   interpreted	   in	   context,	  with	   the	   full	   appreciation	   of	  where	   the	  
support	   comes	   from,	   its	   strengths	   and	   its	   weaknesses.	   They	   have	   accepted	   that	   support	   from	  
several	  sources	  is	  likely	  to	  provide	  a	  more	  reliable	  guide	  for	  decision-­‐making	  than	  support	  from	  a	  
single	  source	  (Duan	  and	  Burrell,	  1997).	  	  
Given	   the	   plethora	   of	   support	   services	   now	   available	   (Garrick,	   1996),	   it	   is	   increasingly	  
important	   that	   evidence	   presented	   to	   the	   decision	  maker	   is	   kept	   to	   a	  manageable	   proportion.	  
Specifically,	   it	   is	   important	   for	   policy	   makers	   to	   demonstrate	   an	   approach	   -­‐	   an	   analytical	  
framework	  -­‐	  with	  which	  they	  operate,	  from	  the	  outset	  of	  the	  intervention.	  	  
Of	  particular	   importance	  here	   is	   sorting	  out	  how	  different	  government	  departments	  at	   the	  
development	   stage	  present	   the	  problem.	  Too	  often	  policy	  makers	  will	   come	  at	   the	  problem	  by	  
listing	  possible	  outcome	  measures	  (how	  many	  delegates	  can	  we	  attract	  to	  this	  event?).	  Whereas	  
there	  is	  an	  urgent	  need	  to	  communicate	  the	  problem	  in	  terms	  of	  intervention	  objectives	  (what	  is	  
the	  customer's	  overall	  level	  of	  satisfaction	  with	  the	  standard	  of	  support	  service?).	  With	  interest	  in	  
the	  Internet	  (Berthon	  et	  al.,	  1997),	  as	  a	  global	  (never	  mind	  a	  regional)	  communications	  medium	  
burgeoning,	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   understand	   how	   things	  might	   be	   in	   the	   future	  with	   regard	   to	   the	  
sheer	   volume	  of	   information	  available	   to	   the	   small	   firm	   (Rowan,	  1997;	  Denison	  and	  McDonald,	  
1995).	   However,	   the	   question	   remains	   for	   the	   policy	  maker	   as	   to	  whether	   their	   information	   is	  
presented	   (by	   some	   form	   of	   government	   sponsored	   intervention)	   in	   a	   form	   ±	   at	   a	   level	   of	  
specificity	  and	  depth	  -­‐	  that	  makes	  for	  better	  decision	  making	  among	  users	  in	  the	  target	  audience	  
(Antoniou,	  1997).	  	  
Policy	   makers	   must	   be	   alert	   to	   the	   different	   ways	   in	   which	   the	   problem	   may	   be	   initially	  
expressed	  and,	  using	  all	  these	  different	  “languages	  of	  definition”,	  must	  work	  towards	  the	  design	  
of	   an	   intervention	   that	   is	   targeted	   and	   manageable.	   If	   the	   policy	   maker	   is	   allowed	   just	   one	  
question	   at	   the	   outset	   of	   the	   development	   stage(s)	   it	   should	   be,	   “on	   completion	   of	   this	  
intervention,	   what	   value	   do	   I	   anticipate	   the	   small	   firm	   owner/manager	   to	   place	   on	   this	  
intervention?”	  (Tammo	  et	  al.,	  1996).	  	  
Going	   beyond	   the	   credibility	   of	   the	   intervention	   development	   process,	   one	  must	   examine	  
the	  way	   in	  which	  the	  decision	  maker	  scrutinizes	  the	  voracity	  of	  the	  “package	  of	  support”	  which	  
they	  are	  invited	  to	  inspect	  before	  making	  a	  decision.	  Much	  has	  changed	  in	  the	  “hothouse”	  climate	  
of	  the	  small	  firm	  sector	  in	  recent	  years.	  Today	  it	  is	  no	  good	  policy	  makers	  falling	  back	  on	  the	  DTI	  
rulebook	  in	  trying	  to	  explain	  the	  robustness	  of	  their	  offer.	  The	  policy	  maker	  must	  be	  prepared	  ±	  
whether	  they	  like	  it	  or	  not	  ±	  to	  ensure	  that	  their	  offer	  is	  seen	  by	  the	  owner/manager	  as	  believable	  
and	   relevant	   (DTI,	   1996).	   Support	   services	   offered	   to	   the	   owner/manager	  must	   be	   directly	   for	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them.	  In	  a	  business	  environment	  there	  is	  enormous	  emphasis	  on	  measuring	  exactly	  what	  benefits	  
flow	  from	  what	  action	  (Myung-­‐Sul	  and	  Hill,	  1997).	  In	  a	  small	  firm	  setting	  the	  pressure	  is,	  in	  turn,	  
for	   the	   policy	   maker	   to	   produce	   intervention	   in	   a	   more	   competitive	   based	   style.	   Thus,	   the	  
owner/manager	   is	   looking	   for	   the	   policy	  maker	   to	   identify,	   for	   example,	   three	   key	   issues	   that	  
underpin	  the	  offer,	  and	  for	  the	  evidence	  to	  be	  presented	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  it	  helps	  them	  decide	  
how	  to	  interpret	  each	  of	  these	  five	  issues.	  
Conclusion	  
Our	   objective	   was	   to	   provide	   an	   understanding	   of	   the	   decision-­‐making	   processes	   used	   by	  
different	  types	  of	  owner/managers	  in	  the	  small	  firm	  sector.	  We	  sought	  to	  show	  that	  leading	  edge	  
qualitative	   research	   has	   now	   burst	   the	   myth	   that	   small	   businesses	   are	   simply	   scaled	   down	  
versions	  of	   large	  enterprises;	  with	  examples	  from	  recent	  research	  we	  explained	  how	  small	  firms	  
actually	  think	  and	  behave.	  For	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  policy	  maker,	  we	  also	  addressed	  the	  question	  of	  
whether	  the	  information	  needs	  of	  those	  engaged	  in	  decision	  making	  in	  the	  small	  firm	  sector	  are	  
being	  satisfied.	  
We	  know	  that	  today's	  policy	  maker	  (16	  Tory	  ministers	  in	  less	  than	  20	  years	  at	  the	  DTI;	  Labour	  
is	   already	  on	   its	   third!)	  may	  be	   in	   a	   post	   for	   a	   comparatively	   short	   period	  of	   time.	   It	   therefore	  
becomes	  important	  for	  the	  policy	  maker	  to	  concentrate	  on	  what	  is	  achievable	  in	  the	  market	  and	  
not	  necessarily	  for	  their	  personal	  career	  (Mercer,	  1996).	  Of	  course,	  the	  idea	  that	  there	  can	  be	  a	  
clash	   between	   the	   individual	   goals	   of	   a	   minister	   and	   the	   goals	   of	   the	   party	   is	   hardly	   a	   new	  
observation.	  Nevertheless,	   the	  authors	  would	  argue	   that	  pressures	  placed	  on	  a	  policy	  maker	   in	  
recent	   years	   have	   brought	   this	   issue	   into	   sharp	   profile.	   Thus,	   individuals	   –	   knowing	   they	  must	  
produce	   results	   in	   the	   short	   term	   to	   keep	  a	   career	  on	   line	   -­‐	   tend	   to	   associate	   themselves	  with	  
projects	   and	   tasks	   that	   are	   achievable	   within	   reasonable	   time-­‐frames	   (Saunders	   et	   al.,	   1996;	  
Abratt	   et	   al.,	   1994).	   There	   is	   less	   interest	   in	   projects	  with	  wider	   and	   longer-­‐term	   pay-­‐offs.	  We	  
suggest	   that	   this	   has	   resulted	   in	   the	   launch	   of	   many	   (small	   firm)	   interventions,	   which	   have	  
addressed	  the	  career	  of	  the	  policy	  maker,	  not	  the	  target	  audience.	  	  
It	   is	   well	   documented	   that,	   with	   regard	   to	   new	   services,	   there	   is	   a	   leading	   edge	   “early	  
adopter	  group”	  who	  are	  first	   in	  to	  the	  new	  service	  offer	   (McDonald,	  1996).	  At	   the	  other	  end	  of	  
the	   spectrum,	   a	   group	   of	   “technophobes”	  who	   feel	   uneasy	   about	   embracing	   anything	   new.	   In	  
between	  there	  exists	  the	  owner/manager	  who	  will	  keep	  a	  watching	  brief	  -­‐	  neither	  committing	  to,	  
nor	   rejecting	   the	   offer.	   Given	   this	   often	   large,	   “watching	   brief”	   category,	   good	   qualitative	  
research	  practice	  dictates	  that	  we	  need	  to	  unpack	  this	  mindset,	  rather	  than	  simply	  accept	  it	  (for	  
example,	  the	  authors	  highlighted	  the	  critical	  issue	  of	  the	  business/personal	  overlap).	  For	  instance,	  
it	   is	   reasonable	   to	   assume	   that	   a	   certain	   individual's	   attitude	   towards	   a	   government	  offer	   (e.g.	  
Business	  Links	  and	  TECs)	  will	  be	  a	  function	  of	  his/her	  own	  individual	  beliefs	  and	  attitudes.	  It	  will	  
also	   be	   the	   function	   of	   the	   individual's	   perception	   of	   what	   they	   think	   others	   think	   about	   the	  
brand.	   In	   the	   light	   of	   this	   insight,	   the	   interventionist	   can	   start	   unpacking	   this	   “watching	   brief”	  
category	   by	   exploring	   the	   wider	   context	   of	   respondents'	   perceptions	   of	   what	   others	   currently	  
think	  and	  may	  be	  about	  to	  do.	  For	  instance,	  the	  interventionist	  could	  start	  by	  exploring	  the	  extent	  
to	   which	   an	   individual's	   willingness	   to	   embrace	   the	   brand	   (Business	   Link)	   would	   be	   changed	   -­‐	  
triggered	   -­‐	   by	   external	   events,	   such	   as	   learning	   that	   a	   key	   competitor	  was	   now	   embracing	   the	  
offer.	  Thus,	  putting	  their	  own	  business	  at	  a	  competitive	  disadvantage.	  By	  providing	  a	  model	  that	  
explained	  this	  “watching	  brief”	  category,	  one	  is	  able	  to	  provide	  the	  policy	  maker	  with	  insights	  that	  
will	  enable	  them	  to	  interpret	  how	  other	  market	  sectors	  might	  take	  up	  the	  offer.	  	  
Concerning,	  for	  example,	  the	  Business	  Link	  brand,	  research	  evidence	  (Culkin,	  1998)	  indicates	  
that	  as	  a	  mass	  (SME)	  market	  product	  is	  not	  the	  “green	  light”	  winner	  Michael	  Heseltine	  may	  have	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originally	   envisaged	   (Culkin	   et	   al.,	   1999).	   However,	   certain	   sectors	   and	   businesses	   are	   highly	  
receptive.	   The	   longer-­‐term	   strategy	   (and	   there	   does	   need	   to	   be	   a	   long-­‐term	   strategy)	   must	  
address	  weaknesses	  identified	  if	  the	  service	  is	  to	  be	  used	  wider	  afield.	  	  
Policy	  makers	  can	  only	  achieve	  this	  by	  demonstrating	  a	  real	  empathy	  with	  the	  target	  market	  
and	   factoring	   in	   the	   business	   leader's	   own	   intuition	   and	   prior	   knowledge	   on	   the	   subject.	   In	  
addition,	  by	  helping	  set	  support	  services	   in	  a	  wider	  analytical	   framework	  context,	   together	  with	  
helping	   improve	   the	   quality	   of	   the	   small	   firm	  offer,	   policy	  makers	  may	   yet	  win	   the	   case	   in	   the	  
arena	  in	  which	  the	  service	  must	  be	  compete.	  	  
Looking	  to	  the	  future,	  as	  we	  enter	  a	  world	  with	  more	  and	  more	  information	  sources	  (online	  
and	  database),	  the	  authors	  would	  argue	  that	  many	  of	  the	  issues	  raised	  above	  will	  come	  into	  even	  
sharper	  focus.	  One	  can	  envisage	   increasing	  calls	   from	  small	   firms	  for	   information	  from	  different	  
sources,	   which	   they	   require	   piecing	   together.	   In	   the	   face	   of	   an	   overwhelming	   amount	   of	  
information	  service	  provision,	  small	   firms	  will	  place	  more	  emphasis	  on	  concentrating	  on	  what	   is	  
achievable,	  and	  making	  sure	  that	  the	  outcomes	  are	  entirely	  actionable.	  There	  is	  also	  likely	  to	  be	  
increasing	   demand	   among	   the	   target	   audience	   for	   assurance	   about	   the	   applicability	   of	   the	  
information	  and	  advice	  source	  that	  has	  been	  assembled.	  
The	  authors	  believe	   there	   is	   also	  going	   to	  be	  a	   competitive	  advantage	   to	   the	  policy	  maker	  
who,	  at	  the	  outset	  of	  the	  intervention	  process,	  can	  help	  define	  the	  problem	  in	  a	  manageable	  way,	  
while	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	   intervention	   helping	   the	   decision	   maker	   through	   the	   decision	   making	  
process.	   The	   government	   (through	   the	   Business	   Link	   network)	   is	   in	   the	   right	   position	   to	   take	  
advantage	  of	  the	  opportunity,	  but	  does	  the	  policy	  maker	  have	  the	  vision	  to	  make	  it	  so!	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Abstract	  	  
Universities	  should,	  and	  must	  take	  a	  lead	  role	  as	  an	  anchor	  institution	  within	  their	  region,	  
especially	  in	  light	  of	  the	  Brexit	  decision.	  Such	  a	  role	  will	  include	  providing	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  
formal	   and	   informal	   support,	   knowledge	   and	   resources	   targeted	   at	   micro	   and	   small	  
businesses	   (MSBs),	   complementing	   usual	   Small	   and	  Medium	   Enterprise	   (SME)	   support.	  
Drawing	   on	  my	   evaluation	   of	   the	  winners	   of	   the	   annual	   Times	   Higher	   Education	   (THE)	  
Entrepreneurial	  University	  of	  The	  Year	  Award	  and	  analysis	  of	  the	  Chartered	  Association	  of	  
Business	  School	   (CABS)	  Small	  Business	  Charter	  Awards,	   I	   suggest	   four	  different	  ways	   to	  
enhance	   collaboration	   to	   enable	   MSBs	   to	   make	   maximum	   use	   of	   ‘anchor	   university’	  
support.	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Introduction:	  how	  “localism”	  is	  driving	  the	  MSB	  innovation	  ecosystem	  
Whether	  you	  were	  part	  of	   the	  RemainIn	  camp	  or	  a	  Brexiter,	   the	  die	  has	  been	  cast.	  We	  
have	  entered	  unchartered	  territories	  and	  to	  borrow	  from	  a	  speech	  delivered	  in	  1898	  by	  
the	  politician	  Joseph	  Chamberlain	  (father	  of	  British	  PM,	  Neville	  Chamberlain),	  “I	  think	  that	  
you	  will	  all	  agree	  that	  we	  are	  living	  in	  most	  interesting	  times.”	  
Even	  before	   this	  decision	  was	   taken,	   the	  UK	   faced	  a	  productivity	   challenge	  whereby	   its	  
performance	  	   has	  weakened	   compared	   to	   the	   rest	   of	   the	  G8	   economies.	  Nevertheless,	  
research	  demonstrates	   that	  micro	  and	  small	  businesses	   (MSBs)	  are	  a	  key	  under-­‐tapped	  
resource	   for	   addressing	   this	   challenge	   –	   especially	   when	   engaged	   in	   international	   and	  
innovative	  activities	  -­‐	  accounting	  for	  60	  per	  cent	  of	  all	  private	  sector	  jobs	  and	  47	  per	  cent	  
of	   revenue	   (ERC,	   2015).	   Improving	   the	   UK’s	   low	   productivity	   is	   a	   key	   challenge	   to	  
generate	  growth	  in	  the	  post-­‐Brexit	  economy.	  While	  MSBs	  are	  a	  vital	  part	  of	  the	  economy,	  
many	  commentators	  also	  recognize	  the	  key	  part	  played	  by	  business	  support	  initiative	  in	  
helping	  stimulate	  growth	  amongst	  this	  group.	  	  
Take	   for	   example,	   Growth	   Accelerator,	   a	   nationwide	   business	   advice	   programme	   for	  
growth-­‐oriented	  businesses,	  underpinned	  via	  a	  government	  subsidy.	  As	  is	  common	  in	  the	  
vast	   majority	   of	   national	   programmes,	   Growth	   Accelerator	   was	   subject	   to	   numerous	  
audits	   in	   order	   to	   evaluate	   its	   effectiveness.	   The	   estimates	   from	  government	   indicated	  
that	  for	  every	  £1	  spent	  yielded	  benefits	  to	  the	  economy	  of	  between	  £4.54	  and	  £9.92.	  If	  
true,	  Growth	  Accelerator	  would	  have	  boosted	  the	  SME	  economy	  by	  £1bn	  (Mole,	  2015).	  
Business	   support	   comes	   primarily	   from	   national	   government,	   but	   in	   the	  UK	  November	  
2015	   public	   spending	   plans,	   the	   Department	   for	   Business	   Innovation	   and	   Skills	   was	  
pressed	  to	  find	  20%	  savings	  or	  face	  a	  possible	  a	  possible	  break-­‐up.	  The	  Business	  Secretary	  
argued	   it	  would	  be	  “a	  step	  backwards”	   if	  his	  department	  were	  abolished	  and	  while	  BIS	  
remains,	  the	  Growth	  Accelerator	  ended	  abruptly	  the	  following	  month.	  	  
	  
The	   closure	   of	   the	   Business	   Growth	   Service	   (BGS),	   which	   included	   the	   Manufacturing	  
Advisory	   Service	   (MAS)	   and	   the	   Growth	   Accelerator	  
programme	   was	   announced	   by	   Anna	   Soubry,	   the	  
minister	   for	   small	   business.	   She	   said,	   “Where	  
taxpayers’	   money	   is	   used	   to	   provide	   support,	   this	   is	  
best	   done	   at	   the	   local	   level	   which	   is	   why	   we’re	  
providing	   further	   funding	   to	   growth	   hubs	   and	   away	  
from	  Whitehall.”	  
So,	   given	   all	   that	  we	   know,	   the	   question	   is,	   how	  will	  




	   	  
BIS	  was	  formed	  in	  2009	  through	  a	  merger	  of	  the	  
Department	  for	  Innovation,	  Universities	  and	  Skills	  
and	  the	  Department	  for	  Business,	  Enterprise	  and	  
Regulatory.	  Reform.	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Think	  Local,	  Act	  Local:	  anchor	  institutions	  and	  Regional	  Innovation	  Systems	  
In	  the	  rest	  of	  this	  paper,	  I	  want	  to	  present	  some	  ideas	  as	  to	  why	  universities	  should	  take	  a	  
central,	  or	  anchoring	  role	  in	  this	  drive	  towards	  regional	  devolution.	  I	  believe	  the	  benefits	  
for	   the	  MSB	   community	   in	   embracing	   such	   an	   idea	   would	  
come	   directly	   in	   the	   form	   of	   a)	   attracting	   foreign	   direct	  
investment	   and	   b)	   increased	   retention	   of	   highly	   skilled	  
talent.	   In	   Scotland	   alone,	   Universities	   are	   cited	   as	   a	  
determining	   factor	   in	   almost	   half	   of	   all	   foreign	   direct	  
investment	   (FDI)	   projects.	   As	   a	   producer	   of	   highly-­‐skilled	  
graduates	   and	   postgraduates,	   generator	   of	   world-­‐class	  
research	   and	   development	   and	   found	   at	   the	   centre	   of	  
industry	  clusters	  universities	  help	  create	  the	  conditions	  that	  
make	  Scotland	  the	  most	  attractive	  place	  to	  invest	  in	  the	  UK,	  
second	  only	  to	  London.	  	  
As	   the	   devolution	  movement	   gathers	   pace,	   the	   terms	   anchor	   institutions	   and	   Regional	  
Innovation	   Systems	   (RIS)	   will	   become	   increasingly	   important.	   Anchor	   institutions	   are	  
nonprofit	   institutions	  that	  once	  established	  tend	  not	  to	  move	  location.	  Emerging	  trends	  
related	   to	   globalization	   -­‐	   such	   as	   the	   decline	   of	  manufacturing,	   the	   rise	   of	   the	   service	  
sector,	   and	   a	   mounting	   government	   fiscal	   crisis	   -­‐	   suggest	   the	   growing	   importance	   of	  
anchor	  institutions	  to	  local	  economies.	  According	  to	  Community-­‐Wealth.org	  (a	  project	  of	  
The	  Democracy	  Collaborative	  in	  the	  U.S.),	  in	  many	  places,	  these	  anchor	  institutions	  have	  
surpassed	   traditional	   manufacturing	   corporations	   to	   become	   their	   region's	   leading	  
employers.	   Their	   scale	   and	   local	   links	   mean	   that	   they	   can	   play	   a	   key	   role	   in	   local	  
development	   and	   economic	   growth,	   representing	   the	   ‘sticky	   capital’	   around	   which	  
economic	  growth	   strategies	   can	  be	  built	   and	   innovation	   fostered	  at	   a	   local	   level	   (Work	  
Foundation,	  2010:3).	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  this	  is	  why	  universities	  have	  powerful	  credentials	  
and	   potential	   to	   be	   key	   anchors	   within	   UK	   regions.	   We	   know	   that	   universities	   are	  
somewhere	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  that	  somewhere	  matters,	  more	  than	  ever	  before.	  
Regional	   Innovation	   Systems	   encourage	   rapid	   knowledge,	   skills	   and	   best	   practice	  
diffusion	   within	   a	   geographic	   area.	   Larger	   than	   a	   single	   city,	   an	   RIS	   is	   a	   supported	  
innovation	   network	   that	   interacts	   regularly	   to	   enhance	   innovation	   in	   a	   region.	   The	  
apparent	   shortcomings	   of	   traditional	   regional	   development	   models	   and	   policies,	   led	  
Doloreux	   and	  Parto	   (2005)	   to	   develop	   a	   framework	   that	   highlighted	   the	   importance	  of	  
regional	   scale	   and	   of	   specific	   and	   regional	   resources	   in	   stimulating	   the	   innovation	  
capability	  and	  competitiveness	  of	  firms	  and	  regions.	  
v firstly,	  the	  importance	  of	  interactions	  between	  the	  actors	  of	  the	  innovation	  system	  in	  
relation	  to	  the	  exchange	  of	  knowledge;	  	  
v secondly,	  the	  set-­‐up	  and	  the	  role	  of	  institutions	  supporting	  knowledge	  exchange	  and	  
innovation	  within	  a	  region;	  and	  	  
v thirdly,	  the	  existence	  and	  role	  of	  RIS	  in	  regional	  innovation	  policy-­‐making.	  	  
	  
Fig.	   1	  depicts	   the	  RIS	   concept,	   showing	   the	  main	   actors	   and	  dimensions	   and	  how	   they	  
The	  Road	  To	  Devolution	  
The	   five	   devolution	   deals	  
announced	   since	   –Liverpool	   city	  
Region,	   North	   East,	   Sheffield	   City	  
Region,	   Tees	   Valley	   and	   West	  
Midlands	   Combined	   Authority	   –	  
build	   upon	   a	   foundation	   of	   city	  
deals,	   growth	   deals,	   combined	  
authorities,	   enterprise	   zones	   and	  
university	  enterprise	  zones	  (UEZs).	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interact	  (Cooke	  and	  Piccaluga,	  2004).	  As	  such,	  we	  can	  see	  how	  innovation	  is	  very	  much	  an	  
interactive	   and	   dynamic	   process	   heightened	   by	   networking	  with	   related	   actors.	  Whilst	  
lonely	  individualistic	  pursuit	  happens,	  more	  generally	  supportive,	  symbiotic	  relationships	  
within	  networks	  trigger	  innovation.	  Innovation	  and	  technological	  advancements	  are	  very	  
complex	  processes	  with	  mutual	  interdependencies;	  it	  also	  goes	  to	  show	  how	  key	  anchor	  
institutions	  act	  as	  a	  life	  support	  system,	  particularly	  for	  MSB	  growth	  firms.	  
	  
	  
Fig	  1.	  The	  Regional	  Innovation	  System	  	  
Source:	  Cooke	  and	  Piccaluga,	  2004	  	  
	  
Supporting	   the	   UK	   MSB	   sector	   and	   improving	   start-­‐up	   and	   scale-­‐up	   survival	   rates	   is	  
important	  
Without	   a	   champion	   in	   Whitehall,	   it	   has	   not	   been	   easy	   to	  
evidence	  the	   impact	   the	  MSB	  sector	  makes	  on	  the	  UK	  economy,	  
nor	  the	  barriers	  it	  faces.	  	  The	  creation	  of	  the	  Enterprise	  Research	  
Centre	   (ERC)	   in	   2013	   -­‐	  with	   its	   core	  mission	   to	   help	   understand	  
what	   drives	   small	   firm	   growth	   -­‐	   has	   already	   gone	   some	  way	   to	  
identify	  policies,	  structures,	  processes	  and	  techniques	  effective	  in	  
supporting	  MSB	  growth	  and	  development.	  
Thanks	   to	   the	   work	   of	   ERC	   experts	   we	   now	   know	   that	   MSBs	  
employ	  12.1	  million	  or	  60%	  of	  all	  UK	  employees.	  As	   important	   is	  
the	  fact	  that	  90%	  of	  MSBs	  survive	  their	  first	  year	  in	  existence,	  74%	  
manage	  to	  keep	  going	  for	  two	  years	  but	  that	  figure	  drops	  to	  63%	  
for	   three	   years,	   or	   more	   (BIS,	   2015).	   What	   is	   more	   alarming	   is	  
work	  by	  the	  Centre,	  which	  show	  of	  all	  UK	  firms	  born	  in	  just	  one	  year	  (1999	  in	  this	  study)	  
around	  90%	  no	   longer	  exist	  and	   that	   for	   the	   first	   fifteen	  years	  about	  10%	  die	  per	  year.	  	  
Enterprise	  Research	  Centre	  
The	   ERC	   was	  established	   in	   2013	   to	  
answer	   one	   central	   question,	   ‘What	  
drives	   SME	   Growth?’	   Originally	  
funded	  by	  the	  ESRC,	  Innovate	  UK,	  BIS	  
and	   the	   BBA,	   the	   ERC	   is	   a	  
collaboration	   of	   senior	   researchers	  
from	   Aston,	   Warwick,	   Imperial	  
College,	   Queens	   University	   Belfast	  
and	   the	   University	   of	   Strathclyde.	  
The	   Centre	   aspires	   to	  become	   the	  
international	  focal	  point	  for	  research,	  
knowledge	   and	   expertise	   on	   SME	  
growth	  and	  entrepreneurship.	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Only	   about	   5%	   of	   start-­‐ups	   add	   a	   substantial	   number	   of	   jobs	   to	   the	   UK	   economy	  
Anyadike-­‐Danes	  &	  Hart	  (2014).	  	  
Passing	  the	  five-­‐year	  survival	  point	  and	  building	  critical	  mass	  of	  five	  or	  more	  employees	  
massively	  increases	  an	  MSB’s	  survival	  chances;	  and,	  it’s	  one	  reason	  why	  we	  need	  anchor	  
institutions	  with	  a	  remit	  built	  in,	  to	  help	  firms	  through	  those	  early	  years	  –	  from	  start-­‐up	  
to	  scale-­‐up.	  The	  2015	  CMI/CABS	  survey	  highlighted	  limited	  business	  capabilities	  in	  many	  
MSB’s.	  Three	  quarters	  of	  UK	  customers	  shop	  online	  but	  44%	  of	  MSB’s	  have	  no	  website,	  
71%	  are	  not	  mobile	  ready	  and	  69%	  do	  not	  use	  social	  media	  marketing;	  missing	  significant	  
revenue	  opportunities.	  Moreover	  only	  7%	  of	  MSBs	  seek	  support	  to	  increase	  productivity.	  
Universities	  have	  the	  capabilities,	   in	  the	  form	  of	   industrial	  placements,	  student	  projects	  
and	  more	  to	  make	  significant	  inroads	  in	  the	  resourcing	  requirements	  of	  local	  MSBs.	  
Making	  The	  Case:	  Universities	  As	  Anchor	  Institutions	  
Certain	   universities	   already	   play	   a	   key	   role	   in	   enterprise	   support	   and	   entrepreneurship	  
within	   their	   region,	   responding	   to	   the	   need	   to	   develop	   competent	   individuals	   to	  work	  
across	  commercial	  and	  public	  sectors	  and	  cope	  with	  today’s	  uncertainty	  and	  complexity.	  
UK	   universities	   are	   learning	   how	   to	   teach	   enterprise	   and	  
entrepreneurship	  programmes,	   in	  a	  way	  that	  goes	  well	  beyond	  
the	   business	   school,	   extending	   across	   the	   institution	   and	  
embracing	  wider	  networks	  (James	  &	  Culkin,	  2015).	  	  
Such	   universities,	   located	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   a	   region	   encourage	  
innovation	  amongst	  MSBs,	  stimulate	  entrepreneurial	  aspiration	  
from	  students	  and	  provide	  skills,	  knowledge	  and	  experience	  to	  
help	   start	   their	   own	   business.	   	   In	   so	   doing,	   they	   send	   signals	  
about	   innovation	   and	   growth	   to	   smaller	   businesses	   (Mason,	  
2014;	   Culkin	   &	   Mallick,	   2011).	   Universities	   can	   stimulate	  
regeneration,	   skills	   acquisition,	   innovation;	   and	   business	  
support,	  provided	  that	  businesses	  understand	  the	  scope	  of	  what	  
is	  available	  (See	  Case	  Study	  1).	  	  	  
One	   only	   has	   to	   look	   at	   the	   citations	   for	   each	   of	   the	   eight	  
Entrepreneurial	  Universities	  of	  the	  Year	  Award	  winners,	  and	  the	  
REF2014	  Impact	  Case	  Studies	  (that	  speak	  to	  small	  business	  and	  
entrepreneurship),	  to	  see	  the	  anchoring	  role	  certain	  universities	  
already	  play	   for	   the	  MSB	   sector,	   as	  well	   as	   the	  wider	  business	  
community	  (Witty,	  2013).	  	  
What	  does	  a	  successful	  anchor	  institution	  do?	  	  
I	  want	  to	  conclude	  with	  a	  call	  to	  action.	  Despite	  the	  uncertainty	  
that	   a	   Brexit	   victory	   has	   caused,	   there	   are	   four	   simple	   steps	  
required	  in	  order	  to	  enable	  universities	  to	  take	  on	  the	  mantle	  of	  
anchor	   institutions,	   operating	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   their	   regional	  
innovation	  system	  and	  help	  MSB	  sector	  grow	  and	  prosper	  in	  an	  
Case	  Study	  1:	  Digital	  Estate	  Value-­‐Added	  
Reseller	  
Hertfordshire	  Business	  School	  (HBS)	  is	  Hertfordshire’s	  
principal	  regional	  university	  and	  as	  such	  attracts	  
significant	  inquiries	  from	  the	  local	  business	  
community.	  	  These	  inquiries	  are	  often	  related	  to	  
existing	  business	  challenges,	  specifically	  those	  
associated	  with	  skills	  gaps	  in	  three	  main	  areas:	  
marketing	  related,	  product	  development	  and	  
operational	  issues.	  	  One	  such	  business	  RealTech,	  
approached	  us	  in	  2008	  with	  a	  small	  project	  for	  our	  
Graduate	  Consultancy	  Unit,	  this	  involved	  us	  
evaluating	  the	  current	  trends	  concerning	  digital	  
estate	  in	  Tier	  1	  retailers.	  	  Our	  Graduate	  Consultancy	  
Unit	  (GCU)	  was	  made	  up	  of	  undergraduate	  final	  year,	  
postgraduate	  students	  and	  a	  group	  of	  academics	  
with	  various	  sector	  and	  enterprise	  competencies.	  
RealTech	  were	  keen	  to	  both	  understand	  the	  current	  
digital	  estate	  in	  these	  Tier	  1	  Retailers,	  and	  to	  also	  
understand	  the	  customer’s	  use	  of	  these	  information	  
systems,	  and	  their	  appetite	  for	  more.	  	  The	  GCU	  
delivered	  its	  first	  report,	  details	  a	  technology	  vs.	  
product	  roadmap,	  and	  suggestions	  for	  RealTech	  
concerning	  future	  customer	  latent	  needs.	  	  They	  
commissioned	  a	  second	  study	  involving	  accompanied	  
shopper	  journey	  research,	  again	  a	  report	  was	  
delivered.	  
Four	  years	  later	  RealMedia	  came	  back	  to	  us,	  this	  was	  
a	  Management	  Buy-­‐Out	  (MBO),	  from	  the	  original	  
RealTech,	  and	  were	  looking	  for	  another	  study.	  In	  the	  
intervening	  four	  years,	  we	  have	  conducted	  two	  
contract	  research	  projects,	  and	  had	  two	  
postgraduate	  student	  project	  teams	  work	  with	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increasingly	  devolved	  nation.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1. Boost	  university-­‐business	  collaboration	  	  
MSBs	   need	   to	   value	   opportunities	   to	   collaborate	   with	   universities.	   Hughes	   &	   Kitson,	  
(2013)	   and	   NCUB	   (2014)	   found	   ‘universities	   and	   colleges	   are	   brimming	   with	   expert	  
knowledge	  that	  attracts	  scholars	  and	  businesses	  from	  all	  over	  the	  world.	  However	  only	  a	  
small	  percentage	  of	  UK	  firms	  cite	  universities	  as	  their	  principal	  source	  of	   information	  for	  
innovation	  (5%	  of	  SMEs	  and	  2%	  of	   larger	  firms)’.	   It	   is	  not	  suprising	  therefore	  that	  Dame	  
Ann	  Dowling’s	   Review	  of	   Business-­‐University	   Research	  Collaborations	   in	   the	  UK	   (2015),	  
highlighted	   found	   that	   collaborative	   R&D	   funding	   for	   commercial	   projects	   with	   two	   or	  
more	  academic	  partners	  was	  twice	  as	  high	  for	  those	  without	  any	  academic	  partner.	  	  	  
2.	   Simplify	   and	   clarify	   collaboration	   processes	   between,	   government,	   universities	   and	  
businesses	  	  
There	   is	   massive	   potential	   for	   universities	   to	   raise	   impact	   through	   simplifying	   and	  
clarifying	  agency	  support	  roles.	  Dowling	  (2015)	  found	  that	  complexity	  causes	  frustration	  
and	   confusion,	   especially	   among	   MSBs.	   	   Hence	   the	   UK	   economy	   is	   not	   reaping	   full	  
potential	   from	   connecting	   businesses	  with	  University	   research,	   and	   such	   arrangements	  
need	  simplification.	  Projects	  should	  be	  needs-­‐driven.	  As	  Kevin	  Mole	  (2015)	  argued	  in	  the	  
Guardian	  Newspaper	  “Growth	  hubs	  are	   certainly	   interested	   in	   the	   same	  outcomes	  as	  …	  
government,	  but	  will	  not	  deliver	  more	  effective	  programmes	  than	  Growth	  Accelerator…..	  
because	  the	  programmes	  and	  projects	  are	  developed	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  funding,	  rather	  
than	   an	   evidence-­‐based	   view	   …….	   abrupt	   policy	   changes	   undermine	   confidence	   and	  
squander	  resources.	  Closing	  Growth	  Accelerator	  was	  costly	  –	  not	  for	  the	  Treasury	  but	  for	  
the	  economy	  as	  a	  whole.”	  
Initiatives	   targeted	  at	  MSBs	  need	  to	  be	   tailored	  and	  targeted	  to	  specific	  market	  niches.	  
Smallbone	  et	  al.	   (2015)	  believe	  that	  many	  market	  failures	  in	  the	  small	  firm	  sector	  result	  
from	  a	  one-­‐size	  fits	  all	  approach.	  In	  addition,	  key	  mind-­‐sets	  and	  personality	  drivers	  need	  
to	  be	  better	  understood.	  Support	  for	  different	  MSB	  owner-­‐manager	  personality	  types	  and	  
helping	  businesses	  in	  a	  targeted	  way	  at	  critical	  stages	  in	  their	  development	  are	  important.	  
Focusing	  on	  identifying	  MSBs	  with	  greatest	  growth	  potential	  is	  highlighted	  in	  a	  BIS	  Paper	  
(2015)	   on	   the	   Sociology	   of	   Enterprise,	   which	   distinguishes	   between	   growth	   inclined	  
businesses	   (where	   there	   is	   a	   strong	   vision	   for	   the	   future)	   and	   growth	   ambivalent	   and	  
growth	  resistant	  organisations.	  Initiatives	  characterised	  by	  a	  psychological	  dimension	  will	  
help	  to	  target	  scarce	  resources	  on	  improving	  start-­‐up	  and	  small	  business	  scale-­‐up	  success	  
rates.	  	  
The	  lack	  of	  growth-­‐focused	  organisations	  has	  returned	  us	  to	  a	  policy	  proliferation	  period,	  
during	  which	  Greene	   and	   Patel	   (2013)	   noted	   that	   891	   different	   sources	   of	   support	   for	  
MSB’s	   and	   18	   access	   to	   finance	   schemes	   co-­‐existed.	   This	   is	   hardly	   the	   most	   efficient	  
arrangement,	  some	  might	  say,	  and	  we	  need	  to	  make	  a	  more	  determined	  effort	  to	  learn	  
from	   other	   approaches	   elsewhere	   in	   the	   world	   (e.g.	   Mazzucato,	   2013;	   Block	   &	   Kellor,	  
2012).	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3.	  Encourage	  MSBs	  to	  become	  strategic	  and	  entrepreneurial	  thinkers	  	  
Start-­‐ups	   need	   to	   balance	   enthusiasm	   with	   strategic	   clarity	   in	   order	   to	   scale-­‐up.	  	  
Universities	   can	   help	   with	   strategic	   thinking,	   whilst	   acknowledging	   that	   retrieving	   a	  
flawed	   strategy	   is	   very	   challenging.	   MSB	   start-­‐ups	   need	   to	   balance	   being	   strategic	  
entrepreneurs	  with	  living	  as	  enthusiastic	  opportunity	  seekers.	  A	  lack	  of	  strategic	  focus	  is	  at	  
the	   heart	   of	   many	   business	   failures.	   Entrepreneurial	   ventures	   are	   often	   effective	   in	  
identifying	   opportunities	   but	   less	   successful	   in	   developing	   competitive	   advantages	   to	  
drive	  value	  (Ireland	  et	  al.,	  2003).	  The	  chances	  of	  moving	  from	  start-­‐up	  to	  scale-­‐up	  can	  be	  
improved	  by	  addressing	  three	  key	  axes.	  	  
Firstly,	  appropriate	  decisions	  about	  strategic	  positioning,	  “knowing	  where	  to	  play	  to	  win”.	  
Secondly,	  “focus	  for	  maximum	  impact”.	  Thirdly,	  “following	  the	  minimum	  route	  to	  success	  
and	  maximising	   limited	   resource	  usage”.	  Business	   School	   academics	   know	   that	  when	   it	  
comes	  to	  leadership,	  the	  skills	  required	  to	  steer	  a	  start-­‐up	  through	  its	  first	  12-­‐18	  months	  
are	   very	  different	   from	   those	   required	  during	   the	   scale-­‐up	  period.	   The	   skills	   needed	   to	  
attract,	   develop	   and	  mentor	   can	   place	   additional	   unforeseen	   burdens	   on	   the	   founders	  
during	  this	  period;	  often	  leading	  to	  a	  need	  to	  bring	  in	  a	  new	  skill	  set	  from	  outside,	  with	  
experience	  of	  navigating	  the	  a	  much	  larger,	  more	  mature	  form	  of	  company.	  
4.	  Position	  universities	  as	  thought	  leaders	  in	  the	  local	  labour	  market	  
Universities	   drive	   thought	   leadership	   and	   prompt	   fresh	   thinking.	   People	   find	   it	  
increasingly	  difficult	  to	  progress	  from	  low	  to	  high	  skilled	  jobs,	  partly	  explaining	  why	  many	  
consider	   setting	   up	   an	   MSB.	   	   Anyadike-­‐Danes	   (2014)	   stressed	   that	   universities	   can	  
support	  individuals	  in	  the	  labour	  market,	  concluding	  that	  just	  over	  one	  in	  four	  of	  all	  jobs	  
in	   the	   private	   sector	   are	   destroyed	   or	   created	   over	   an	   average	   of	   12-­‐month	   period.	  	  
Coupled	  with	  the	  survival	  rate	  of	  MSBs,	  joined	  up	  thinking	  is	  essential	  to	  approaching	  the	  
MSBs	   and	   the	   low	   skilled	   sector.	   It	   is	   why,	   as	   part	   of	   its	   RAKE	   initiative	   in	   2015,	   ISBE	  
focused	  on	   the	   role	  of	  anchor	   institutions.	   In	   today’s	  primary	   labour	  market	   individuals	  
receive	   training	   to	   keep	   pace	   with	   technical	   change	   and	   raise	   productivity.	   	   In	   the	  
secondary	   labour	  market	   and	  MSBs,	   people	   gradually	   fall	   behind	   in	   skills.	   	   Universities	  
enable	  networking	  opportunities	  and	  can	  help	  MSB	  and	  the	  lower	  skilled	  jobs	  alike.	  	  	  
Concluding	  Mantra:	  think	  local,	  deliver	  applied	  research,	  and	  collaborate	  
	  
Here,	   I	   have	   set	   out	   the	   role	   universities	   can	   play	   -­‐	   as	   anchor	   institutions	   within	   a	  
devolved	   regional	   innovation	   system	   -­‐	   for	   the	   benefit	   of	  MSBs.	  My	   view	   is	   that	  much	  
value	  can	  be	  gained	  when	  universities	  lead	  in	  terms	  of	  providing	  thought	  leadership	  and	  
offering	  initiatives	  to	  support	  MSB	  communities	  to	  help	  overcome	  systemic	  concerns	  that	  
hold	   back	   competitiveness	   and	   innovative	   performance.	   A	   recent	   Universities	   UK	   blog	  
highlights	   the	   direct	   and	   indirect	   effects	   that	   universities	   can	   have	   on	   the	   economic,	  
cultural	  and	  social	  spheres	  in	  the	  areas	  they	  operate.	  Long-­‐term	  challenges,	  that	  include	  
hard-­‐to-­‐fill	  vacancies	  and	  skills	  shortages,	  demand	  systemic	  solutions.	  Universities	  have	  a	  
pivotal	   role	   to	   play	   through	   their	   relationships,	   especially	   at	   local	   level,	   and	   fulfilling	  
management	  leadership	  needs.	  These	  can	  be	  combined	  as	  the	  basis	  of	  new	  local	  learning	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and	   innovation	   ecosystems,	   engaging	   learning	   providers,	   employers	   and	   other	  
stakeholders	  into	  a	  shared	  solution.	  
	  
The	  majority	  of	  academics	  live	  in	  the	  same	  region	  as	  their	  host	  university,	  which	  recruits	  
the	  majority	  of	  their	  students	  and	  governing	  bodies	  from	  the	  cities	  and	  regions	  in	  which	  
they	  are	   located.	   	  As	  Dowling	   says	   “We	  need	  a	   change	  of	   culture	   in	  our	  universities	   to	  
support	  and	  encourage	  collaboration	  with	  industry.	  In	  the	  UK	  we	  can	  be	  a	  bit	  dismissive	  
about	  research	  that	  actually	  has	  an	  application,	  but	  in	  reality	  such	  use-­‐inspired	  research	  
can	  be	  truly	  excellent.”	  	  
	  
I	   would	   add	   that	   collaborations	  with	   industry	   should	   focus	   on	   the	   local	   and	   start	  with	  
micro	   and	   small	   businesses.	   	   This	   would	   acknowledge	   the	   importance	   of	   “the	  
somewhere”	   which	   the	   winners	   of	   the	   eight	   Entrepreneurial	   Universities	   of	   the	   Year	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Abstract:	  	  
The	  growth	   in	  popularity	  of	  the	  Regional	   Innovation	  System	  (RIS)	  approach	  has,	   in	  part,	  
been	   driven	   by	   the	   need	   for	   economies	   to	   respond	   to	   the	   after	   shocks	   of	   the	   global	  
financial	  crisis.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  we	  see	  the	  term	  Anchor	  institutions	  is	  used	  increasingly	  
to	  describe	  organisations	   that	  have	  an	   important	  presence	   in	   the	   local	   community	   and	  
make	  some	  strategic	  contribution	  to	  the	   local	  economy.	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  paper	   is	  to	  
consider	   the	  needs	  of	   the	  micro	  and	   small	   business	  ecosystem	   through	   the	   lens	  of	   the	  
entrepreneurial	  university	  as	  a	  regional	  anchor	  institution.	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Introduction	  
In	  the	  lead	  up	  to	  George	  Osborne’s	  combined	  Autumn	  Statement	  and	  Spending	  Review,	  
Sajid	   Javid	   the	   Business	   secretary	   made	   a	   plea	   for	   his	   department	   to	   exist	   beyond	  
November	  2015,	  in	  front	  of	  the	  Business,	  Innovation	  and	  Skills	  select	  committee	  on	  14th	  
October.	  With	  Javid’s	  department	  under	  pressure	  to	  find	  20-­‐40	  per	  cent	  of	  savings	  in	  its	  
£18bn	  budget	   it	  was	  no	   surprise	  when	   the	   committee's	   chair	   (Iain	  Wright	  MP)	  opened	  
proceedings	  with	  a	  withering	  observation,	  	  “where	  are	  you	  adding	  that	  distinctive	  added	  
value	   in	  order	  to	  make	  a	  real	  difference	  to	  developing	  a	  more	  enterprising,	  competitive	  
economy	  for	  Britain…[a	  lot	  of	  it]…could	  be	  carried	  out	  and	  successfully	  completed	  with	  a	  
revised,	  enhanced	  Treasury	  and	  a	  beefed‑up	  Department	  for	  Education	  and	  Skills?”	  
The	   Business	   secretary	   defended	   his	   department,	   saying	   it	   would	   be	   “a	   step	  
backwards”	   if	   the	   government	   decided	   to	   abolish	   it,	   as	   his	   was	   the	   only	   one	   focusing	  
solely	  on	  economic	  productivity	  while	  playing	  a	  big	  role	   in	   innovation,	  research,	  science	  
spending,	   self-­‐employment	   and	   the	   delivery	   of	   apprenticeships.	   Despite	   such	   an	  
apparently	   wide-­‐ranging	   brief,	   the	   Department	   for	   Business,	   Innovation	   and	   Skills	   was	  
only	   formed	   in	   2009,	   by	   Peter	  Mandelson.	   Then	   it	  was	   tasked	  with	   boosting	   economic	  
growth	   in	   the	   wake	   of	   the	   2008	   financial	   crisis,	   but	   now	   includes	   a	   wide	   span	   of	  
regulatory	   and	   business	   support	   functions.	   As	   Javid	   went	   on	   to	   say,	   “I	   have	   some	   45	  
partner	  bodies.	  	  Do	  I	  still	  need	  45	  partner	  bodies?	  	  Are	  there	  costs,	  middle‑office	  costs	  or	  
other	  costs,	   that	  can	  be	  shed	  between	   those	  bodies?	  	   I	  have	  over	  80	   locations	   that	  my	  
Department	  operates	  in.	  	  Do	  we	  need	  80	  locations?	  	  I	  do	  not	  think	  so.”	  
Following	  the	  Spending	  Review	  a	  series	  of	  events	  were	  set	  in	  motion	  that	  could	  leave	  
just	   science,	   research	   and	   higher	   education	   teaching	   as	   the	   only	   items	   of	   revenue	  
spending	   left	   in	  a	  post	  2017	  BIS	  budget.	  As	   Julian	  Gravatt	  pointed	  out	   in	  a	   recent	  blog,	  
responsibility	   for	   current	   higher	   education	   teaching	   costs	   moved	   taxpayers	   from	   to	  
students;	  matched	  by	  a	  similar	  switch	  with	  apprenticeships.	  The	  apprenticeship	  levy	  will	  
help	   BIS	   cut	   most	   of	   its	   £800	  million	   a	   year	   spending	   by	   transferring	   responsibility	   to	  
employers.	   In	  addition,	   Innovate	  UK	  will	  transfer	  £165	  million	  from	  grants	  to	   loans	  over	  
the	  next	  few	  years.	  Finally,	  with	  the	  Treasury	  currently	  assessing	  38	  landmark	  devolution	  
deals	  from	  cities,	  towns	  and	  counties	  across	  the	  UK;	  it	  is	  not	  unreasonable	  to	  expect	  that,	  
most	  of	  the	  £1.5bn	  adult	  skills	  budget	  will	  be	  moved	   into	  the	  regions	  along	  the	   lines	  of	  
the	  Greater	  Manchester	  devolution	  deal	  struck	  in	  2014.	  
In	  a	  further	  erosion	  of	  BIS	  duties,	  the	  Higher	  Education	  Funding	  Council	  for	  England	  
(HEFCE)	   and	   the	   Office	   for	   Fair	   Access	   will	   most	   probably	   merge	   to	   become	   a	   single	  
regulator	  of	  universities	  called	  the	  Office	  for	  Students.	  This	  is,	  after	  all,	  one	  of	  the	  major	  
recommendations	  of	  the	  recently	  released	  Higher	  Education	  Green	  Paper.	  But,	  while	  the	  
Green	  Paper	   commits	   to	  a	   continuation	  of	  quality-­‐related	   (QR)	   funding	   for	  universities,	  
who	  is	  to	  say	  that	  post-­‐Hefce,	  BIS	  will	  be	  responsible	  for	  the	  distribution	  of	  the	  research	  
excellence	  framework	  (REF)	  funds?	  It	  may	  take	  time	  for	  the	  political	  ramifications	  to	  play	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out,	   given	   the	   vested	   interests	   at	   stake,	   but	   the	   links	   between	   BIS	   and	   the	   UK’s	  
universities	  have	  further	  loosened.	  This	  will	  come	  as	  little	  surprise	  to	  some	  commentators	  
as	  Scott	   (2014)	  noted	  there	  has	  always	  existed	  a	   lack	  of	  coordination	  between	  national	  
policies	   for	  higher	  education	  and	   for	   regional	  development.	  This	   is	  notwithstanding	   the	  
fact	   that	   universities	   contribute	   to	   UK	   productivity	   targets	   by	   delivering	   direct	   and	  
indirect	   expenditure	   on	   goods	   and	   services,	   providing	   jobs,	   developing	   a	   more	   highly	  
skilled	  workforce	  and	  generating	  new	  knowledge.	  	  
Despite	  its	  origins,	  when	  higher	  education	  largely	  reflected	  the	  values	  of	  localism,	  the	  
reform	  of	   English	   higher	   education	   triggered	  by	   the	  Browne	  Report	   (2010)	   encouraged	  
universities	   to	   shift	   their	   attention	   towards	   an	   international	   growth	   trajectory,	   at	   the	  
expense	   of	   local	   and	   regional	   development	   support	   (Goddard	   et	   al,	   2014).	   But	   as	   we	  
know,	  universities	  are	  somewhere	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  that	  somewhere	  matters,	  especially	  since	  
the	   demise	   of	   the	   Business	   Link	   network	   in	   2011	   and	   the	   government	   committed	   to	   a	  
widening	  devolution	  agenda	  (Christopherson	  et	  al,	  2014).	  I	  want	  to	  explore	  some	  of	  the	  
reasons	   why,	   and	   how	   universities	   might	   reinvigorate	   their	   relationships	   with	   local	  
business,	   in	  an	  effort	  to	  retain	  highly	  skilled	  talent,	  re-­‐exert	  their	   influence	  on	   local	  and	  
regional	  economies	  and	  emerge	  as	  a	  long-­‐term	  anchor	  institution.	  	  This	  paper	  concludes	  
with	   four	   key	   observations	   that	   could	   be	   of	   value	   to	   other	   universities	   exploring	  
opportunities	  for	  locating	  themselves	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  their	  regional	  innovation	  system.	  
	  
Think	  Local.	  Act	  Local	  
Anchor	   institutions	   are	   large,	   often	   non-­‐profit,	   organisations	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   a	   local	  
regional	   community	   that	   have	   a	   clear	   social	   purpose	   and	   are	   able	   to	   offer	   a	   range	   of	  
formal	   and	   informal	   support	   and	  guidance	   to	   the	   local	  business	   community.	   In	   fact,	   an	  
examination	  of	  the	  eight	  Entrepreneurial	  Universities	  of	  the	  Year	  Award	  winners	  and	  the	  
REF2014	  Impact	  Case	  Studies	  -­‐	  those	  pertaining	  to	  small	  business	  and	  entrepreneurship	  -­‐	  
would	  appear	  to	  support	  the	  idea	  that	  value	  exists	  for	  a	  university	  to	  take	  a	  lead	  in	  terms	  
of	  being	  a	  focal	  point	  for	  thought	  leadership	  and	  initiatives	  to	  support	  the	  MSB	  sector,	  in	  
addition	  to	  the	  wider	  business	  community	  (Witty,	  2013).	  	  
The	  importance	  of	  supporting	  the	  UK	  MSB	  sector	  and	  improving	  start-­‐up	  survival	  rates	  
Identifying	   policies,	   structures,	   processes	   and	   techniques	   that	   will	   be	   effective	   in	  
supporting	   the	   health	   of	   small	   firms	   remains	   as	   vital	   as	   ever,	   which	   in	   part	   led	   to	   the	  
launch	  of	  the	  Enterprise	  Research	  Centre	  (ERC)	  in	  2013.	  Small	  firms	  continue	  to	  be	  in	  the	  
engine	   room	  of	   the	   successful	   recovery	   of	   the	  UK	   economy,	   employing	   12.1	  million	   or	  
60%	  of	  all	  UK	  employees	  (BIS,	  2015).	  Yet	  despite	  there	  being	  over	  5.4	  million	  small	  firms	  
in	  the	  UK,	  accounting	  for	  33%	  of	  the	  total	  private	  sector	  turnover,	  recent	  research	  shows	  
that	  90%	  of	  businesses	  survive	  for	  one	  year,	  74%	  for	  two	  years	  and	  63%	  for	  three	  years	  or	  
more.	  One	  of	  the	  most	  powerful	  insights	  into	  this	  issue	  comes	  from	  a	  study	  conducted	  by	  
Anyadike-­‐Danes	   &	   Hart	   (2014)	   at	   the	   ERC.	   Their	   analysis	   of	   all	   UK	   firms	   born	   in	   1999	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shows	   that	   90%	   no	   longer	   exist.	   	   Moreover	   their	   analysis	   showed	   that	   of	   those	   that	  
survived	  the	  first	  fifteen	  years	  the	  hazard	  of	  extinction	  is	  running	  at	  about	  10%	  per	  year.	  	  
In	  summary	  research	  at	  the	  ERC	  tells	  us	  only	  about	  5%	  of	  all	  start-­‐ups	  make	  it	  through	  to	  
a	  point	  where	   they	  make	  a	   significant	   contribution	   to	   the	  UK	  economy	   in	   the	   sense	  of	  
adding	  a	  substantial	  number	  of	  jobs.	  	  
Further	  uncomfortable	  reading	  comes	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  in	  many	  ways	  small	  firms	  do	  
not	  help	  themselves.	  For	  example,	  the	  findings	  of	  a	  recent	  CMI/CABS	  survey	  (2015)	  stated	  
the	  majority	   of	   entrepreneurs	   were	   positive	   about	   their	   future,	   but	   at	   the	   same	   time	  
alerted	   us	   to	   some	   staggering	   figures	   about	   the	   limited	   business	   capabilities	   of	   many	  
small	  businesses.	  	  For	  example,	  44%	  of	  small	  businesses	  do	  not	  have	  a	  website,	  71%	  are	  
not	  mobile	  ready	  and	  69%	  do	  not	  use	  Twitter,	  or	  even	  make	  use	  of	  free	  or	  low	  cost	  tools	  
such	  as	  social	  media,	  as	  part	  of	  their	  marketing	  mix.	  	  With	  three	  quarters	  of	  UK	  customers	  
now	  shopping	  online	  this	  clearly	  points	  to	  many	  small	  businesses	  missing	  out	  through	  a	  
lack	   of	   strategic	   thinking	   on	   significant	   revenue	   opportunities.	   Moreover	   the	   survey	  
showed	  that	  only	  7%	  of	  smaller	  businesses	  are	  seeking	  support	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  increase	  
productivity.	  	  
A	   key	   takeout	   from	   these	   research	   findings	   with	   regard	   to	   the	   role	   of	   anchor	  
institutions	  within	  regional	  innovation	  systems	  might	  play	  seems	  to	  underline	  the	  critical	  
importance	   in	   getting	   small	   businesses	   past	   the	   five	   year	   survival	   point,	   whilst	   also	  
helping	   them	   build	   a	   critical	   mass	   of	   five	   or	   more	   employees.	   If	   they	   can	   get	   to	   this	  
threshold	   then	   this	  massively	  pushes	  up	   their	   chances	  of	   survival,	   including	   introducing	  
them	  to	  the	  digital	  age	  and	  new	  ways	  of	  doing	  business.	  	  
The	  Concept	  of	  the	  Regional	  Innovation	  Systems	  (RIS)	  
I	   now	   want	   to	   look	   at	   one	   important	   dimension	   in	   supporting	   the	   MSB	   sector:	   the	  
growing	  popularity	  of	  the	  regional	  innovation	  system	  concept.	  This	  is	  the	  notion	  of	  there	  
being	   within	   a	   region	   different	   economic	   and	   social	   interactions	   between	   agents	   -­‐	  
spanning	   the	   private	   and	   public	   sector	   -­‐	   that	   encourages	   the	   rapid	   diffusion	   of	  
knowledge,	  skills	  and	  best	  practice	  within	  a	  geographic	  area.	  Larger	  than	  a	  single	  city,	  a	  
RIS	   is	   an	   administratively	   supported	   innovative	   network	   of	   institutions	   that	   interact	  
regularly	   and	   strongly	   to	   enhance	   the	   innovative	  outputs	   of	   firms	   in	   the	   region	   (Cooke	  
and	   Schienstock,	   2000).	   Of	   course,	   the	   concept	   of	   thinking	   more	   regionally	   about	  
innovation	   is	  not	  new.	  Lord	  Heseltine	  has	   long	  argued	  that	  central	  government	   is	  often	  
too	   remote	   and	   too	   organised	   along	   national	   government	   departmental	   lines	   to	   foster	  
the	   quality	   of	   support	   needed	   by	   small	   firms	   working	   in	   towns	   and	   cities	   within	   key	  
regions.	   	  Numerous	   reports,	   including	   those	   from	  the	  Lords’	  Heseltine	  and	  Young,	  have	  
emphasised	   the	   importance	   of	   setting	   up	   regional	   economic	   infrastructures	   that	   will	  
support	   small	   firm	   communities.	   The	   argument	   is	   that	   the	   focus	   should	   be	   on	  
understanding	  the	  nuances	  of	  the	  regional	  business	  economy	  and	  setting	  up	  support	  that	  
is	   sensitive	   to	   local	   conditions,	   rather	   than	  relying	  on	  central	   interventions	  –	   the	   raison	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d'être	  of	  the	  defunct	  Business	  Link	  movement.	  As	  a	  concept,	  there	  is	  much	  debate	  about	  
exactly	   which	   characteristics	   constitute	   a	   RIS,	   and	   despite	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   research	  
framework	   is	   still	   being	   developed	   Doloreux	   and	   Parto	   (2005)	   have	   identified	   three	  
dimensions	  that	  help	  us	  define	  the	  concept.	  	  
First,	  the	  term	  is	  used	  to	  imply,	  and	  place	  an	  emphasis	  on	  the	  notion	  of	  innovation	  as	  
an	   interactive	   and	   dynamic	   process,	   as	   opposed	   to	   some	   linear	  model	   path.	   The	   point	  
being	   that	   learning	   and	   innovation	   will	   be	   heightened	   through	   people	   being	   part	   of	   a	  
network	  of	   related	  actors.	  There	  will	  be	  some	  who	  argue	  that	   innovation	  and	  creativity	  
stems	   from	  a	  more	   lonely	   individualistic	  pursuit.	  But	   it	   is	  more	  generally	   accepted	   that	  
supportive,	  symbiotic	   relationships	  within	  networks	  can	  provide	  a	   trigger	   to	   innovation,	  
as	   innovation	   and	   technological	   advancements	   are	   two	   very	   complex	   processes	   with	  
mutual	  interdependencies	  (Cooke,	  2001;	  Mastroeni,	  et	  al.	  2013).	  	  
The	   second	   characteristic	   of	   a	   RIS	   is	   the	   existence	   within	   regional	   networks	   of	   key	  
anchor	  organisations	  -­‐	  whether	  these	  would	  be	  private,	  semi-­‐public	  or	  public	  -­‐	  that	  act	  as	  
a	   type	   of	   life	   support	   system,	   particularly	   for	   small	   and	   high	   growth	   firms	   (Runiewicz-­‐
Wardyn,	  2013).	  Thus	   typically	   the	  presence	  of	  a	  RIS	   is	   seen	  as	  being	   in	  evidence	  where	  
there	  is	  a	  strong	  regional	  institutional	  presence	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  geographical	  network.	  	  
The	   third	   characteristic	   of	   a	   RIS	   is	   the	   fact	   that,	   when	   there	   is	   recognition	   of	   there	  
being	  a	  regional	  network	   in	  play,	  with	  a	  core	  anchor	  organisation	  at	   its	  heart,	   then	  this	  
becomes	  a	  magnet	   for	  attracting	  more	  focused	  policy	  thinking	  and	  resourcing,	   targeted	  
on	   the	   area.	   	   In	   a	   way	   the	   very	   existence	   of	   an	   anchor	   organisation	  within	   a	   regional	  
network	   creates	   a	   kind	   of	   virtuous	   circle	  whereby,	   given	   the	   focus	   on	   the	   debate	   and	  
discussion	  the	  anchor	  institution	  creates,	  the	  region	  then	  becomes	  more	  likely	  to	  attract	  
government	  funding	  and	  ideas	  to	  support	  small	  firms	  (Mason	  &	  Brown,	  2014).	  	  
The	  concept	  of	  the	  economic	  anchor	  institution	  	  
According	   to	   the	   Work	   Foundation,	   anchor	   institutions	   do	   not	   have	   a	   democratic	  
mandate	   and	   their	   primary	   missions	   do	   not	   involve	   regeneration	   or	   local	   economic	  
development.	   Nonetheless	   their	   scale,	   local	   rootedness	   and	   community	   links	   are	   such	  
that	   they	   are	   acknowledged	   to	   play	   a	   key	   role	   in	   local	   development	   and	   economic	  
growth,	  representing	  the	  ‘sticky	  capital’	  around	  which	  economic	  growth	  strategies	  can	  be	  
built	  (2010,	  P3).	  Anchor	  institutions	  are	  seen	  as	  playing	  a	  vital	  role	  in	  ensuring	  innovation	  
is	   fostered	  at	  a	   local	   level	   in	  a	  way	   that	  benefits	   from	   local	  eco	  systems.	   I	  would	  argue	  
that	  this	   is	  a	  particular	  benefit	   to	  micro	  and	  small	   firms,	  who	  are	  often	  more	  reliant	  on	  
the	   revenue	  derived	   from	  within	   the	   region	   than	   their	  medium	  sized	  counterparts.	  The	  
anchor	  organisation	  typically	  provides	  a	  range	  of	  formal,	  but	  also	  informal	  support,	  advice	  
and	   guidance	   to	   members	   of	   the	   small	   business	   community.	   The	   creation	   of	   Local	  
Economic	   Partnerships	   (LEPs)	   in	   England	   and	   Innovation	   Agencies	   in	   Scotland	   and	  
Northern	   Ireland	   is	   one	   example	   of	   the	   need	   to	   foster	   innovation	   with	   a	   deeper	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understanding	   of	   the	   nuances	   and	   complexities	   of	   the	   regional	   context	   (Fitjar	   and	  
Rodríguez-­‐Pose,	  2015).	  
Against	  this	  backdrop,	  over	  the	  last	  few	  years,	  universities	  have	  been	  seen	  as	  having	  
all	   of	   the	   credentials	   to	   play	   the	   role	   of	   the	   key	   anchor	   institution	  within	   regions.	   The	  
question	   remains,	   is	   that	  a	   role	   the	  universities	   see	   for	   themselves?	   	   It	  was	   the	  Wilson	  
Review	   (2011)	   that	   first	   introduced	   the	   idea	   of	   the	   importance	   of	   there	   being	   a	   local	  
economic	  anchor	   institution,	   such	   as	   a	   university,	  within	   a	   regional	   innovation	   system.	  	  
Certain	   universities	   are	   now	   playing	   a	   key	   role	   in	   helping	   to	   encourage	   enterprise	   and	  
entrepreneurship	  with	   their	   region;	   responding	   to	   the	   need	   to	   help	   develop	   graduates	  
capable	   of	   enterprising	   and	   entrepreneurial	   behaviour.	   As	   can	   be	   seen	   among	   the	  
Entrepreneurial	   University	   of	   the	   Year	   Awards	   winners,	   this	   goes	   beyond	   simply	  
encouraging	  a	  cohort	  of	  individuals	  who	  may	  be	  minded	  to	  set	  up	  their	  own	  business.	  It	  
also	   focuses	   on	   the	   wider	   need	   to	   generate	   individuals	   able	   to	   work	   across	   the	  
commercial	   and	   public	   sector	   because	   they	   have	   the	  mind-­‐set	   that	   can	   cope	  with	   the	  
uncertainty	  and	  complexity	  that	  is	  a	  feature	  of	  today’s	  environment.	  UK	  universities	  are	  
learning	  how	   to	   teach	  enterprise	   and	  entrepreneurship,	   both	  within	   the	   curricular,	   but	  
also	   through	   a	   wide	   range	   of	   experiential	   methods	   and	   activities.	   These	   activities	   go	  
beyond	  the	  business	  school,	  extend	  across	  the	  institution	  (James	  &	  Culkin,	  2015)	  and	  also	  
embrace	  the	  wider	  network.	  	  
A	  Entrepreneurial	  university	  campus	  located	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  a	  region	  is	  now	  seen	  as	  a	  
way	   of	   supporting	   and	   encouraging	   innovation	   amongst	   SMEs	   in	   the	   area	   (Etzkowitz,	  
2014).	  This	  focus	  naturally	  brings	  universities	  into	  greater	  contact	  with	  businesses	  within	  
its	  local	  area	  and	  reinforces	  a	  point	  that	  universities	  are	  natural	  anchor	  institutions	  with	  
the	   regional	   innovation	   system	   concept.	   	   The	   report	   on	   creating	   entrepreneurial	  
campuses	   (Mason,	   2014)	   addresses	   the	   importance	   of	   a	   space	   that	   stimulates	   the	  
entrepreneurial	   aspiration	   of	   students	   and	   provides	   them	   with	   the	   opportunity	   to	  
develop	  the	  skills,	  knowledge	  and	  experience,	   including	  helping	  them	  to	  start	  their	  own	  
business	   (Culkin	   &	   Mallick,	   2011).	   The	   combination	   of	   comparatively	   light	   touch,	  
minimum	  intervention	  support	  activities,	  coupled	  with	  much	  more	  in-­‐depth	  research	  and	  
consultancy	   support,	   sends	   out	   a	   signal	   to	   smaller	   businesses	   in	   the	   region	   that	   the	  
University	   is	   a	   natural	   first	   port	   of	   call	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   helping	   with	   innovation	   and	  
growth.	   	  Universities	  can	  also	  operate	  as	  a	  beacon	  alerting	  businesses	  to	  where	  funding	  
can	  be	  accessed,	  and	  creating	  an	  entrepreneurial	  flavour	  to	  the	  campus	  that	  encourages	  
businesses	  to	  be	  innovative	  and	  apply	  fresh	  thinking	  to	  their	  own	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  challenges.	  	  
The	  collective	  and	  cumulative	  impact	  of	  a	  university	  being	  the	  anchor	  institution	  within	  
its	  regional	  innovation	  system	  	  
A	  simple	  checklist	  of	  activities	  universities	  offer	  does	  not	  communicate	  the	  way	  in	  which	  
the	   collective	   impact	  of	   these	   activities	   creates	  outcomes	   for	   the	   region	   that	   are	  often	  
greater	  than	  the	  sum	  of	  the	  parts.	   	  While	   infrastructure	  matters	  feature	   in	  many	  of	  the	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recent	   devolution	   deals,	   the	   softer	   aspects	   of	   skills	   and	   innovation,	   the	   potential	   for	   a	  
sustainable	  and	  more	  productive	  growth	  and	  inclusion	  is	  somewhat	  diluted.	  This	  is	  where	  
universities	  can	  play	  a	  significant	   role	  according	  to	   the	  mission	  of	   individual	   institutions	  
for	  example,	  in	  regeneration;	  skills;	  innovation;	  and	  business	  support.	  The	  challenge	  is	  of	  
course	  getting	  out	  the	  message	  that	  this	  support	  from	  universities	  is	  available.	  The	  next	  
challenge	  is	  managing	  expectations,	  particularly	  for	  micro	  and	  small	  businesses	  about	  the	  
extent	  to	  which	  the	  university	  can	  help	  any	  of	  them	  on	  a	  one-­‐on-­‐one	  consultancy	  basis.	  	   	  
My	   analysis	   of	   the	   role	   played	   by	   the	   eight	   Entrepreneurial	   University	   of	   the	   Year	  
winners	   leads	   me	   to	   make	   four	   observations	   that	   may	   be	   of	   benefit	   to	   other	   anchor	  
institutions	   and	   also	   help	   inform	  wider	   national	   policy	  making	   on	   how	  best	   to	   support	  
micro	  and	  small	  businesses.	  	  
Redoubling	  efforts	  to	  boost	  the	  extent	  of	  university-­‐business	  collaboration	  	  
There	  is	  value	  in	  an	  entrepreneurial	  university	  taking	  a	  lead	  -­‐	  within	  a	  region	  -­‐	  in	  terms	  of	  
being	  a	  focal	  point	  for	  thought	  leadership	  and	  initiatives	  to	  support	  the	  micro	  and	  small	  
business	  sector.	  Universities	  provide	  a	  natural	  rallying	  point	  for	  marshalling	  governmental	  
and	   other	   funds	   that	   can	   be	   accessed	   by	   these	   firms.	   	   They	   provide	   networking	  
opportunities	   for	   small	   businesses,	   e.g.	   as	   a	   facilitator	   for	   putting	   micro	   and	   small	  
businesses	  in	  touch	  with	  each	  other.	  Being	  able	  to	  access	  an	  anchor	  institution	  seems	  to	  
give	  smaller	  businesses	  the	  confidence	  and	  expertise	  to	  innovate	  and	  grow.	  For	  example,	  
Dame	  Ann	  Dowling	  who	   recently	  published	  her	  Review	  of	  Business-­‐University	  Research	  
Collaborations	   in	   the	  UK	   (2015),	   highlighted	   that	   analysis	   of	   collaborative	   R&D	   funding	  
showed	   that	   the	   business	   impact	   for	   commercial	   projects	   with	   two	   or	  more	   academic	  
partners	  was	  twice	  as	  high	  for	  those	  without	  any	  academic	  partner.	  	  
	   However	  there	  is	  tremendous	  room	  for	  improvement	  (Hughes	  &	  Kitson,	  2013).	  In	  their	  
recent	   Report,	   NCUB	   (2014)	   found	   that	   ‘universities	   and	   colleges	   are	   brimming	   with	  
expert	  knowledge	  that	  attracts	  scholars	  and	  businesses	  from	  all	  over	  the	  world.	  However	  
only	   a	   small	   percentage	   of	   UK	   firms	   cite	   universities	   as	   their	   principal	   source	   of	  
information	  for	  innovation	  (5%	  of	  SMEs	  and	  2	  %	  of	  larger	  firms)’.	  From	  a	  Business	  School	  
perspective,	  Thorpe	  and	  Rawlinson	  (2013)	  highlight	  a	  number	  of	  different	  ways	  in	  which	  
business	   schools	   can	   collaborate	  more	   effectively	  with	   businesses,	   including:	   designing	  
best	   business	   practice	   into	   courses;	   bringing	   more	   practitioner	   experience	   into	   the	  
university	  faculty;	  moving	  away	  from	  individually	  funded	  projects	  to	  a	  more	  multi-­‐touch	  
relationship	  between	  businesses	  and	  business	  schools;	   improving	  the	  measurement	  and	  
the	   impact	   of	   research	   on	   business;	   promoting	   research	   in	   larger	   multi-­‐dimensional	  
teams	  and	  having	   clearer	  more	  defined	   roles	   for	  different	   institutions,	  which	  of	   course	  
links	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  understanding	  the	  role	  played	  by	  different	  anchor	  organisations	  within	  
any	  one	  local	  economy.	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Making	   collaboration	   between	   government,	   universities	   and	   businesses	   more	  
straightforward	  
My	  second	  observation	   is	   there	  does	  seem	  to	  be	  a	  massive	  potential	   for	  universities	   to	  
play	  an	  even	  greater	  role	  within	  their	  regional	  innovation	  system,	  post	  the	  Business	  Link	  
network,	  the	  winding	  down	  of	  the	  Business	  Growth	  Service	  and	  the	  under	  resourced	  local	  
growth	  hubs	  –	   the	   latest	   incarnation	  of	   the	  one-­‐stop	  business	  support	  shop.	   	  However,	  
for	  this	  to	  be	  achieved	  it	  would	  seem	  that	  all	  players	  in	  a	  regional	  system	  would	  seem	  to	  
benefit	   from	   greater	   simplification	   and	   clarification	   of	   the	   role	   played	   by	   different	  
support	   agencies	   within	   the	   region.	   Dowling	   (2015)	   concluded	   that	   the	   complexity	   of	  
existing	  support	  mechanisms	  cause	  frustration	  and	  confusion,	  and	  means	  that	  the	  UK	  is	  
not	  reaping	  the	  full	  potential	  of	  connecting	  innovative	  businesses	  with	  the	  excellence	  in	  
the	  research	  base	  at	  UK	  universities.	  The	  report	  highlighted	  the	  importance	  of	  simplifying	  
what	   many	   seem	   to	   believe	   are	   excessively	   complex	   schemes	   designed	   to	   assist	  
collaboration	  between	  industry	  and	  universities	  (Hughes,	  2008).	  The	  goal	  is	  to	  unlock	  the	  
full	  strategic	  potential	  of	  collaborative	  relationship,	  but	  as	  Mole	  (2015)	  argued	  this	  is	  now	  
under	   threat,	   “Growth	   hubs	   are	   certainly	   interested	   in	   the	   same	   outcomes	   as	   the	  
government	   but	   will	   not	   deliver	   more	   effective	   programmes	   than	   Growth	  
Accelerator…..because	   the	   programmes	   and	   projects	   are	   developed	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   the	  
funding,	   rather	   than	   an	   evidence-­‐based	   view	   …….	   abrupt	   policy	   changes	   undermine	  
confidence	  and	  squander	  resources.	  Closing	  Growth	  Accelerator	  was	  costly	  –	  not	   for	  the	  
Treasury	  but	  for	  the	  economy	  as	  a	  whole.”	  
So,	  enterprise	  researchers	  have	  made	  considerable	  progress	  in	  adding	  granularity	  to	  
our	  understanding	  of	   the	  massively	  wide-­‐ranging	  notion	  of	  a	  SME	   (Wright,	  et	  al.,	  2015;	  
Theodorakopoulos,	  et	  al.,	  2015;	  Culkin	  &	  Smith,	  2000).	  But	  there	  is	  still	  a	  need	  to	  target	  
and	   tailor	   initiatives	   to	   specific	   niches	   within	   this	   overall	   sector.	   In	   addition	   to	   Kevin	  
Mole’s	  article	   in	  the	  Guardian,	  Smallbone	  et	  al.	   (2015)	  believe	  that	  many	  of	  the	  market	  
failures	   in	   the	   small	   and	   medium	   enterprise	   sector	   result	   from	   government	   persisting	  
with	  a	  one	  size	  fits	  all	  approach	  towards	  such	  a	  heterogeneous	  range	  of	  businesses.	  They	  
go	  on	   to	   argue	   that	   little	   attention	  has	  been	  paid	   in	   the	   literature	   to	   the	   issue	  of	   how	  
anchor	  institutions	  might	  support	  small	  firms	  in	  the	  local	  economy.	  	  
Today	   the	   emphasis	   needs	   to	   identify	   the	   key	  mind-­‐sets	   and	   personality	   drivers	   at	  
work	   within	   the	   small	   firm	   sector.	   We	   now	   find	   there	   is	   more	   recognition	   of	   the	  
importance	  of	  directing	  support	  on	  different	  personality	  types	  and	  helping	  businesses	  in	  a	  
targeted	   way	   at	   critical	   stages	   in	   their	   development.	   More	   recently,	   with	   a	   focus	   on	  
identifying	  MSBs	  with	  the	  greatest	  growth	  potential,	  there	  is	  the	  Department	  for	  Business	  
and	  Innovation	  Skills	  Paper	  on	  the	  Sociology	  of	  Enterprise,	  led	  by	  a	  team	  at	  the	  Enterprise	  
Research	  Centre	  (Theodorakopoulos,	  et	  al.,	  2015).	  This	  has	  alerted	  us	  to	  the	  importance	  
of	  distinguishing	  between	  growth	   inclined	  businesses,	  where	  there	   is	  a	  strong	  vision	  for	  
the	   future.	   These	   are	   differentiated	   from	   growth	   ambivalent	   organisations	   who	   are	  
somewhat	  averse	  to	  business	  growth	  and	  less	  likely	  to	  exhibit	  the	  positive	  mind-­‐sets	  and	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behaviours	  of	  the	  more	  growth	  inclined.	  And	  in	  a	  further	  category	  there	  are	  the	  growth	  
resistant,	  who	  although	  apparently	  attempting	  to	  build	  a	  business,	  do	  not	  demonstrate	  a	  
strong	  vision	  for	  growth	  of	  their	  business,	  with	  one	  concrete	  manifestation	  of	  this	  being	  
their	  reluctance	  to	  employ	  staff	  or	  take	  on	  financial	  commitments	  that	  would	  help	  them	  
innovate	  and	  succeed.	  	  
Initiatives	   that	   bring	   a	   psychological	   dimension	   to	   helping	   us	   target	   resources	   on	  
improving	  start-­‐up	  and	  small	  business	  success	  rates	  are	  to	  be	  welcomed.	  What	  no	  growth	  
organisation	  needs	  now	  is	  a	  return	  to	  the	  policy	  proliferation	  period,	  during	  which	  Greene	  
and	  Patel	  (2013)	  noted	  that	  891	  different	  sources	  of	  support	  for	  small	  businesses	  and	  18	  
access	   to	   finance	   schemes	   co-­‐existed.	   This	   is	   not	   the	  most	   efficient	   way	   of	   organising	  
enterprise	   initiatives	  for	  small	   firms	  given	  there	  are	  more	  effective,	  focused	  approaches	  
that	   could	   be	   followed	   from	  elsewhere	   in	   the	  world	   (Mazzucato,	   2013;	   Block	  &	   Kellor,	  
2012).	  	  
	  
Encouraging	  smaller	  businesses	  to	  develop	  a	  strategic	  entrepreneurial	  mind-­‐set	  	  
There	  is	  the	  challenging	  issue	  of,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  encouraging	  and	  supporting	  those	  who	  
wish	  to	  start-­‐up	  a	  business,	  whilst	  at	  the	  same	  time	  alerting	  putative	  start-­‐ups	  about	  the	  
dangers	  of	   launching	   into	  a	  venture	  without	   total	  clarity	  around	  their	  overall	  marketing	  
strategy.	   	   In	   an	   anchor	   role	  within	   the	   region,	   universities	  would	   need	   to	   review	  what	  
they	  can	  do	   to	  get	   the	  message	  out	   to	   ‘would	  be’	   start-­‐ups	   the	   importance	  of	   thinking	  
strategically	  at	  the	  outset	  about	  their	  potential	  business	  development	  idea.	  The	  message	  
is	  that	  it	  is	  extremely	  difficult	  to	  tactically	  retrieve	  a	  flawed	  strategic	  position.	  Energy	  and	  
enthusiasm	  are	  a	  necessary,	  but	  not	  a	  sufficient	  condition	  of	  business	  success,	  which	   is	  
one	  reason	  failure	  rates	  are	  so	  high	  among	  early-­‐year	  firms.	   	  So	  the	  challenge	  is	  how	  to	  
find	   ways	   of	   developing	   cost	   effective	   ‘one	   to	   many’	   ways	   of	   communicating	   with	  
putative	   micro	   business	   start-­‐ups	   about	   the	   importance	   of	   acting	   like	   strategic	  
entrepreneurs,	  rather	  than	  enthusiastic	  opportunity	  seekers.	  	  
A	  difficult	  challenge	  is	  encouraging	  the	  entrepreneurial	  culture,	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  
helping	  to	  educate	   individuals	  about	  exactly	  what	  the	  process	  of	  setting	  up	  a	  successful	  
business	   involves.	   On	   the	   one	   hand	   we	   must	   acknoweldge	   those	   seeking	   out	   new	  
opportunities	  and	  who	  are	  willing	  to	  take	  a	  step	  into	  self-­‐employment,	  but	  on	  the	  other	  
hand,	  we	  need	   to	   remind	   individuals	  of	   the	   importance	  at	   the	  outset	  of	  having	  a	   clear	  
strategic	   focus.	   It	   is	   this	   lack	   of	   strategic	   focus	   that	   is	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   explaining	  
considerable	   amount	   of	   business	   failure	   (ERC,	   2015).	   In	   this	   new	   Volatile,	   Uncertain,	  
Complex,	  Ambiguous	  (VUCA)	  world	  it	  is	  important	  for	  businesses	  themselves	  to	  recognise	  
the	   importance	   of	   applying	   some	   strategic	   assessment	   of	   the	   likely	   success	   of	   the	  
venture.	  	  	  
With	   this	   in	   mind	   it	   is	   helpful	   to	   distinguish	   between	   the	   concept	   of	   strategic	  
entrepreneurship	   and	   opportunity	   seeking.	   Strategic	   entrepreneurship	   involves	  
simultaneous	   opportunity-­‐seeking	   and	   advantage-­‐seeking	   behaviors	   and	   results	   in	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superior	  firm	  performance.	  On	  a	  relative	  basis,	  entrepreneurial	  ventures	  are	  effective	  in	  
identifying	   opportunities	   but	   are	   less	   successful	   in	   developing	   competitive	   advantages	  
needed	   to	   appropriate	   value	   from	   those	   opportunities	   (Ireland	   et	   al.,	   2003).	   I	   would	  
argue	  that	  any	  start	  up	  needs	  to	  be	  absolutely	  clear	  about	  the	  difference	  between	  these	  
two	  concepts.	   In	  essence	  strategic	  entrepreneurs	  are	  those	  who	  would	  have	  clarified	   in	  
their	  own	  mind	  three	  key	  characteristics	  of	  success.	  Firstly,	  they	  have	  made	  appropriate	  
decisions	  about	  their	  strategic	  positioning,	  they	  know	  where	  to	  play	  to	  win,	  namely	  areas	  
where	   they	   have	   a	   differentiating	   strategic	   advantage.	   Secondly,	   they	   have	   identified	  
where	  to	  focus	  their	  business	  efforts	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  maximum	  impact.	  Thirdly,	  they	  
are	   clear	  about	  how	   to	   follow	   the	  minimum	  route	   to	   success,	   they	  know	  how	   to	  make	  
maximum	  use	  of	  their	  limited	  resources.	  In	  contrast	  opportunity	  seekers	  have	  energy	  and	  
ideas	   around	   a	   possible	   innovation,	   but	   have	   not	   necessarily	   subjected	   this	   idea	   to	  
rigorous,	  strategic	  entrepreneurial	  thinking.	  	  
This	   differentiation	   between	   strategic	   entrepreneurship	   and	   opportunity	   seeking	   is	  
likely	  to	  be	  more	  important	  as	  we	  find	  more	  and	  more	  people	  being	  forced	  into	  freelance	  
work	  or	  setting	  up	  micro	  businesses,	  due	  to	  job	  redundancies	  and	  cost	  cutting	  exercises,	  
rather	   than	   opting	   for	   this	   out	   of	   choice	   (Jayawarna,	   et	   al.,	   2014).	   	   I	   have	   already	  
mentioned	   that	   universities	   are	   somewhere	   in	   the	   UK	   and	   that	   somewhere	   matters,	  
especially	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   supporting	   start-­‐ups	   to	   a	   point	   where	   they	   can	   make	   a	  
contribution	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  adding	  a	  substantial	  number	  of	  jobs.	  	  
Universities	  as	  thought	  leaders	  in	  planning	  for	  the	  arrival	  of	  a	  radically	  different	  structure	  
to	  the	  UK	  labour	  market	  
My	  observations	  also	  highlights	  the	  potential	  for	  universities	  to	  play	  a	  thought	  leadership	  
role	   in	   shaping	   the	  development	  of	   skills	   in	   their	   regional	  economy.	   	  Universities,	  given	  
their	  closeness	  to	  the	  dynamics	  of	  the	  local	   labour	  markets,	  are	  well	  placed	  to	  read	  the	  
more	  deep-­‐seated	  trends	  that	  are	  taking	  place	  and	  help	  prompt	  fresh	  thinking	  about	  how	  
we	  should	  respond	  to	  these.	  For	  example,	  from	  an	  overall	  perspective,	  the	  UK	  economy	  
might	   be	   seen	   to	   be	   on	   a	   path	   to	   recovery.	   But	  we	   cannot	   assume	   that	   this	  means	   a	  
return	  to	  business	  as	  usual	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  overall	  structure	  of	  the	  labour	  market.	   	  A	  
number	   of	   commentators,	   including	   members	   of	   ISBE	   highlight	   the	   continuing	  
polarisation	  of	  the	  labour	  market	  with	  growth	  in	  relatively	  high	  and	  low	  skilled	  jobs.	  This	  
means	   that	   people	  will	   be	   finding	   it	   increasingly	   difficult	   to	   progress	   from	   low	   to	   high	  
skilled	  jobs.	  	  This	  has	  major	  implications	  for	  helping	  people	  with	  a	  career	  progression	  and	  
skills	  development.	  The	  fact	  that	  many	  people	  may	  feel	  that	  they	  are	  trapped	  in	  the	  low	  
skilled	   sector	   perhaps	   (partly)	   explains	   why	   many	   will	   consider	   setting	   up	   a	   micro	  
business.	  	  This	  leads	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  an	  integrated	  approach	  to	  skills	  development	  
and	   boosting	   productivity	   at	   a	   local	   level	   is	   needed,	  whereby	  we	   recognise	   the	   fluidity	  
between	  being	  in	  employment	  and	  being	  a	  freelance	  worker/	  micro	  business.	  During	  an	  
engaging	   debate	   at	   the	   ISBE	   Conference	   in	   Manchester,	   Michael	   Anyadike-­‐Danes	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captured	   the	   importance	   of	   radical	   thinking	   around	   how	   universities	   can	   best	   support	  
individuals	  in	  the	  labour	  market	  succinctly	  in	  his	  presentation	  (2014).	  He	  concluded	  that	  
just	  over	  1	  in	  4	  of	  all	  jobs	  in	  the	  private	  sector	  were	  destroyed	  or	  created	  over	  an	  average	  
of	   12-­‐month	   period.	   	   This	   remarkable	   level	   of	   volatility	   and	   turbulence	   in	   UK	   labour	  
market,	   coupled	   with	   the	   issue	   of	   the	   survival	   rate	   of	   small	   firms,	   emphasises	   the	  
importance	  of	  joined	  up	  thinking	  in	  the	  approach	  to	  micro	  businesses	  and	  the	  low	  skilled	  
sector.	  Clearly	  there	  are	  no	  easy	  answers	  to	  this	  complex	  issue,	  but	  universities	  are	  well	  
placed	   to	   prompt	   fresh	   thinking	   on	   how	   we	   deal	   with	   enhancing	   skills	   and	   boosting	  
productivity,	  with	   so	  many	   individuals	  being	   in	   the	   low	   skilled	   sector	  and	   fluctuating	   in	  
and	  out	  of	  the	  micro	  business	  sector.	  It	  is	  why	  as	  part	  of	  its	  RAKE	  initiative	  in	  2015,	  ISBE	  
focused	   on	   the	   role	   of	   anchor	   institutions.	   I	   for	   one,	   look	   forward	   to	   following	   the	  
developments	  from	  each	  of	  the	  three	  funded	  projects,	  over	  the	  coming	  twelve	  months.	  	  
In	  thinking	  about	  support	  for	  micro	  businesses	  and	  the	  challenge	  of	  the	  skills	  crisis,	  it	  
is	  helpful	   to	   return	   to	   the	  notion	  of	   there	  now	  being	  a	  primary	   labour	  market	   in	  which	  
individuals	  can	  be	  expected	  to	  receive	  training	  and	  development	  that	  will	  keep	  them	  up	  
to	  speed	  with	  technical	  change	  and	  ensure	  that	  they	  are	  at	  the	  leading	  edge	  in	  terms	  of	  
productivity.	   	   But	   at	   the	   other	   end	   of	   the	   spectrum	   is	   the	   secondary	   labour	  market	   in	  
which	   it	   becomes	   difficult	   for	   employers	   to	   provide	   training	   and	   where	   people	   in	   this	  
sector	  will	   gradually	   fall	   behind	   in	   terms	  of	   acquiring	  new	   skills.	   	  When	  we	   look	   at	   the	  
labour	  market	  through	  this	   lens	  we	  can	  see	  that	  the	  support	  needed	  to	  help	  those	  who	  
are	  in	  micro	  businesses	  will	  be	  similar	  to	  those	  who	  find	  themselves	  in	  the	  increasing	  long	  
tail	   of	   low	   skilled	   jobs	   in	   the	   secondary	   labour	  market.	   	   Finding	   a	  way	   forward	   to	  help	  
those	  in	  the	  secondary	  sector	  is	  a	  massive	  challenge,	  but	  one	  can	  see	  how	  universities	  in	  
their	   role	   as	   anchor	   organisations	   in	   their	   region	   can	   help	   people	   provide	   networking	  
opportunities	  that	  will	  help	  the	  micro	  business	  and	  those	  in	  lower	  skilled	  jobs	  alike.	  	  The	  
message	  is	  that	  increasingly	  people	  will	  need	  to	  find	  imaginative	  ways	  of	  taking	  personal	  
responsibility	  for	  their	  own	  training	  and	  career	  development.	  	  More	  and	  more	  individuals	  
will	  need	  to	  see	  themselves	  as	  a	  brand	  that	  needs	  cultivating,	  rather	  that	  expecting	  a	  job	  
and	  attendant	  training.	  	  	  
	  
Final	  Thoughts	  
In	   this	  paper,	   I	  have	  sought	   to	   re-­‐examine	  the	  role	  played	  by	  anchor	   institutions	  within	  
the	  RIS,	  in	  the	  light	  of	  Chancellor’s	  Spending	  Review.	  Anchor	  institutions	  are	  large,	  often	  
non-­‐profit,	   organisations	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   a	   local	   regional	   community	   that	   have	   a	   clear	  
social	  purpose	  and	  are	  able	  to	  offer	  a	  range	  of	  formal	  and	  informal	  support	  and	  guidance	  
to	  local	  SMEs.	  	  
My	   review	   of	   both	   the	   work	   of	   the	   eight	   Entrepreneurial	   Universities	   of	   the	   Year	  
Awards	   winners	   and	   the	   REF2014	   Impact	   Case	   Studies	   has	   been	   very	   revealing.	   It	   has	  
indicated	   that	   much	   value	   can	   be	   gained	   when	   universities	   take	   a	   lead	   in	   terms	   of	  
providing	   thought	   leadership	   and	   offering	   initiatives	   to	   support	   the	   MSB	   sector	   -­‐	   in	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addition	  to	  the	  local	  business	  community	  -­‐	  in	  order	  to	  overcome	  the	  systemic	  issues	  that	  
have	   held	   back	   UK	   competitiveness	   and	   innovative	   performance	   for	   decades.	   As	   I	   was	  
reminded	  in	  a	  recent	  Universities	  UK	  blog,	  universities	  have	  direct	  and	  indirect	  effects	  in	  
the	  economic,	  cultural	  and	  social	  spheres	   in	  the	  towns	  and	  cities	   in	  which	  we	  live.	  Long	  
term	   problems	   –	   such	   as	   hard-­‐to-­‐fill	   vacancies	   and	   skills	   shortages	   -­‐	   demand	   systemic	  
solutions	   and	   new	   models	   to	   transcend	   the	   barriers	   and	   rigidities,	   along	   with	   the	  
fragmentation	  of	   interests,	  which	   characterise	   our	   current	   systems.	  Universities	   have	   a	  
pivotal	  role	  to	  play	  in	  this,	  through	  their	  relationships	  with	  key	  players	  in	  the	  skills	  system,	  
especially	   at	   local	   levels	   –	   as	   well	   as	   meeting	   the	   management	   leadership	   needs	   of	  
employers	  within	  the	  communities	  they	   inhabit.	  These	  can	  be	  developed	  and	  combined	  
as	   the	   basis	   of	   new	   local	   learning	   and	   innovation	   ecosystems,	   engaging	   learning	  
providers,	  employers	  and	  other	  stakeholders	  in	  a	  shared	  solution.	  
The	   fact	   that	   the	   majority	   of	   academics	   live	   in	   the	   same	   region	   as	   their	   host	  
university;	   those	   universities	   recruit	   the	  majority	   of	   their	   students	   from	   their	   localities	  
and	  regions	  and	  the	  composition	  of	  their	  governing	  bodies	  are	  drawn	  from	  the	  cities	  and	  
regions	   in	  which	   these	  universities	   reside	  has	  also	  contributed	   to	  my	   thinking	  here.	   	  As	  
Dowling	  said,	  “We	  need	  a	  change	  of	  culture	  in	  our	  universities	  to	  support	  and	  encourage	  
collaboration	   with	   industry.	   In	   the	   UK	   we	   can	   be	   a	   bit	   dismissive	   about	   research	   that	  
actually	   has	   an	   application,	   but	   in	   reality	   such	   use-­‐inspired	   research	   can	   be	   truly	  
excellent.”	  	  
I	  would	  go	  further	  and	  say	  collaborations	  with	  industry	  should	  focus	  on	  the	  local	  and	  
start	  with	  the	  small	  and	  micro	  businesses	  that	  we	  know	  reflect	  the	  somewhere	  that	  most	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